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
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
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
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NEW ENGLANDER

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No. CCXIV.

JANUARY, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—CABOT'S LIFE OF EMERSON.

EMERSON has been fortunate in his friends. Since his death we have heard from those who had a right to speak of him, and most of them have spoken judiciously, and have left with us a pleasant impression of his character, and a strong impression of his genius. They have dealt largely with his personal qualities, with some of the more prominent peculiarities of his thinking and teaching, with a limited sphere of relations, and naturally no very thorough attempt has been made to estimate his permanent place, significance, and value in literature. The volumes before us are from the hand of a personal friend and, as we may infer, disciple of Emerson, who aided him at times, during the last five or six years of his life after his physical strength and power of memory began to fail somewhat, in preparing his work for the press, and in arranging new lectures

out of the chaos of his old manuscripts. They are a personal memoir, and do not undertake for us the largest estimate of Emerson and his work. They are prepared at the request of his family, and the position of the author as literary executor gave him access to unpublished writings, especially to his journals and to letters that have never before appeared. The sources are abundant, the material is fresh, and the work is done with excellent judgment and taste. There is no fulsome laudation and no tone of advocacy or of apology. Emerson is made to speak largely for himself. To a considerable extent he is made to explain himself. The author writes as one who believes in Emerson's teachings, but believes in them discriminately. He is perfectly frank in dealing with his most radical and revolutionary and contradictory utterances. But he does not affect the rôle of champion or partisan. The work is done in a simple, natural, and manly way, and there is no slightest trace of undue literary influence from his hero. We note the absence of that sentimentalism, diletantism and cant which we naturally look for in a disciple of the prince of Boston Transcendentalists, and which we sometimes find in some of the followers of Theodore Parker.

I. A brief account of Emerson's life, as here presented, may not be without interest, and may be of value in estimating the man and his work. He was of English blood, came from an old Massachusetts family, belonged to a race of Puritan preachers, and was born in Boston. A remote ancestor—Bulkley by name—a clergyman of the Church of England, silenced for dissent, came to this country in 1634 and founded the town of Concord, Mass., where Emerson lived during the greater part of his life. The three immediate ancestral predecessors of Emerson were all men of weight and influence as preachers and scholars. They were all Harvard men, and bore the marks of good training. Joseph Emerson, his great-grandfather, was one of the best scholars of his day. William, his grandfather, builder of Hawthorne's "Old Manse," at Concord, chaplain in the revolutionary army, was a man of notable eloquence and of refined literary taste. He was the father of Mary Moody Emerson, that acute and vigorous aunt, who so strongly influenced Emerson during his earlier and even later years. William, the

father, pastor of the First Congregational Church, of Boston, inherited these same qualities, and was a man of great literary activity. Emerson was thus heir to large intellectual and literary wealth. He seems especially to have inherited his father's sturdy independence of character and to have received a bias from his latitudinarianism. The traits that appeared in later life marked his childhood and youth. He was never a child in his sports, and had few associations outside of his own family. His brothers, to whom he was warmly attached, were his companions, three of whom, William the older and Edward and Charles the younger, exerted much influence over him. The two latter are said to have been among the most brilliant men in the roll of Harvard graduates, and gave promise of quite eclipsing their brother, but they died in early manhood. Emerson was not particularly brilliant. He was slow, but always studious in his way, and remarkable for his deliberation and self-poise, and for the equableness and justice of his judgment and disposition. His habit of reflection was early formed. He was always shy and lived apart. He early familiarized himself with the English poets, and developed facility in versification. His remarkable capacity for exact and free expression early disclosed itself, and he cultivated it with the utmost scrupulousness and severity of exactness. The death of the father when he was eight years old left the mother with her family of six children, all under ten years of age, in straitened circumstances. The boys helped in the housework, and the mother took boarders to support the family. He entered Harvard from the Boston Latin School at the age of fourteen, and worked his way through. He did not take kindly to the curriculum. He had independent views about it and followed an independent course. As late as 1864 he advocates the optional method which in college he strongly inclined to and as far as possible followed, and in fact substantially outlines the method Harvard has at last adopted. He urges that our colleges "thwart the natural love of learning by leaving the natural method of teaching what each wishes to learn, and insisting that you shall learn what you have no taste or capacity for." He advocates voluntary attendance, and a share by the student in the election of the professor. In college he had misgivings indeed as to the wisdom of

his course, but his dogged independence and strong native bias always got the better of him, and shipwrecked all purpose with respect to a better order and method. He was not particularly distinguished in any of the chief departments of the course, was particularly poor in mathematics, and graduated just above the middle of the class in rank. But he devoted himself to literature. He got Shakespeare by heart, and read widely and thoroughly of essays, memoirs, history, poetry, and made all the great English poets tributary to him. He aimed from the first at the cultivation of the power of expression. He elaborated his style in most painstaking fashion. He made a study of vocabulary and syntax, paraphrased, analyzed and absorbed quotations, and composed continually and with vast enthusiasm. His success is known of all men. No one will deny that he is one of the great masters of expression, and it is clear enough that the college students of our day know little of such fine and exact and skillful elaboration in the handling of the English language. The wealth of Emerson's English is not purely the gift of genius. It is the product of long years of keenest scrutiny and most painstaking elaboration. He was a thorough student of all branches of rhetoric. He aspired to be a teacher of rhetoric, and it is said that there never was a time in his life when he would not have accepted the chair of rhetoric at Harvard. He put high value even upon elocution. He was himself something of a master of it, and read, as those who remember him as a lecturer will testify, with propriety, and even to the last with deep rich intonation. The art of expression was the great study of his life. It is interesting to find a man so introverted and abstracted, so dreamy and poetic, so absorbed in his own visions and mental impressions, who is at the same time so thoroughly committed to the art of expression, as if this were the chief work of his life. "Expression," he says, "is what we want; not knowledge but vent." "I do not know but I value the name of a thing, that is the true poet's name for it, more than the thing." There is a singular contrast often between the vagueness of his thought and the exquisite nicety and even precision of his expression. Dr. Holmes well says: "Emerson was sparing of words, but he used them with great precision and nicety. If he had been followed about by a short-

hand writing Boswell, every sentence he ever uttered might have been preserved." The fragmentariness of his style early disclosed itself. It is, of course, partly due to his peculiar mental structure and habit, but partly also, perhaps, to this early habit of literary elaboration. "In his writing," says Mr. Cabot, "the sentence is the natural limit of continuous effort, the context and connection was an after thought." It was his custom "to write out a sentence in his journal when it had taken shape, and leave it to find its fellows afterwards. These journals, paged and indexed, were the quarry from which he built his lectures and essays. When he had a paper to get ready, he took the material collected under the particular heading, and added whatever suggested itself at the moment." We are told, too, that in the course of time these manuscripts got hopelessly mixed, so that it was impossible to tell their original order or belonging. Emerson says of himself: "in writing my thoughts, I seek no order or harmony or result. I am not careful to see how they comport with other thoughts and other words. I trust them for that." As regards the connection between one sentence and another, and between successive sentences and the subject as a whole, the suggestion said to have been made by one of his hearers seems to state the case accurately; namely, that there was "none, save in God." No wonder Emerson got tired of this sort of fragmentariness, and that he is forced to exclaim as once in his journal: "Give me continuity. I am tired of scraps. Let me spin some yards or miles of helpful twine, a clue to lead to one helpful truth." His repetitiousness, too, may perhaps be in part accounted for by this peculiarity of his literary habit. He was aware of this defect, and spoke of "repeating his opinions, which are stereotyped as usual and will surely come in the same words." And yet with all these defects and others that might be named, he must be called a master in the art of expression. His power of description and of characterization seems to us to reach at times even to the measure of Thomas Carlyle, and he is much more idiomatic and pure and exact than Carlyle.

After leaving college he teaches awhile and with success. Meantime he is agitating the question of his future profession. He thinks of literature. The writings of Washington Irving

and the novels of Sir Walter Scott and of Fennimore Cooper were at this time issuing from the press. He has some aspirations for the career of a writer of novels, at another time for that of an artist and again for that of a poet. But he had turned his thoughts most definitely towards the pulpit. He aspires to be a pulpit orator. He had made a study of rhetoric and oratory. His ancestors had been men of power in the pulpit. Channing had already made his mark. George Bancroft the "infant Hercules" was at that time a Boston preacher, and Edward Everett had won his earliest honors in the pulpit. These were some of the influences that drew him to the pulpit. But he thought, and rightly, that he had discovered his unfitness for it, and as the time of decision draws near, he hesitates. Theological questions especially, trouble him, although for the most part his life through, he cared very little about them one way or the other. He however decides to enter Harvard Divinity School. He attended such lectures as he chose; ill health in part, preventing his taking the full course. He was in demand as a preacher from the first. At the age of 26 he was ordained as assistant pastor of the 2nd Congregational Church of Boston. The Rev. Henry Ware, the pastor, resigning a short time after, to accept a professorship in the Harvard Divinity School leaves Emerson sole pastor. The qualities that marked him later appeared in his early ministry; the independence, the reserve, the sobriety, the ethical earnestness, the eagerness for facts to illustrate his teachings, the enigmatic yet homely utterance, the refinement of literary taste. He served the church three years and resigned on account of a difficulty with the church about his administering of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. He denied its sacramental character and the obligation of the church as to its perpetual observance, but the ground of his difficulty lay further back, in his conception of religion and of the church. This is the turning point in Emerson's life. From this time on it becomes more and more evident that he is at radical and hopeless variance with even that type of Christianity in accordance with which he was trained. He never could have remained in the pulpit and he became more and more dissatisfied with the existing condition

of the churches and more and more hopeless of reform. He had no programme. He never thought any measure through. What he wanted, however, in his vague and indefinite fashion, was a general break down of all traditional religion. He preached more or less up to the year 1847, but it was evident long before this that he must reach the world through the press and the platform rather than the pulpit. The subsequent career may be briefly sketched. After the resignation of his pastorate, he visits Italy and on his return makes the acquaintance of Carlyle. Returning in 1833, he enters the lecture field, in which he wins abundant success, and in which he continues for more than forty years. The year 1838 is marked by the tempest which his address to the Harvard Divinity Students raised in the churches. The address was a singularly bold and radical utterance. It was so bold and radical that one questions whether Emerson fully measured the import of his words or clearly saw how complete was the antagonism between his position and that of the most liberal Unitarian churches of that day. The Unitarianism of that day still maintained that Christianity is a divine revelation. Emerson's address is the baldest naturalism. It is a denial of the supernatural character of Christianity. Its miracles are no more supernatural than the commonest wonders of nature are supernatural. Its truths are no more supernatural than any of the utterances of man's higher moral nature. Jesus is no more divine than any man is divine. He only saw what it is possible for the human soul in its higher moments to see. He was charged with Pantheism and even with Atheism and the attack came chiefly from Unitarians. It was impossible that Emerson should not have been from the first an opponent of the system of American Slavery. He did not wholly sympathize with the abolitionists. He advocated the purchase of the slaves and gradual emancipation. But the encroachments of the slave power in the fugitive slave law in 1850 opened his eyes and henceforth he became aggressive in his opposition. The fame which he won from his published volumes and from his public lectures soon reached beyond the sea, and when in 1847-1848 he visits England again the welcome he receives is honorable to himself and an honor to

his countrymen. He had already won his public, although a small one and his lectures were fairly successful. He revisits the old world yet again in 1872 when sixty-nine years of age, but in all the journey, in the objects that interest him and in the character of his movements, he discloses the change which the years have wrought. His opinions no doubt remained substantially the same during the last years, but he became increasingly tolerant in feeling of tradition and the existing religious order. He turned back with more of satisfaction to the habits of earlier years. He lived more in the past. He resumed the habit of attendance at church. He advocates—as Spinoza did—the habit of private and public worship, and when he who in earlier years had advocated non-compulsory attendance at prayers at Harvard, was summoned as a Harvard Trustee—an honor late conferred upon him—to vote upon the question, he opposed the change, saying in substance that he “should be sorry that the young men should not have the opportunity afforded them each day of assuming the noblest attitude man is capable of—that of prayer.” And it is understood that his vote at that time was decisive against the change which has since been effected. His last years were years of quietness and satisfaction among the people of Concord who had known him for so many years, and who loved and revered him. These were the years in which the power of memory failed, and yet although productive labor had ceased several years before, up to within a year of his death he could appear before the public, and it was most fitting that his last public act should have been to read a paper on his friend Carlyle.

II. It is time now to render some account of the impression of Emerson made upon us or re-impressed by the reading of this memoir. We shall not attempt an exhaustive estimate and shall not be able to discriminate successfully between the peculiarities of the man and the peculiarities of his work. Few men have so impressed the peculiarities of their personality upon their work.

1. The first thing in Emerson that impresses us is his Individualism. He was individual in his personality, and individualistic in his teachings, and the two facts are inseparable. We never meet just such a man as Ralph Waldo Emerson. It is

rarely that we meet a man who largely resembles him. He seems to have been born apart, and he lived apart. The solitariness of his character and life is very impressive. This strongly individual quality disclosed itself as we have seen from the very first. In childhood he lived largely apart. He had few associates. He never seemed to have the capacity to get far from his own doors. He was reflective and self-involved. Few men probably have ever shown such capacity, and so early in life, for turning back upon themselves, and making themselves objects of investigation. We see this in his college course. While he chides himself for his neglect of the prescribed course of studies, he still seems, as it were, fated to neglect them. The peculiar impulses of his own personality are so strong that he seems shut up to his own course. We see this in the difficulties he encounters at the very beginning of his ministerial career. He seemed persuaded from the outset that he never could work in that harness. He had his own notions about the Sacraments and he could find no common standing ground with his church in their use. The element common to his own and others' views was not large enough for practical coöperation. If he had not broken with the church at that point he would soon have found some other. He had his own notions about public prayer, and there were times when he would not offer public prayer. He held that its only justification is that it expresses a prayerful frame of mind at the time. He seems to have pushed Schleiermacher's view, viz: that all public prayer is expressive and has no object beyond itself, to the extreme of individualism. It appears in his preaching and in his opinions about preaching. His pulpit work was unique. Few men probably ever carried so much that is individual into the pulpit as he did. Preaching, as related to the fellowship of the Christian church, he seems to have known nothing about. That men should "say only what is uppermost in their minds after their own individual manner," seems to him to exhaust the significance of preaching. We see the same thing in the formation of his opinions. His opinions were the product of his own reflection. He was very little dependent on books or on his intercourse with men. "I have long ago discovered," he says, "that I have nothing to do with other people's facts. It is

enough for me if I can dispose of my own." His habit of reading illustrates this. "On the whole," Mr. Cabot says, "what is most noteworthy in Emerson's relation to books is the slightness of his dependence on them." "They did not enter much into his life." "In general, after he began to write and publish, his reading was for the lustres—for a touch of suggestion that might crystallize the thoughts that were floating within him." Now we must take this into the account in estimating the free expression of his opinions. As Mr. Cabot says: "not reaching his convictions by investigation and comparison of opinions, but by taking a fresh view, he was not apt to be conscious himself or to remind others of any startling novelties in what he said." It is very likely that he was not fully aware of the significance his words were sure to have in minds differently constituted from his own, or of the amount of scandal they were sure to stir, or of the harm they were likely to do, and there seem to be indications that the storm he sometimes raised was a surprise to him. This may well be taken into the account in estimating what seems on the surface of it to be the gigantic conceit of the man. It is doubtful if in his self-involvedness he would have at all understood the charge of conceit. There is not evidence that he deliberately purposed to rudely unsettle men's religious beliefs even in his earlier years, and in his later years he was much more cautious and regardful of others' opinions, as if he had discovered his individualistic defect. With advancing years the practical side of the man was more thoroughly developed and he was able to see more clearly the "foolish and canting side" of movements of which he was the very center.

We see this characteristic again in his dependence on inward impulse. His method of work, his habits of life, as the author suggests, "left him without the momentum which in general serves the man of letters to carry him over the dead-points of life." He himself complains of this failure of impulse and sometimes seems to wish for a more regular and orderly life, or at least for more outward and habitual impulse. He says, "I have wished for a professorship, much as I hate the church, I have wished the pulpit, that I might have the stimulus of a stated task, I doubt not a course of mobs would do me much good."

It is likely that a more methodical life would have furnished at times an incentive which he lacked, just as a more objective habit of mind might possibly, as the author suggests, have saved him, partially at least, from that singular loss of the power of memory which confused and troubled him in his last years. But after all it is questionable whether, considering his singular individuality, he would ever have worked well in any harness. It is likely that the harness would not have furnished the incentive he seemed to need. He was less dependent on all outward incentive than most men. We see this individuality, also, in his singular incapacity to adjust himself to other men, and to get into connection with them. He certainly was not without genuine love for his fellow-men. It is true that he never had a large surplus of emotion. One feels the defect especially in his poetry and in his letters. He never seems to pour himself out even to his most intimate friends in a free and spontaneous manner. All utterance, even the most common, seems studied. And yet he was not cold-hearted and selfish. He was indeed kindly and even benignant in his appearance and in his bearing towards others. He was hospitable even to those who had no particular claim on him. "He kept his house open to all who chose to come, even if they stayed all day." On the whole, he did not like solitude. "It is fearsome and heavy-hearted," he says. He even longed for companionship, and in his own family he was "affectionate and unreserved, even playful." But after all he never got very near to men, not even to those whom he loved best, and they never got very near to him, and this was one of the sorrows of his life. "Is it not pathetic," he says, "that the action of man on man is so partial? I am wholly private. Such is the poverty of my constitution. Every man is an infinitely repellent orb and holds his individual being on that condition." He approaches people and finds that something drives him within doors. Neither Carlyle, nor Hawthorne, nor Margaret Fuller, nor even Alcott ever got very near to him. "Speak to me of anything but myself," he writes to Margaret Fuller, who had complained that he would let none of his friends know him, but kept them aloof, "and I will endeavor to make an intelligible reply." It caused him pain to remember that he had been able to get no nearer even to those

whom he had loved best and who had died. "Why was I not made," he says, "like those beatified mates of mine, superficially generous and noble as well as internally so. They never needed to shrink at any remembrance, and I, at so many sad passages that look to me now as if I had been blind and mad. This is the thorn in the flesh."

We linger with this trait of his character because it seems to explain much in his life and even in his habit of thought, particularly it serves largely to explain his theoretic individualism. In theory he was an individualist through and through. It pervades all his thinking from first to last. In this at least he is a true child of Calvinism. This was the basis of his religion. It was faith in the individual soul, in its capacity to be touched and inspired and developed by the divine power. "Every man is a new and incalculable power of whom it can only be predicted with certainty that he possesses some faculty never yet unfolded." This in substance was his Transcendentalism, the transcendent possibilities of the individual man. His great lesson is therefore that every soul shall sacredly cherish its own convictions, its own impressions, shall be true to itself, shall yield itself to all the noblest impulses that are awakened within it by the great forces of the universe. Only as individual men are developed and brought to completeness will human society be regenerated. The fall of man, according to Emerson, is his fall into the conventional life of the world. Every new fresh life has before it the problem of escaping the trap of conventionalism and remaining true to its own nature and vocation. He has no sympathy with socialistic efforts at reform. He sees that men are not changed by bettering their social and material condition. This explains why he was so cool at first towards the anti-slavery movement. The basis of his opposition to slavery was the fact that it degraded the manhood of men. But that manhood is not ennobled by mere change of condition. Individualism is easily overdone, and there can be no doubt that Emerson has overdone it. But there can be as little doubt that in many directions he has accomplished a great work, and a beneficent in his advocacy of this gospel of individualism. As John Morley suggests and as even Carlyle himself perhaps intimates, some of the re-

sults of this doctrine of individualism may be seen in the character of the American people as disclosed by the war for the Union. At any rate it is evident that Emerson's war against tradition and convention and custom and socialism had its motive largely in the recognized need of stable individual manhood in the citizens of a Republic.

2. A second prominent peculiarity in Emerson and closely connected with the one just discussed is his Intuitionism. There are individualists and individualists. Most of the great thinkers, especially the revolutionary thinkers of the modern world from Martin Luther downward, have been in some form individualists. They have emphasized in some way the sacredness, the worth, the capacity, the rights, the freedom, the possibilities, of the individual man. They have done it in different ways and from different points of view. And in some way every great and valuable movement in thought and every intelligent and hopeful movement of reform must take into account the significance and worth of individual men. Religion as dealing with the personal soul must always have a strongly individual aspect. The Protestant Reformation developed this side of Christianity in opposition to the socialistic aspect it had taken in the Roman Catholic Church. Calvinism, one of the most valuable developments in many particulars of the Reformation movement, carried it however into an extreme of individualism. Some of the most notable men of the modern world who have rejected not only Calvinism, but Christianity itself, have been powerfully influenced by Calvinism. Emerson is one of them, Thomas Carlyle is another. Both in their way are extreme individualists. Carlyle has one great theme with infinite variations. We are reminded in every conceivable manner that our souls are our own, that they are all we have to front eternity with and that it is the meaning of our lives that we put forth unto their utmost the energies that are in us. His gospel is to the individual man and it is the gospel of salvation by work; work is his watchword and it is the substance of all the best he has ever said. But after all, Carlyle has very little practical faith in the capacities of the souls of the individual men to which he shouts so lustily. Men must work out their own salvation, but the average man needs to do it under leadership, and

the forces of leadership are concentrated in the strong man. It is the strong man that has the right to direct our individual task, and to force us to do of his own good pleasure. His individualism means at last the privilege and duty of the individual strong man to guide and of the individual weak man to be guided. John Stuart Mill was an individualist but his individualism disclosed itself in the advocacy of the rights of the individual man with respect especially to social, political and religious interests. Emerson's individualism is a very different affair. It is the individualism of personal manhood in its wholeness. Carlyle is the advocate of individual action, Mill is the advocate of individual liberty. Emerson is the advocate of individual manhood. With him, what the man is in his fidelity to all the powers of his own being is of far more importance than what he does or what he has a chance to do in the ordering of his associate life. Now the difference—as John Morley has intimated, at least, the difference between Emerson and Mill—lies largely in the fact that Emerson was an intuitionist, or as he called himself and was called, a transcendentalist. Emerson deals with those forces of personality that lie back in its remoter recesses. He deals especially with the capacity of the soul to look eye to eye with all highest knowledge, to know God, to know all moral and spiritual reality by direct vision. This is his transcendentalism. It means intuitionism. It means, to use his own words, "the openness of the human mind to the new influx of light and power from the divine mind." And this is Emerson's religion. It is the master thought in all his thinking. It is not the opening of the understanding to God. It is the opening of what lies back of it, of the higher rational as well as emotional, ethical and æsthetic natures of man. With him religion is an emotional and æsthetic as well as rational and ethical interest. This is theoretic transcendentalism. It is advocacy of the sacredness of the soul's capacity for the knowledge and service of God. In emphasizing the nearness of the soul's relation to God he seemed to run over into Pantheism. The charge of Pantheism seems to be well supported. Such utterances as he has made, if made by an ordinary thinker, would be justly regarded as pantheistic. But, as the author suggests, Emerson did not regard himself as a Pantheist. He did not definitely

deny the divine self-consciousness. He only denied our capacity to affirm it out of the contents of our own experience. But granting that he was a theist, he was not a believer in supernatural revelation in the Christian sense. Christ's knowledge of God was only a disclosure in ideal form of the capacity which belongs to every human soul. It is not pantheism but naturalism that is the vice of his thinking and his transcendentalism, regarded as intuitionism, is an affirmation from the point of view of natural religion, of that which the Protestant Reformation emphasizes from the point of view of supernaturalism. What Emerson affirms of the human soul in its native estate, Christianity, especially as interpreted by the Reformation, affirms only of the soul in its redeemed estate, the soul as under the guidance of the higher revelation of God in Christ. But it is to be noted that, although he repudiated the distinctively Christian conception of man, there is much that is common between his own and the Christian view. He was first, last, and always an intuitionist. This accounts for his interest in Plato, in Kant, in Coleridge, in Swedenborg, in the Quakers. It accounts largely too for his reaction against the traditional religion of his day. The Transcendentalists were regarded as religious iconoclasts. Emerson accepts this as a practical statement of the aims of the motley group with which he coöperated. He says: "omit what is given by Tradition and the rest will be Transcendentalism." He simply defines the practical purpose of Transcendentalism. He means to intimate perhaps that the traditional religion of the day is wedded to Deism, which so shuts God out from the world that He gets no access to the souls of his children and that the whole fabric must be demolished before the natural relation of God and man as Father and child will be recognized again or that relation practically re-established. Emerson's movement on its theoretic side was not so far removed as might at first appear from all the great mystical movements of the Christian church. It was not so far removed from the movement of Schleiermacher. It was more decidedly naturalistic of course, but Emerson always regarded himself as to a considerable extent allied with the mystics. He was able to appropriate much of the teaching of mysticism. He could even use the forms of the Orthodox

Church provided he gave them a mystical significance. Now this intuitionism was constitutional. He was a man of insight. He looked straight at the object of his thought rather than for the path that would lead him to it. He held his object in direct vision. The dialectical faculty in him was very weak. He never reasoned. The truth came to him in glimpses. It came to him in a fragmentary manner, not in its relations. In reply to Mr. Ware, who criticised the Harvard address which made so great a stir, he says: "I could not give an account of myself if challenged. I could not possibly give you one of the arguments you cruelly hint at, on which any doctrine of mine stands. For I do not know what arguments mean in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in telling what I think, but if you ask how I dare say so, or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men." "He did not hold his thoughts," Mr. Cabot says, "by means of their relations to premises, or on the strength of reasons such as others may appreciate, but merely through the impression made on his own mind which could not be communicated." And for this reason he would never attempt to force his thoughts. "Thoughts," he says, "have a life of their own and their own proper motion independent of the will. They are not to be tampered with or spied upon, but obeyed. Do not force your thoughts into an arrangement, and you shall find that they will take their own order and that the order is divine." And this habit of mind in part accounts for his incapacity to speak without a manuscript or without most careful previous preparation. All this accounts too for his indifference about winning followers.

3. In line with what has already been said it is natural to note thirdly his Idealism. He was constitutionally a poet. Valuing everything according to the impressions made upon him, cherishing the impressions as of chief value, it was natural that he should look back upon the world through the medium of those impressions. The world to him was for the most part an object of sentiment, not an object of scientific knowledge. He reflected upon the world; he indulged his fancies about it, he did not undertake to examine it. His studies in natural science were more with reference to literary than scientific results. He says: "I know but one solution to my nature and

relations which I find in remembering the joy with which in my boyhood I caught the first hint of the Berkleyan philosophy and which I certainly never lost sight of afterwards." He means to say, perhaps, that the Berkleyan philosophy is a sort of endorsement and reinforcement of his ideal way of looking at the world. It honored his poetic impulse. The secret of Emerson lies in the fact that his tendency was overwhelmingly strong to idealize the world and that he was incapable of philosophical conceptions of anything. He was preëminently a poet. He naturally took to the poetic form of utterance. He disclosed it in early years. He believed in it as the superior form of utterance. "We may speak ideal truth in verse," he says, "but we may not in prose." If it be necessary to our conception of poetry that it be the utterance of passion, of passion in the sense of highly wrought emotion, according to Milton's definition, then Emerson was not a poet. This definition John Morley seems to have in mind when he questions Emerson's capacity as a poet. But if poetry be the utterance of ideal reality, then Emerson was a poet and that of a high order. It is not true that his utterance was always tranquil. It was sometimes the utterance of profoundly stirred emotion. But though it were tranquil utterance, according to the nature of the man, this does not rob it of its poetic quality.

4. Finally, we note his optimism. Mr. Wm. F. Dana regards it as Emerson's distinguishing significance that in an age of pessimism he has honored and exalted the optimistic view of life. It is certainly a great honor to him that, he has kept before us the higher and nobler and brighter aspects of life, and he has served his generation well and the generation following and will serve other generations in doing it. And here as everywhere the teaching of this man was inseparable from his personality. He was a born optimist. No power could have perverted him into anything else. It is not that he was wholly blind to the darker side of life. He was, no doubt, to a certain extent. But this aspect of life did not greatly affect him. It did not distress him as others have been distressed by it. We are sometimes offended at his coolness. We wish we could hear a single groan or sigh over the contradic-

tions and discords and sorrows and sins of the world. But we listen almost wholly in vain. It is not that he was insensible to it all. It is true, however, that he preferred not to dwell upon it. He was of a tranquil nature and he preferred to cultivate tranquility, and he did so to the end. Carlyle held him in great admiration for his serenity, and regarded his visit to the Craigen puttoch home as the visit of an angel. Emerson had no sympathy with Carlyle's pessimism, and it had no doubt the effect to keep the two men from coming into the most familiar relations. Emerson expresses his disgust with Ruskin that during his last visit to England, he found him taking so gloomy a view of everything about him. His gloomy view of modern civilization he says "was as bad as Carlyle's and worse, for Carlyle always ended with a laugh which cleared the air again, but with Ruskin it was steady gloom." It was this happy temperament that kept him always fresh and young. He never grew old in heart. His faith in the good never wavered. He always wanted to see people cheerful about him, and was anxious to contribute something of his own cheer to others. He was very sensitive about speaking of his physical infirmities. He liked children because they contributed to his good cheer, and he wanted always to see them healthy and happy. This optimism was not levity and worldliness. It was not irreligiousness. In his way Emerson was a profoundly religious man. It was his poetic idealism. It may argue great defect of religious training, it may argue indeed a constitutional defect and a one-sidedness of judgment in his estimate of the facts of life that he did not see more clearly or feel more profoundly the fact of human sin and that he had so superficial an estimate of its significance. That he did not feel more keenly too the sorrows of the world indicates the remoteness in which he lived from the world of reality, and it proves his incapacity to do the largest and most uplifting work for men. It brings us back to what we have recognized as his most prominent peculiarity—his individualism. It indicates that he was born and lived too much apart, but after all we cannot find in it a selfish and insensible nature. He was so constituted that he must find an ideal world behind the world to dark and sinful reality, and this world was so bright

in his vision that it seemed to irradiate the darkness and sin and they were lost in "the glory that excelleth." And it must be said in conclusion that optimism is not so common a grace and the optimist not so common a gift to the world in our time that we could well afford to lose a man like Emerson or could reasonably wish him to have been thoroughly changed.

LEWIS O. BRASTOW.

ARTICLE II.—BITS OF COMMONPLACE AESTHETICS.

THE term aesthetic has been used for over a century to signify the science of the beautiful; that is, the principles and laws which are supposed to govern in the detection, the analysis, the appreciation, the enjoyment and the artistic production of the beautiful.

Aesthetics should teach a man to enjoy the beauties of nature, to appreciate the beauties of art, and to make beautiful his living and the works of his hands. Literally the term means the science of sensations, and was first used by Baumgarten, a German metaphysical philosopher of about the middle of the last century. Wolf, Baumgarten's master, declared that the object of metaphysics was the perfecting of knowledge; that knowledge was either the product of thought, or the result of observation; and that as logic could occupy itself only with the higher knowledge, that is, thought, there was needed another and inferior science to occupy itself exclusively with the knowledge derived immediately from perception, that is, with sensations. So Baumgarten devoted himself to the task. At first the learning was scoffed at: but as time went by and the school enlarged, taking in questions of the beautiful in nature and in art; more and more were students attracted by the new subtleties, till to-day there is not a university in Germany where aesthetics is not regarded as one of the chief branches of metaphysics, and where its captivating problems are not explained by eloquent and enthusiastic professors to interested and enraptured students.

Of late expounders, Vischer of Stuttgart is leader. He is a magnificent German; as particular about his beer as about his text-books. During hours of leisure he composes war songs to fire Swabian patriotism. Once he came out first best in a contest with the king who sent the royal band to play in the square in front of the University. Vischer objected; and stoutly refused to change the time or the place of his lectures for any potentate. Eventually the king had to give in. Some years ago I went to Stuttgart expressly to attend his course;

but that particular year he tired of aesthetics, and announced his intention of lecturing on German poetry. Of course there was a row in the University. The professors of literature were specially excited, fearing the loss of pupils. But Vischer held firm and had his way. His lecture room was packed; even some of the opposed professors abandoning their courses to listen.

German *aesthetikers* divide themselves into two schools; the objective and the subjective. The first declares that beauty is an integral quality of the object observed; that all should perceive it; and that all would if endowed and properly informed. The other maintains that beauty is a sensation in the observer; excited by the object, to be sure, but not by its attributes, which may excite very different sensations in another equally endowed, and equally well informed, observer. The latter school agrees with the songster who, while lauding the beauty of his darling Mariandel, confessed she might not appear so lovely to others, complacently adding that he was glad of it; less danger of rivalry.

A German would rather discuss than enjoy. His teachings, while analytic, but negatively assist to appreciate and enjoy. To enjoy thoroughly, to know how to put into blissful action the capacities the German has discovered and dissected, aid from France must be sought, where Taine still lives to detect hidden beauties and make them plain to idle minds; and where Sutter, Voiturion, Lévêque and others are showing the possibility of writing aesthetics in clear and succinct language. But this paper is neither argumentative nor didactic. Its simple object is to apply a few aesthetical notions to every-day life; to give a hint or two of commonplace beauty. Is there beauty in daily life? And if there be, how may it be increased and expanded. I write, of course, to those who recognize, and have a sense of beauty, and who wish to have more of it day by day.

All objects from a physical point of view have three dimensions; length, breadth, and thickness. All objects from the point of view of beauty have three elements; outline, shadow and color. Lines, projections and colors are, therefore, the three qualities of objects to which the laws of beauty apply.

In the first place, lines. Hogarth is supposed to have originated the saying that the curved line is the line of beauty and the straight line is the line of utility. And it has been argued ever since his time that there is no use in art, because you can't "get there" so rapidly on a curved line as on a straight one. Lines are all about an object. They outline it. Therefore lines govern parts, their relations and proportions. And the relations of a whole to its parts, and of each part to the whole, are conveniently considered under the head of lines. So that the system of lines is made to embrace everything that is not shadow or color. The lines of beauty may be thought of as corresponding to the length and breadth of physical science; shadow, to the thickness.

By shadow, from the point of view of beauty, is meant the effects produced, by the advancing and receding of surfaces of the same substance and color, and by the location of objects in reference to one another in space, or in reference to space itself. For instance; a statue may be of marble so pure and white that without a background it would hardly appear at all; yet, if skillfully carved, the shadows cast by its receding and advancing surfaces will show recognizable features and distinct character. Again; objects may be so placed in space that the less will overshadow the greater. Distance will dull sharp edges and eventually hide. Lines, surfaces and shadows are inseparable; for shadows and surfaces are terminated by mathematical lines; and lines, when not artificially drawn, are but the edges of shadows and surfaces. Still, theoretical distinctions exist and are easily understood.

Color needs no explanation. It is the appearance of an object regarded independently of its shape and surface modifications; and is produced by the natural color of its material, or by the artificial color imparted by pigments modified always, of course, by the medium through which it is seen and by reflections cast upon it. A brick in sunlight appears very differently from the same brick in shade.

Is there any intrinsic beauty in a line, a shadow, or a color, by itself and apart from an object? It is so claimed. A straight line is more beautiful than a crooked and tangled one, for there is beauty in order. A curved line is more

attractive than a straight one; because it suggests completion, and beauty dislikes the vague and the indefinite. A body bounded by curved lines is more beautiful than one bounded by straight ones. Of curves, an oval is more beautiful than a circle; for a circle is monotonous, and beauty dislikes monotony. Moreover, as the eye soon tires of any one thing, a curved line, if of great length, should be relieved by an occasional angular jog; and a straight line is more attractive if it be occasionally broken by a bit of a curve, as in cornices. The most beautiful outlines result from the flowing together of convex and concave curves, as in Greek vases and in the human body.

The proportion of parts is too vast a subject to have more than an allusion in this paper. As household beauty must grow out of, and emphasize, the useful, so adaptability would seem to be the one great law of commonplace beauty. A mediæval donjon for living in would be as inappropriate now-a-days as a square pitcher for holding water. A narrow five-story brick building on a farm would be as out of place as would be an open-air seaside pavilion in Wall street. The simple principle of appropriateness is of such vast application that there is no limit to its usefulness. Practice will be sure to develop discrimination and taste in judging all the acts and articles of daily living. An easily understood subdivision of the law is that objects intended for use should show themselves prominently along the lines of their usefulness. Candelabra are to support candles in place: the upright shafts should therefore be more prominent than supporting pedestals or enclosing holders. A candlestick is to carry a lighted candle about: the base should therefore be broad to catch dropping wax and to permit rapid putting down. Departure from this arrangement would be ugly because mischievous. Beauty must be understood as that which pleases the whole man. His sense as well as his senses. The panels of a bed should be long and horizontal; those of a door, long and perpendicular. A pitcher should have rounded surfaces because drops of water are round. Who ever drank out of a square tumbler, or bathed in an angular bath-tub?

Passing rapidly on; is there more of beauty in any one color than in another? This seems a question of individual taste, and

may be a question of individual eyes. No two pair of eyes see exactly the same colors. No one color makes the same impression on two pair of eyes. And the color which the eye sees with the least trouble is the color which is the most pleasing to the individual. Ask a person who has never thought of the matter what is the color of a particular shadow. He will say "dark," and may continue to say "dark" in reference to any and every shadow. Teach him to paint, and set him to painting a shadow, and he will surely paint it more red, or more blue, or more yellow than it appears to your own eyes. I was once present at a very animated and very interesting discussion between two of the greatest of living French painters. Each accused the other, amicably of course, of being "way off" in his shadows; while to me the shadows in the picture by the one, seemed altogether too red; and the shadows in the picture by the other, altogether too blue.

There are some things, however, about colors which are independent of individual eyes, and which must be known in exercising judgment and in forming taste.

Chevreul, the eminent French chemist, whose hundredth birthday has been lately so gloriously celebrated, if not the first to discover, was the first to make plain to all the world, the system of contrasted colors which, in France at least, bears his name. How true it is that to give an idea universal circulation it must be spread by a Frenchman! According to Chevreul's system there are in nature three fundamental colors to which all others may be reduced; red, blue and yellow. If these three were to be had in absolute purity, and were to be mixed together in exact intensity and portions, they would neutralize one another, and no color, or pure white, would result. If the three be put in imagination at equal distances about a circle, then directly opposite the point occupied by any one of the three will be the point on the circle where the mix of the other two will constitute its direct opposite; or, as it is called, its compliment. For instance, take red; its compliment is blue and yellow mixed, that is green. The compliment of blue is red and yellow mixed, that is orange. Of yellow, red and blue mixed, that is purple. In other words pure red mixed with pure green will give white; so will pure blue

mixed with pure orange and pure yellow mixed with pure purple. And so on all around the circle with the intermediate hues. Every hue finding its compliment at the other end of its diameter. Throughout this paper I avoid the technical and use every-day terms and adjectives.

Now the inner eye apparently always desires white light; so that the outer eye is constantly manufacturing the compliment of the color of the object at which it is looking so as to transfer a white image to the inner eye. For instance, let the eye rest on a red object. After a while turn the eye to a white surface. In a second or two the object will appear on the surface, but green; showing that the eye has been manufacturing the complimentary color of the object, and in a manner to cover it exactly. Of course this is only one of the various ways of putting a well-known phenomenon. The fact remains, put it any way you please, that to make the eye comfortable and to relieve it of extra work, whenever you present to it a strong color, present along with it some of the complimentary color. This is the reason, and the only reason, why a red house needs green blinds; why a blue ribbon looks well in golden hair; or why purple trimmings go with a yellow dress. It follows, too, that as the complimentary color assists the eye to see the original color more easily, it assists it to see more of it; that is, to see it more intensely. A red disk surrounded by a green rim appears stronger than when the rim is away. A red-headed girl is always more striking in a greenish-blue dress. Yet she is always wearing one; and the carrot-headed boy is always at his happiest when he has under his chin a blue, or green, tie of vast dimensions. The two, intuitively, select the colors that relieve their own eyes, though they thereby make their peculiarities more conspicuous. There is no law of æsthetics of more extended, or of easier application. Practice first with strong colors of the greatest attainable purity. Soon the eye will be able to apply the law to the most delicate tints and the most varied hues. The secret of the success of Worth, the great Paris dressmaker, is his skill in using many colors and still keeping well within this simple law. The law is as valuable in the manufacture and decoration of the humblest garment or utensil, as it is in the production of the grandest work of art.

To apply some of these æsthetical notions to common life let man himself be first considered ; then his dress, his home, and his citizenship.

Man is the consummation of creation. No beauty in art or nature approximates to manly beauty. The natural lines of man's body and the tints of his skin are beyond all comparison supremely beautiful. That is, of course, when his body has been properly developed and nourished ; when his skin is ruddy with health, and when age and vice have neither abraded nor shattered. There is not a man or a woman who, if not accidentally deformed, may not at some period of life show forth in greater or less degree that supreme beauty where creation stopped, and which has inspired poetry and plastic art ever since artists have lived and art has been recognized. We live in a country whose customs and climate oppose public nudity, but no circumstances can justify neglect of the body. Within the sanctity and warmth of household walls clothes may be thrown aside and bodies exercised and trained, their beauty criticized and developed, as among the Athenian Greeks. Care of the body should be among man's chiefest. He should preserve its youthfulness as long as possible. He should guard it against the inroads of disease and keep it sweet and pure from the corruption of every vice. When age approaches he should recognize the approach of change and school the body to the showing forth of the undying beauties of mind and spirit. The beauty of age, when the body seems filled with mind, is only second to the beauty of extreme age when features are illumined with the light of the immortal soul, each day shining through them with greater power and clearness. But if sensuality and vice have clogged and thickened the outer covering so that mind and spirit may not transpierce, how hideous is every phase of age !

Man's body has two coverings, the natural and the artificial. Man himself has hair, beard, and clothes. His partner is ordinarily without the beard.

There may be a citizen of the United States of sufficient recklessness to tell the ladies thereof bluntly and to their faces how they should dress their hair. But even he may well commence with a bit of flattery, calling attention to the undoubted fact that in nine cases out of ten the outlines of a lady's head are of

great beauty; that in purity and delicacy of head lines she far surpasses her liege lord whose head is apt to be bumped, and bulged, or wedged out, to the expression of some particular force of character. Then he might plead the great pity that so much loveliness should be hidden away beneath artificial frills, and borrowed plumage, and monumental piles of hair-dresser's work. And finally he might timidly and silently point to the head of the Venus of Milo, or to the head of the Medici Venus, where the hair without losing its power as a factor of beauty, so gracefully and daintily lends itself to enhancing the beauty of the lines of brow, head and neck. But fashion rules and will continue to rule in spite of any petty revolution of puny man's exciting. Oddly, fashion's sway is ever accepted as beneficent. With every change her votaries return thanks not only for the addition to their looks but for the great increase of their comfort, each time wondering how they could ever have done what they have just ceased doing. But with hirsute man the case is different. His brother may with impunity take him by the beard and hold him fast in the grip of a severe scolding. Not a country in civilization presents such monstrous hair vagaries as the United States of North America. Every sort of hair ugliness has been invented and is held onto by the proprietors thereof with immense pride and as appendages of unusual beauty. Long, unkempt hair is supposed to indicate poetic frenzy, or prophetic sanctity. Hair closely cropped is to prove that the individual has muscles of brawn and sinews of steel. Beards are worn in shapes, sizes, and lengths to hide and distort features. They excite ridicule when the intention is to inspire awe. They are the offspring of conceit. Do not beget consideration. Are more suggestive of dirt than of dignity.

The question of hair is of course in a great measure a personal one. Still there are general rules which may serve for guidance. The hair of the head should be worn long enough to part, so that it may be brushed to one side and out of the way. The college athlete may be pardoned the cropping of his youthful locks; and the venerable sire may certainly grow his white ones long enough, if he so choose, to brush them over the dome of his saint-like head. But all other growths,

in the absence of exceptional necessity, are affectation and ugliness. If baldness will come and must be covered, let a skull cap do the business. Of all male hair arrangement, certainly the most sad and shallow disguise is to part just above one ear and plaster long locks over a bare pate to the other ear. Within certain limits, do anything you please; beyond them, crop. The question of beards is still more individual than the question of hair. Still I am inclined to think that nine-tenths of mankind look better with beards than without them, and that mustaches add to most faces the shading the upper lip requires. There are grand, heroic faces in the country of which every bit of every feature is so full of strength and character that no particle should be hidden. How ridiculous Evarts would appear with a mustache, or Dr. Hall with a goatee, or Sheridan with English side whiskers, or Pres. Porter with an imperial! On the other hand, how much would the faces of Sherman, Blaine, and Edmunds, lose in dignity with the beards away which they know so well how to trim in conformity with their manly beauty! A pointed beard is a suitable termination to a long face. Fat cheeks may be covered by a full beard, hiding the too expansive outlines. A hooked nose appears well rising between side whiskers. But no human face looks human when fringed baboon fashion, or when decked with beards terminated by straight or eccentric lines. Everything that is worn, which attracts attention to itself and away from the individual wearing it, is in bad taste and ugly. Whatever be done with hair and beards let it be done fixedly. A strong-minded man will cut his hair and beard as he chooses, and keep it so. Only the weak-minded experiment.

How should men and women dress? What a question; when so many human beings are struggling to get anything with which to cover nakedness and to keep benumbing cold from bones! Charity would say, buy the most enduring of every stuff; that when tired of it, it may serve to cover others who have no money for purchasing. But even the smallest purse commands choice and the cheapest textures are of varied hues. Far away from me be the presumption of criticizing a lady's dress. Venturing to ask if the present style be not uncomfortable, I am told that it is the most comfortable fashion has as

yet permitted her votaries to wear, and that fashion must be always absolutely and implicitly obeyed; that I am mistaken in supposing that hats are intended for protection from sunshine and cold; that shoes are to assist in locomotion; that there can be one style for the young and another for the old, one for the thin and another for the fat, or that there can be any comfort or happiness without the pale of fashion.

There is apparently no remedy. All one can do is to hope that some day there may arise in Greece a princess so beautiful and so powerful that fashion will hail her queen. And that she, thoroughly appreciating the classic costumes of her native country, will have wit to adapt them to the exigencies of modern ways and manners. It was supposed that the garments which so beautifully clothe the goddesses and the virgins of the Parthenon were of artistic imagining, with no real derivatives. The discoveries at Tanagra have dissipated the notion, showing Greek drapery in daily life and in varied use.

As to man and his toggery, nothing can be suggested so long as he continue to wear trousers. No sartorial art can make a pair of trousers beautiful. And with such a handicap it were time wasted to consider man's upper story. If trousers hang straight, they impart a columnar, and immovable, aspect, if creased, the individual appears legless, and about to collapse. When legs are allowed to show themselves forth as active and living supports, then it may be suggested that man put off his funereal garments, learn that there are other stuffs than black broadcloth, and begin the study of complimentary colors by occasionally wearing a bright neck-tie. Trousers and the plug-hat are concomitants. Neither could exist alone. The cylinder on the head is only justified by the cylinders around the ankles. Even the Englishman's hunting hat requires the exposed cylinder of his top-boot. The trousers explain the wonder of the plug-hat's tyrannical sway. Cylinders at one end of the body demand a cylinder at the other end for support and balance.

A man should dress according to his circumstances and his surroundings. Light clothes in summer: darker ones in winter. Loose clothes for fat men; closer fitting ones for thin men. A fat man in a tight coat is almost as unpleasant to look

at as a fat woman in the dress of the period with its tight waist, its panier, and its pull-back. Both cases excite pity ; for there must be a terrible discomforture if not actual pain.

Pleasant indeed would be a return to the fashion when each man's garb showed forth his occupation and his social standing. Then men were proud of their guilds and their professions. Now there seems but one dress, and that the dress of a candidate for the presidency.

In this rapid and sketchy review there is no time for pauses. So in the next place, how should a man house himself ? Here again how happy would be the rule that each man's house should indicate his individual tastes, his occupation, and his accomplishments. No one would mistake a smithy for a mill, nor a blacksmith for a miller. Yet after work hours they may go back with the lawyer and the dominie to uniform houses in a monotonous block, hardly a bit away in the impression they make from a row of cells in a prison. How odd to speak of one's own home as part of a block ! What disparagement to the dear old English word, which stands without an equivalent in any other tongue ! Not until the sway of architects be broken, not until men will think out their own houses and use architects and builders but as shell masters to their own ideas, will the country be a country of homes. Let foundations be laid broad and deep. Let walls be raised high and strong. Build not for a day, but for generations. Let each room indicate its use. Let no room be shut up. Avoid meretricious ornamentation. Every piece of furniture, every utensil, may be sufficiently and appropriately ornamented along the lines of its usefulness. Banish bric-a-brac to the public museum ; or, better yet, chop it up for kindling wood. Love portraits of ancestors, the chairs in which they sat, the tables about which they kept good cheer, the stately clocks which ticked them to bed and early to rise, the quaint andirons before which they toasted their toes before retiring, and the broad brass "blockers" that held their tallow dips as they plodded up the stairs. Private houses of princely dimensions are only excusable in a republic when all the doors are hung on hospitable hinges. Homeless humanity will cry out against vast summer residences closed ten months in the year. Have a porch, a veranda, green

things growing wherever they will grow. Love sunlight and sunny rooms. Be not afraid of the buzz of the cheery fly, and let the carpet fade if it will. Hate all shams and deceits. An object of beauty is no more costly than a plain one. A well proportioned carriage is as cheap as an ugly one. A coachman, properly braced on a high seat, with his body at the right angle to the restraining and guiding reins, will cost no more per month than the independent son of Erin, with his knees tucked under his chin, the reins dangling, his slouched hat pulled over one eye and meeting the gleaming end of the forbidden segar. The later may be the stronger evidence of the glorious independence of this glorious country, but he is not so pretty. Put a date on your house with an inscription, as did German burghers three hundred years ago, and never be caught without a trencher and a tankard for passing friend or belated traveler. Don't live in the city : live in the country. Have a horse, a dog, a cat, a cow, a pig, and a hen ; and learn the language of them.

When the American citizen leaves his home and goes forth to his place of business, accompanying aesthetics perceives that there is but little fault to find with store, warehouse, or office. Where business is done, there business rules ; and wherever one idea governs, there is sure to be artistic unity ; and unity is a fundamental principle of beauty. The shop-keeper soon finds out how to arrange his wares in the window so as to attract customers, though the parlor of his house may contain monstrosities to give one the nightmare. Banking offices are so arranged that financial matters may travel the prescribed rounds without pause. No projecting moulding will be allowed in the path of speed. The architects who design and the builders who erect are held fast to one idea. There cannot fail to be beauty in such unity and simplicity. The cities of the Union show banking houses, law chambers, wholesale warehouses, and retail stores which are models of civil architecture and with which it were extremely captious to find fault. One of the marvels of the day is the development of hotel architecture. So admirably do exteriors show forth interiors that the passing traveler may tell at a glance how he is to be housed and fed, and how much it will cost him.

But when the inquirer turns from private to public buildings no satisfaction will accompany investigation.

In a republic where there are no royal names to excite reverence, no personal sovereigns as objects of loyalty, institutions should be made most venerable, should be decked with every pomp and surrounded with every dignity. Residences of executives, halls of legislation, and courts of justice should be as sumptuous as wealth and art can make them. There is hardly a princelet in Europe who has not a finer residence than the President of the United States. There is scarcely a court house in the land which is not a puzzle, or a disgrace. There is not a legislative hall that is ample, comfortable, and safe. Legislators are squeezed, and are threatened with falling roofs; while the watchful public is jammed into stifling galleries from which patriotic eloquence is inaudible. Law is majestic, and in a republic should attain to the summit of majesty. Its approach should be broad, elevated, and stately. Its abode should be unmistakably the home of justice. Its servants and officers should be robed in robes of dignified state. There is a prating of republican simplicity which leads to a misunderstanding of terms. Simplicity is consistency with elements. To array a judge like a clergyman and the two like waiters is the grossest violation of simplicity; for simple elements are completely ignored and simplicity is bartered for uniformity. The idea of a dress coat of state and a plug hat of dignity! Robes alone are stately; and so far there seems no substitute for the judicial wigs of the law courts of England. Robes and wigs, giving sense of dignity, become bulwarks of justice. Robes for judges imply robes for lawyers, and the extending of form and ceremony from the bench to the curb-stone of outer life.

How many jails are there in this republic which have the forbidding aspect and awful appearance to inspire virtue by terrifying from vice. Can any one but "The Tombs" be mentioned? Many jails are attractive, and convey to criminals the idea of comfortable housing and fat feeding. So look about and see, for the vision of the American public is very clear when fixed.

Another time perhaps of churches. One of the greatest of New England's divines summed up his opinion of church

architecture by saying that as many souls could be saved in a barn as in a cathedral. That may be; but can it be that in Divinity, perfect beauty is lacking though the perfect good and the perfect true be elements?

A church from crypt to spire should invite to worship, should impose awe and kindle faith. The house of God should differ from every other abode. Its exterior should show forth holy use. Its interior should take thought away from sad human things and give suggestion of the blessedness and peaceful beauty of Heaven. Architecture is of the essence of God's own building. Church architecture should be replete with history; for religion has always striven to show itself in form, and the church of to-day should exhibit its efforts.

One more notion; the æsthetics of every day conduct.

How easy to be kind and pleasant: how uncomfortable to be rude and grouty! It is a little thing to lift one's hat and bow pleasantly, but the act does good to the bower and makes happy his friend. It is not hard to have pleasant greetings ready. A kind word begets immediately a kind thought, and kind thoughts lead to kind acts wherein is charity. You can stuff your soul full of goodness by formulating kind words. There are thousands of graceful things one can say and do all the day long: things to make life beautiful, and to teach the understanding that beauty is quite as much of the mind as of the senses. Beauty may pervade the whole man; for it is the same beauty whether it be of thought, of speech, of act or of sight. "Do to others as you would that they should do to you," is the ethical law of common life. "Appear to others as you would that they should appear to you," may be regarded as its æsthetical compliment. Affectation and hypocrisy are as ugly as they are wrong. Let candor and honesty shine forth. Appear exactly what you are; that is, one of the band of God's children, mutually striving to make life better, happier and more beautiful. When pleasant words are spoken the ugliest face is attractive. Surliness can never be good-looking.

The stiffest necked Puritan must read of the beauty of godliness. And if there be beauty of godliness, why not beauty of lesser things; of reason, of thought, of ways and manners as well as of objects? Beauty is divine, part of our divinely

created soul. It is to be recognized, cultivated, and kept pure. It is an entity, a real thing; not a mere subjective sensation. The soul instinctively hungers for beauty. The longing is the same as the longing for truth and for goodness. Goodness, truth, and beauty are three proofs of our divine origin.

So the mission of art is sacred, and æsthetics is the catechism of art.

D. CADY EATON.

ARTICLE III.—STATE AUTONOMY VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGNTY.

IT is unfortunate that the idea of local self-government has come to be identified in America with the notion of State sovereignty. With what Speaker Carlisle, in a recent article which may be regarded as an authoritative exposition of Democratic doctrine, says in regard to the necessity of maintaining the rights of the states against undue centralization, most of his readers will sympathize. The distribution of the powers of government in such a way that the people of particular localities shall manage their local affairs, is a cardinal feature of our system. The general government would break down were it not relieved of so many burdens by the states. If, as things are, Congress is often reduced to impotence in dealing with great questions, what would be its condition if it had to legislate for all the interests of the country? A centralized administrative system which spread a network of public functionaries over the entire country and which embraced all branches of administration, might become dangerous to liberty. The people should be trained to self-government in municipalities, counties, and states. So far we go with Mr. Carlisle. But when he identifies local self-government with state sovereignty and defends it with the arguments of Calhoun we can follow him no longer. We can only regret that by his manner of defending it he has weakened a strong cause. Mr. Carlisle and the party of which he is one of the foremost leaders can do the country a great service as champions of the autonomy of the states; but they must be careful to distinguish between autonomy and sovereignty. The question that divided the federalists and the anti-federalists has entered upon a new phase, and the old theory in regard to the relations between the general government and the states has become untenable. The Democratic party would be stronger with the people if it would sell to the lowest bidder some of its heir-looms, if it would throw aside its jealousy of national authority and its reverence for the sovereign rights of

the states. To be sure, it would be no easy thing to do. Political parties are slow to accept new ideas. It is difficult to overcome the inertia of a large body of men. Party traditions exert a powerful influence and politicians are unwilling to throw aside the old weapons which have done good service in so many campaigns; but it would be well worth the trying. People will no longer listen to arguments which armed half of the states against the Union. Let Mr. Carlisle and his friends abandon state sovereignty and come out as champions of state autonomy.

Mr. Carlisle lays it down as "an indisputable historical fact that the Constitution of the United States was adopted and the Union formed under it by the people of the several states, each political community acting separately and independently of all others, through its own state organization." Notwithstanding the eminent names from Madison downward that may be mentioned as countenancing this view, the assertion may be ventured that no state ever came into existence in that way, neither ours nor any other. This misinterpretation of facts results from a mechanical conception of the nature of the state. A treaty can never be the legal foundation of a state. Treaties are agreements entered into by sovereign states. Treaty obligations are assumed, not imposed. Thirteen states might form a confederation whose government should be their organ and whose sovereignty should be but the reflection of their own; but how could thirteen states create a state which by virtue of original and undelegated power should have the right to command and whose commands it would be their duty, a duty not assumed but imposed, to obey? By this we do not mean to deny that the government is one of limited and enumerated powers. Congress has only the powers granted in the Constitution. But from the fact that the nation in ordaining the Constitution granted certain powers to Congress while withholding others, it does not follow that the sovereignty of the Union is the gift of the states. We can speak of the delegated powers of Congress but delegated sovereignty is a contradiction in terms. The agent can not be sovereign in respect to his principal. A Union created by the states, a sovereignty delegated by sovereigns, was the major premise of Calhoun. Admit this premise and the rebellion deserved success.

We have said that a treaty can not be the foundation of a state. We may go a step further and say that the origin of a state cannot be explained by any legal formula. The causes that give birth to a state are to be found in the history of the people. In former times the ruler of a small territory added to his dominions by inheritance and conquest until at length a large state was formed. In this way the mark of Brandenburg became in the course of a few centuries the kingdom of Prussia. But in modern times it is not the will of a ruler but the quickened consciousness of nationality that brings new states into existence. A nation that has been part of a foreign state or divided into a number of states experiences a quickening of its national life, becomes dissatisfied with existing political relations and organizes itself as a state. A nation is in existence before the state, but by organizing itself as a state it becomes an independent political community. At the beginning of this century there existed a Greek nation, and the territory inhabited by it was marked Greece on the map; but there was no Greek state. For a long time Greece had been groaning under the yoke of Turkey. The national yearnings, however, could no longer be suppressed, and in the third decade of the century Greece revolted and took its place in the family of nations. It is but little more than twenty-five years since the kingdom of Italy was formed. A glance at the map will show that, up to that time, Italy was divided into a number of states. But though there was no kingdom of Italy there was an Italian nation. Can any one be found who would claim that the states that were already in possession of the territory created the kingdom of Italy. Did Victor Emanuel and Cavour merely perform a sum in addition which may be expressed in this wise: The kingdom of Sardinia, plus the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, plus the States of the Church, plus the grand duchy of Tuscany, plus the duchy of Modena, plus the duchy of Parma, plus Austrian Lombardy, equals the kingdom of Italy? To state such a proposition is to prove its absurdity. No one will deny that the kingdom of Italy is the Italian nation organized as a state.

As there was a Greek nation in existence before the kingdom of Greece was formed and an Italian nation before the establish-

ment of the kingdom of Italy, so there existed an American nation before the adoption of the Constitution. And as the other two nations, dissatisfied with existing political conditions, organized themselves as states, so the American nation organized itself as the United States of America. Our history from the foundation of the colonies to the Philadelphia Convention, is the history of the birth and growth of the American nation. The sparse settlements scattered along the Atlantic coast were from the first united by the common heritage of English language and law. As population grew denser and each colony spread out to join its neighbors, the communities began to grow together into one community united by common interests. The most momentous social changes take place so slowly and quietly that they well nigh escape observation. As a rule, the forces that are slowly transforming society first come to the light when they meet with obstacles which can be overcome only by revolution. Every great crisis, such as the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution, has been preceded by a long period of quiet preparation. Historians are often tempted to dwell on what is striking and picturesque and to neglect those forces which, though hidden in their workings, yet produce tremendous results. Nor need we be surprised at this; for what could be more difficult than to follow the formation of that network of ties, social, commercial, and religious, which, as they increased in number and grew tighter, caused colonial boundaries to grow dim and brought the people of the several colonies to regard themselves as the people of America. Men who believe that the states created the union have surely never considered this organic process by which a nation was born. It was, however, in the struggle against the mother country that the American nation first saw the light. The Stamp Act encountered a national resistance. Sympathies overleaped colonial boundaries. In the face of a common foe the men of Massachusetts and of Virginia felt themselves brothers. Patrick Henry, in the first Continental Congress, voiced the national sentiments inspired by a common cause: "The distinctions between Virginians, Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and New Englanders are no more, I am not a Virginian but an American." To be sure, local feeling was still so strong that in the Articles of

Confederation, drawn up after enthusiasm had begun to subside, the sovereignty of the states was expressly recognized. This usurpation, however, was of brief duration. Experience soon showed the inadequacy of a league of states and the need of a national government. Attempts to amend the Articles of Confederation failed, and a convention was summoned to meet at Philadelphia.

Having briefly traced the causes that gave birth to the American nation, we are now to see the nation organize itself as a state. But at this point we encounter the formidable objection that all the facts are against such a theory. The Philadelphia Convention was summoned by Congress for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. It was made up of the delegates of sovereign states, and the vote was taken by states. The Constitution was submitted to the states and was not to take effect until it had been ratified by nine states, and then only between the states so ratifying the same." These are the facts behind which the defenders of state sovereignty have entrenched themselves as in an impregnable fortress. Now, while admitting the facts, we deny that any inference in regard to the nature of the union can be drawn from the character of the Convention that framed the Constitution.

When a nation organizes itself as a state, the first thing to be done is to establish a provisional government, whose duty it shall be to decide upon the form of government and to draw up a constitution. There will be no other course to adopt when all government has been swept away by revolution. Such was the case in Greece where the government of the Sultan sought to prevent by arms the establishment of the new state. The revolution in Greece had to destroy the old in order to establish the new. In America there was no less a revolution than in Greece, but here it was peaceful. The authorities that were already in possession, far from being hostile, coöperated in the establishment of the Union. Hence they could be made to serve as a provisional government. The American people, though they had in becoming a nation outgrown the existing political order, were politically organized in states. The states were the organs through which they had long been accustomed

to formulate and express their will. From the fact, then, that the nation chose to express its will through the organs to which the people were accustomed, we are not justified in inferring that it was not the nation's will but the will of thirteen separate sovereignties. To reason in this way is to mistake for the river the banks between which it flows. We are not concerned with the character of the political machinery that was employed. The question is whether there already existed an American nation and whether the men who made use of the existing political machinery in forming the new state acted in behalf of the people of America.

We must also be on our guard against attaching too much importance to the way in which the framers of the constitution understood their own action and to the motives by which they explained it. This is only another way of saying that the intellect often lags behind the impulses and feelings that govern conduct, that men are not seldom influenced by motives of which they have not given themselves an account, and that a man may even become the champion of a cause the nature and bearings of which he has not clearly discerned. It was natural, too, that men who by their temperament were inclined to moderation and compromise should dwell on the points that were common to the old and the new, rather than on the radical character of the proposed measures. But despite these hindrances to a clear comprehension of their own work, the members of the Convention could not close their eyes to the fact that they were accomplishing a revolution. They were convinced that it was necessary to build upon a new foundation. Delegates of the states to revise the Articles of Confederation, they proceeded as representatives of the nation to establish a national state. And as the American nation had, for drawing up the Constitution, made use of a convention composed of delegates of the states, so it ratified the Constitution by means of conventions chosen by the people of the states—by the people of the states, however, who had become the people of America, the American nation, and who turned the organs of state sovereignty into modes of national action.

It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the task the nation took in hand was nothing short of political re-organization.

The only conditions imposed upon it were those growing out of the history of the people. When a new state comes into existence it can organize itself either as a simple or as a federal state. There is no authority standing above it which can compel it to take one form or the other. If, however, the people, while wishing to establish a national government, were attached to their state governments and were unwilling that they should disappear, they would find a place for them in the new system. Shorn of sovereignty and of some of their most important functions, they might still be allowed the uncontrolled exercise of the remaining functions of government, subject, however, to have their competence still further restricted at the will of the state into whose system they had entered. They would not thereby cease to be states. States differ from mere administrative districts in that their action, unlike that of the latter, is not subject to control. There is no reason why a state should not incorporate other states into its system, assigning them important functions in the exercise of which they shall be free from control; but in doing so, it must subject them to its sovereignty, in that it vindicates for itself the right of deciding what are the limits of their competence, and of changing those limits at its pleasure. Functions can be distributed to the different organs of the federal state, some being assigned to those which it has in common with the simple state, others to the states; but sovereignty, which is in its nature indivisible, cannot be divided between the states and the federal state. The states may retain autonomy; sovereignty they must relinquish.

It lies, indeed, in the nature of sovereignty that it is unlimited, that no obligation can be imposed upon it by any earthly power. A state the limits of whose competence are determined for it, cannot be a sovereign state. Two sovereigns cannot rule over the same territory at the same time, nor divide between them the life of a nation. In order to reconcile the sovereignty of the union with the sovereignty of the states, jurists have drawn a line on one side of which they have placed the sovereign powers of the Union, on the other the sovereign powers of the states. This line which divides the powers is, according to their view, the boundary between sovereign states. This theory overlooks the organic nature of the

state. The functions of government may be assigned to different organs, but these organs must be the organs of the one sovereign state. As well set up two sovereigns within the life of the individual as within the life of the state. There is no clear and sharply defined line between state and federal powers. They are so interlaced and intertwined that it taxes the ingenuity of our highest tribunal to determine where federal functions end and state functions begin. Can it be that these delicate and perplexing questions are to be regarded as boundary disputes between two sovereigns, and is the federal judiciary a board of arbitration to which these sovereigns have agreed to refer their disputes? Moreover this boundary between federal and state powers should not be unchanging. As the conditions of national life change, it becomes necessary that the federal government should assume jurisdiction over subjects which in simpler conditions are left to the states. With a written constitution, which cannot be easily amended, it is inevitable that this transference of power should be made largely by interpretation. But by whatever process the change is wrought, whether by interpretation or by constitutional amendment, the competence of the state is narrowed even against its will by the action of the federal state. It is, indeed, inconceivable that a nation should allow such vital questions as the distribution of governmental functions to depend upon the decision of another sovereignty and to be settled by an international agreement.

With these deductions from the nature of sovereignty the federal Constitution is in accord. All cases involving questions of federal authority are decided by the federal judiciary. The limits of the competence of the states may be changed by constitutional amendment. But from the fact that the assent of three fourths of the states is required, it has been inferred that this is not federal but state action. The states, it is said, relinquish powers which they reserved when the Constitution was established. To this it may be replied that the Article prescribing how the Constitution may be amended is, like the constitution of which it forms a part, a fundamental federal law binding upon the states. Moreover, since the assent of three fourths of the states is sufficient, what becomes of the sovereignty of the dissenting fourth—a fourth, too, that may change with every new

amendment. The objection rests upon a misconception of the nature of a federal state and of what constitutes federal action. The states are not outside of the federal state but are parts of it. They are indeed its organs, although enjoying greater freedom of action than belongs to administrative districts. If we are to deny the character of federal action to everything in which the states take part, we shall have to deny it to laws enacted by a Congress one branch of which is chosen by the states. While we have denied that the states are sovereign we have not claimed that the sovereignty resides in those organs of the federal government which bear a distinctively national character and which it has in common with every simple state. The sovereignty is lodged in the federal state.

There are to be seen in the museums of Europe, large collections of antiquated armor. A proposition to equip a modern army with these ancient weapons might excite a smile. This mirth-provoking spectacle we actually see in America where the two great political parties confront each other armed with weapons which should long ago have been consigned to a museum of antiquities. One of these antiquated missiles is the doctrine of state sovereignty. Formidable as it may have been, it is now dangerous only to those who wield it. For it is not only antiquated but dishonored. The fact that it came so near being fatal to the union has brought it into perpetual discredit. There are, we are aware, but few in our day who accept Calhoun's doctrines. But there is no middle ground between Calhoun's principles and the views here advanced. Sovereignty belongs either to the federal Union or to the states. Either the federal government is the agent of the sovereign states, or the states are organs of the federal state and subject to its supreme authority. The federal state is not the negation of the idea of the state. Although the states are not subject to control, since, within the sphere of their competence, they have the right to establish the law as well as to administer it, yet they are the organs of the federal state, which in depriving them of sovereignty has left them autonomy. The Democratic party is, in virtue of its history, the champion of state autonomy; but, also as a result of its history, it is fighting for a good cause with antiquated and discredited weapons.

RICHARD HUDSON.

ARTICLE IV.—ANTHROPOLOGICAL MYTHOLOGY.

Myth, Ritual and Religion. By ANDREW LANG. London : Longmans, Green & Co., 1887. 2 vols.

AMONG the newer sciences which have recently attracted the study of scholars, none is of wider scope and greater interest than anthropology. Men have at last realized more than ever before that there is, in a sense, a limit to the profit of the study of the single functions of man, and that the truest and most instructive method of regarding him is in his entirety. The anthropologist views man as a whole, developed under varying conditions of climate, situation, race, and temperament. The influence of his environment is considered as bringing about different states of life, manners, customs and ideas. His intellectual development is studied as being due in large measure to his surroundings, and nothing is overlooked which may in the least have contributed to this development. The theory of Evolution and the "survival of the fittest," has been one of the most powerful factors in awakening interest in this subject, and it is in the phenomena of this science that the working and results of this principle can perhaps be most readily observed and vividly portrayed. Evidently anthropology must call in the assistance of her sister sciences, and in turn she is not niggardly in returning facts which add much to their value. We are now inclined to wonder how it could be that the study of man as a being composed of both body and mind should have been so long neglected. With the gradual growth of the conviction that the so-called "historical" method promised the truest results in all lines of inquiry, has come also the conviction that the development of any part must depend in some measure upon the corresponding development of the whole, and the good consequences of this belief are everywhere visible. Mr. Andrew Lang's *Myth, Ritual and Religion*, is the latest and most noteworthy attempt to apply the method and conclusions of anthropology to the settlement of some of the problems

of that much debated subject, mythology. Mythology has long been synonymous with uncertainty. For many years students refused to take hold of it in any scientific way, very likely because the idea that such an apparently confused and heterogeneous mass of legends could be brought under any general categories, did not occur to them. Moreover the real distinction between mythology and religion was not observed, and there has always been more or less reluctance to submit religion to any scientific study. Again, it must be acknowledged by all that comparative philology is necessary, as an aid, at least, to any fruitful study of mythology. It was natural and necessary that the first steps in the direction of a science of comparative mythology should be made by philologists, and we can truthfully say that Max Müller, Bréal, and Adalbert Kuhn were the real founders of this science. Theirs are the great names in mythology, and should every one of their theories be disproved and rejected, they would still be deserving of as much honor as is cheerfully given to Bopp for his pioneer work in another field. Probably nothing so stimulates investigation among scholars as the desire to discover some new truth or law, which shall invalidate received opinions and overthrow the results of earlier labors. Therefore they are the more courageous and deserving of honor, who first offer themselves to the dissecting knife of the future critic. Since the time when the results of the investigations of these pioneers were laid before the public, our ethnological knowledge has increased so much, and so much new material has accumulated that at the present time years are required to thoroughly familiarize one's self with the established data of mythology. The scope and extent of the science has also widened, and even the most rigid "Aryans" will accept non-Aryan myths and folklore as illustrations at least.

Naturally the question which presents itself to every mythologist is, "How can I account for the existence of this body of legend?" and it is the answer given to this question by each investigator that determines his explanation of each particular myth. It may be well to enumerate three or four schools of mythical interpretation resulting from the different ways of answering this question. First of all in importance comes the philological school. Its adherents, comprising some of the most

illustrious scholars of the day, maintain that the origin of myth was something on this wise. Originally there were only concrete words in use, distinguished by gender. Therefore people being compelled to give names to various natural phenomena, used words with necessarily implied ideas of individuality and gender. Then as men in an early stage of development seem to be poetically inclined, metaphor was frequently although unconsciously employed. Thus the earth was called *prthivi*, the wide extended, &c. In this connection synonyms and homonyms would naturally play an important part. In process of time the original sense of this figurative language was lost, the *nomina* became *numina*, and individual beings, gods, were supposed to really exist because of their names. The whole method rests on the assumption of a confusion in words, unconscious punning, and the forgetfulness of men. Other theories have been : the physical theory that "all mythopoeic men had been physicists;" that of Euhemerus, that the gods were originally men and all "myths exaggerated records of facts;" the symbolic theory, that all myths are simply symbols of pure ideas, &c. Practically the philological theory, which is based on the etymological theory of the ancients, in its various developments, is the orthodox one now, and that against which any "new departure" must contend. This "orthodox" theory has held its ground long and sturdily, and it behooves one to examine carefully the claims and arguments of the last work which so valiantly attacks its veteran opponent. It is plain that, if the claims of Mr. Lang are substantiated, there must be dismay in the ranks of the philologists, and an immense advance will have been made towards the establishment of a true foundation for the interpretation of myths and myth-making. It will be well to premise something about what may be called the Aryan tendency of the philological school, and the objections thereto. Comparative philology is for numerous obvious reasons mainly concerned with the Indo-European languages, and no defense of the correctness and justice of this state of things need be entered upon here. Now as the most eminent mythologists have also been eminent Aryan scholars, it was natural that their view should be in general limited to the Aryan races, especially as so little was known until recently about the lan-

guages and myths of other peoples. Under present circumstances, the demand that comparative mythology be restricted to the domain of Aryan thought seems unreasonable. There can be no doubt as to the preëminence of the early Indo-European languages as a philological basis, but surely there is no *a priori* ground for supposing such fundamental differences between Aryan and non-Aryan modes and habits of thought and expression as to invalidate all comparisons. The very fact of the close analogy which has been discovered between Aryan and non-Aryan legends, immensely strengthens the force of the claim of the anthropological mythologist that he be not limited to Indo-European stocks.

Mr. Lang's method in the work under discussion is first to state the various explanations of myths to which men have had recourse, and their failure to accomplish the desired results, next to make plain his own theory or rather the one which he supports, and then to produce the evidence in its favor both theoretically and by numberless illustrations from the myths of all nations.

During all historical time we have seen various attempts made by the ancients as well as moderns to account for the strange and revolting tales which had attached themselves to the different divinities, and which seemed as authentic as any. It is evident that even Homer endeavored to suppress some of these stories, and as we come farther down in Greek thought, we find open acknowledgment of this sort of suppression. Aristotle says that the young must be prevented from seeing representations of the wicked acts of the gods, and Plutarch is filled with disgust at the recital of their doings, and explains them by assuming that all corrupting tales really were told of demons and not of gods.

There is always a distinction to be made between the "rational, reasonable, decent part of a myth," which we can easily conceive that even well civilized men could invent, and what is called the *irrational element*, comprising all that is "unreasonable, disgusting and monstrous." This difference is perhaps the most striking point in myths and the first to call for explanation. The anthropological student of myths makes a great point of this difference, proves by many examples that

even the ancients realized the incongruity of the legends of their gods, and draws the just inference that "myths were not evolved in times of clear civilized thought," an inference just, at least, so far as the irrational element is concerned. If this is so we may conclude that it was "not men in an early stage of philosophic thought, not men like Empedocles and Heraclitus, nor reasonably devout men like Eumaeus, the pious swine-herd of the *Odyssey*, who evolved the blasphemous myths of Greece, of Egypt and of India. We must try to discover some actual and demonstrable and widely prevalent condition of the human mind, in which tales that even to remote and rudimentary civilization appeared irrational and unnatural, would seem natural and rational." "To discover this intellectual condition has been the aim of all mythologists who did not believe that myth is a divine tradition depraved by human weakness, or a distorted version of historical events." We imagine that the number of mythologists who look upon myths as depraved remnants of a divine tradition is exceedingly small and unimportant. The phrase "a distorted version of historical events" is capable of very wide application, but we do not see why those who are inclined to grant that *some* myths may have had a basis of fact, should not join in the endeavor to discover the intellectual condition above described, for no less savagery is required to make divine the crimes of a real man, than to attribute the same to a god. Mr. Lang is careful to state exactly what he is endeavoring to do, and what not. He does not propose to find an adequate explanation for every mythical legend, for myth is altogether too complex to allow of this being done successfully. "He is chiefly occupied," and this is the point to be particularly insisted on,—"with the quest for a historical condition of the human intellect to which the element in myths, regarded by us as irrational, shall seem rational enough." If it can be proved that "such a state widely exists among men and has existed, that state of mind may be provisionally considered as the fount and origin of the myths which have always perplexed men in a reasonable modern mental condition," and "if it can be shown that this mental stage was one through which all civilized races have passed, the universality of the mythopoeic mental condition will to some ex-

tent explain the universal diffusion of the stories." This theory is plainly based on the doctrine of evolution, but whether one is willing to accept that doctrine to its fullest extent or not, the fact remains that we have historic records of no race of mankind now existing which has not developed more or less in the scale of intellect and civilization, and which has not preserved traces in institutions and customs of an inferior condition. Even if we suppose that man fell originally from a better into a worse condition, it nevertheless remains true that he has been developed back again, which for our purpose is quite the same thing. The law of growth is not to be destroyed. If therefore we are convinced that savages at the present time are in this mythopoeic stage, and that there is the closest analogy between their products and the irrational in classic myth, it is hard to see how we can refrain from confessing the probable truth of the theory. Mr. Lang is much more modest than most mythologists. He grants that every myth can not be satisfactorily explained on any one theory, while no myth is too incomprehensible for those who find the sun or dawn everywhere. The objections to the philological theory are well known and obvious, but it will be well to bring them again to mind. This theory is, as has been said, founded on etymology. A word applied to some natural phenomenon or object lost its original meaning, and was made to represent an individual. The name became a god. Take for illustration the Myth of Zens and Kronos. Müller's explanation is of this nature. Originally there was no Kronos a god, but Zeus was called *χρονίδης*, "existing through time," the suffix *ιδης* not yet being used distinctively in forming patronymics. Later, when this use was common, the old idea was lost and it became necessary to invent a god to correspond to the words *χρόνος*—*χρονίδης*. Even now the difficulty is not obviated, for supposing that this explanation were accepted by all philological mythologists, the question still remains to be answered, "Why did Greeks in the stage of culture in which the language shows them then to have been, invent so loathsome a series of stories as those that relate to the doings of Kronos?" But even the philologists are not agreed on the bare explanation, and the greatest weakness of their theory is the almost total lack of agreement. Under their hypothesis

it would seem that all investigators should come to the same final etymology, the key stone of the whole arch, instead of each finding a different one and ridiculing all others. But alas! this is the sad fact. How can the partisans of any theory assert that it is the only true one, and then differ totally on the very point which is most important? Kuhn and Curtius explain this word Kronos as coming from the Sanskrit *krāṇa*, which Kuhn translates by the phrase "der für sich schaffende." There is a slight difference between this meaning and "existing in time." Further the supporters of this theory, as a rule, refer the original conceptions of all divinities to the sun, moon, dawn, or other natural phenomena, and explain all their myths as developments out of the figurative language used in describing these phenomena. Here again we find the astonishing fact that one eminent authority sees a sun myth everywhere, another a stellar myth, and others still a moon or dawn myth, or possibly by way of variety a storm myth. In the logical carrying out of their theory, they are obliged to resort to the most violent analogies. Thus to take one instance, Müller, who is as often wrong as right, makes *ahana* a word used once in the Rig Veda, equivalent to *dohana*, meaning the dawn, and this again the same as the Greek *Adφην* meaning the laurel, all of which etymology is certainly false. The consequence of much of this kind of reasoning is the piecing together a tissue of absurdities. Further, the etymological theory is an exceedingly small basis on which to place so great a superstructure as the mythology of the world, for it necessitates our attributing oftentimes to mythopoeic men, powers of abstraction and metaphysical conception of which they certainly were not capable. This same myth of Kronos means, according to Kuhn, "that Kronos, the lord of light and dark powers, swallows the divinities of light. But in place of Zeus (that is, of the daylight sky), he swallows a stone, that is the sun. When he disgorges the stone (the sun), he also disgorges the gods of light, whom he had swallowed." Many find it hard to believe that all these distinctions were in the mind of the mythopoeic man. Other objections to this theory are more easily brought forward in particular myths, and it is the cumulative evidence of this kind which is collected in several hundred pages, that will, we feel

sure, be for most students amply sufficient to prove its inadequacy. But let it not be understood that Mr. Lang or any student supposes for a moment that etymology has not had a considerable share in the development of myths. Tiele's words are quoted with approval, that "in the genealogical relations of myths, where we have to determine whether the myths of peoples whose speech is of the same family, are special modifications of mythology once common to the race whence these peoples have sprung, the philological method alone can answer."

Before proceeding to the theoretical support of the anthropological method and the answering of the objections brought against it, Mr. Lang gives credit to several men of earlier time, notably to Fontanelle in his *Origine des Fables*, for having suggested this theory and its main ideas, and to a remark made by Eusebius of similar tenor, a striking proof that there is nothing new under the sun. Attention has already been called to the really perplexing part of the mythical question, namely how it came about that the great mass of myth should consist of vile and monstrous tales about the gods, of which even the ancients were thoroughly ashamed as is shown by their attempts at apologetics. Now the fundamental difference between the anthropological and earlier methods is that whereas earlier "inquirers took it for granted that the myth-makers were men with philosophic and moral ideas like our own—ideas which from some reason of religion or state they expressed in *bizarre* terms of allegory," the anthropologists "attempt to prove that the human mind has passed through a condition quite unlike that of civilized man, a condition in which things seemed natural and rational" that now do not, and consequently myths evolved then, "if they survived into civilization would be such as civilized men find strange and perplexing." The question then is whether there is a state of mind to which such monstrous and unnatural stories seem perfectly natural and legitimate. This being answered in the affirmative, the theory is maintained that all such portions of myths are a "legacy" from savage ancestors, and that the senseless element is in the nature of a survival. We admit survivals from savagery in our institutions political and social, why not in ritual and religion? This would

seem at first sight to contradict the evolutionist's doctrine of the "survival of the fittest," but this is really not the case, for it is not a permanent survival but only the cropping out of old ideas before they perish forever in the light of advancing culture. The object then is to prove that this element is such a survival, or "has been borrowed from savage neighbors by a cultivated people, or lastly is an imitation by later poets of old savage data." The working advantages of this method are plain, for savages are even now in the mythopoeic stage, and an "actually demonstrable condition of the human intellect" is to be dealt with. All suppositions as to what the "primitive" man did or thought, are rendered useless, and we have only to observe the actual methods and results of the savage mind. It is now admitted that the best way to gain a correct knowledge of certain phenomena of language is to study those actually spoken, and it would seem reasonable to apply the same process to mythology. All that is necessary to account for the survival of this irrational element so long, is found in the fact that religious tradition of every kind is the most persistent and ineffaceable, continuing with a strength quite incomprehensible. Even Socrates did not care to run the risk of attempting to do away with the current disgusting Greek myths, but preferred to invent apologetic explanations.

The wonderful diffusion of stories which are almost identical, is a somewhat different question from that of the origin of myths although closely related to it. The anthropologists holds that if myths originate in the savage mind and are conditioned by his mental habits, then as these are almost the same the world over, the wide diffusion of the same mythical ideas may be accounted for by the practical identity of the conditions which produced them, without necessarily supposing either "borrowing or transmission of myth, or unity of race." One must admit however that this will hardly explain the occurrence of long and similar plots in opposite quarters of the globe. This strange fact is really unaccounted for by any theory, and seems to necessitate some hypothesis of borrowing or original unity of race. Still this is not vital to the discussion at hand.

There is now in Mr. Lang's words, a double hypothesis upon which this method rests : "first, that satisfactory evidence as to

the mental conditions of the lower and backward classes is obtainable; second, that the civilized races (however they began) either passed through the savage state of thought and practice, or borrowed very freely from people in that condition." The substantial truth of this hypothesis is proved by a wealth of evidence that is quite convincing, but can not of course be reproduced here. The bulk of the work consists of an examination of very many of the myths of many nations in the light of this theory, showing point by point its general adaptability and truth, with results in the way of rational explanation which are most gratifying. It is not to be expected that in five hundred pages of such work there should be no errors and no conclusions which are not thoroughly proved and necessary, but Mr. Lang has succeeded wonderfully well in avoiding pitfalls and rash generalizations. The treatment of Hindu myths is perhaps the least satisfactory, but this is probably due to the fact that they are extremely difficult and complex in themselves and that having no knowledge of Sanskrit the author had to obtain all information second hand. We are confident that no one can rise from a perusal of this book and the careful weighing of its cumulative evidence without feeling that a method of explaining the irrational in mythology has been here worked out, far more comprehensive and satisfactory than any other yet discovered.

S. B. PLATNER.

ART. V.—TOLSTOI AND THE MODERN CHURCH.

THE promising young scholar* who translated Tolstoi's "My Religion" into English speaks thus of his work: "I made a translation of Count Leo Tolstoi's 'My Religion' which has had something of a success. * * * The Christians do not seem especially to admire it, however, probably because there is so much of Christianity in it." Such a remark as that, coming from a literary man who reflects the prevailing opinions of his circle, is significant; and, though much has already been said and written on this subject, it may be profitable to review it again. What the literary man accepts, the theologian should carefully investigate, even though he finally decide to reject it utterly.

Let us glance briefly at Tolstoi's religious experience and opinions as embodied in the three works, "My Confession," "My Religion," and "The Spirit of Christ's Teaching."†

Count Lyof N. Tolstoi was born in the Russian province of Tula in the year 1828. He belonged by birth to the nobility, and had every advantage and disadvantage that wealth brings to a young Russian. He was christened and educated in the faith of the Orthodox Greek church; but at the age of 18, he had discarded "all belief in anything." He says "for thirty-five years I was * * * a nihilist, not a revolutionary socialist, but a man who believed in nothing."‡ Finding no morality and little real faith among the professed adherents of his national church, it is not surprising that he discarded its teachings. He extended his studies in every direction, and did all he could to develop his physical powers. He became a soldier, and won distinction in that position most highly honored among Russians. He returned from the war, settled in St. Petersburg, and soon gained great distinction as an author. Having abundant wealth at his disposal, he plunged into all those Corinthian,

* Huntington Smith.

† The references in this article are to the American editions, published by Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., New York.

‡ *My Confession*, page ix.

Babylonian excesses, from which society among the Russian nobility has gained a world-wide infamy. He says: "I put men to death in war, I fought duels to slay others, I lost at cards, wasted my substance wrung from the sweat of peasants, punished the latter cruelly, rioted with loose women, and de-violence, and murder, all committed by me, not one crime omitted deceived men. Lying, robbery, adultery of all kinds, drunkenness, etc., and yet I was not the less considered by my equals a comparatively moral man. Such was my life during ten years."* No wonder he says: "I grew disgusted with mankind and with myself."† His literary career was outwardly brilliant—yet all the time he had a consciousness that he was presuming to teach, when he knew nothing, believed nothing.

Finally, he left the city and went to his estates, mingled with the people, and tried to find satisfaction in establishing schools for them; soon disgusted with this, he went abroad for travel and study, but failed to learn in Western Europe what is the true meaning of life. Soon after his return he married; this led him away from his search after the meaning of life, and for a time he lived happily; but seven years before publishing his Confession—that is, in 1874—his life seemed to come to a "sudden stop."‡ When asking how he should educate his children, he was confronted with the question "Why"?

It is interesting and yet sad to go through the experience of this period. One sentence will suggest it. He says: "Had a fairy appeared and offered me all I desired, I should not have known what to say."§ He quotes at length from Ecclesiastes, as expressing his sentiments: "The great Buddha, Saky Muni, Socrates, and Schopenhauer" are all brought forward to confirm his own impressions that life has no meaning—that it is worthless—it is all vanity of vanities, emptiness, and disappointment.

For those who were in the same position as himself he finds four means of escape. First, Ignorance—not seeing the evil and absurdity of life. The second means of escape is the Epicurean—enjoy anything you can enjoy, keep the evil out of sight. The third is in strength and energy of character—life is

* *My Confession*, page 10.

† Ib., page 14.

‡ Ib., pages 24, 26.

§ Ib., page 26.

worthless, strike down, kill, force a place for yourself, or die. The fourth escape is through weakness—drag on, though aware that nothing can come of it. He rejects all these; and this is his final conclusion: “My reason tells me that life is contrary to reason.”* The Brahmin, Schopenhauer, Solomon, and myself” have worked out an equation—the equation of life—and this equation is $0=0$.

The process by which he builds a system of faith out of this philosophical chaos, is an interesting one. The fact is very patent (to which fact he himself alludes) that he has been a student of Kant. Let us follow this process in his own words:—“Then I thought to myself. But what if there be something more for me to know? Surely this is the way in which ignorance acts. Why, it always says exactly what I do now! What men are ignorant of they say is stupid. It really comes to this, that mankind as a whole have always lived, and are living, as if they understood the meaning of life, for not doing so they that, besides the reasoning knowledge, which I once thought could not live at all.”† “In this way I was compelled to admit the only true knowledge, there was in every living man another kind of knowledge, an unreasoning one, but which gives a possibility of living-faith. All the unreasonableness of faith remained for me the same as ever, but I could not but confess that faith alone gave man an answer as to the meaning of life, and the consequent possibility of living.”‡ “This search after a God was not an act of my reason, but a feeling, and I say this advisedly, because it was opposed to my way of thinking; it came from the heart. It was a feeling of dread, or orphanhood, of isolation amid things all apart from me, and of hope in a help I knew not from whom. Though I was well convinced of the impossibility of proving the existence of God, * * * I still sought to find a God, still hoped to do so, and still, from the force of former habits, addressed myself to one in prayer.”§ “I reasoned thus: Faith springs, like man and his reason, from the mysterious first cause. That cause is God, in whom begin the body and the mind of man. As my body proceeded through successive gradations from God to me, so have my

* *My Confession*, page 68.

† Ib., page 69.

‡ Ib., page 81.

§ Ib., page 108.

reason and my conception of life proceeded from Him, and consequently the steps of this process of development cannot be false. All that men sincerely believe in must be true.”*

After his faith returned to him, he went through another struggle or series of struggles. He came back to the Orthodox Church, humbled himself, and conformed to its ordinances; but he could not accept it. Its forms were meaningless, its morality was worse than questionable, its anathemas against Catholics and Protestants were unreasonable. He found the same objection against other churches, but learned much from his associations with the common people, and finally concluded that they had discovered something of the true meaning of life. Then he began to study the sayings of Christ, and succeeded in finding in them just about what he had worked out in his own mind.

So let us turn to “My Religion” for the true solution of this great problem.

Half of this book is taken up with a direct examination of the Sermon on the Mount and kindred sayings of Christ. It is worth careful study, and no adequate idea of it can be given in our present limited space. But the key of the whole is in the simple words of Christ: “Resist not evil”—taken literally. When he had once grasped this idea, all else became simple. This is the first great commandment; but it is just what the Christian world has discarded and explained away. In this connection we quote the following:—“Some time ago I was reading, in Hebrew, the fifth chapter of Matthew, with a Jewish rabbi. At nearly every verse the rabbi said, ‘This is in the Bible,’ or ‘This is in the Talmud,’ and he showed me in the Bible and in the Talmud sentences very like the declarations of the Sermon on the Mount. When we reached the words, *Resist not evil*, the rabbi did not say, ‘This is in the Talmud,’ but he asked me, with a smile, ‘Do the Christians obey this command? Do they turn the other cheek?’ I had nothing to say in reply, especially as at that particular time, Christians, far from turning the other cheek, were smiting the Jews upon both cheeks.† “Judge not that ye be not judged” is a literal command. It sweeps away all courts of justice—all punishment of

* *My Confession*, pages 114 and 115.

† *My Religion*, page 17.

crime by the State. In the New Testament two different laws are referred to : the written law which Jesus abrogated and the law eternal which Jesus confirmed : namely, the law of non-resistance.

The second commandment is against adultery. He finds that Christ forbade a man to put away his wife for any cause. Matt. v. 32 and parallel passages trouble him at first, but after a critical study of the text, he decides that this is the true meaning : "The abandonment of a wife, that is the cessation of sexual relations, even if not for the purpose of libertinism (*εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*), but to marry another, is none the less adultery." A man's wife is the woman with whom he first has intercourse ; and under no circumstances is he justified in leaving this woman for another.*

The third commandment is "Swear not at all." The Christian world declares that Jesus did not intend to prohibit judicial oaths ; but our author finds that that is just exactly what Jesus did have in mind. All connection with armies and courts where oaths of allegiance or of confirmation are required, is forbidden in the teaching of Jesus.

The fourth commandment is a renewal of the great command : "Resist not evil." Special application should be made of this to war and military affairs.

The fifth is "Love your enemies." Your neighbor is your compatriot ; your enemy is not your *enemies* but your *enemy*—a hostile people—a foreign nation. Distinctions of race and nation are swept away by this command.

Let us turn to "The Spirit of Christ's Teaching" for a brief *résumé* of these commandments in the author's own words.— "In order to fulfil the will of the Father, which gives life and happiness to all men, we must fulfill five commandments. The first commandment—To offend no one, and by no act to excite evil in others, for out of evil comes evil. The second commandment—To be in all things chaste, and not to quit the wife whom we have taken ; for the abandoning of wives and the changing of them is the cause of all loose living in the world. The third commandment—Never to take an oath, because we can promise nothing, for man is altogether in the hands of the

* *My Religion*, page 85.

Father, and oaths are imposed for wicked ends. The fourth commandment—Not to resist evil, to bear with offences, and to do yet more than is demanded of us; neither to judge, nor go to law, for every man is himself full of faults, and cannot teach. By seeking revenge men only teach others to do the same. The fifth commandment—To make no distinctions between our own countrymen and foreigners, for all men are the children of one Father.”*

With these commandments as the true teaching of Jesus, our author works out a beautiful ideal of what is the true meaning of life. It is gentleness, love, peace—no longer heartless and restless striving—no longer will men desire above all things the unnatural life of the city—they will prefer the works of God to those of man. And this is practicable just now, even in a military despotism like that of Russia. You need not resist; for if you have nothing, no one will rob you. If you live a life of unselfish devotion to others, they will find you useful to them, and will protect, not destroy, you. You may get put in prison for refusing to serve in the army, but that would be witnessing publicly to the truth and so the highest degree of blessedness. The scientific activity of the age is “epidemic insanity.”† To hold property for one’s self is contrary to God’s will.‡ Under the law of Jesus all must live a life of unselfishness. This is true life—the true meaning of life—the eternal life promised by Christ. And he carries this even to *Nirvana*. He rejects the idea of conscious immortality as a superstition. We quote: “And Jesus not only did not recognize the resurrection but denied it every time he met with the idea. When the Sadducees demanded of Jesus, supposing that he believed with the Pharisees in the resurrection, to which of the seven brethren the women should belong, he refuted with clearness and precision the idea of individual resurrection, saying that on this subject they erred, knowing neither the Scriptures nor the power of God. * * Jesus’ meaning was that the dead are living in God. God said to Moses, ‘I am the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob.’ To God, all those who have lived the life of the Son of Man, are living. Jesus

* *Spirit of Christ’s Teaching*, page 176.

† *My Religion*, page 128.

‡ Ib., page 192.

affirmed only this, that whoever lives in God, will be united to God; and he admitted no other idea of the resurrection. As to personal resurrection, strange as it may appear to those who have never carefully studied the Gospels for themselves, Jesus said nothing about it whatever."* Of the thirteen passages which are usually interpreted as prophecies of Jesus in regard to his own resurrection, our author says:—"In none of these passages is the word 'resurrection' found in the original text. Ask any one who is ignorant of theological interpretations, but who knows Greek, to translate them, and he will never agree with the received versions."† The reality of miracles, also, he seems to doubt. We find no specific denial of the possibility of miracles; but those that he has occasion to notice receive a rationalistic explanation.‡

Prayer, too, he seems to discard. He makes much of the Lord's Prayer as a teaching, but of specific prayers he says: "So we have nothing to ask him for but only to strive to do his will."§ Inspiration of the Scriptures, in the ordinary sense, is unreasonable to his mind. Nor is Christ divine, in any such sense as Theology represents Him. All our author's religion seems to consist in following the practical teachings of Jesus, as Lyof Tolstoi interprets them.

Now let us note some thoughts and queries, which naturally arise after an examination of his writings:—

1. Is he in earnest? Many have doubts on this subject, and it must be acknowledged that in his writings there is a great deal of inconsistency and egotism; but, to the mind of the present writer, there is also evidence of genuine personal experience and honest personal conviction. In his simple stories of the most commonplace Russian peasants—which have been highly praised, and severely criticised—there is something real; it is just what the author sees—or thinks he sees. And so in his religious writings, we find the same element, and conclude that it is just what he believes—or what he thinks he believes. It is true, I fancy, that any man who is deceived, is, to say the least, partly *self-deceived*. So it probably is with Tolstoi, if we conclude that he is in the wrong. But he be-

* *My Religion*, page 143. † Ib., page 146. ‡ Ib., page 206.
§ *Spirit of Christ's Teaching*, page 178.

lieves in himself, and in his own opinions so sincerely, that he does not try to put himself in the background, or to conceal his own opinions.

2. Has he made out his case ? The answer to this question can come only after mature thought. Individuals, like Tolstoi and his critics, do not settle such questions. The final appeal is always to the great throbbing heart of thinking, feeling, intuitive humanity. That he has made out a strong case, we cannot deny. No critical examination of his arguments is attempted here ;* but in this connection we do well to consider a few points.

(a) His environment is something that has had a great influence upon his opinions—the corruption of the Greco-Russian church is familiar to all, but the corruption of Russian society is something which few of us realize. In his confession, he says that, when a very young man, “my kind hearted aunt, a really good woman, used to say to me, that there was one thing above all others which she wished for me—an intrigue with a married women : Rien ne forme un jeune homme etc.”† He draws terrible pictures of the society in which his early life had been passed ; and they are true pictures. Those who have had an opportunity to know personally something of the Russians, have been impressed with two facts : the horrible corruption of the nobility, and the rugged strength, negative virtues, and religious faith of the peasantry. There is much of coarseness, ignorance, and sensuality, but still the lower classes of Russia are the stuff out of which men can be made. It was, then, perfectly natural for Tolstoi to conclude that the church and civilization only made men bad and unhappy. If his associates had been wealthy men like William E. Dodge, A. C. Hardy, and Peter Cooper, scholars and preachers like Mark Hopkins and Leonard Bacon, public men like Abraham Lincoln and James A. Garfield, he would not have gone to the huts of squalor, and slums of tenement houses, to find the only people who had discovered the true meaning of life. It is natural, that he takes as self-evident some things which are directly contrary to our experience and observation.

* For an able criticism of this character, see *The New Englander* for February, 1887.

† *My Confession*, page 9.

(b) Again, his eyes are blinded by his own egotism. It does not seem to disturb him that there are contradictions and inconsistencies in his works. This egotism is not at all offensive, but decidedly illogical.

(c) His exegesis will bear examination. Many of his interpretations are novel ; we find it very easy to pile up authorities against him, and he follows what we consider a false method. He goes to the New Testament to find confirmation of his own ideas, and leaves out what does not suit his purpose.

(d) And when we look at his system as a whole, we find fatal breaks in his chain of reasoning. After his struggles of a lifetime, he finds rest in faith—faith in God—which was not a work of reason, but of feeling. From this faith which was the only satisfactory thing he could find to rest upon, he leaps over to the teaching of Jesus. What is the connection between the two ? Jesus did not work miracles, he is not divine. What, then, is the connection between faith in God, which is man's only hope, and the teaching of Jesus, which is man's only rule of action ? And then again, how do we know what the teaching of Christ really was ? Tolstoi cannot trust the Apostles. This is the way he speaks of Paul. “The separation began with the preaching of Paul, who knew but imperfectly the ethical doctrine set forth in the Gospel of Matthew, and who preached a metaphysico-cabalistic theory entirely foreign to the doctrine of Jesus.”* In fact, in discarding the story of the Resurrection he must give up all attempt to claim reliability for anything reported in the New Testament. The men who told that story were not mistaken ; if the story was not true, they lied. So they may have lied about other things. Tolstoi evidently believes that they did do so. We have, then, these two gulfs : between faith in God and the authority of Christ's teaching, and between the true teaching of Jesus and that which has come down to us ; how shall we bridge them ? To do this, he seems to rely upon reason. Reason is supreme. “We cannot deny reason by the use of reason.”† The thought is not put directly, but implied in his system, that he accepts the teaching of Jesus because it is reasonable. Not only does this seem inconsistent with his appeal to faith already noted,

* *My Religion*, page 219.

† Ib., page 125.

but the reason of other men has led them far away from Tolstoi and his system. In fact, all the world have found what he regards as the true teaching of Jesus, so unreasonable that they have perverted it, or denied it outright. And we do not feel at all sure that the teaching that prayer is useless, that there is no such thing as incarnation and immortality, that the highest reward of virtue is *Nirvana*, would turn men of the world to that simplicity of virtue which Tolstoi recommends—at least, not until they had dragged themselves through some of those filthy sins which taught him the vanity of worldly attainments.

3. Another point we wish to notice, is that he carries many with him, or there are many others going in the same direction. We have quoted the remark of one literary critic; take a higher authority: Howells, who puts Tolstoi first among contemporary writers of fiction, adds in regard to his religious opinion, that he is almost alone in “his frank acceptance of Christ’s message.” Whatever we may think of Howells as a novelist or as a critic, we must acknowledge that when he speaks he is heard. He has hundreds of imitators, and thousands of admirers. He is supposed to know what Tolstoi has written, what Jesus said, and what the modern pulpits teach; yet as a cold-blooded critic, he says Tolstoi is almost alone in his “frank acceptance of Christ’s message.” The thought is not a new one. The French revolutionists, a hundred years ago, declared that Jesus of Nazareth was the first of the *sans-culottes*. And in our day, and in our land, meetings of Socialists have hissed the church and ministry with every sign of scorn and hatred, but have cheered the name of Jesus till the rafters rung. Is it not a growing impression, an idea that receives wider and wider acceptance, that religion, as represented by the modern Church, has drifted far away from the words of Jesus?

4. And this leads us to another inquiry:—May it not be that there is some important truth which we have crushed to earth, that is striving to rise again through the false assumptions and faulty logic of Tolstoi’s Religion? It is the height of eloquence when he describes the victims of the “world life” we lead, as contrasted with the peace and love under what he regards as a true Christian life; and it is an eloquence that appeals strongly to every human heart. Some eight years ago, a remarkable

article in this same line of thought appeared in an English review. There is some doubt about its authorship, but it purported to come from a Turk. He was born, he said, and educated a Mohammedan, but having become skeptical in regard to his own faith, and being possessed of considerable wealth, he went to Western Europe for education, then traveled around the world, studying the institutions of different lands, and finally came to this conclusion: no other religion ever came so near absolute truth as that taught by Jesus of Nazareth; but, he adds, no other has been so perverted and twisted out of its original form as that miscalled Christianity. And he is not led to this opinion by the corruption of the Eastern Churches, but by what he calls the "worship of mammon," universal in those Western lands where Christianity is most active. Four years later President White took up a kindred thought in his Yale address upon what he called "the Commercial Spirit." We are not misers in America: we give like princes, and spend like prodigals; but there is a ceaseless rush, and whirl, and contest—grasping, seizing, holding, crushing. The prophet of old complained that Israel had become Canaan; and commentators tell us that from association with Tyre and Sidon, Canaanite had come to be a synonym for merchant, trader, money-man. Called to be the religious teachers of the world, the Jews became instead, the financiers and bankers and merchants of ancient and modern times. And perhaps, if we may be allowed to coin a word, there may be such a thing as the Canaanization of Christianity. Christ said: "My kingdom is not of this world." "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth." "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven." But to-day Christian nations own the earth and dominate the world; and wherever Christianity is most earnest and active, as in England and America, there we find most fully developed this Canaanization of our faith—this worship of Mammon—or, if you wish a milder term, this Commercial Spirit. And we are confronted with the question: Is this a legitimate and essential element in Christianity, or is it an evil incidental to Christianity, or is it an excrescence to be repudiated?

5. If we have gone too far in encouraging this Commercial Spirit, there will surely be a reaction; and if a reaction, some

will go to the opposite extreme. Perhaps there are already signs of such a reaction. Perhaps Nihilism, Socialism, the peculiar theology of Tolstoi, and the significant comments made upon it, are signs of such reaction, carried to unreasonable extremes.

There is a plant of peculiar growth springing up in the social, literary, and theological vineyard. It may perish in a night like Jonah's gourd—it may grow like the mustard plant, until it overshadows us all. We may call it a new reform or a new heresy; but, judging from past reforms and past heresies, if it be a reform, there is much falsehood mingled with the truth; if it be a heresy there is much truth mingled with the falsehood. And all who are, in any sense, religious teachers, or religious leaders, should be interested in this movement—should be prepared to strengthen the true and destroy the false—to “prove all things,” and “hold fast that which is good.”

EDMUND M. VITTM.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

MATHEMATICAL CLUB.

Tuesday, November 15.

Professor Gibbs showed the modifications which would be expedient in his method of computing elliptic orbits when there are two solutions in which the distances of the heavenly body are not very different; also how the fact that the orbit of the earth is one such solution, may be utilized.

POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB met December 9. Mr. Evans Woollen read a paper on Trade Unions and Strikes in the United States from 1834 to 1840. As early as 1834, it was shown, central labor unions, or trades' unions as they were then called, had been organized in New York, Boston, and doubtless other cities, implying the existence of constituent trade-unions. There was some attempt at national organization. During 1835 and 1836, which were years of extraordinary inflation and speculation, the organization of labor was rapid and general. At least a score of trades organized throughout the country from Jacksonville and St. Louis to Boston. The organization was materially weakened during the subsequent period of depression, the population not being dense enough nor the facilities for communication sufficient to support it permanently.

The strikes of the period which, particularly in 1835 and 1836, were exceedingly numerous, were mostly for a lowering of the hours of labor. The prevailing system was work from "sun-to-sun" and the ten-hour system was desired. Attention was called to the fact that the strikes of the time exemplified the greater liability to strikes at the beginning than at the middle or end of a period of inflation. The successful strikes, with rare exceptions, occurred in the times of prosperity.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

MEN AND LETTERS*—is a collection of biographical and literary essays; Mr. Scudder's style is peculiarly agreeable and interesting; and while the matter of the book is of the varied character which pleases the general reader, it is rich enough in observation and suggestion to win attention from those who overlook all but the best. Yale men particularly will be interested in the tribute to Elisha Mulford which holds the place of honor in the collection. It gives a delightful picture of the man as he appeared to an appreciative and clear-eyed friend, in his private life; and one regrets that the sketch is not made ample enough to fill the book; but the same feeling comes to his reader over "Emerson's Self," and "Anne Gilchrist." The next paper on "Longfellow and his Art," is perhaps the most studied and valuable of all, and the student of our literature cannot afford to neglect it or its companion piece, "The Shaping of Excelsior."

In "Landor as a Classic," we believe many will agree with his conclusion; "apart from a course of study in the Greek and Latin classics, I doubt if any single study would serve an author so well as the study of Landor."

In the last paper of the book as Mr. Scudder looks over the mass of Shaksperiana represented in Dr. Furness's New Variorum, the question arises: Will a wise man ever again have the temerity to write under the title of "Shakespere Once More"? and the thought occurs that "The Future of Shakespeare" will be chiefly marked by the study of his impression on the different literary periods and generations of men. Here certainly is a rich suggestion. It would be most interesting to study the barnacles, some pearl-producing, some corrupting and destructive, which have gathered on the sides of the good ship Shakespere on its voyage through all oceans; and the log-book of the grand old craft would afford more literary entertainment than most log-books yield.

**Men and Letters: Essays in characterization and criticism.* By HORACE E. SCUDDER. Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1887.

Back in the days when memories of the Armada were fresh to the Mistress of the Seas, "Many were the wit-combats," wrote Thomas Fuller, "betwixt him and Ben Jonson, which two I beheld like a Spanish great galleon and an English man-of-war; Master Jonson, like the former, was built far higher in learning, solid, but slow in his performances. Shakespeare, with the English man-of-war, lesser in bulk but lighter in sailing, could turn with all tides, tack about, and take advantage of all winds by the quickness of his wit and invention." Then later Dryden and Davenant cut down and new rigged the frigate till it looked like Cleopatra's barge, and then dry-docked it. Another generation spent most of its time very worthily in rebuilding and restoring it, but paying more attention to the calking of leaks and driving of spikes in the hull, than to the sailing. There were not many passengers in those days, and the crew and sailing masters were in continual mutiny. A later judgment recognized that the master builder knew what he was about, and pilots like Goethe and Coleridge showed that Hamlet was hewn on Norwegian hills to be the mast of no light Admiral. And now arises a company of landsmen who think the ship has all along been flying the pirate flag, or at least sailing under false colors! So the curious history goes on. But Mr. Scudder has done more than to present a merely entertaining theme, he has pointed out a line of study which will surely be followed seriously and with profit.

ERNEST WHITNEY.

TEN THOUSAND MILES ON A BICYCLE.*—Readers of the various wheelmen's papers have long been familiar with this title and at one time many of them despaired of becoming familiar with anything more. Now that the work has appeared they will wonder no longer why it was delayed. The labor which entered into its composition has been something enormous and we can only hope that the author will be amply rewarded for it. A brief description of its aim and scope will doubtless be serviceable to such of our readers as are interested in the subject, since the book itself from a mistaken policy is not generally supplied to the booksellers. The book is designed to furnish such information as cyclists need about the roads of the principal Eastern States. The author has ridden over 10,000 miles of these roads and has drawn informa-

* *Ten Thousand Miles on a Bicycle.* By KARL KRON, author of "Four Years at Yale. By a Graduate of '69." Published by Karl Kron. The University Building, Washington Square. New York. Price \$2.00.

tion from other riders about other roads of the neighboring regions. Beyond this he has given a great variety of useful suggestions on all matters in which cyclers are interested, such as dress, food and drink, touring, hotels, cyclometers, etc. Then there are chapters on records, literature of the wheel, the League of American Wheelmen, a directory of wheelmen and most elaborate and exhaustive indexes. For the general reader into whose hands the book may fall there are two chapters of a more literary character. "Curl, the best of bull-dogs," an old pet of the author's, is honored by a humorous and sympathetic biography; while the chapter entitled "Castle Solitude in the Metropolis," is an interesting study of Bohemian life in New York.

We feel no hesitation in saying that this is a book which it would be greatly worth the while of all bicyclers to get. Those who are just beginning the sport will find it a work of absorbing interest. More than that the author's enthusiasm is contagious. The tired cycler who comes in from a long or hilly jaunt and takes up this book will soon lose his sense of weariness and the recollection of steep ascents, his spirits return, and he eagerly lays plans for the morrow. Even when the novelty wears off he will not forget his indebtedness to Karl Kron.

ROMANISM AND THE REFORMATION from the Standpoint of Prophecy.*—This book is made up of certain lectures which were delivered early last year at Exeter Hall, London, under the auspices of the Protestant Educational Institute. The author is of the opinion that the Roman Church is and has been, during the last fifty years, "making a desperate effort to secure a renewed ascendancy" in the British empire and especially in England. He furthermore believes that the only sure way to arouse Protestants to their social, civil, and religious duties in this grave contingency is to present to them the prophetic denunciations of Romanism which he thinks are to be found in the book of Daniel, the epistles of Paul, and in the Apocalypse.

These apocalyptic utterances of mysterious and uncertain import have again and again been forged into weapons of attack and defense during the long course of ecclesiastical history. In them popes and heretics, reactionaries and reformers, aided by a flexible method of interpretation, have been able to find whatever they

* *Romanism and the Reformation* from the Standpoint of Prophecy. By H. GRATTAN GUINNESS, F.R.G.S. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1887. New Haven, E. P. Judd.

sought. Our author regards the prophecies of Daniel, of Paul, and of John neither as mere disclosures of what is to take place at the consummation of all things nor as predictions of events which were to come to pass in the age of the seer. He, with the so-called historical school of interpretation, considers them "as, fully and faithfully setting forth *the entire course of Christian history.*"

Such expositors as Alford, Tregelles, and Ellicott are looked upon with suspicion because, forsooth, "Greek scholars of such eminence are naturally *shortsighted.*" "Prophecy," Mr. Guinness moreover asserts, "must be studied in the light of its fulfilment." The value of this principle becomes apparent when we consider that each class of interpreters assumes a different fulfilment. Taking it for granted, however, that the entire course of Christian history is mapped out by the three Biblical writers mentioned, Mr. Guinness proceeds to unfold the significance of their utterances. While the reader may be inclined to reject the allegorical method of interpretation and therefore may not accept expositions founded upon it, he will doubtless give the author credit for his earnestness and for his painstaking investigations.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

ADAMS' PUBLIC DEBTS.*—The chief title of this work conveys an inadequate idea of its scope; the sub-title does it better justice. It is not a book-keeper's schedule of national liabilities, but a scholarly treatise on deficit financing, or that method of adjusting public receipts to disbursements which entails the necessity of borrowing in certain contingencies.

The author describes the growth of national debts, and shows that they imply the existence of a developed money market, on the one hand, and a guaranty against repudiation, on the other. Nations cannot borrow money unless there is a loan fund from which to draw it; owners of the fund will not lend money unless they can be assured that it will be repaid. The nature of the guaranty that is actually afforded is an interesting study; at best it seems inadequate to account for the readiness with which capital, proverbially timid, entrusts itself in limitless amount to borrowers whose income regularly fails to meet their expenses, and who are above the reach of ordinary coercion. The author finds the chief ground of the trust in the security of public loans in the

* *Public Debts: An Essay in the Science of Finance.* By HENRY C. ADAMS, Ph.D., of the University of Michigan and Cornell University. D. Appleton & Co.

political power of the moneyed class: "The confidence which they (the public creditors) repose in government does not rest upon sentiment or patriotism, nor does it show greater integrity on the part of the people now than in former times; its simple interpretation is that the possessing classes have made their conception of rights and liberty the efficient idea of modern times, and that in some way the moneyed interest has captured the machinery of government." Progress toward ultra-democracy must then impair public credit, unless it be accompanied by a decided quickening of the public conscience. This security indirectly sustains the credit of weak and despotic states; the subjects of the Queen of England lend money to Egypt because they are certain that they can so far control the policy of the Queen's government as to force Egypt to pay her debts. Here lies a grave cause of international complications, not only because weak debtor states lose their independence, but because the strong states that become the protectors of the weak, acquire thereby an increased influence in European affairs, and become objects of jealousy on the part of other nations of rank equal to their own.

The author finds that overgrown public debts are hostile to the free working of constitutional government. Loans place great sums at the disposal of officials, to be expended under inadequate surveillance on the part of the people who have the taxes to pay. They dangerously increase class distinctions; and the so-called "democratization" of public debts, or the diffusion of them among a large number of bond-holders, by no means obviates this evil.

The industrial effects of public borrowing are the subject of an acute and original study, in which separate attention is given to loans placed at normal rates, to those at high rates, and to those at exorbitant rates. The last two varieties are found to work injuriously. The conditions under which borrowing is a legitimate policy are set forth so clearly as to show the inexpediency of maintaining a "war chest," not to mention reserves accumulated in less intelligent ways. The proper management of wars, and the payment of special debts incurred by them, as well as the ultimate payment of the general funded debts of nations are adequately discussed; and the concluding portion of the book, devoted to local financing, if less complete than the earlier portions, is perhaps scarcely less important, as a pioneer work in this difficult field. The entire book is peculiarly American, and places for the first time, within the reach of every citizen of this

country who can read and understand his own language, a certain kind of knowledge that is necessary for the intelligent discharge of his public duty. The work combines, in a rare degree, interest with instruction ; it is especially timely, and it would effect a positive elevation of our political life if it could be read by every voter.

J. B. CLARK.

HELPS TO WORSHIP.*—The publication by the Century Company of these four books is one illustration of the current direction of religious thought in the line of improving the forms of public worship. Dr. Robinson's "Laudes Domini," first published in 1884, is the culmination of the Spiritual Song Series, which has so long been a help to the devotions of Christian people of various denominations. Its pages have a familiar look which make one feel at home in handling it, although its twelve hundred selections include many hymns which have not found their way into his other manuals.

But the other works referred to, open new paths diverging widely from the well-beaten road which Dr. Robinson has done so much to improve; attractive paths, free to all and which any congregation may follow at will, except as it is restrained by formal rules or by traditions and usages which have all the restrictive force of law.

"Parish Problems" indeed covers a wide range of topics discussed by many writers, and forms a sort of cyclopedia of things material and spiritual; but a sixth part of the volume is devoted to the department of worship, and its closing sections from the pen of Rev. Richard G. Greene lead up to the special forms of ritual which he has elaborated in "Aids to Common Worship."

* *Parish Problems.* Hints and helps for the people of the Churches. Edited by WASHINGTON GLADDEN. New York. The Century Co.

Song of Worship for the Sunday School, Edited by WALDO S. PRATT. New York. The Century Co.

Aids to Common Worship. Services of Holy Scripture from the revised version in the readings and renderings preferred by the American revisers. The Century Co. New York.

Laudes Domini. A selection of Spiritual Songs, Ancient and Modern, Edited by CHAS. S. ROBINSON, D. D. The Century Co. New York.

Mr. Pratt, whose hand is seen in the musical settings of Mr. Greene's book, contributes five of the articles in "Parish Problems," and is himself the editor of "Songs of Worship," a Sunday School manual which appears to be remarkably well adapted to devotional service, and is in refreshing contrast to much of the popular music which has a certain fascination for the young but serves no religious ends.

Mr. Greene modestly entitles his work "Aids to Common Worship." He attempts to answer the questions which exercise every one on whom rests responsibility for guiding, week after week, the public devotions of a Christian Congregation : What hymns shall be sung; What Scriptures read; By what means may every worshipper be interested, guided and benefited? His answer is given with a great amount of detail, the value of which can best be learned by trial; but the book and its method are well worthy to be studied, especially as they embody the fruits of a long pastoral experience.

The book is quite in harmony with two tendencies which characterize the worship of this day as distinguished from that of our fathers; first, to make a larger use of the Scriptures; and second, to give the congregation a larger share of the audible service. Strange as the statement may seem, yet in the early part of this century there were many churches in Connecticut in which the reading of the Bible formed no part of the usual Sabbath exercises, and in which the larger part of the assembly were silent from the beginning to the end of the service. Changes are all the time going on, not the results of legislation, nor matters of record, nor usually ordered by church vote, but according to the taste and discretion of the director of worship, who therefore needs to be a careful student of what is profitable and proper.

Mr. Greene indicates a method by which the selections of Scripture read by the minister shall be made with larger variety than is usually the case. Hence, for the morning and evening of every Lord's Day in the year he indicates one appropriate passage from the Old Testament, another from the Gospels, and another from the "Apostolic Word." This reading he would have preceded by an introductory sentence, with a response recited or chanted, and followed by responsive readings in the style now becoming so much a matter of course in our congregations. It is to be noticed, however, that his "Responsive Lessons" are by no means limited to selections from the Psalter, but embrace almost

every passage of Scripture which is specially appropriate for such uses. These Lessons, being taken from the revised version with the alternate readings preferred by the American revisers, may or may not be acceptable to ordinary congregations, who will stumble on some unexpected phraseology and may very likely disapprove of the substitution of the name of Jehovah for the word *LORD*, to which all readers of the English Bible are habituated. As a rule, it may be said, that changes of phraseology are less likely to be welcomed in the language of devotion, than in narrative and prophetic parts of the Bible.

A point to which Mr. Greene attaches great importance is that "in every Service *certain parts* shall consist of *direct praise to God* by the *whole assembly in song*;" and for this he provides by Psalm Chants ending with *Gloria Patri*, and by familiar Praise Songs set to congregational tunes and invariably followed by a metrical doxology. Of these hymns he provides about one hundred, arranged so that they may be easily and frequently used, say on a given Sabbath every month.

In accordance with another tendency of our day, Mr. Greene advocates the observance of the Christian Year, so far at least as to commemorate the cardinal points of our Lord's life on earth. Hence, besides noting the first and last days of the year, he has special selections of Scripture and of song relating to the Nativity, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection, the Ascension, the Day of Pentecost and Thanksgiving Day.

His complete Order of Service provides a place also for the frequent reading of Christ's summary of the Law or the Beatitudes of the Gospel: the reciting of a Confession, like the Apostles' or the Nicene Creed; a Song of Ascription (*Te Deum* or *Gloria in Excelsis*, etc.); and the Offertory.

The Offertory comprises three parts: appropriate sentences spoken by the Minister while the Alms are collected; a brief Prayer; and a Blessing, said or sung. The rubric, however, suggests that in case the contribution is for the ordinary expenses of the Church, the Offertory Service is not to be used. Why not?

Such careful attention to the details of ordinary worship leads to some suggestions and improved formulas for use in special services of Church Fellowship, as at the Organization of a Church, the Recognition and Reception of Members, the Baptism of Believers and of Children, and the Communion at the Lord's Table.

All these forms invite and are worthy of careful study, and one can not fail to be impressed with the thoroughly Scriptural phraseology which pervades them all.

While provision is made for free unwritten prayer, a short Scriptural prayer is also given for every Lord's Day, and a litany, with suffrages to be uttered by the Congregation.

More than thirty-two years have passed since a Connecticut minister, temporarily in charge of a Presbyterian Church in Western New York, edited "The Church Book of St. Peter's Church, Rochester," containing the Order of Public Worship and of various Special Services; a Psalter for Responsive Reading; the Nicene and other Creeds; and Psalms and Hymns, with tunes, for congregational singing. Responsive Readings outside of Episcopal Churches, were then a novelty, and seven or eight years elapsed before the Church of the Pilgrims in Brooklyn ventured to introduce them, in face of the fear that such service might unduly protract public worship, or possibly introduce an element of formalism. Mr. Greene has been working on the same lines that Mr. Leonard W. Bacon marked out in 1855, and Dr. Storrs in 1863; but the public attitude has changed immensely. St. Peter's Church Book probably had a limited circulation, but more than four hundred churches, of different communions, are said to have adopted the Psalter Lessons prepared by Dr. Storrs, and to have become greatly attached to what has now gained place as a well-established usage.

Mr. Greene's book starts with better prospect of adoption by congregations than the Selections from the Psalter had a quarter of a century ago; but whatever may be its success or want of success in that regard, it cannot fail to be helpful to the conductors of worship, by guiding their selections, illustrating the fulness and variety of the Bible in its adaptation to ritual uses, and showing methods of combination and arrangement for the edification of the devout. The book is fitly entitled "Aids to Common Worship," and ought to be welcomed by all who care to improve and enrich the forms of service by which our Churches are to glorify God.

E. W. GILMAN.

The MAGAZINE OF ART for January contains a photogravure of Delaplanche's bronze statue of Music. The opening paper describes the "Forest of Fontainebleau," which is illustrated from

engravings by A. Lepère. The subject of the "Progress of English Art" is treated by Claude Phillips. English costumes in the time of William III. is illustrated by Richard Heath. A full-page engraving is devoted to the old painting of "John Arnolfini of Lucca and his wife," by John Van Eyck. An account is given of the "Wolverhampton Municipal Art Gallery" in England, which is illustrated with five large engravings of some of the best pictures of the collection. The Art Magazine is published monthly by Cassell & Co. (Limited), price 35 cents a number, \$3.50 a year.

Messrs. HENRY HOLT & Co., New York, have just published

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FEBRUARY, 1888.

ART. I. Schurz's Life of Henry Clay,

Hon. Daniel H. Chamberlain, New York City

II. What Headway is Christianity making against Mohammedanism?

Rev. Benson Sewall, Bangor, Maine

III. Beliefs that Dishonor God,

Rev. I. N. Tarbox, D.D., West Newton, Mass.

IV. Christianity a Science, not a Dream,

Rev. Wilbur F. Crafts, New York City

V. The Difference between Prohibition and High License,

William Lyon Phelps, New Haven

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

Classical and Philological Society of Yale College.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

The Story of Ireland.—The Religion of the Present and of the Future. By Theodore D. Woolsey.—Christian Facts and Forces. By Newman Smythe. Essays on some of the modern guides of English Thought in matters of Faith. By Richard Holt Hutton.—Is there Salvation after Death? By E. D. Morris, D.D., LL.D.—Life Notes or Fifty Years' Outlook. By William Hague, D.D.—Art Amateur.—The Seybert Commission on Spiritualism.—Introduction to Psychological Theory. By Borden P. Bowne.—The Science of Thought. By F. Max Müller.

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NEW ENGLANDER

AND

YALE REVIEW.

No. CCXV.

FEBRUARY, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—SCHURZ'S LIFE OF HENRY CLAY.

THE volumes known as the *American Statesmen* series, now numbering seventeen, had a just *raison d'être*; for the biography of our past political leaders compels or induces a study of the times in which they acted, the forces with which they dealt, and the public measures of importance on which their influence was felt. American history is still but scantily known or accessible in well-written books or well-arranged sources of information and learning. The history of our Federal Constitution has only within the last few years been adequately set forth in formal works; and it must still be said, even after the most valuable labors of Curtis and Bancroft, that the student who seeks to furnish himself with an adequate idea of the men who framed our government and of the spirit in which they wrought, must go back to the authorities

and sources from which those writers have drawn. But the formation and adoption of the Constitution, however signal and interesting an event, was only the beginning of our political career as a nation ; and of our political history—meaning here the history of political parties, ideas, and measures,—since that event, we have absolutely no complete general treatment ; at most only a few sketches or compendious views. Yet it is a subject capable of exact, orderly, and complete treatment. It has for the most part, concerned only one homogeneous people, one nation united by the Constitution, and owing its uniformity as well as variety of political development to the generally undisturbed, legitimate action of the forces which existed and caine together a century ago.

The series to which we refer and of which Schurz's *Life of Henry Clay* is the fifteenth in order of publication, may be said for reasons now hinted at, to be of high value, though the volumes composing it are of very unequal merit. If it were worth while, more than one volume might be specified which could fairly be described as meagre, mechanical, and jejune in its style and treatment ; but it is pleasanter, as well as permissible here, to refer to those volumes which are of most value for form or substance. Of such, prior to the volumes we are now reviewing, we feel sure the judicious reader or critic will point to Stevens's *Gallatin* and Sumner's *Jackson* ; though one ought not to omit to include also Tyler's more recent *Life of Patrick Henry*, which has been reviewed in a recent number of the *New Englander* ; and in which, with skillful hand, the author rescues a prolonged and noble career of public service, from the oblivion induced by the splendor of one memorable speech.

It is one of the strange facts of our history that Gallatin, for example, is so little known and appreciated. He was in truth in the judgment of his contemporaries and by the testimony of his works, now admirably arranged and edited by Mr. Henry Adams,* an amply furnished statesman, of antique simplicity and purity of character, serving the public from a modest but firm sense of capacity and fitness for his work, and equally ready to retire without pretence or the conscious-

* Gallatin's *Writings*, 3 vols. Lippincott & Co. 1879.

ness of fame, when the chances of public life released him. Few abler statesmen, taken all in all, or purer patriots, adorn and ennable our history. As an illustration of the spirit in which he acted, upon a question now prominent in the politics of the country, we cannot forbear to give here the following letter of Gallatin to Madison, written when Madison was President.*

"NEW YORK, June 4th, 1816.

"Dear Sir:—

A late circumstance induces me to mention another subject. During the twelve years I was in the treasury, I procured places only for two friends. One is an obscure clerk in one of the offices of the treasury. The other, whose name is John Badollet, is the Register of the Land Office at Vincennes. He is perfectly competent, of most strict integrity, and supports a large family with the moderate emoluments of his office. Permit me to request, as my absence deprives him of his friend, that if the attempt should be made, he may not be removed without sufficient cause and inquiry. This I know is the same thing as to request that he be not removed at all."

It is often said that political feeling ran as high or higher in the days of Washington and Jefferson than at any period within the last three decades. This is true with limitations. Party feeling, even party rancor, was very unbridled in the former days, but party action and methods, as exhibited in the present "spoils" system and in the present "machine" methods, were unknown until the time of Jackson.

Sumner's *Life of Jackson* cannot be praised for its literary style, but its vigor, directness, and skill in avoiding minor matters and in presenting those of real significance, far more than atone for all other defects. Nowhere else, so far as our knowledge goes, can so just a view be gained of that most truculent, implacable, and despotic political chieftain. Setting aside certain qualities which his times brought into action to the great service of the country—courage and a real though rude devotion to the Union,—the career of Jackson remains the most dangerous and pernicious to our civil and political life, which our history presents. This lesson no one can fail to read in Sumner's *Life*.

But at last the series touches a very high level in all respects in Schurz's *Life of Henry Clay*. There was an unusual fit-

* Gallatin's *Writings*, vol. i., p. 706.

ness here of author and subject,—fitness coming not so much from likeness of character or aims, or from identity of opinions, as from the knowledge and sympathy which long experience of public life is fitted to give, and from profound interest in high topics of statesmanship, and admiration of a truly patriotic political leader. We think, however, nothing will more justly attract attention to these two volumes than the literary skill of the work. Mr. Schurz's life and work have lain apparently so exclusively with public, political affairs, that some sense of surprise is aroused by the delicacy of literary touch, the finish of literary form, which is observable in these volumes.

The life of Henry Clay covered by its actual activities and influence, a period of fully fifty years of our political history. It was a truly American career ;—a poor country boy, rising by sheer force of character and ability to the dizziest heights of public influence and political ascendancy—a career which rested from first to last on the confidence and love of the popular heart—a public life concerned always with distinctly American interests, so that it might fairly be called, aggressively American,—a life tempted by all the allurements which a free government peculiarly presents ; in turn elevated by lofty patriotism, marred by lack of courage to meet its greatest issue, and embittered by all the trials of an insatiable ambition for the highest official place. Such a career would have been possible nowhere but here, and the free and generous nature of Clay, as well as of the American people, appears on every page of the story which Mr. Schurz tells us. A conspicuous public life, crowded with labors, concerned always with great interests, covering a full half-century, furnishes a subject which in the hands of a master, must be of high interest. When to this is added the charm of a really magnetic character and personality, such as Henry Clay presents, the public and biographic interest combine to furnish opportunity and materials for attractive and valuable results. These we think Mr. Schurz has given us even to a higher degree than his friends could have expected.

The materials of the book are, first of all, thoroughly digested. There is not a page which suggests the mere annalist, or which is scrappy or crude in style. The thread of narra-

tive is unbroken, easily followed. Though the subject, as the work proceeds, calls for the constant exercise of the higher qualities of discussion, comment, and reflection, it must not be imagined the purely biographic interest is allowed to flag. Nothing seems to us more admirable than the constant picture we are made to keep before our eyes as we read, of the man, Henry Clay. Few pages, in this work, or in any similar work, seem to us more fascinating in style and effect than this personal portraiture of Clay, on page 25, vol. i :

"A tall stature ; not a handsome face, but a pleasing, winning expression ; a voice of which some of his contemporaries say that it was the finest musical instrument they ever heard ; an eloquence always melodious, and in turn majestic, fierce, playful, insinuating, irresistibly appealing to all the feelings of human nature, aided by gesticulation at the same time natural, vivid, large, and powerful; a certain magnificent grandeur of bearing in public action, and an easy familiarity, a never-failing courtesy in private, which, even in his intercourse with the lowliest, had nothing of haughty condescension in it ; a noble generous heart making him always ready to volunteer his professional services to poor widows and orphans who needed aid, to slaves whom he thought entitled to their freedom, to free negroes who were in danger of being illegally returned to bondage, and to persons who were persecuted by the powerful and lawless, in serving whom he sometimes endangered his own safety ; a cheery sympathetic nature withal, of exuberant vitality, gay, spirited, always ready to enjoy, and always glad to see others enjoy themselves,—his very faults being those of what was considered good fellowship in his Kentuckian surroundings ; a superior person, appearing, indeed, immensely superior at times, but making his neighbors feel that he was one of them,—such a man was born to be popular."

Better mastery than this of language for purposes of personal description one seldom sees. Space will only allow one other specially significant example of this literary quality,—the picture of Andrew Jackson, on pp. 321-2, vol. 2 :

"He was very ignorant. In his youth he had mastered scarcely the rudiments of education, and he did not possess that acquisitive intellectuality which impels men, with or without preparation, to search for knowledge and to store it up. While he had keen intuitions, he never thoroughly understood the merits of any question of politics or economics. But his was in the highest degree the instinct of a superior will, the genius of command. If he had been on board a vessel in extreme danger, he would have thundered out his orders without knowing anything of seamanship, and been indignantly surprised if captain

and crew had not obeyed him. At a fire, his voice would have made by-standers as well as firemen promptly do his will. In war, he was, of course, made a general, and without any knowledge of military science he went out to meet the enemy, made raw militia fight like veterans, and won the most brilliant victory in the war of 1812. He was not only brave himself; his mere presence infused bravery into others. To his military heroism, he owed that popularity which lifted him into the Presidential chair, and he carried the spirit of the warrior into the business of government. His party was to him his army; those who opposed him, the enemy. He knew not how to argue, but how to command; not how to deliberate, but how to act. He had that impulsive energy which always creates dramatic conflicts, and the power of passion he put into them made all his conflicts look tremendous."

We have already said that Clay's public career covered a full half-century. He entered the Kentucky Legislature in 1803, having already been conspicuous for four years in the political discussions and contests of that State; he died at Washington in 1852. With three great questions, or phases, of political life, he held the most important and influential relations,—our foreign relations, the tariff, and slavery. He entered the Senate of the United States in 1806, and Mr. Schurz's volumes contain nothing more striking than his sketch, in chapter iv. of his first volume, of the visions of territorial greatness and national grandeur which were opened to the American people with the purchase of Louisiana in 1803, and the movement of population into the "Great West." No such era of adventure, springing from the throbbing sense of coming power and greatness, had before inspired the country. Clay was by temperament suited to such an era, and he rose easily to the height of the great hopes which then fired the popular heart and imagination. A valiant, proud, fervent American spirit became at once characteristic of him. He threw himself into the advocacy of Jefferson's great schemes of national works and internal improvements, and on his return to the Senate in 1809, he began his championship of what was called "home industries," which, however, as Mr. Schurz points out, was far from being "a large conception of industrial development as the result of a systematic tariff policy," but only "a little manufacturing to run along with agriculture, enough to keep the people in clothes and the navy well-supplied with hemp, and so to relieve the country of its dependence on foreign countries in case of war."

With his election to the House of Representatives in 1811, began the stress of his career. He was the soul of the war of 1812. Mr. Schurz's sixty pages—chapters v. and vi. of volume i.—including Clay's career as speaker of the House of Representatives and as one of the American peace commissioners at Ghent, give us a view of the war of 1812, as well as of Clay's part in it, which is hardly equalled in historical value and descriptive power by any brief account of those events with which we are acquainted. Mr. Schurz states that "it is reported that Madison seriously contemplated making Clay commanding general of the forces in the field, but that Gallatin dissuaded him, saying: "But what shall we do without Clay in Congress?"

A chapter is given to Clay's career as Secretary of State, under John Quincy Adams, 1825–1829. This was attended by one of the most persistent and effective scandals of our political history,—the charge that Clay was induced to support Adams for President by the promise of appointment as Secretary of State,—a charge which doubtless did much to accomplish its purpose of aiding in the election of Jackson in 1828, when the cry was, "The rights of the people against bargain and corruption." In the act of supporting Adams, Clay seems, as Mr. Schurz carefully shows, to have been governed by high motives and to have deliberately put his popularity, even in Kentucky, at risk, the legislature having passed a resolution requesting the Kentucky members to vote for Jackson. Clay manifestly had a deep-seated distrust of Jackson, and his motives in preferring Adams were probably truly stated in his letter to F. P. Blair,—"Mr. Adams, you know well, I should never have selected, if at liberty to draw from the whole mass of our citizens, for a President. But there is no danger in his elevation now, or in time to come. Not so of his competitor, of whom I cannot believe that killing two thousand and five hundred Englishmen at New Orleans qualifies for the various difficult and complicated duties of the chief magistracy." Of this scandal, Mr. Schurz says: "Nobody believes that lie now. But it defeated his dearest ambitions, and darkened the rest of his public life. It kept him refuting and explaining, explaining and refuting, year

after year: yet still thousands of simple-minded citizens would continue honestly to believe that Henry Clay was a great knave, who had defeated the will of the people, by bargain and corruption, and cheated the old hero of New Orleans out of his rights."

In this connection it is interesting to note again Adams' firm adherence to the earlier practice in respect to appointments to federal offices. Adams' practice was, as usual with him, aggressively patriotic and fearless, and Mr. Schurz has well described it by remarking, "That he did not exclude his friends from place, was perhaps all that could be truthfully said."

The transition from Adams to Jackson was striking in several ways. A trained, austere statesman, unused to court popularity or to shrink from unpopularity, was succeeded by a party chief of little fitness for civil life, whose election was the result of appeals to some of the most mischievous methods known to party history. Party organization and management succeeded the earlier reliance on great public policies as the basis of political power. The "spoils system" sprang full-fledged into practice. Party patronage became the method of party success. It is to the lasting credit of Clay that while no purist in this respect, he deplored and denounced the new debasing *régime*. In his speech on his return home from service as Secretary of State, he said: "Government is a trust, and the officers of the government are trustees; and both the trust and the trustees are created for the benefit of the people."

Upon the whole, Clay's relations to our foreign diplomacy were advantageous to the country, being in general marked by a liberal, prudent, and enlightened spirit. He acted in the spirit of a statesman, displaying no restless activity and dealing with the real interests of the country, in a large spirit of patriotism.

Henry Clay's claim to long remembrance as a statesman has often been said to rest upon his relations to what has been called the "American system," that is, a policy of tariff taxation with the aim of building up and protecting our domestic industries. We have already seen that he had no conception of such a policy in the earlier part of his career,

his plan in 1810 providing for no more than a preference to home products in the purchase of naval supplies. And when in 1820, he abandoned his earlier scheme for a strictly protective one, it was on behalf of new, struggling, "infant" industries that he made his appeal; and it is a curious and remarkable fact that his tariff measure of 1833 provided for the reduction of duties on foreign imports to 20 per cent. *ad valorem!* Fifty years later the average duties under our tariff were more than 50 per cent., and they still remain about 45½ per cent. Of such protection to full-grown, giant industries, it is evident Henry Clay had no conception or forecast.

Clay's relations to the slavery question are, and will long be, one of the most interesting studies connected with his career. His generous, sympathetic nature, his gallant and chivalrous spirit, made him, like so many of the earlier Southern statesmen, theoretically and as a matter of sentiment, anti-slavery; he would mitigate its severities, discourage its spread, and hope for its discontinuance. But he was a Southern politician, eager for the Presidency, and easily moved by popular sentiments which did not run counter to his fixed ideas of public welfare and personal honor. His moral fibre was not of the finest order, and he was not accustomed or disposed to any austere views of moral duty. As the slavery interest grew aggressive, he yielded opposition, and though never in terms renouncing his earlier views and even reiterating them as matters of wish and sentiment, he became if not a champion, an abettor and servant of the system and its interests. Mr. Schurz's well-known and constant opinions on this subject have not led him to do injustice to Clay's positions and motives. He has measured him by the just standard of his education, his situation, and his temptations. Clay was a compromiser on all questions of public domestic concern where his personal feelings were not overmastering. In the Missouri compromise of 1820, we find him arguing not only in defiance of his earlier anti-slavery sentiments, but gravely claiming that the Constitutional provisions securing to citizens of a State the privileges and immunities of the several States, would be violated by excluding slavery from the new State of Missouri. No doubt his support of the compromise of 1820 was dictated by an

ardent desire to promote the peace of the country rather than by the wish to see slavery extended.

In connection with the disposition of the Missouri question by Congress, Mr. Schurz asks the question which has often been raised, whether it would not have been wiser to have "forced the Missouri question to a straight issue at any risk, rather than compromise it?" He reaches the conclusion that it was wiser to "hold the Union together by compromise at that time, and to adjourn the final and decisive struggle on the slavery question to a time when the Union feeling should be strong and determined enough to maintain the integrity of the Republic, if necessary, by force of arms, and when the Free States should be so superior in men and means to the slaveholding section as to make the result certain." That this motive controlled Clay's course is not asserted, but the inquiry, though speculative, is one of large interest.

In 1837, upon the question of petitions to Congress regarding slavery in the District of Columbia, Clay's stand was characteristic. He boldly asserted the right of petition, but said such petitions should be denied as asking what was "palpably beyond the scope of the constitutional power of Congress," thus putting himself in sharp contrast to that genuine champion of slavery, Calhoun, who instinctively saw the truth of what Mr. Schurz says: "In the nineteenth century, slavery could live only if surrounded by silence." The following words of Clay uttered in this debate are as characteristic and worthy of remembrance as any he ever spoke:—"I am no friend of slavery. *Wherever it is safe and practicable* I desire to see every portion of the human family in the enjoyment of civil liberty. But I prefer the liberty of my own race to that of any other race." Calhoun on this occasion exclaimed, "The difference between me and the Senator from Kentucky is as wide as the poles." Clay's somewhat rancorous denunciation of the abolitionists of that day doubtless arose from the same motives,—his habitual fear of anything that tended to threaten the domestic peace of the country. To the end of the chapter, Clay appeared not to understand the true nature of the conflict between slavery and freedom, or if he understood it, he indulged the delusion that postponement and compromise could avert and prevent a final collision.

Of Clay's great passion,—the belittling, unceasing, morbid longing for the Presidency—Mr. Schurz tells the tale and points the moral, with admirable clearness and fidelity. It is a lesson of infinite concern to aspiring public men of this country, and Clay's life is its most impressive illustration.

Mr. Schurz's Life presents the materials for judgment upon the brilliant, and, in the main, lofty career of a patriotic American; a born, true leader of men, who, as John Quincy Adams cautiously wrote, "had all the virtues indispensable to a popular leader," whose tenor and line of life was as elevated and consistent as was perhaps possible to one who was guided by the loadstar of ambition for the highest office, and who lacked the supreme qualities of deep knowledge, and unwavering devotion to principles. As respects Mr. Schurz's work in these volumes, all who wish to get clear and correct views of past times and leaders in our history, owe much to him for the labor and thought which he has here expended; and all good readers and students will, we think, join in hoping that the intimation which sometimes reaches the public, of his purpose to write a complete history of our political life as a nation, may be carried out. Probably no one of our countrymen is better fitted for such a work by studies, sympathies, faculty and habit of fair judgment, by broad, clear views, and literary skill, than Mr. Schurz.

DANIEL H. CHAMBERLAIN.

**ARTICLE II.—WHAT HEADWAY IS CHRISTIANITY
MAKING AGAINST MOHAMMEDANISM?**

RECENT mission reports from Mohammedan lands are discouraging. The southern Asiatic and northern African belt of countries seem as impregnable against the influences of Christianity as ever. In Central Africa the case is still worse. It is from this dark region that the gloomiest accounts come to us. Mohammedan missionaries by the thousand are said to be deluging the continent with their tenets. Their zeal is as great as their number. The University of Cairo, with its ten thousand students, stands ready with re-enforcements, and a productive, populous, and easily intimidated country lures them on. If they were the heralds of a religion which might pave the way to Christianity, we should hail their propagandism with delight. But if we listen to the verdict of history, or to the not uncertain words of such workers as Bishop Crowther, we learn that it is far easier to convert the heathen directly to Christianity than those who have once come under the influence of Mohammedanism. Looking, therefore, at the problem of the enlightenment of Africa, we must admit that under the present circumstances it is daily growing more serious. Some of the more gloomy of the critics take the position, which they undoubtedly regard as the broadest and most optimistic, that Islam has, by its career and present mission work, the seal of divine favor as a co-religion with Christianity. "We ought to begin," they say, "by recognizing the fact that Islam is not an anti-Christian faith, but a half Christian faith—an imperfect Christianity. Islam is a replica of the faith of Abraham and Moses, with Christian elements. Though the teaching of Mahomet falls grievously short of the teaching of St. Paul, there is nothing in it antagonistic to Christianity."* We shall have occasion to refer again to this somewhat remarkable conclusion.

On the other hand there is reason for some encouragement in viewing certain points along the line where the advantage

* Canon Isaac Taylor at the recent English Church Congress as reported by the *N. Y. Tribune*.

gained has been on the side of Christianity. Turkey, for example, is beginning to show the effects of recent years of contact with better influences. Some well organized and successful mission stations have long been established in Persia. Southwestern India has whole communities of converted Mohammedans, as sober and peace-loving as any in our own favored land. Surely it cannot be truthfully said it is useless to try to bring the Mussulman over to our faith.

Yet compared with the progress of Christianity against any other religion, its progress against Mohammedanism is slight. Is there adequate reason for this state of things? Is there something radically wrong in our way of meeting the problem? Or, is Islam a branch of the true church, a God-given revelation, to be not only tolerated but encouraged?

While exercising the truest Christian charity, we must remember that it is from the Christian standpoint that we are viewing this question. However broadly we may look upon our religion, we must include in our definition of it its fundamental principle of vicarious suffering. To step down from that broad and divine law upon any other ground is to lose sight of the keystone, the grandest fact in the whole system. Is the Koran, then, with its "nothing shall be imputed to a man but his own labor," in harmony with the gracious truth, "the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all"? Is the blind fatalism of the Prophet in anywise akin to the moral freedom underlying the very foundations of Christianity? Is Mohammedan pessimism compatible with the genius of a religion whose tread is ever hastening toward its golden age? Let the Mussulman show, if he can, a revelation corresponding to the Christian's, which is capable of solving the tangled problems of human history and destiny.

In the light of differences such as these, have we a right as candid thinkers to class as an heretical Christian a person whose attitude toward his fellowmen is expressed by these words, recently spoken by a Mohammedan in regard to the Nestorians? "Kill all the men who will not receive the Koran; raise up a race of Moslems from their women; and train up the children in the faith of Mohammed—on whom be peace."*

* Ely Volume, p. 85.

Attempts have thus been recently made to place the Moslem in the attitude of a much misunderstood Christian, on whom it was the merest folly to expend missionary funds. It is argued that his present religion is as high and spiritual as he needs, and that it is best in his case to let well enough alone. His creed it is said is not out of harmony with the great truths of the Christian revelation, and the Christian has neither the need nor the right to interfere with his worship or proselyte him to a new faith.

If these theories are true, we are brought face to face with some serious facts. The open evils for which Mohammedanism is notorious must be indorsed. Faith becomes the dead husk instead of the life-giving principle. Liberty is known only as license. The very foundation of the moral life of man is made to rest not on the eternal principle of loyalty to a personal manifestation of God, but on the quicksands of a nature-religion, whose unit is the tribe or nation, and whose effects therefore in the individual are merely formal.

We must then take the ground of opposition to those who would passively let Mohammedanism take its course. If not for the sake of truth, at least for the sake of humanity, we long for relief for the unfortunate Moslem from the claims of an immoral, intolerable, and bigot-making creed. Christianity has brought this relief wherever it has been propagated in its simplicity. Its beneficent effects, however, have been limited, owing to the deadly opposition in the face of which it has had to press its claims.

In the light of these facts, we are led to inquire into the causes of the slow progress of Christianity in Mohammedan lands, to glance at the present relation between the two, and then, if the root of the matter is touched, to endeavor to find some remedy for the unnatural state of affairs revealed.

I.

First, then, as to the causes.

1. Mohammedanism is essentially to-day what it was in its prime a thousand years ago.

To ascertain, therefore, the nature of the peculiar difficulties of missionary endeavor among the Moslems, it is necessary to

call up in review some of the springs of action and of its founder and their subsequent development. And that we may get them clearly before us, let me draw a rough sketch of the dark background against which in early days the Mohammedan thunderbolts spent their force.

In the seventh century the heathen world was intensely heathen. Idolatry was the law of the day, especially in Arabia where it was particularly offensive, because an admixture of truth had at least flavored it with some resemblance to a revealed and historic religion.

At that time the Arabs were the world's merchants and Arabia the highway of its commerce. True to their nature the Jews had followed the glitter of gold and the odor of sweet spices, and had made themselves and their ideas felt throughout the peninsula. Mecca and Medina soon found their objects of veneration clothed in Jewish lore and brought into connection with patriarchal traditions. Ishmaelitish Judaism had long since ceased to hold to monotheism, the essence of the religion of the Jew. At the birth of Mahomet, naturally a high-minded, thoughtful soul, there was accordingly nothing uplifting, nothing spiritual in the degraded idolatry about him, nothing vital in the distorted Old Testament traditions.

At this crisis we look in vain for a benign Christianity to enlighten the God-seeking soul. Mahomet, in his search, met only a vitiated form of it. What he saw repelled him. All he found was an apparently polytheistic religion, with devotees, ignorant and bigoted, ruled by a priesthood whose power was measured by the superstition of the masses. The gospel was hidden under monuments of earthly ambition and pride. An admirer of the character of Jesus, he was disgusted with the professed imitators of the Perfect Man. He hastened back repelled by the very truths, which, if presented in their simplicity, might have been the means of establishing Christianity throughout that vast region which became the stronghold of the haters of Christ and His followers. Mahomet's eyes were opened to a twofold truth—that there must be a higher religion than idolatry, and that Christianity as he saw it was not that one. The sincerity of his purpose to attain, if possible, to a truer communion with God seems undoubted. Whatever may have

been the later developments of selfish ambition on the part of its founder, Islam surely took its conception in the noble aspiration of a soul to free itself from its base environments.

Happy would it be if this were the whole truth as to the early spirit of Mohammedanism. But, scarcely had it taken its stand as a religion before it began to make concessions to the world—concessions not to the liberty of religious opinion, but to the license of existing evils. If the Prophet was the prophet of God, how explain his attitude toward slavery, polygamy, and divorce, three of the darkest blots on the chronicle of any civilization? If a great unselfish reformer, how could he sanction them? But the evil was done. Ambition, the carnal heart, and love of power had already thrown their deadly manacles about his motives. To be consistent, or even to maintain his personal ascendancy, his revelations must embody these compromises. The Koran betrays the sad downfall of a lofty soul ensnared by temptations trivial in themselves, yet mighty in their awful effects on his own character and on the character of succeeding generations. The polluted fountain sends forth turbid waters. Henceforth the heralds of Islam use worldly means of converting unbelievers, proclaim it as a political creed, universal in its scope, and death as the alternative of conversion and the punishment of apostacy. These phases of the immediate spread of the faith are characteristic to-day and but for the restraint under which it is placed by the European powers, would be most terribly exemplified in persecution and bloodshed. How they have affected missions we shall presently see.

Yet, notwithstanding such elements of evil, Mohammedanism was far superior to the surrounding forms of religion. To quote from a prominent religious journalist, it "would never have flashed like a running flame across the east and around the southern shore of the Mediterranean, if there had not been a great and vitalizing truth at the core of all its errors."* Is it saying too much that it was better than the degraded and idolatrous Christianity which at that time was quarreling and wrangling with itself at the next door? Is it too much to say that in the providence of God Mohammedanism had a mission in its day, and that now that mission has played its part in the

* *Christian Union*, May 12, 1887.

world's history? It has certainly been weighed in the balances and found wanting in those great hidden principles of life in the individual soul which have been among the strongest evidences of the divinity of the Christian revelation.

2. In whatever way we reconcile its sudden and prodigious growth with the beneficence of God, there are certain facts connected with Islam which we must recognize,—facts which will serve to explain not merely its mushroom growth, but, what is more to the point, its present attitude toward Christianity.

There are certain *external* reasons why the new faith gained rapid headway. Of these the most obvious was the weakness of existing governments. The union between throne and province was by a rope of sand. Given faithless executive officers and intercommunication slow and unsafe, and you have an end of good government. Strike the fabric a fair blow and it scatters in a thousand fragments. Mahomet and his immediate successors had no difficulty in the use of the magic wand. One touch, and all was ruin; another touch, and a new political temple rose, with themselves as high priests.

To the political situation there is added a most interesting religious element. The idolatrous worship of the Orient had not enough intrinsic truth or even plausibility to hold its adherents in a strong grasp. The Jewish expectation of a Messiah had undoubtedly insinuated itself unseen but not unfelt along the highways of international commerce. A certain instability and unrest, always perceptible in the popular mind on the eve of a great crisis, took possession of the peninsula. A wavering, unsatisfied attitude was developed toward existing institutions, which showed itself later in an enthusiastic and devoted adherence to the claims of the Prophet.

Allusion has already been made to the corruption of Christianity as a cause of the rise of the new faith. We have reason to believe that this corruption had no less a part as an element in its development. In both the eastern and the western church image worship and reverence for the saints had become so essential a part of the system that the Christians to the Moslem were the merest idolators. The very doctrine of the Trinity seemed blasphemy. Taught from the outset to spread monotheism, he came to look on the Christians not merely as polytheists,

but as deep dyed infidels who could not be made to accept the true God and His Prophet. Missionary work, therefore, that should have been done by the Christian was forgotten in sectarian dispute, and left to the advocate of Islam. The nerve of Christian missions was in a state of torpor. That of the Mohammedan on the contrary was excited by those external and baser motives of self-gratification, indulgence, and even license. It was not the first time in the world's history that a corrupted and belied truth had to give place to a more plausible but intrinsically less vital system than its own.

Mohammedanism thus became external. The natural and inevitable result was that the growing power, unquenchable zeal, and outspoken observance of the prescribed forms of worship of the faithful, added greatly to the momentum of the new force in society.

Notwithstanding the power of these circumstances in moulding the future of Islam, this wonderful onward march could not have come about but for certain inherent qualities it possessed, at least in the germ, which rendered it in its older days one of the most powerful of political religions, and now renders it one of the most difficult of access.

Scarcely had Mahomet found himself at the head of a politico-religious party, before which the avenues of influence opened enticingly, ere he yielded to the pressure of the ambition to gain power and maintain it by the law of might. Successes followed. The bait of spoils was so fascinating to the class of men among whom he lived, that myriads flocked to his standard, undoubtedly influenced by this motive alone. It soon became a religious duty to convert the infidel or murder him and confiscate his goods,—the latter presenting on the whole the most attraction. From this cause a sort of hereditary taint still lingers in Moslem blood, a taint of jealousy and hatred of all creeds but his own. The narrowness and bigotry of the Koran foster it. A conservatism too conservative to merit such an honorable title rules the Mohammedan world, and harasses all attempts to better its condition. The fatalism of its founder is an influence which has probably been more nearly the direct cause of stultifying and retarding any desires for advancement along the lines of better life than all other causes put together.

To thoughtful Europeans and even to many educated Moslems to-day, the Koran and its extravagances are an acknowledged dead letter, fit for a past age perchance, but now inadequate to supply the spiritual longings of enlightened peoples. In the dark ages there was such gloomy spiritual darkness, and the groping after the Comforter was so blind, that the tangible, didactic laws of Islam to a certain extent undoubtedly met the common want. The missionary to-day has the same condition of things in which to work. Canon Isaac Taylor in his recent paper before the English Church Congress is said to have represented Islam as being readily accepted by low and barbarous tribes because of its material and concrete structure. The remark is quite true. But his assertion that Christianity is too lofty, too spiritual, and perhaps too metaphysical for barbarous or semi-barbarous races to appreciate or comprehend, does not seem to be wholly justified by the history of missions. It is indeed more difficult to plant and cultivate the more spiritual religion than the more sensuous. But in the light of the experience of past ages and in the far more penetrating light of revelation, Christianity has undoubtedly proved itself adapted to all men, even the lowest. That a grosser creed should be received more cordially by the ignorant and vicious should neither surprise nor discourage the Christian worker. It is to be expected and accepted as one of the difficulties against which he has to contend.

Probably the strongest reason for the sudden growth and lasting hold of Islam on so large a part of mankind, lies in the fact that it requires in its convert no regeneration, no inward change. Acceptance of the Prophet demands no renunciation of the world, no life of holiness; the passport is, "There is no God but God, and Mahomet is the Prophet of God,"—a creed far easier for the elegant Oriental or the lawless Bedouin to accept *instanter* than its alternative, the sword. When a poor ignorant soul's salvation is put before him in that shape, what marvel that half the known world dropped on its knees at the bidding of the herald of such a positive gospel? To gain Paradise by such a route was naturally far more acceptable than by the slow, painstaking, and more spiritual way of the Christian.

This scene is being enacted now wherever in the lands of Islam the standard of the cross has been planted. Moslems are satisfied with their easy religion. They look neither kindly nor candidly at the untiring efforts of the Christian missionary. False motives are placed at his door and all his movements are eyed with suspicion. He is constantly met by such remarks as this, which came recently from a sober, well-meaning but bigoted official in India : " Now, tell me in confidence how much you get for each convert you make." Generations of prejudice against Christianity in their veins, and corruption in their own methods of gaining converts, blind them to the possibility of seeing any unselfishness in the labors of others.

II.

We have thus glanced at some of the causes of the slow headway Christianity has made against Mohammedanism. Let us now trace them to their results as seen in some of the present obstacles and encouragements to evangelistic work.

1. The former show themselves in so many and so insidious ways that the faithful missionary is often led to the verge of despair. Let a headstrong fanatical race get hold of a religion and it will, so to speak, take the bits between its teeth and soon be past all control. The Moslem feels that his is the universal religion, spread as it is already among twelve per cent. of the inhabitants of the globe. It rides its servant easily and does not bear down too heavily on his favorite sins. To try to convert him to another he says is folly and worse than folly.

The truest article in his creed is also the truest in our own, namely, the oneness of God. But it is the stumbling stone over which the missionary's help is scarcely able to lift the prejudiced inquirer. " God cannot have a Son," he says. A tri-theistic theology is the rankest blasphemy. When Islam has run such a glorious course, holds with scarcely a break its 170,000,000 human souls, and sees nowhere a religion higher than itself, what wonder mission statistics look meagre ? I say " no other religion higher than itself." The influence of twelve hundred years of contact with a false Christianity cannot be overcome in a generation. Until recently, Mohammedanism

as a religion has actually never seen Christianity in any form which even approached purity. The oriental churches were and are almost idolatrous. The nominal Christianity of European governments has not always been an influence on the right side. Even the Protestant missions themselves have been so hampered and scorned by the self-righteous Moslems as scarcely to have been able to gain a hearing for their cause. And when a Moslem knows that to apostatize is to be a traitor and to incur all the ignominy of a traitor among his former co-religionists, he plainly must be a man of sound convictions, and have the courage of his convictions, who will for their sake renounce all he formerly held dear.

2. The discouraging features of missionary enterprise among the Mohammedans have thus at some length been dwelt upon that the way may be cleared for the brighter aspect which such work certainly presents, and for a better understanding of our relation as unprejudiced thinkers to an important part of the un-Christianized world about us.

This century is a missionary century. Men have waked up from the apathy of the past, and are learning how to reach the masses. The science of missions is in its infancy. If to this cause we may attribute any past failures it is an encouraging fact that time will remedy the evil. Even now the missionary knows better how to make his work tell than he did a generation ago. He has a more thorough equipment before leaving home. His ideas of the grandeur of the work before him are more inspiring. His conception of the love of God and the efficacy of Christ's atoning grace are broader. He has a better grasp on the great principles that govern human action and can consequently use to better advantage the subordinate influences about him in the cause of Christ. His methods are less argumentative and destructive; more persuasive and constructive. He consumes his energies less in curbing the misdirected zeal of the heathen soul than in guiding and encouraging every thing in him that is noble into the channels of Christian motive.

Outward circumstances also yield seed for encouragement. This new awakening in thought and action in Christian lands has made itself felt on the African deserts and the islands of

the sea. Men perceive the influence and acknowledge its ultimate result. A leading Pasha of the Turkish Empire recently said to a clergyman, "The signs of the times are altogether favorable to you Protestants. We are falling and you are rising. I shall die in the faith of the Koran but my grandchildren will believe in your Bible."* They see themselves that the vast fabric of the Moslem faith is rotten through and through. It is a political religion, local in its fundamental ideas. To the truth of these statements the appeal to force and the verbal inspiration of their scriptures attest. To-day there is not a Mohammedan power of stability on the face of the earth. The sacredness of the letter of the Koran, which renders it untranslatable confines its influence to narrow and ever narrowing channels. The result is not far to see. Look back at the pagan Roman Empire and what do we find but these same principles? A state putrifying in its own immorality, a religion whose power had long since waned and whose votaries were rapidly decreasing. We see a new principle, a new religion in each case undermining the old, planting seeds of truth which will spring up and blossom on the ruins of by-gone errors. History repeats itself before our eyes.

In individual communities Christianity has transformed men and shown its power and benign effects on life and character. The Moslem has begun to appreciate the value if not of the new morality, at least of the changed outward circumstances of the Christian converts. No little advantage has accrued to the missionary by his patient devotion to the secondary work of making his home and his home-life Christian in the largest sense of the word. School and college as well as the more strictly mission work have called forth unwilling praise at home and abroad. By the respect he and his work gain in the sight of the natives as well as by the background of respect for the foreign government of which he is a representative, the missionary has an advantage of no small moment. An influence thus in almost every case used for the practical and material as well as for the spiritual good of the people has increased mutual confidence and given the missionary a leverage of vast power over his people. Whatever attitude the

* Bainbridge's "Tour of Missions," p. 481.

Mussulman takes in respect to Christianity he has come to look on its representative as a person whose word is not to be treated with contempt. It may be asserted that this is not much to say. On the contrary it is a matter of prime importance. The power of the missionary thus planted in the Moslem's home life, in his methods of business, in his views of worldly affairs, is the beginning of a change whose progress may involve generations of time but whose import is vast and unquestioned.

III.

What now are some of the results attained from our study of the attitude toward each other taken by these two great religions?

The conflict which has waged for twelve centuries is now coming to a crisis. It is believed that a new day is approaching when the crumbling mass of error will give place to the mighty power of Christ. We are to be witnesses of at least the beginnings of that disintegration. And we may wisely inquire how best the missionary is to make his influence felt not merely as a destructive power working against a false creed, but rather as a power uplifting and life-giving, struggling to present to the superstitious Moslem a truer faith, a surer hope, a diviner love.

How, we ask, is this to be done?

1. It seems to be the judgment of the most experienced missionaries, that the Moslem must be reached *indirectly*. In certain localities, to be sure, preëminently in south-western India, where the Mohammedans are peculiarly open to religious appeal, marked success attends the use of direct evangelistic work. But the past has shown that far greater results at a far smaller expenditure of energy and means, have been attained, by sowing seeds in neighboring sects, more accessible to the gospel and letting them fructify before the Moslem's eyes. In time, when he has been influenced by its visible power in other lives he is willing to receive what he before would have utterly rejected. Now is the time of seed sowing. The great and obvious fact of the weakness of the Mohammedan faith is in itself enough to stimulate the Christian world to renewed en-

deavor. But the methods must be adjusted to the ends. To-day, for example, the Bible, in the noble version of Drs. Smith and Van Dyck, is accessible to every reader of the Koran. A year's labor at the dissemination of copies of the Testament and Biblical literature in Arabic, which our Protestant press in Turkey, Persia, and India are so abundantly issuing, will hasten the coming of the kingdom more than ten years of direct evangelistic work in a new mission station. Not that the latter is undervalued. God forbid. Every possible effort for the conversion of individuals must be put forth. The crisis has not yet come when men have but to rest on their oars waiting to see the great Moslem ark sink at her moorings. Raise every muscle to rescue all by all means. Clothe them and put them in their right minds; point them higher in every department of their lives. But for the present it is evident that we must base our highest hopes for the Mohammedan, so far as direct influence on him is concerned, on the dissemination of the Bible in the vernacular, looking for results here and there, but waiting patiently for the great upheaval.

2. Past generations have erred in assuming Mohammedanism to be wholly, utterly, and absolutely false, and in charging its adherents with consciously opposing the higher light of truth. It has a core of divine reality in it which should be recognized and used. Can it be that He who is the Light of the World, and who lighteth every man coming into the world, has totally hidden His face from honest seekers after truth in that highest of all religions but Christianity itself? Instead, therefore, of ignoring the Koran, should not the missionary endeavor to lead the Moslem to examine those suras which express reverence for the Bible and for Jesus? His interest in the Koran may be thus used to awaken in him an interest in the Bible. His reverence for prayer may be shown to him to be the channel through which all true men seek the good God he worships. To neglect these important factors is a fatal mistake—nay more, it is a narrow misapplication of the best weapons given for spiritual warfare. The story is told of a skillful captain who found himself caught in a typhoon. He calculated the position of its center, gained the outer edge and was carried by it gloriously on his course half way across the Indian ocean. Surely the

wise missionary should unhesitatingly take advantage of those elements which at first sight seem to present only difficulties. While recognizing Christ-like traits which occasionally appear in the Mohammedan, there may be danger indeed of going too far and dropping the bars of Christianity so low as to reduce it to the level of other religions. This is not Christian. But the recognition of the brotherhood of man and of the higher strivings after truth that come into each life, and the endeavor, in the face of all difficulties, to meet this want with a satisfying faith, is truly Christian.

The faith which is ours is the broadest, most human, most divine we can know. And as we rise in it to greater heights we obtain larger views of the relation between God and man, and more satisfying conceptions of the extent of Christ's atoning work. Look at Islam, "a prophet without miracles, a faith without mysteries, a morality without love,"* and then look at Christianity with its perfect Founder, its life-giving faith, its eternal possibilities of service. It is the lifeless pebble by the side of the nascent seed. The onward march of mankind demands release of all who thus may be slaves to any vice, any law, any philosophy or any religion which hides higher truth. "Let well enough alone" is not a Christian sentiment. If the plane of Mohammedan faith and morality still seems to any one, "well enough," what is to be said of its soul-cramping externality and its self-blinding hatred of all that goes to make up Christian liberty?

Interest in human welfare demands interest in this solemn question of the relation to one another of these two mighty forces. It is one of the most important problems of the hour, as well as one of the standing problems of the centuries. As such it has been presented in the hope that a question so vital to humanity may become more real to us, whose privilege it is as sharers in the blessings of a Christian civilization to direct those blessings toward the right side of every problem on which we are called to pass judgment.

BENSON SEWALL.

* Schlegel.

[It remains to add the painful intelligence that Mr. Sewall, the writer of the foregoing paper, was drowned in the Penobscot River, near his father's home in Bangor, Maine, Wednesday morning, December 28.

He was born in Wenham, Mass., July 2, 1862, and graduated at Bowdoin College in 1883. The death of his sister left him the only child of his parents. He early consecrated himself to Christ and to the Christian ministry. He spent four summers in the Summer Schools at Amherst, Burlington, and Boston, and two in Europe, going the second time for study in Germany. During the two years that intervened between College and Seminary he was Principal of the Academy in Shoreham, Vt., and entered upon his work there with the vigor of youth and the high aims of a Christian. His labors proved an inspiration not only to his pupils but throughout the community. Returning he entered Bangor Theological Seminary in the autumn of 1885, and would have graduated next June. At the close of his middle year he spent three months in home missionary work in Iowa, to which he devoted the energies of a robust body, a clear brain, an earnest purpose, and a warm heart. The results were remarkable, and the churches he served are praising God for his fidelity and success.

His youthful culture took a wide range,—from such work as preparing the Index for Professor Harper's *Hebrew Grammar*, to the study of art and music, of both which he was very fond. He was well read in the master minds of literature.

He had for a long time purposed to offer himself to the Board for service as a foreign missionary. Three years of his college course and the whole of his seminary work were made to point steadfastly in this direction. But while yet his preparations were going forward, his Master has transferred him to another sphere, where his youthful promise will find fuller fruition, where his ardor will find larger scope, and where the Lord can make his ministrations—even perhaps to the pagan empires over whom his heart yearned—more effective than any service he might have rendered in a longer life below.]

ARTICLE III.—BELIEFS THAT DISHONOR GOD.

MILTON closes his invocation at the opening of *Paradise Lost*, with these familiar but memorable words,

“What in me is dark
I lumine; what is low raise and support,
That to the height of this great argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.”

Every one who sits down to write on the relations which God sustains to the free and intelligent beings whom He has created, ought devoutly to offer that prayer. Little did some of the prominent theologians of three and four hundred years ago, realize the consequences of the forms of doctrine which they were then embodying. In fact, in those remote ages, back of all thinking and writing, it was quietly assumed, that whatever God might say or do was right, simply and solely because he said it or did it, without the slightest regard to the ethical character of the supposed word or act. Of course in every generation, the devout believer in God is ready to say from the depths of his heart, “Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right?” But this is something very different from saying, that every act, however wrong in itself, is made right by a simple decree of God. And while these old writers might not accept such a statement if they were boldly to confront it, yet in the interpretation of the Scriptures this element of God’s absolute sovereignty crept in largely to mar and deform their work. In this general way articles of faith were framed utterly repugnant to reason and to righteousness, but which were then thought to be Scriptural. These articles once fully accepted by the Christian Church, and passed along for one or two generations, became sacred as the Ark of God, and no one must presume to change them in the slightest degree.

Two hundred and fifty years ago in the Protestant churches of Europe, the theological trend was toward the doctrine of the Federal Headship of Adam. This was not far from the time

when our English fathers, Puritans, Presbyterians, and Independents, in the Westminster Assembly were working out their systems of theological doctrine and church polity. At that time the dissenting churches of England were closely allied with the churches of Holland. There was then living in Holland an eminent divine and theologian, John Koch, or in the latinized form of his name Cocceius. He had been connected with the University of Bremen and that of Franeker, but spent the later years of his life at the University of Leyden, where he died in 1669. He is reckoned as being the father of the Federal theology, so called. But what he did seems rather to have been the shaping or embodiment of a system of theological thought, then widely current in Scotland, England, and on the continent.

When this theological system came into being, one of its great and special excellencies was claimed to be that it was scriptural. The theology of the earlier generations was called scholastic, but this was something wrought out directly from the word of God without the help of human philosophy. And when we turn to the writings of Paul, we easily discover the foundations upon which this strange superstructure was reared. These are some of the passages which serve as its chief corner-stones.

"As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." 1st Cor. xv. 22.

"As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin: and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned," Rom. v. 12.

"As by the offence of one; judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." Rom. v. 18.

"As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." Rom. v. 19.

"For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead." 1st Cor. xv. 21.

"Nay but O man who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, 'Why hast thou made me thus?' " Rom. ix. 20.

"Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?" Rom. ix. 21.

The compilers of the New England Primer concentrated the general doctrine supposed to be taught in some of these passages, into the briefest possible space in the couplet,

“ In Adam’s fall
We sinned all.”

In this half dramatic interchange and counterpart between the first and the second Adam, our fathers, while they were disposed to give the most unlimited range to the direful and deadly consequences of the first man’s sin, did not feel at liberty to give a like comprehensive range to the saving power of the second man who “is the Lord from heaven.” They held back very naturally from such an interpretation of Christ’s work as should make it furnish a full relief and restoration from all the sin and misery occasioned by the act of the first Adam. In this respect the two parts of their theological system were not evenly balanced.

But in order to make a theological scheme scriptural, something more is necessary than to find in the Bible a few passages which seem, even strongly, to support it. This plan of the Federal Headship—this condemnation of a race for the sin of its first father, stands opposed to all those passages in the Old Testament and the New, directly or indirectly showing the intense personality which exists in the relation of each individual soul to God. In the scene of the Judgment opened before us by Christ in the 25th of Matthew, how strange and incongruous it would seem if in the items of wrong alleged against those on the left hand had been included the charge that they had sinned in Adam. Or in that penitential psalm of David, “O Lord thou hast searched me and known me,” the whole burden of that bitter cry, is directly from the heart of the penitent into the open ear of God. In this psalm, it is true, occur those remarkable words, “behold, I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me,” but this is not a reference to Adam and his sin, but is only a confession that he came of a sinful parentage, and his leanings from his birth were toward evil. Any where in that psalm, if David had made confession for the sin of his first father, Adam, the effect would have been peculiar.

Paul himself in this same epistle to the Romans from which we have quoted, says :

“ But why dost thou judge thy brother or why dost thou set at nought thy brother? for we shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ.
* * * So then every one of us shall give account of himself to God.”

The prophet Ezekiel says :

"The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son. The righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." * * Behold all souls are mine as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine, the soul that sinneth it shall die."

However, nearly 250 years ago this theological dogma of the Federal Headship was thoroughly incorporated into the creed of the Westminster Assembly, was current in the Dissenting churches of England and Scotland, and so came naturally into the early churches of New England. No one in New England at that time would presume to dispute or doubt this great deliverance of the Westminster Assembly of divines after their long and learned labor.

This was the theological system on which the churches of New England were planted, and which has remained in full force through by far the larger part of their whole history. There are many thousands of men and women yet living in New England, who in their childhood, both in their own homes and in the district schools, used to recite this doctrine of the Federal Headship, with but a feeble conception of the tremendous meanings which lurked in the words which they so flippantly and carelessly repeated. And, in the large majority of cases it may be doubted whether those that asked the questions were much more thoughtful than those that answered them.

Q. "Did all mankind fall in Adam's first transgression ?

A. "The covenant being made with Adam not only for himself but for his posterity, all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression."

Q. "Wherein consists the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell ?

A. "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it."

Q. "What is the misery of that estate whereinto man fell ?

A. "All mankind by their fall lost communion with God, are under his wrath and curse, and so made liable to all the miseries in this life, to death itself, and the pains of hell forever."

Q. "What doth every sin deserve ?

A. "Every sin deserveth God's wrath and curse, both in this life and that which is to come."

It is only about eighty years ago that this doctrine of the Federal Headship was incorporated into the creed of Andover Theological Seminary and stands there to this day in the following stately fashion :

"I believe . . that **ADAM**, the federal head and representative of the human race was placed in a state of probation, and that in consequence of his disobedience, all his descendants were constituted sinners ; that by nature every man is personally depraved, destitute of holiness, unlike and opposed to **GOD** ; and that previously to the renewing agency of the **DIVINE SPIRIT**, all his moral actions are adverse to the character and glory of **GOD** ; that being morally incapable of recovering the image of his **CREATOR**, which was lost in **ADAM**, every man is justly exposed to eternal damnation."

Now we hesitate not to say, that looked at with the eye of the natural man or the spiritual man this is one of the most finished and well-compacted systems of tyranny ever invented, and could only have gained currency at the first, out of the idea, that the Scriptures so taught us and that God could do no wrong. As a piece of tyranny that to which the Jews were subjected in Egypt was of a very light and trifling character. They were required to deliver their tale of brick without receiving the customary straw. "Thus saith Pharaoh I will not give you straw. Go ye, get you straw where ye can find it, yet not aught of your work shall be diminished." But here men were required to deliver the tale of brick, with no possibility on their own part of procuring the necessary straw. Some were to be kindly and gratuitously furnished with this material.

"God having, out of his mere good pleasure, from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace to deliver them out of the state of sin and misery and to bring them into an estate of Salvation by a Redeemer." "Out of his mere good pleasure."

This acts almost like an additional touch of cruelty to this system. What is the counterpart of those words, "Out of his mere good pleasure"? It is that God might have brought the family of Adam into existence just as he did, and might have left it to go on and multiply in almost endless generations for thousands upon thousands of years until the individuals of the race should become like the "sands upon the sea shore for

multitude" and then have left them all "under his wrath and curse, and so made liable to all the miseries of this life, to death itself, and to the pains of hell forever." He might have done just this, and according to this old theology no being in heaven or earth would have had the slightest right to complain or to say unto God, "What doest Thou?" By such strange ascriptions of right and power, our ancestors thought they were doing honor to God, but without knowing it were loading that high and holy name with utter shame and disgrace.

This doctrine in its full old fashioned form is not now preached in the churches of New England or taught in her theological seminaries. Though it stands yet in the Andover creed it is safe to say that it has not been taught in that seminary for the last forty years at least.

But while the direct reign of this doctrine is over in New England, the side histories by which it has been attended, and some of its consequences which still linger about us, are worthy of our notice.

The old doctrine as it is stated in the creeds and catechisms carries with it by an inevitable logic the everlasting destruction of little children, dying before the age of reason and moral responsibility. It involves the destruction of *all* of this class, because they do not live to an age making them capable of repentance and faith. If a full grown man can be consigned to endless doom simply and solely for Adam's sin, aside from his own personal transgressions, the infant of a week old, so far as his relations to Adam are concerned, is certainly in no better condition, and so far as his relations to Christ are concerned, he is seemingly by the light which the Scriptures throw on the subject, in a worse condition. In our own day and generation we have all been ready stoutly to assert that our churches do not hold to the doctrine of infant damnation. But it belongs logically to the Federal Theology and our only escape from it, if we admit the premises, is by methods not pointed out in the Bible.

The writer had occasion the past summer to spend a Sabbath in the town of East Greenwich, R. I. The principal church there was the Baptist, which, the week before had dedicated a new and handsome church edifice. The pastor

was present at the Sabbath service, but the preacher was an elderly man, a former pastor. In the course of his sermon was a passage in which he undertook to show that the only denomination which preached a simple, straight-out doctrine of salvation by repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ was the Baptist. He then went on to characterize different denominations in this particular, and the Congregationalists were classed among those who believe in salvation by baptism. We were so astonished at this statement, that our thought at first was to tell the preacher after the service, that this assertion was a very grave misrepresentation. We had been accustomed to associate baptismal regeneration with Catholics and High Church Episcopalian, but had never thought of hearing it charged upon Congregationalists. But on second thought, looking back over our past history as a denomination, we have given considerable occasion for such a charge, though in the shape in which it was then and there made, it was unjust.

It will be remembered that the second of our larger New England Church Synods, convened in 1662, had special reference to this subject. The early churches of New England being composed only of those who could furnish reasonable evidence of an inward spiritual change, the great question that confronted our early fathers was what was to become of the children of the outsiders. And so the half-way covenant scheme of Church membership, as it was called, was adopted, that the great body of the children might become subjects for baptism. Thus it came to pass for a long course of years that almost every body born and brought up in New England was baptized in early infancy.

Dr. Leonard Bacon, once speaking of this subject, said that in those old times whatever other religious duties might have been neglected the business of infant baptism was thoroughly attended to, and he told the story of an old minister in western Connecticut, who at the close of a long ministry regretted that he had not kept better church records, but then and there entered in the record-book, as final and comprehensive testimony, that he believed all the people of that parish had been baptized except a few Indians, who lived in a remote corner of the town.

Now what was the animating idea—the religious principle underlying this old-time system of baptism? Undoubtedly the Christian people of that day had some thoughts and feelings in common with those of the present time on this subject. The intelligent members of our churches to-day would be generally ready to say that infant baptism had its chief meaning and use not as applied to little children who were to die before the age of moral responsibility, but to those who were to grow up and encounter the temptations and trials of an earthly life. It was to act directly and indirectly upon both parent and child, and thus secure an influence for good that might otherwise be wanting. Doubtless this thought had its place in the old-time baptism of little children.

But there was another idea that held a far larger place than the one just mentioned, and which has now become almost entirely inoperative among us. Baptism was resorted to in the hope and expectation that it would somehow save the child from that direful doom which naturally overhung all the children of Adam. There was nothing in the Scriptures to warrant such a belief, but the mind in its desperate straits needed something on which to hang a hope, and so there grew up the belief that baptism, in some mysterious and unknown way, changed the relations of the soul of the child toward Adam on the one hand and God on the other. This was the beginning of that larger hope respecting little children, which has gone on until at length it has almost entirely outgrown its early shape and dimensions.

That baptism in these former times was resorted to in the hope and expectation of snatching the child from this impending doom is made evident by the haste with which this rite was administered. It is a familiar fact with all students in genealogy, that throughout the whole period of our New England history down to very recent times the date of a child's baptism is taken instead of his birth date when the latter cannot be found. By common custom, the one came so near to the other, that it mattered little which was taken, though the date of birth, of course, was always to be preferred if known. But in these later years if we were to treat the date of baptism as being essentially one with the date of birth, we should find ourselves often ranging very wide of the mark.

The famous Rev. Thomas Williams, who died in Providence, R. I., in 1876, at the age of 97, used to relate, how, when he was born in Pomfret, Conn., in 1779, he was taken, when three days old, through a driving snowstorm, some miles away to the meeting-house to be baptized. For long periods of time it was the custom far and wide, for children to be baptized as soon as possible after birth, so that in case of their temporal death, they might be saved from eternal death. This went on from generation to generation, and men did not stop to think what kind of a being they made of God when He was supposed to be satisfied in this way to settle questions of eternal character and destiny. They did not intend to dishonor Him, but He was dishonored in being supposed capable of sanctioning such trivial distinctions.

When the writer was settled in the ministry in the town of Framingham forty years ago, there came one day, from a neighboring parish, a man in trouble and in urgent haste, to obtain a minister to go with him and baptize his little child, a few weeks old, lying at the point of death. The pastor of that parish was away. We did what probably any minister would have done under the circumstances. The parents were communicants. We went at once and baptized the child. But on the way we tried to make the father feel how entirely safe his little dying infant was in the hands of a just and loving God, and how utterly impossible it was, that any human hand by the mere rite of baptism could change the eternal relations of that soul just beginning its existence. Indeed there was in us a sense of shame and humiliation that any human being should attribute such an official agency and power to a fellow-mortal like himself. Yet this idea in various forms dominated the Protestant churches of Europe and this country for centuries, and we are still living under some of the shadows of these false ideas, dishonorable both to God and man.

But now at length, after centuries of such experience, it has come to pass, that little children dying in infancy, whether baptized or not, whether the children of believers or not, are regarded as safe and secure in the comprehensive justice and love of God. And this wide spread revolution in opinion has came about not through the discovery of any new passages of

scripture bearing directly upon the subject, but through a larger and more hopeful interpretation of the old texts, and through a protest, steady and sure, against the injustice of the old beliefs. The Bible gives us no clear and direct light how infants are saved; whether by the atoning work of Christ, or by the simple purifying agency of the Holy Spirit, or by both combined, or by the fact that they have committed no actual sin, and that the tendencies of sin in their natures are possibly checked and stayed by their transfer from the temptations of the earthly to the securities of the heavenly life.

In a council called in a New England parish for ordaining a minister, thirty or forty years ago, one of the ministers conducting the examination, questioned the candidate very closely on this subject of the salvation of infants, and tried to bring him to say that they were saved through Christ's atoning work. The candidate, while fully believing that infants were saved, would not undertake to say *how* they were saved. After the examination was through, and the members of the council were by themselves, the minister above noted, remarked, that "the candidate did not seem to come up to the common measure of faith in our churches, as to the relations of Christ and his atoning work to little children." Another member of the council ventured to suggest that the candidate was to be commended for stopping where the Scriptures stopped, and not pretending to know what he did not and could not know.

When any article of any theological creed is opposed to the general sense of justice in men it is time to pause and inquire carefully what claim that article has to be called scriptural. It is quite unsafe to conclude, that the Bible in its full utterance upon any subject contradicts the highest and best instincts and judgments of the race. Preachers in the olden time used to make bold to declare, that only those who had been enlightened by the Spirit, and had passed through the new birth, were capable of judging as to what is right and what is wrong in God's relations and dealings with men. But we do not think that the cause of good morals or good theology requires any such distinction as this to be made. While it might be hoped and expected that the moral judgments of a truly Christian man would be more clear and discerning than those of the

masses of men, yet it is to the average sense of right and wrong in men that we must make our appeal. And when, as we have already said, any theological dogma strikes men generally as cruel and unjust, doing violence to man and dishonor to God, it is high time to inquire whether this doctrine is scriptural or a human construction built up in the ages of darkness and superstition. We do not of course mean to say that there are not features of the gospel that cut sharply across human prejudices, but the conscience of the man may approve as just that to which his heart may be opposed. We call men to be law-makers, judges, jurors, arbitrators on questions of right and wrong between man and man, without thinking to raise the question whether they have been converted and spiritually enlightened or not. "There is a spirit in man and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." The average mind of the race is forever busy with these problems of good and evil, justice and injustice, right and wrong. And though this is not an infallible standard, it is one to which we are compelled by the conditions and limitations of our earthly existence, constantly to refer. And when the average judgment of the race decides any doctrine or practice to be wrong, it is safe at least to give some attention to such a warning voice.

Whether we wish it or not we shall have to meet the inevitable fact, that the people of this and coming generations will not rest content with theological systems constructed centuries ago. The Bible is a book which will abide unchanged, in all essential particulars. But theological systems are made by men; and if we are not in a better condition to judge of these systems than were our fathers two, three, and four centuries ago, we certainly have not improved our privileges and opportunities. At any rate, let us try ever so hard to keep those old standards unchanged, we shall assuredly fail.

The people of Scotland are about as sturdy in holding fast to the old doctrines and walking in the old ways, as any people on the face of the earth. Their churches were planted upon the same foundations of doctrine with our own. Like ours they have passed through the changing experiences and influences of two hundred and fifty years. They have reached a

time when they feel constrained to give a milder interpretation to the ancient standards and to speak gentle and comforting words to soften away their asperities. Doubtless many of our readers are familiar with the facts, but if any are not, if they will look into the Schaff-Herzog Cyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, 3rd vol., under the head of Westminster Assembly, they will find the following important document.

"The United Presbyterian Church of Scotland has recently adopted an explanatory supplement or "Declaratory Act" (May, 1879), which sets forth more fully and clearly some doctrines of Holy Scripture, among which are the following important modifications of the Westminster Statements."

(1.) "That in regard to the doctrine of *redemption* as taught in the standards, and in consistency therewith, the love of God to all mankind, the gift of His Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the world, and the free offer of Salvation to man without distinction on the ground of Christ's perfect sacrifice, are matters which have been and continue to be regarded by this church as vital in the system of gospel truth, and to which due prominence ought ever to be given.

(2.) "That the doctrine of *divine decrees* including the doctrine of *election to eternal life* is held in connection and harmony with the truth, that God is not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance, and that he has provided a salvation sufficient for all, adapted to all and offered to all in the gospel, and also with responsibility of every man for his dealing with the free and unrestricted offer of eternal life.

(3.) "That the doctrine of man's *total depravity* and of his loss of all ability of will, to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, is not held as implying such a condition of man's nature as would affect his responsibility under the law of God and the gospel of Christ, or that he does not experience the striving and restraining influences of the Spirit of God or that he cannot perform actions in any sense good, although actions which do not spring from a renewed heart, are not spiritually good or holy, such as accompany salvation.

(4.) "That while none are saved except through the mediation of Christ and by the grace of his Holy Spirit, who worketh when and where and how he pleaseth, while the duty of sending the gospel to the heathen who are sunk in ignorance, sin, and misery is clear and imperative, and while the outward and ordinary means of salvation of those capable of being called by the Word, are the ordinances of the gospel; in accepting the standards it is not required to be held that any who die in infancy are lost, or that God may not extend his grace to any who are without the pale of ordinary means, as it may seem good in his sight.

(5.) "That in regard to the doctrine of the *Civil Magistrate* and his authority and duty in the sphere of religion as taught in the standards, this Church holds that the Lord Jesus Christ is the only King and Head of the Church and "Head over all things to the Church which is his body," disapproves of all compulsory or persecuting and intolerant principles in religion, and declares as hitherto that she does not require approval of any thing in her standards that teaches or may be supposed to teach such principles."

Here leaving other points untouched, we are called to notice distinctly, that the good people of Scotland, established originally upon the same doctrinal foundations with ourselves but passing on in a way of their own, have come into the same conditions of belief with us touching little children dying in infancy, baptized or unbaptized; and in respect to the unevangelized millions of the race, they are no longer prepared to say "that God may not extend his grace to any who are without the pale of ordinary means, as it may seem good in his sight."

Of course, no one will conclude because of these criticisms, that we do not consider the religious system which has prevailed in New England, as a vast and uplifting power for good, in spite of these defects and anomalies in her creed. Our religious system, taken as a whole, is something vastly wider and more comprehensive than any creed. It embraces the never-ending succession of Sabbaths with their sanctuary praise and worship,—the public sermons and prayers warm from living hearts and blending themselves with all the checkered experiences of human life,—the reverent use of the Bible in the family and the daily worship around the household altar,—all these, and other elements combine to make up a sum total of influence and power, in the presence of which the creed is often well-nigh forgotten.

Nevertheless truth is always better than error. The things which are just and pure and righteous are to be carefully sought for and cherished. Who can tell how many generous and noble natures have been repelled from our religious system and kept from our sanctuaries by those arbitrary and cruel features in our ancient creeds which were meant to honor God, but served only to dishonor him?

ARTICLE IV.—CHRISTIANITY A SCIENCE, NOT A DREAM.

THIS theme was suggested by the following words in a letter from a candid skeptic: "I was born and brought up in a family connected with the Orthodox Church. My wife, too, is a member of it, and I go with her on Sundays. I do it more from habit than because I get any good. It would be a real comfort to me if I could believe what she believes. But I cannot do it because I want to ; I can only believe what seems to me true, and it does not seem to me that the orthodox ideas of religion have much foundation. There is too much of fancy and imagination about them, instead of substantial facts. God and Heaven, especially God living on earth in the flesh, seems to me like beautiful dreams."

We answer, *Christianity is a science, not a dream.*

What, then, is science? Professor Youmans, one of its chief priests, when editor of the *Popular Science Monthly*, gave this definition: "Science is exact knowledge, obtained by demonstration, observation, or experiment."

This definition ought to be kept ever in mind, for nothing is more frequently counterfeited than the word "science." Since the days when the Bible was written, there has always been "science, falsely so called." Much that is called science is not exact knowledge, but only partial knowledge, that is, "disturbed ignorance."

In our National Treasury at Washington, numerous clerks count the torn and worn-out greenbacks that have been forwarded for redemption. The clerks become so expert that they can detect a counterfeit by a glance or touch, and when one is found, it is at once thrown out and deducted from the account of the sender. So in reading and hearing statements about scientific matters, one should be ever on the watch for the "counterfeits" that abound,—the plausible speculations and unproved hypotheses that may have been falsely passed off as "science."

Hypotheses are legitimate tools by which to construct and test science, but they are no more to be called "science" than the presses that print our greenbacks are to be called "currency."

It should also be noted here that as the clerks who count and examine the currency do not need to be paper-makers or printers or engravers in order to detect counterfeits, so one need not be a scientist to know whether a scientific statement is *logical* or not,—whether its facts are well attested, and its conclusions established.

A certain man looked over his commercial paper, and divided it into three bunches, marked "B" for bad, "D" for doubtful, and "G" for good—an excellent system for books as well as banks, that no "bad" or "doubtful" speculations may be counted in our "assets" of scientific knowledge.

Christianity asks no exemption from the tests of counterfeit truth. It demands them. God's command is: "Prove" (that is, *test*) "all things: hold fast that which is good." Are the facts of Christianity well-attested? Do its conclusions necessarily follow? Is the "paper" of Christianity "B" or "D" or "G?"

We answer again, *Christianity is a science, not a dream, since it consists, in its essentials, of proved knowledge, established, in part, like law and history, upon abundant and reliable testimony; established, in part, like the scientific certainties of gravitation and the roundness of the earth, upon a proved hypothesis which is found to be alone inclusive of all the facts and consistent with all; established, in part, like chemistry and medicine, upon repeated and thorough experiments.*

I. As to the evidences of Christianity in the line of *testimony*, it is well-known that the great jurist, Sir Matthew Hale, declared that the evidence on which Christianity bases its claims, is such as would be deemed competent in any court of justice. More recently, Greenleaf, the standard authority among English-speaking lawyers on questions of evidence, in his great work on "The Testimony of the Four Evangelists," after testing the Gospels as he would test documentary evidence offered in a court, declares that they are sufficient to

establish as historic the facts which they allege in regard to Christ and the origin of Christianity.

Not only the historic but also the *experimental* elements of Christianity are established upon abundant testimony. No crime was ever better attested than its opposite and preventive—conversion. A lawyer found himself one night in a meeting for Christian testimony. The subject was Conversion. To the fact of it as a personal experience, testimony was given by a score of his friends and neighbors, many of them persons whose honesty and good sense he had learned to respect. They all declared, in varying terms, that in answer to a penitent, trusting appeal to Christ, a radical change had occurred in the springs of life. Their tastes as to associates, songs, books, amusements, had been changed; also their consolations, aims, activities, habits. He said to himself: "If any two of these men should testify that I had committed murder I should be hung. Shall I reject all this evidence?" He made the only answer that an honest man can make without self-condemnation. The conclusive testimony demanded a decisive verdict. He pronounced himself "Guilty," and appealed to Christ for pardon.

II. But the evidences of Christianity in the line of testimony have been so often and so strongly presented, that I pass at once into a new field of Christian evidences, that of *proved hypotheses*, through which many of the most unquestioned truths have been received into the hall of science,—for instance, gravitation and the roundness and revolution of the earth,—to show that, like these, Christianity is scientific because it presents a system that includes all of the facts involved and harmonizes all the facts.

How do we know that the earth is round? We never saw its roundness—nor felt it. To the senses it seems both flat and firm. But long ago men noticed that a ship coming in from sea showed to those on the land, first its rigging, and then its hull. This and other facts suggested that the earth might be round. The guess or hypothesis was tested and found to include and harmonize all the facts involved, and so became, by an accumulation of probabilities, a scientific certainty. To-day we all believe that the earth is round as firmly as we

believe that it contains gold and silver. The rantings of the ignorant Richmond preacher against this doctrine of science disturb us as little as the rantings of Ingersollism should disturb our convictions that Christ is the Son of God, and the Bible the Word of God.

So gravitation was at first a guess and became a certainty by being proved to include and harmonize all the essential facts involved.

One may reach moral certainty in regard to God as well as in regard to gravitation by an accumulation of probabilities. Gladstone, in his famous paper on "Probability as the Guide to Conduct," by the very title, which is all one needs to read to catch his argument, suggests that in the matters of home and business, men are guided not by certainties but by probabilities. Fathers provide food and raiment for coming days, not because there is a certainty that they and theirs will live to need them, but because there is a probability of it. The farmer sows because of the probability that his harvest will not be snatched away by drought or pest. By the same sensible principle, if a man deems it more probable that Christianity is true than false, he is bound at least to test it, that probability may be changed to certainty by experiment. It is playing the quack on oneself to insist that every claim of Christianity shall be proved as mathematically as that two and two make four, when in almost everything probability is the guide to conduct.

Our problem at this point, then, is, whether Christianity is not probably true in its essential claims as to history and experience.

We are strongly assured by one of the chief priests of science that there is nothing unscientific or self-contradictory or inconsistent in the main theory of Christianity. Professor Tyndall, in the *Popular Science Monthly*, says: "The theory that the system of nature is under the control of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men, is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one. It is a matter of experience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and tender, listens to the requests of his children, and, if they do not ask amiss, takes pleasure in granting

their requests. We know also that this compliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the current of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our experience, it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, alters the current of those phenomena. But, without *verification*, a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect. The region of theory, both in science and theology, lies behind the world of the senses, but the verification of theory occurs in the sensible world."

There is, then, no difficulty in the Christian *theory* of the universe, but only in the *verification* of the theory. Matthew Arnold, in the preface of his work on "Literature and Dogma," with as cool a dogmatism as if he were an infallible pope over all knowledge, utters the dogma that the theory of a personal and intelligent First Cause is untenable, because it can never be *verified*. But it *can* be verified, and all the other essential facts of Christianity, in exactly the same way as the facts of optics, astronomy, and many other theories of Science which Mr. Arnold and Professor Tyndall fully accept, *by showing that this theory alone includes and is consistent with all the facts.*

There is a problem of far higher importance than anything in optics or astronomy to which I shall apply this scientific method. It is well stated in the following extracts from the letters of an old schoolmate: "Death has taken my father, mother, and sisters away since those days of early friendship with you, and my life is mostly made up of this wearisome repetition of common-places. I wonder sometimes what all this glittering, shiny pageant, which we call life, may mean; what is the key to it all? How shall I find the meaning of this ever-recurring I, and all its relations to the infinite universe about me?"

Mr. Huxley expresses the problem in these earnest words: "The question of questions for mankind—the problem which underlies all others, and is more interesting than any other—is the ascertainment of the place which *man* occupies in nature, and of his relation to the universe of things." Many a thoughtful man has felt that life is an island on which he has

been left in sleep, with no land in sight as he looks behind him, no land in sight as he looks forward, and no human voice about him able to answer the questions, Whence came I? What am I? Whither am I going?"

How can he solve this problem of highest moment? What is "the meaning of this ever-recurring I, and all its relations to the infinite universe about us?"

The answer must be a theory that includes all the facts involved and is at the same time consistent with them all.

Let it be remembered that there are mental and moral facts as well as physical ones. Every man's common sense tells him that the word he hears is no more a fact than the unheard *thought* that prompted it; that the clock he sees is no more a fact than *time*, which he cannot see; that the hot stove which he has felt is no more a fact than the idea of *cause* which the pain awakened in his mind. The Sermon on the Mount is as much a fact as a labelled bug, or a stuffed monkey, or an idiot's brain. Any theory of the universe which does not include all the facts involved, mental and moral as well as physical, and does not prove itself consistent with them all, is, by the very laws of science, unworthy of acceptance.

First, notice the answer which atheists make to the anxious inquiry of the human soul. By atheism I mean what the word literally means, any theory that is *without God*, that leaves God out, whether by denying Him or ignoring Him. I am aware that it is now the fashion to call atheism, "agnosticism," which is usually nothing else but atheism under a less malodorous name. When agnosticism is not atheism it is his lazy brother. It takes energy and courage to defend a positive denial of God. It is easier to sit on the fence. Those who are too lazy or too timid to deny the existence of God have borrowed the trick of sharpers in the courts, and say to all religious questions, "I don't know." No one has any right to say that of any important matter until he has *earnestly tried to know*. I do not count as agnostics those who, like Thomas, are seeking to know what is truth.

Atheism gives an answer to the problem of man's relation to the universe as superficial as the Ptolemaic answer to the problem of the earth's relations. Ptolemy, judging by the mere

appearance of things to the senses, considered the earth as the greatest body in the universe, the stable centre of all things, and took no account whatever of the unseen force of gravitation. So the atheist, looking only at the seen and temporal, makes *man* the highest being in the universe, and selfishness the highest motive, and takes no account whatever of the unseen spiritual forces at work in the world, such as Providence and prayer.

These Godless theories in regard to man and his relations to the universe are not scientific; first, because they ignore a large proportion of the facts. Tyndall, in his famous Belfast Address, confessed that there was a class of facts which his materialism had not included in its theories,—“The unquenchable claims of man’s emotional nature.” The human race will never be satisfied with any answer to its grandest problem, any theory of the universe and its relations to man, which does not include and is not consistent with this class of facts, which are as universal as humanity, and as deep as human thought,—“The unquenchable claims of man’s emotional nature.”

The theories of atheism also fail to include or explain the fact that thoughts of immortality have a place in every human mind, either as a faith, a tradition, or a question.

Especially must a satisfactory theory of the universe explain the origin of matter, life, and mind, but atheism offers no explanation. Tyndall speaks for the world of science when he denies that there is the slightest evidence of spontaneous generation, or of life except as “an emanation of antecedent life.” Huxley long since admitted that his bathybius protoplasm, which he hoped would prove to be the jelly-mother of all life, is only inorganic gypsum—the same material as the Cardiff Giant. Atheism leaves us no way to get an existence. And yet we exist. No fact is more *vital* in a theory of the universe than *life*, and no theory that fails to explain such a fact is scientifically satisfactory.

The theories of atheism are unscientific because, second, they are inconsistent with many facts.

Five expressions distinguish man as man everywhere. He can say, “I am,” “I can,” “I ought,” “I will,” “I pray.” As being corresponds to the words “I am,” and freedom of choice

to the words "I will," so God must correspond to the words "I pray," by the very laws of science, which allow in nature no universal instinct without an adequate answer.

The theory of atheism is also inconsistent with the scientific fact that in universal experience, plan, adaptation, purpose, law, order, progress, are found to be the result of personality and intelligence.

Nor is the theory of atheism consistent with the facts of present experience in ascribing to matter "the power and potency of every form of life." The fairy stories that make flowers talk, and magic axes cut down whole forests with no hand to wield them, and the mythologies of heathenism that tell of matter in images of wood and stone thinking and acting as gods, are not one whit less scientific than the theories of atheism that make the hot and lifeless atoms of primeval fog, the builders of the present world of matter and mind.

It is scientifically certain, then, that the theories of the universe which deny or ignore God have not sufficient credentials to take their contested seats in the Congress of Science, since they neither include nor harmonize all the facts involved.

The problem of "the ever-recurring I, in its relations to the universe," is answered but little better by unchristian theism. No hypothesis of the universe, even though it recognizes the existence of God, that does not include and harmonize the four large groups of well-attested facts in regard to Providence and prayer, the Bible and Christ, can be considered a scientific theory of man and his relations.

From these theories that fail to answer the problem of the universe, we turn to one that succeeds. As gravitation included and explained all the essential facts in regard to the movements of the heavenly bodies, so Christianity alone offers a theory of man's relations that includes and explains all the facts involved. In the words of Napoleon, "The Bible contains a complete series of facts and of historical men to explain time and eternity." No other theory tells us how the world of nature began, or how it will end. No other theory explains the evidences of a controlling mind in the order and progress of nature and history. No other theory gives a reasonable explanation of the fact that a poor, uneducated carpenter

ter of Nazareth, who died as a malefactor almost 1900 years ago, is the best known, the most beloved, the most obeyed of any being that ever lived in flesh. No other theory explains why the Bible alone of ancient books is the book of the people to-day, the King-Book in the literature of power.

In the Palace of Justice at Rome, they take the traveler into a chamber with strangely painted frescoes on the ceiling and around the walls, and strange mosaics upon the floor. He cannot reduce them to harmony. It is all a bewildering maze. But there is one spot upon the floor of that room, standing upon which everything falls into symmetry. He can see at that point, and that only, the design of the artist and the beauty of his work. So the world seems a chaos of sorrow and sin from every point except one. From any other standpoint life is *not* worth living. But when one stands beside the Cross, with the Bible in hand, he can see that through all the convulsions of nature and history

“One eternal purpose runs,
And the thoughts of God are ripening
With the progress of the suns.”

The evidences of Christianity in the line of testimony and proved hypothesis are sufficient at least to show that Christianity is more probably true than false. That is all that one who is daily making probability his guide to conduct has a right to ask as a reason for going forward to the third and most conclusive department of Christian evidence, that of experiment, in which probability is changed to certainty.

We have seen that the religion of Christ, when it is compared with history and law and other departments of science that are based on *testimony*, vindicates its right to be also considered a part of Science, by showing abundant and reliable testimony as the basis of its claims.

We have also seen that Christianity, when it is compared with any department of Science which is based on a *proved hypothesis*, again establishes its claim to be counted a part of Science by presenting a theory of the universe that includes, explains, and harmonizes all the facts involved.

III. Comparing Christianity with those branches of Science, such as chemistry and medicine, that are chiefly based on care-

ful, thorough and repeated experiments and tests, we shall see that by the proof of tests and experiments also, Christianity is a science, not a dream.

Science ascertained thus by personal experiments is considered somewhat more certain than that which comes from reliable testimony or proved hypotheses. Absolutely certain knowledge in this matter of religion can only be secured by adding to reliable testimony and proved hypotheses, a personal experience of the reality of conversion and the power of prayer.

The most important elements of Christianity are not theories but experience, and therefore the final test of it must be a personal experiment of its power. Error can debate, but truth alone can bear tests and experiments. Reasoning is a long route to conclusions, that even then are not absolutely certain. Experiment is the short cut to truth, and much the surest path when the object can thus be reached. Hence the religion of Christ has grown by the condensed logic of tests more than by spoken arguments.

It is to this department of evidence especially that the command applies, "Prove all things," which does not mean that we are to *argue* about everything, but rather, "Test all things." Experience comes from *experior*, meaning to make trial of, to put to the test. Some one asked Coleridge if he could prove the truth of Christianity? "Yes," said he, "try it." Philip's answer to Nathaniel's doubt whether the Messiah could come out of Nazareth was almost as brief,—"Come and see." He might have argued that Christ was not originally of Nazareth but of Bethlehem, but some new difficulty would then have arisen, and hours or days or perhaps weeks would have been lost in debates. He led his friend rather along the short cut of experiment. A moment with Christ cured Nathaniel's doubts, and he exclaimed, "Thou art the Son of God, Thou art the King of Israel."

If a scientific professor should say to his class that he could change a bottle of a certain black liquid into snowy whiteness by pouring into it a scarlet fluid, and a score of witnesses should corroborate his testimony, his hearers might believe it. This belief might be strengthened if he could philosophize clearly on the characteristics and relations of the two liquids. But

they would more quickly reach certainty by taking the two bottles into their own hands, to prevent any chance of jugglery, and performing the experiment for themselves. So in the Divine chemistry of conversion, one reaches the certainty that the black heart of sin may be changed by the blood of Christ into the snowy whiteness of purity and joy, when to Christian testimony and Christian philosophy he adds personal experience. If Christianity is a matter of such moment as to be worthy of volumes of reasoning; if it involves issues of life and death, of happiness and misery; if its truth or falseness is an important matter for each individual to decide, as the world's wisest men have generally believed; then surely, it ought to be fully *tested* by every rational being who has heard of its claims.

"One must have his standing in God to understand God." If there is a God personally interested in man, it would be natural for him to give a written revelation of His will for all the ages. How can one know that the Bible is such a revelation? By doing God's will as there asserted. An aged Christian had a great many passages in her Bible marked "T" and "P." She was asked what these letters signified. She said they marked the promises of God that she herself had *tried and proved*. Here, then, is a method of testing the Bible, more direct than by examining its historical and scientific accuracy and the fulfillment of its prophecies. Many of the promises of God are personal prophecies whose truth can be readily tested. It is fair, then, to make this challenge to the skeptic. "Live according to the precepts of the Bible for a year, and observe whether such living tends to make you nobler and happier, or baser and more miserable. Thus you may surely know by its fruits whether it is truth or deception."

If there is a God personally interested in us, there would naturally be provided not only a written revelation of His will but also a means of daily communication between Him and our hearts, for the expression of adoration, penitence, praise, petition, and self-surrender, the five elements of prayer. In the words of Joseph Cook we may therefore say to the skeptic: "I don't ask whether you believe what I believe. You believe something. There are a few religious propositions which appear to you to be incontrovertible. *Will you take these and submit*

to them in your places of business, in your places of secret temptation, in your family, in your thoughts, in your imagination? Will you yield gladly to your conscience as illuminated by the best you know of God's Word and works. **WILL YOU TAKE ALL THE LIGHT YOU HAVE AND SURRENDER TO IT,** and all the other light you get by self-surrender—the most vital part of prayer? If so, you will have probably new views of prayer before to-morrow morning."

An infidel physician in Pennsylvania, who had been startled into unusual thoughtfulness by the sudden death of a friend, resolved to give the question of prayer a fair, full personal test. As he read the Bible for light, the words of James especially impressed him, "If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not." He knelt down to pray in the solitude of his own chamber, and by an earnest and honest test, found that prayer, at which he had formerly sneered, was indeed a power in the universe, and especially in his soul. By a thorough experiment he had exchanged a tormenting "perhaps" for an assuring "verily." The interrogation mark of skepticism that has appeared in every age from the days of Job, with the question, "What profit shall we have if we pray?" was changed to the period of certainty, so that he could say with James, "The effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." He became the eloquent Bishop Thompson, of the Methodist Church.

Only a few centuries ago the scholarship of Europe doubted the very existence of America. It was thought to be a mere dream of Columbus. Long after America's existence had been proved, the possibility of receiving anything from it, or sending anything to it by steamboats, was doubted by many learned men. Is there any America? Can steamers carry messages to it, and bring back answers and goods? These questions were both answered, after much useless argument, by experiment, with a mighty "Yes."

Is there a God in Heaven? Can we hold intercourse with Him by Bible-reading and prayer? These questions to which skeptics sneer back their theoretic "No," multitudes of Christians have answered for themselves, by experiment, as all others might do, with a mighty "Yes."

WILBUR F. CRAFTS.

ARTICLE V.—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROHIBITION AND HIGH LICENSE.

THE liquor problem is a large question, and one that may be profitably discussed from widely different standpoints. In the space of a few pages, it is idle to attempt anything like a general treatment; the purpose of this paper is to suggest only one point of view. Many of the present discussions concerning the relative merits of Prohibition and High License seem tacitly to assume that the actual results of these two methods will be pretty nearly the same. As Prohibition does not prohibit, it is said, common sense shows that it is more expedient to adopt a measure whose aim is more moderate, and moreover, a measure which is generally admitted to succeed in its aim. Since the sale of liquor cannot be stopped by any means of legislation, is it not wiser to restrict the sale by a law adapted to that end, than to have it restricted by a law which, attempting to perform the impossible, is continually broken? The effect on the community of a law constantly broken is enough to settle the case against Prohibition.

This argument is heard every day; and on the outside, it looks plausible enough. But it exhibits a misconception of what Prohibition really aims to accomplish. Let it be admitted that Prohibition does not prohibit, for it is absurd to suppose such a thing to be possible. The repeated utterance of that phrase need scare no one; it is a platitude, and is perfectly harmless. If, now, we view the question from the common standpoint, we see that Prohibition restricts the liquor traffic with the law daily broken, while High License restricts the traffic with the law fairly well enforced. Many instantly jump to the conclusion that the practical results of the two plans are similar, with moral and social considerations all in favor of the latter.

It is worth our while to see if such reasoning is not based on a superficial glance. There is a fundamental difference between Prohibition and High License, and it is only fair to

insist that it be considered. High License greatly diminishes the number of the saloons ; it closes those of the most filthy and disreputable character ; so that the "dens of vice" are the points which feel the weight of the law most severely. But this is not the conclusion of the whole matter. While lessening the number, High License unquestionably raises the tone of the saloons that remain ; this fact is not only admitted by the advocates of the measure, but it is curious to observe that some of them estimate it as an ally to their forces. A short time ago, a writer in the *New York Evening Post* gravely argued in favor of High License because it did raise the tone of the saloon, and seemed to be surprised that the advocates of Prohibition failed to see the force of the argument. Now it is exactly at this point that the rival methods are widely separated. Raising the tone of the saloon is precisely what Prohibition condemns. The attempt of a prohibitory law is to discourage the liquor traffic ; to accomplish this end, the traffic must be lowered, not elevated in the public esteem. It must be put under a ban. If it is once admitted that retail liquor selling is prejudicial to the best interests of the community, then the aim of the law should be to arrange matters so that the influential part of the community may remove their patronage from it. This result is not, and from the nature of the case, cannot be accomplished by High License. As long as the saloon is supported by the law for value received, and made not only respectable but attractive with music, art, literature, and agreeable recreation, it will appeal to the higher classes of society. Will there be no difference between the results of a measure which makes a certain thing an offense against the law, and the effects of a measure that popularizes that thing among the more influential classes of the community ?

Prohibition has to work against the tide. The practical cast of mind, which is the fashionable style of intellect in these days, impairs the mental vision of many men. It makes them near-sighted, and incapable of appreciating results that cannot be grasped on the spot. Not a few politicians to-day even wear blinders, lest something should distract them from the beaten track. Many "practical" writers condemn Prohibition

because its good effects are not immediately apparent. They insist that Prohibition must either revolutionize the community explosively, or it must be abandoned as worthless. If a prohibitory law is passed in any town or state, a period of two or three years is judged to be abundant time to estimate the results. They are like many zealous Christians, who refuse to consider a sinner "converted," unless an instantaneous and total change has taken place in all his natural inclinations. This analogy indicates another line of separation between Prohibition and High License. The latter aims at immediate results; and to a high degree realizes them. Prohibition aims at results, which, from the character of the circumstances involved, cannot be instantly attained. High License attempts a partial cure. Prohibition attempts prevention of the disease.

It is absolutely certain that a prohibitory law cannot stop the sale of liquor in hidden holes and dark alleys where life and property are in danger. There needs no ghost come from the grave to tell us that. Men who are habitual drunkards, who drink not for social pleasure but to quench thirst, will satisfy the appetite in some way or another. Prohibition cannot change their nature nor does it attempt to do so. These creatures who "put an enemy in their mouths to steal away their brains" are all traveling in one direction; a miserable death is visibly written on their faces. Prohibition hardly touches this class; it has work more important to accomplish. It recognizes the fact that no one *begins* to drink in a hiding-place. Most young men who eventually become drunkards take their preparatory course in pleasant surroundings. They drink, not to satisfy thirst, but because moderate drinking is an "Open Sesame" to congenial society. High License, by elevating the tone of the saloon, makes the bait still more attractive. Young men may now pass a pleasant evening in the most warm-hearted and delightful society, with every attraction in the way of respectable amusement, and can feel that they are gentlemen in every sense of the word. If on important occasions, they become a trifle more demonstrative than the circumstances would seem to call for, they need fear nothing from the community. Those who live in glass houses cannot throw stones.

Now most of these young men who some day will step into positions of trust and responsibility—would never think of spending their evenings at a drinking resort, if the higher class of saloons were closed and liquor selling an offense against the law. With the majority of them, the appetite for drink has not yet assumed any appreciable proportions. The idea of a refined young man smuggling whisky into his room for private consumption, or frequenting the vilest places to take his glass, is absurd on the face of it; though it is far from absurd to imagine him doing so after the habit and taste for drinking is acquired. The prohibitory law undertakes to save him while there is time; by degrading the rank of the saloon, it strips it of all attractions. The traffic is made a criminal offense. Hence, while liquor may still be secretly sold, and drunkards seen reeling on the streets, the prohibitory law has struck home. The good effects cannot be seen immediately, but they are bound to come in time. It is a case of cause and effect.

The saloon-keepers say, with a deprecatory shake of the head, that Prohibition means free rum. If this be true, why are they in mortal terror of the measure? If under a prohibitory law they can sell liquor without paying for the privilege, why do they not secretly support such a law? Far from it; they are too far-seeing and acute for that. They are but mad north-north-west; when the wind is southerly they know a hawk from a handsaw. They will pay almost any sum under a license law, but they hate Prohibition as they hate Christianity.

The cause of Prohibition suffers so much from the support of unreasoning fanatics, and from those who seek to make it the national political principle, that it is not surprising to find the measure in bad odor with many thoughtful and sincere men. Yet the principle of Prohibition is at bottom wholly reasonable; it is both radical and far-sighted, and it grapples with the problem in a close and fearless way. But High License, while apparently approaching Prohibition as its asymptote, is working swiftly and surely in a contrary direction. The principles underlying the two plans are separated by an impassable gulf.

WILLIAM LYON PHELPS.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

CLASSICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF YALE COLLEGE.

January 17, 1888, Professor Knapp read extracts from the unpublished journals of George Borrow, relating to travels and researches in Wales and on the Isle of Man.

Mr. F. G. Moore presented a communication on **LUCRETIUS AND VERGIL**. A list of Vergil's imitations of Lucretius—making no pretensions to completeness—shows a total of about four hundred, one hundred and seventy of which are in the Georgics. The great influence of Lucretius traceable in the Georgics, is explained by the fact that the poem is didactic, and its subject is Nature. Moreover, Vergil was strongly inclined to philosophy, down to the time of writing the second Georgic (vs. 475–494). Thenceforward he was affected by Lucretius chiefly as a poet. Of the imitations in the Georgics about sixty per cent. are in the first two books; of those in the *Aeneid* only about forty per cent.,—all in the first six books; of those in the Eclogues the great majority are in the sixth. Nearly two-thirds of these imitations are from Lucretius's 5th, 1st, and 8th books, and in this order of frequency. From an actual grouping of the references it is evident that Vergil admired, and most frequently had in mind, just those passages upon which rest the reputation of Lucretius, as judged by modern critics.

The Secretary read a brief account, from private sources, of the excavations at Sicyon which have been resumed by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

THE STORY OF IRELAND.—It is not an easy thing to tell the “story” of Ireland dispassionately. It is therefore to the credit of the author of this volume—who modestly claims only to have prepared a summary of Irish history—that she has written with marked impartiality, and has evidently sought to give only the bare facts. In a somewhat hasty reading we have not noticed a line which would show whether Miss Emily Lawless is an English-woman or an Irishwoman, a Protestant or a Roman Catholic.

The story of Ireland is told from the very beginning—when the island was covered with Arctic glaciers—and is brought down to the present year, and the agitation for “home rule.” The reader is not wearied or confused with details. Attention is directed only to the more important events, and these are described briefly and clearly, so that a distinct impression can be obtained with regard to each one. Prominent in the early history, of course, is the golden age of the Irish church, when Irish ecclesiastics in the sixth century were noted for their learning and piety, and Irish missionaries, with true Celtic enthusiasm, made their way to so many heathen countries on the continent of Europe. But while the church afforded some bond of union for the people, unfortunately there was no political union. The tribal system gave rise to jealousies and feuds which made all sense of patriotism and devotion to a common country impossible, and brought on an internecine war of clan against clan which resulted in what was little better than anarchy. Here was the opportunity of England. The Anglo-Norman invasion under Strongbow could not but be successful, and the “conquest” of the island was accomplished. If this conquest had been complete, and a strong government could have been established, there might have been a possibility of the growth in time of a united Irish people. But the condition of the island for hundreds of years remained substantially the same as when it was ruled by its native chiefs. The best of the land was parcelled out among the Geraldines, who soon became petty kings and “Irish of the Irish;” and, being too far

away from England for any adequate control by the English government, each sought to extend his own power at the expense of the others. Hence came a long, long succession of English invasions, and attempts to root out the native population and replace it by English colonists; "which," as Sir John Davis says, "the English not being able to do, caused a perpetual war between the two nations, which continued four hundred and odd years, and would have lasted unto the world's end, if in Queen Elizabeth's reign the Irish had not been broken and conquered by the sword." It is a long and sickening story of misgovernment; of brutal deeds and yet more brutal retaliations. From the time of Strongbow to the battle of the Boyne, does the history of the world—does the history of even despotic and inhuman Russia, which is to-day a menace to civilization—furnish an example of more outrageous cruelty or of more stupid imbecility than that of the treatment of Ireland by England? We cannot but remember that our ancestors were Englishmen, and do not hesitate to acknowledge that they deserve their full share of the blame. Perhaps this fact of our ancestry is the reason why our American treatment of the Indians offers some remarkably striking and humiliating parallels to English treatment of Ireland. Ireland was colonized by England and re-colonized during hundreds of years, and times without number; and yet, says an old writer: "There was scarce an Englishman who had been seven years in the country and meant to remain there, who did not become averse to England and grow into something of an Irishman." The evidence of the poet Spenser has been often quoted. He went over to Ireland to share in the work of subjugation and colonization, and he says: "They [the Irish] were brought to such wretchedness that any strong heart would rue the same. Out of every corner of the woods and glens they came creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them. They looked like anatomies of death; they spoke like ghosts crying out of their graves. They did eat the dead carriions where they did find them, yea and one another soon after; inasmuch as the very carcasses they spared not to scrape out of their graves; and if they found a plot of watercresses or shamrocks, there they thronged as to a feast." Every generation from Spenser to the beginning of the eighteenth century has its witnesses of what has passed before their own eyes, and they all tell the same terrible story. Sir Henry Sydney tried his hand, and the Earl of Essex,

and Strafford, and Cromwell, and William III., and then—then, after the battle of the Boyne—Ireland was at last “quiet.” A graveyard quiet settled down for two generations. We have not space to describe the commercial ruin that England brought on Ireland in the eighteenth century. It is well known how England, for what she supposed to be the good of her own people, deliberately suppressed and destroyed Irish trade and Irish manufactures. It is enough to refer to the Penal Code to which the people were then subjected, and which Edmund Burke described as “well digested and well disposed in all its parts; a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man.” In this connection we will quote the testimony of Mr. Lecky: “By this code the Roman Catholics were absolutely excluded from the Parliament, from the magistracy, from the corporations, from the bench, and from the bar. They could not vote at Parliamentary elections or at vestries; they could not act as constables or sheriffs, or jury-men, or serve in the army, or navy, or become solicitors, or even hold the positions of gamekeeper or watchman. Schools were established to bring up their children as Protestants; and if they refused to avail themselves of these, they were deliberately assigned to hopeless ignorance, being excluded from the university, and debarred, under crushing penalties, from acting as school-masters, as ushers, or as private tutors, or from sending their children abroad to obtain the instruction they were refused at home. They could not marry Protestants, and if such a marriage were celebrated it was annulled by law, and the priest who officiated might be hung. They could not buy land or inherit or receive it as a gift from Protestants, or hold life-annuities, or leases for more than thirty-one years, or any lease on such terms that the profits of the land exceeded one-third of the rent. If any Catholic leaseholder by his industry so increased his profits that they exceed this proportion, and did not immediately make a corresponding increase in his payments, any Protestant who gave the information could enter into possession of his farm. If any Catholic had secretly purchased either his old forfeited estate, or any other land, any Protestant who informed against him might become the proprietor. The few Catholic landowners who remained were deprived of the right which all other classes pos-

sessed of bequeathing their lands as they pleased. If their sons continued Catholics, it was divided equally between them. If, however, the eldest son consented to apostatize, the estate was settled upon him, the father from that hour became only a life-tenant, and lost all power of selling, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of it. If the wife of a Catholic abandoned the religion of her husband, she was immediately free from his control and the Chancellor was empowered to assign to her a certain proportion of her husband's property. If any child, however young, professed itself a Protestant, it was at once taken from the father's care, and the Chancellor could oblige the father to declare upon oath the value of his property, both real and personal, and could assign for the present maintenance and future portion of the converted child such proportion of that property as the court might decree. No Catholic could be guardian either to his own children or to those of another person; and therefore a Catholic who died while his children were minors had the bitterness of reflecting upon his death-bed that they must pass into the care of Protestants. An annuity of from twenty to forty pounds was provided as a bribe for every priest who would become a Protestant. To convert a Protestant to Catholicism was a capital offence. In every walk of life, the Catholic was pursued by persecution or restriction. Except in the linen trade, he could not have more than two apprentices. He could not possess a horse of the value of more than five pounds, and any Protestant, on giving him five pounds, could take his horse. He was compelled to pay double to the militia. He was forbidden, except under particular conditions, to live in Galway or Limerick. In case of war with a Catholic power, the Catholics were obliged to reimburse the damage done by the enemy's privateers. The Legislature, it is true, did not venture absolutely to suppress their worship, but it existed only by a doubtful connivance—stigmatized as if it were a species of licensed prostitution, and subject to conditions which, if they had been enforced, would have rendered its continuance impossible. An old law which prohibited it, and another which enjoined attendance at the Anglican worship, remained unrepealed, and might at any time be revived; and the former was, in fact, enforced during the Scotch rebellion of 1715. The parish priests, who alone were allowed to officiate, were compelled to be registered, and were forbidden to keep curates or to officiate anywhere except in their own parishes. The chapels might not have

bells or steeples. No crosses might be publicly erected. Pilgrimages to the holy wells were forbidden. Not only all monks and friars, but also all Catholic archbishops, bishops, deacons, and other dignitaries, were ordered by a certain day to leave the country; and if after that date they were found in Ireland they were liable to be first imprisoned and then banished; and if after that banishment they returned to discharge their duty in their dioceses, they were liable to the punishment of death. To facilitate the discovery of offences against the code, two justices of the peace might at any time compel any Catholic of eighteen years of age to declare when and where he last heard Mass, what persons were present, and who officiated; and if he refused to give evidence they might imprison him for twelve months, or until he paid a fine of twenty pounds. Any one who harbored ecclesiastics from beyond the seas was subject to fines which for the third offence amounted to confiscation of all his goods. A graduated scale of rewards was offered for the discovery of Catholic bishops, priests, and schoolmasters; and a resolution of the House of Commons pronounced 'the prosecuting and informing against Papists an honorable service to the Government.'

Under laws of this description, what wonder that Ireland was kept for years in almost absolute tranquillity. There was, it is true, an Irish parliament, but it was composed of Protestants, elected by the small Protestant minority of the inhabitants, and the only vestige of independence that this parliament ever manifested was when a collision occurred between the selfish interests of those in whose hands all power was concentrated. However, towards the end of the eighteenth century, some signs of returning life began to show themselves. There was a brief period when the sessions of parliament were lighted up by the patriotic eloquence of Henry Flood and Henry Grattan, who dared to claim of England some consideration of the rights of their native land. But the hopes of moderate reforms which were for a moment awakened were doomed to disappointment, and Grattan retired from public life. Soon more violent counsels prevailed, leading the way to the unfortunate rebellion of 1798, which was soon put down, and in such a cruel manner that Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who was sent to replace the commander-in-chief, said that "every cruelty that could be committed by Cossacks and Calmucks has been committed here. The manner in which the troops have been employed would ruin the best in Europe."

Ireland was once more lying crushed and exhausted. Here was an opportunity which Mr. Pitt was not slow to avail himself of, and by a series of bargainings which to this day seem, in Irish eyes, thoroughly disgraceful, a majority of a parliament, which was packed with venal placemen, and did in no sense fairly represent the nation, was, in 1800, secured to vote for the act of Union with England. But who can be surprised that this act of Union has always been an offence to the Irish people? Who can be surprised that agitation for its repeal has never ceased? At last these complaints reached the ear of an English statesman. In 1886 Mr. Gladstone brought forward in the House of Commons a bill which proposed to give to Ireland the Home Rule that the Irish people demanded. In a few weeks this bill was defeated by a decided majority; yet to-day this question of Home Rule for Ireland is still the most important question before the people of all the British islands.

It is probable that the merits of this question are very inadequately understood by the American people. The prevailing ignorance is owing in a measure to the fact that there has been no concise, clear, and attractive history which could be readily obtained. It is therefore fortunate that the Messrs. Putnams have added the "Story of Ireland" to the series to which they have given the name of the "Story of the Nations." This little volume will very soon satisfy the reader as to the reasons of the present wretched condition of Ireland, and will perhaps draw out warm sympathy for its people; but the question of Home Rule is a larger and a more difficult one. Even the authoress of the "Story" offers no decided opinion. She closes with the following words:

"Set before a stranger to the whole Irish problem—if so favored an individual exists upon the habitable globe—a map of the British islands, and ask him whether it seems to him inevitable that they should remain forever united, and we can scarcely doubt that his reply would be in the affirmative. This being so, we have at least, it will be said, one fact, one sea-rock high above the reach of waves or spray. But Irishmen have been declared by a great and certainly not an unfavorable critic—Mr. Matthew Arnold—to be 'eternal rebels against the despotism of fact.' If this is so—and who upon the Irish side of the channel can wholly and absolutely deny the assertion?—then our poor standing point is plucked from under our feet, and we are all abroad upon the

waves again. Will Home Rule, or would Home Rule, it has been asked, recognize this fact as one of the immutable ones, or would it sooner or later incline to think that with a little determination, a little manipulation, the so-called fact would politely cease to be a fact at all? It is difficult to say, and until an answer is definitely received it does not perhaps argue any specially sloth-like clinging to the known, in preference to the unknown, to admit that there is for ordinary minds some slight craning at the fence, some not altogether unnatural alarm as to the ground that is to be found on the other side of it. 'Well, how do you feel about Home Rule, now that it seems to be really coming?' some one inquired last spring of an humble but life-long Nationalist. 'Deed, sir, to tell the truth, I feel as if I'd been calling for the moon all me life, and was told it was coming down this evening into me back garden!' was the answer. It is not until a great change is actually on top of us, till the gulf yawns big and black under our very eyes, that we fully realize what it means or what it may come to mean.

"The old state of things, we then begin to say to ourselves, was really very inconvenient, very trying to our tempers and patience, but at least we know the worst of it. Of the untraveled future we know nothing. It fronts us, with hands folded, smiling blankly. It may be a great deal better than we expect, but, on the other hand, it may be worse, and in ways, too, which as yet we hardly foresee."

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

DR. WOOLSEY'S SERMONS.*—We welcome for ourselves and our readers this new edition of these admirable sermons—so simple and strong, so individual and yet speaking to the conscious experience of every Christian. As we read these pages, we seem to hear the tones in which they were uttered; and so long as they shall be perused by any who heard them, so long will they recall the plaintive yet impressive tones in which they were delivered. For reasons not a few, they will be valued for a long time in the future as a collection of unique interest and will inspire, we trust, the production of many other discourses which like them shall combine refined culture and practical insight, profound humility with the authority of strong convictions and a tender love

* *The Religion of the Present and of the Future: Sermons preached chiefly at Yale College.* By THEODORE D. WOOLSEY. New Edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887.

for the souls of men. The only difference between this and the first edition, is in the substitution of four choice discourses, for four which have been displaced. There are few of the author's old pupils and old friends who will read without emotion the following dedication. "To those who have now and then heard my voice in the pulpit of Yale College, and especially to the graduates, who have gone forth from these halls, leaving me here until now when my time of graduation is nearly come, I affectionately inscribe these discourses, as an acknowledgment of the respect and love which they have shown me."

CHRISTIAN FACTS AND FORCES* is the title of a volume of sermons, twenty in number, that were preached during the past year in the Center church of New Haven, by the Rev. Newman Smythe. The great "Christian fact" is that Christ Jesus has come into the world with the distinct purpose to introduce among men a new remedial "force," which shall everywhere make itself felt for good. This force, which has already wrought such changes in the world, is still as efficacious as ever it was; and the object of the preacher is to show how this force is adapted to meet the varying wants of men, women, and children to-day. The sermons are as far as possible from being moral essays. There is no threshing of thrice threshed grain. The preacher is convinced himself that the remedy brought by Christ is still "the power of God unto the salvation of every one who believes," and he delivers his message with a confident and a courageous spirit which can but inspire those who read with similar confidence and courage. He says: "Because I have seen the Lord Jesus Christ everywhere answering human life, meeting all the tides of the human soul, and letting them break, and grow still, upon the great positiveness of his Gospel, therefore I believe that he is the sure and abiding Word of God. Because I have seen Jesus Christ in the midst of men putting his strength of God beneath their integrity, enveloping their personal consciousness with his presence of God's righteousness, surrounding their restlessness with God's rest, and opening all their selfishness out into the largeness of his love; because I have seen Jesus Christ holding calm and strong in his assurance of the heavenly Father, and the eternal life, the wills of men that else would have grown faint, and the hearts of women

* *Christian Facts and Forces.* By NEWMAN SMYTHE. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 12mo., pp. 267.

that else would have ceased to beat; because I have seen Jesus Christ, and may behold him upon any day, and in any town or city throughout the world, going before his disciples, and answering still with his grand, triumphant "verilies" the men and women who have followed him, and who look up into his revelation of God, and will do his will on earth, therefore, I believe him to be the true Messiah, the Son of God, the Way, the Truth, and the Life." As might be expected, in a preacher who has such strong confidence in the eternal "verilies," the spirit of his sermons is invariably hopeful and cheering. What he says on page 111 might be applied to him. "Those men who have really seen evil things, and fought with all their might against the sins of the world, have been as a rule not only the bravest men, . . . but also the cheeriest, the most hopeful men. It is your indifferent man—the man who does not lift a finger to take any burden off from men's shoulders, the man who has not the soul to commit himself against any wrong—who fears that the country is going to destruction,—as it might for all him." Still more noticeable in these sermons is the spirit of genuine and unmistakable sympathy with humanity in all its manifestations. The weak, the timid, the tempted are especially kept in mind, and a word of comfort and encouragement is ever ready for them. The children are made to feel that they are not forgotten. Those who are discouraged in their endeavors to do good, and find that they have "run straight against some dead wall of indifference, or found some custom fortified against them, or some wrong method entrenched in some good institution," are urged to keep on and not to cease their efforts. This kindly sympathy, too, is manifested, as far as possible for those who are low down in the scale of life. He says: "You go down the street, and pass some one who is only another of the multitude of human beings of whom there seem sometimes to be already many more than there is any use for on this earth. You do not know the man, and you do not want to know him." Yet even "that common-place man whom we do not know, that poor man whom we may help," belongs to our common humanity. Christ has that man constantly in mind, and he is not to be passed by contemptuously. It is never to be forgotten that we are all children of the same Father.

The sermons of a preacher who believes thus confidently in the never failing power of the Gospel, who feels warm sympathy for all the common needs of men, who is bold to rebuke all manifes-

tation of meanness or of selfishness, all "dullness and bluntness of feeling" to noble and generous things, and who has ever a word of cheer for those who are striving to do right, are surely sermons for the present times, and, whether listened to or read, will everywhere be felt to be stimulating and uplifting.

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

HUTTON ESSAYS.*—The "modern guides of English thought" who are made the subjects of these Essays, are Thomas Carlyle, Cardinal Newman, Matthew Arnold, George Eliot—as author and as in her life and letters—and Frederic Denison Maurice.

To some, we wish we could say to many of our readers, Mr. Hutton, as a writer, is no stranger. A few know him as one of the two co-editors of *The Spectator*, for which he has been largely responsible since 1861. Previous to this he had been editor and contributor for several journals, and had attained a high reputation as a liberal thinker and actor in Politics and Reform, and also as an able critic and student in Letters and Religious Thought. Born and bred a Unitarian and educated at University college, he early came under the influence of Rev. James Martineau, Cardinal Newman, and Rev. F. D. Maurice, and finally emerged in his early manhood as a Broad Churchman of an earnest and solid type, with positive and outspoken convictions in Theology and Philosophy, with warm practical sympathies for an earnest Christianity; in Biblical criticism most tolerant and catholic, in Theology emphatically broad minded, and yet in devout feeling positive and warm hearted. The thoughtful papers which are unmistakably from his pen are enriched from a wide range of critical knowledge in literature and philosophy, and are at once solid and fluent, positive and genial, and invariably characterized by a warm and earnest sympathy with truth and goodness, as also by a positive and sometimes startling earnestness. Not a few of these articles are copied in whole or in part in some of our journals, and are easily recognized as from his pen, even when the source is not indicated from which they are derived. The constant readers of *The Spectator* expect to find in every weekly issue something characteristic from Mr. Hutton, and they are rarely if ever disappointed. It were well for philosophy and criticism in our country, to say nothing of our

* *Essays on some of the modern guides of English Thought in matters of Faith.*
By RICHARD HOLT HUTTON. London: MacMillan & Co., and New York. 1887.

politics, had we a weekly periodical of the type and excellence of the journal which he has done so much to form.

It was most fortunate for us that Mr. Hutton and Mr. Townsend became co-editors of this paper in 1861, and that from the very beginning of our great conflict its influence was boldly and bravely thrown upon the side of Freedom and our National integrity. This was done at a serious loss of patronage, prestige, and income, but it was done fearlessly and perseveringly till the end. We are not aware that this fact was ever extensively known in this country, or that it has ever been recognized by any expression of personal or public gratitude. The files of *The Spectator* speak for themselves, and to any one who reads them now, and knows against what odds their arguments and appeals were uttered, they make an appeal for grateful recognition to which many of our citizens would delight to respond, could they greet upon these shores the writer who stood so boldly with us in our country's hour of trial.

It is interesting also to know that before the transcendent genius of Abraham Lincoln had begun to be appreciated by any one of our publicists, our shrewd and sympathizing friends of *The Spectator* were the earliest to do homage to his genius and foremost to recognize the inspiration of his words.

Besides his manifold and weighty editorials on political, philosophical, theological, and literary themes, Mr. Hutton has contributed several weighty literary and philosophical articles for the prominent periodicals of Great Britain. The most important of these were collected several years since in two volumes, under the title of "Essays: Theological and Literary," which have passed to a second edition, and from which the Literary Essays were republished by Porter & Coates, of Philadelphia. All of these Essays take very high rank in our modern critical literature, and some of them are of unique excellence.

The essays in the volume before us are of characteristic excellence, and meet the tastes and wants of a very wide circle of readers. The catholic taste and appreciative criticism which does sympathizing justice to the five writers who represent extremes of opinion so far removed as those named in the title page of this attractive volume, and the fearless analysis with which the moral and intellectual foibles of some of these idols of the hour are subjected impart to each one of these essays a peculiar charm, and should command for the volume an extensive circulation.

Could a selection be made from the briefer articles of permanent interest which for so many years have made the columns of *The Spectator* so attractive, a most important addition would be made to our better literature which could not fail to be appreciated in America, if not in England. Now that MacMillan & Co. add "and New York" to London, on the title page of their publications, possibly they might be induced to provide so charming an addition to our literature. They would at least receive the thanks of not a few of Mr. Hutton's American friends and admirers.

NOAH PORTER.

Dr. Morris's treatise entitled : IS THERE SALVATION AFTER DEATH?*—which has reached a second edition, is an able, frank and manly discussion of the question, whether there is any reason to expect or believe that the offer of the gospel will be made in the next world to those to whom it is not made in this. After some preliminary statements, he comes to the fundamental inquiry whether there is any reason to hope for a change of character from sin to holiness in the future life. In the natural tendency of sin to become permanent, and in the retribution which conscience immediately after death inevitably brings in the open presence of the Holy One, and in the impossibility of proving that any disciplinary process would prove effectual, he finds no ground of hope from the natural faculties of the human soul, and then takes up the main question whether there may not be a change of character and condition in the future world, wrought through a proclamation of the gospel there.

The arguments from the Scriptures urged in support of this theory he divides into seven classes, and examines each in detail. In this chapter many good remarks and strong points are made; but the argument on the whole would gain in force to some minds if presented in a more thoroughly exegetical form, although others probably would be repelled by this style of writing. If it had been also frankly admitted that 1 Peter iii. 19, 20, in its natural meaning, does seem to teach the preaching of Christ in person, after his crucifixion, to those who had perished in the flood, yet so little can be made of it, standing as it does alone, confessedly obscure, with no hint as to the result, and in the entire silence of our Lord and

* *Is there Salvation after Death?* A Treatise on the Gospel in the Intermediate State. By E. D. MORRIS, D.D., LL.D., Lane Theological Seminary. Second Edition. New York, 1887. 12mo., pp. 252.

the other books of the New Testament respecting it, that no general proposition can be solely rested upon it in support of a general offer of the gospel to the dead. If Christ's mission to the under-world had this significance, it is certainly remarkable that our Lord is not recorded as having spoken a word concerning it, or cheered the hearts of his disciples with a single text respecting it.

From particular passages of Scripture the author turns to an examination of the claim that its general testimony is in favor of the doctrine in question. The grounds of this claim are certain speculative propositions in which is wrapped up the substance of a very considerable divergence from the ordinarily accepted evangelical theology. The first of these is that Christ is the head of the whole human race. The Scriptures say he is the head of the *redeemed*, that is, of the church. Next it is said that Christianity is the absolute and universal religion. But this does not prove that all will accept it, or that it will be in the future, any more than it has been in the past, offered to all. It is claimed, further, that the love of God points in this direction. But on the one hand this argument, without limitation, must certainly end in the unbiblical doctrine of a universal salvation, and on the other it takes no account of the fact that multitudes, in the exercise of their freedom, have in fact turned away from Christ. The next claim, that justice requires the offer of Christ to be made to all, involves the denial of the Scriptural declaration, that salvation is wholly of grace. After discussing these and similar processes of illegitimate reasoning, the author comes to the conclusion that they all rest upon the fundamental error of exalting speculative or merely sentimental tests or standards above the actual limitations or adjustments made by the plain declarations of the Scriptures.

With this closes the strictly biblical argument. The next chapter, on the witness of Christian symbolism or the testimonies of the confessions of faith, is designed to show that the doctrine of a trans-mundane probation has gained no recognition in any creed of christendom, and instead of being a logical development of the historical confessions can only exist on their ruins. This view is farther strengthened by a discussion of the question how the dogma in question affects in particular the consensus of evangelical doctrine. Here he very justly says that two very diverse positions are assumed by the advocates of probation after

death. "The first describes it as a mere sentiment, a simple speculation, a problem in exegesis, an allowable form of opinion, but something of small theologic moment, quite admissible as a simple theory into the large circle of incidental beliefs. The second describes it rather as having in itself vast revolutionary power, and destined to exert a strong formative influence on the opinions and teachings of the church of God henceforth." Of these two descriptions he justly observes "that from the nature of the case, this opinion can never hide itself permanently in the cloister or the school, as a mere speculation : that at least in such a country as this, it must either live an evanescent life, or assume practical form, and claim the right both to regulate thought, and to influence the practical activities of the church. Once admitted as a Christian doctrine, it would at length compel a thorough reconstruction of the great fabric of Christian theology at almost every cardinal point,—the character, plan, and methods of God, moral government and sin and guilt, the mission of Christ and the scheme of grace, the idea as well as the range of salvation." This result will scarcely be denied; but in this brief notice it is impossible to state in detail, as the author has done to a considerable extent, the almost inevitable process. In the closing chapter the testimony of the so-called Christian consciousness is considered, and the utter invalidity of any claim it has, irrespective of the teaching of the Scriptures, to pronounce upon the question, is exhibited.

The manifest endeavor of the author to state fairly the opinions of those from whom he differs, and his avoidance of all offensive personalities, are worthy of all commendation.

GEORGE E. DAY.

REV. DR. WILLIAM HAGUE'S LIFE NOTES.*—Autobiographical sketches, written by men who have enjoyed opportunities of knowing the distinguished men of their age, form a department of literature which has a marked and distinct charm. Unfortunately it is a department in which our American literature is not especially rich ; so this volume by the Rev. Dr. Hague is the more deserving of notice. It gives a glimpse of school life in the City of New York from 1816 to 1824 ; of college life at Hamilton, New York ; of seminary life at the theological schools at Prince-

* *Life Notes or Fifty Years' Outlook*; by WILLIAM HAGUE, D.D. Boston. Lee & Shepard. 12mo, pp. 362. 1888.

ton, New Jersey, and Newton, Massachusetts; of the pastorates of the author in several important Baptist churches in Providence, Boston, and elsewhere. The descriptions of the men of mark with whom he was brought in contact in all these places through a long life contribute not a few valuable side-lights to the elucidation of the history of his times.

The opening chapters of the volume—with an account of his own childhood at New Rochelle,—present a very charming picture of the large family circle of cultivated people of Huguenot descent, who for the past two centuries have made the whole region around the old “manor” of Pelham, in New York, famous as a center of refined hospitality. Dr. Hague relates the early impressions made upon him by his aged relatives who had themselves heard, from the lips of their parents, accounts of the dragonnades in France, of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the story of the sad fate of one of their own family, who had been “dragged through the streets of Paris by the hair of the head.” It can be easily understood how such relations and such early impressions would, in the case of Dr. Hague, lead to a strong faith in the doctrines of the Reformation, yet he tells us that these same early impressions did not prevent one of his cousins from entering the Roman Catholic Church. This was Mrs. Seton, who was in due time to be the founder of the order of “Sisters of Charity” in the United States. The story is an instructive one; and it is certainly humiliating to find that it was possible that a gifted young woman, of Huguenot origin, could be “staggered” in her early faith and fall into “an agony of suspense” over the question which she herself thus states: “As the Anglican Church recognizes the perfect validity of the Roman Catholic sacraments, while, on the other hand, the older Roman Church has never recognized the validity of the Anglican administration, am I not required, by a proper regard for my soul’s peace and safety, to place myself upon the ground that remains to both sides undisputed?” This question, the importance of which it seems was “strengthened by her æsthetic tastes” and a residence at a time of overwhelming sorrows in the hospitable home of the noble-souled Felichi” became the subject of oral and written discussions with Bishop Hobart of New York and Archbishop Carroll of Baltimore, the “Primate of Baltimore.” The final “change of her ecclesiastical relations so stirred society” that it was deemed of sufficient importance to be published. There is something pathetic in the wail of

her elder sister: "She has gone over to the church that persecuted her ancestors." The nephew of Mrs. Seton was James Roosevelt Bayley, "at first Rector of the Episcopal Church at Harlem, and then at last Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, Primate of America." One of the interesting chapters of the book is an account of a long and friendly conversation between the Archbishop and his cousin Dr. Hague. The Archbishop expressed a wish to know the reason of Dr. Hague's religious faith, and said: "Tell me your story and I will tell you mine." It is impossible to give, in the space at command, even an outline of what was said, but the result, as might be expected perhaps, was that each said to the other: "If I had ever accepted your premise as a basis or starting point of reasoning I would have reached the same conclusion."

A chapter devoted to Dr. Hague's early impressions of that remarkable personage in our American history, Aaron Burr, deserves more than a passing notice. The family relationship to his accomplished and brilliant wife gave the schoolboy almost daily opportunities for observing the charm of Col. Burr's manner and conversation. Dr. Hague enlarges with enthusiasm upon the ease with which that accomplished man put himself in communication "with people of every class, from the highest, to the lowest, from the most cultured to the rudest, old and young alike; instinctively quick to adjust himself, as to thought, tone, and manner, to any personal presence whatsoever, confident in his ability to win responsive feeling, and realize the aim, or even the whim, that may have impelled him at the time." For illustration he describes the entrance of the Colonel into the parlor, once when he had himself been left there for a moment alone, "his physique, air, style of movement, realize a boy's highest ideal of the soldier and the gentleman; while his keen and genial glance and sunny smile, expressive of a personal interest as real as if I had been a Senator, awaken a feeling quickly responsive to the tone of cheer in his greeting: "Well, Will, I'm glad to see you. Have they left you here alone?" Dr. Hague sums up the aggregate of the impression which this fascinating man made upon him as a boy, and says that Col. Burr realized to his youthful conception "the highest type of cultured manhood, and awakened an intense desire to appropriate and assimilate the elements of manly power of which he was ever before me as the most complete exponent." Writing when an octogenarian, Dr. Hague says: "I can truly affirm, that,

as a matter of personal experience, throughout the half century that followed, seldom, if ever, have I found myself tempted to give way to impatience, to anger, to peevishness, to the abandonment of self control, but that the image of Col. Burr has risen before me as a Mentor, rebuking the weakness and quickening manly resolution."

Dr. Hague has made some attempts to analyze the secret of the wonderful social success of Aaron Burr, and ascribes it to the never failing courtesy and cordiality which he manifested to all, and to his readiness to adapt himself to others, and to express interest in them, and sympathy for them. He pleased because, buoyant with life and enthusiasm, he sought to please. A careful consideration of this chapter might repay some of the young aspirants to social success at the present day. For some years, a type of character, that has long been known in Europe, has begun to be copied in this country. It consists in the adoption of a sort of blasé manner which seems designed to announce that the happy individual is so profoundly impressed with his own importance that he cannot possibly make an effort to please any one else; that he has already seen everything in the world that is worth seeing, and done everything that is worth doing; that he has judged everything, and has concluded that there is nothing more that can possibly interest him. With this, there is an effort to cultivate perfect inexpressiveness of manner, and to look down with a kind of pitiful condescension on the weakness of those who manifest any capacity for hearty enjoyment or any indication of enthusiasm or interest in anything. Aaron Burr certainly did not affect a Buddhist's stolidity; and a profound contemplation of nothing is not the highest achievement of the human intellect.

Dr. Hague also says that Col. Burr was as minutely particular as Lord Chesterfield himself, who was to him a typical character, in all his ideas of what was gentlemanly. He was in the habit of emphasizing the smallest things pertaining to conduct as of importance. "Remember, sir," he said, "no gentleman will be seen smoking on the streets." Unfortunately, in these days, we must acknowledge that men who in most things act in a gentlemanly way do "smoke in the streets." It is encouraging, however, to find that the latest results of the study of sociology agree with the views of the American Lord Chesterfield. In one of the latest numbers of the *Independent* which lies on the table before us, a well known scientist explains at great length how it comes about

that a great many things which it might be proper for a man to do "if he were alone in a forest" become highly improper if done on a crowded street. It is to be supposed, as a natural inference, that this distinguished scholar would say that no gentleman on a crowded street will, while breathing pure air himself, puff out tobacco smoke, which, as it goes behind him, will be almost certain to be taken at once into the lungs of some unsuspecting person to whom the smell is nauseous. And do not even smokers themselves think that all tobacco, smoked by people whom they don't know, is vile? The late Professor Thacher used to tell a story of one of his colleagues with whom he was walking in the neighborhood of New Haven Green, when a garbage collector passed them, with the stump of a cigar in his mouth, whose dress was filthy, whose whole appearance was disreputable, and who was carrying a fragrant pail. The gentleman with whom he was walking, said: "I like that! there we see all the unities strikingly in harmony!"

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

ART AMATEUR.—With the advancing interest in Art, which is so noticeably manifest in the various Art centers of the country, there has been even a more widespread advance in all that tends in any way to household decoration. Those who can remember the bare and comfortless rooms which were not uncommon even ten years ago, recognize the change which is everywhere manifest. Vast numbers of our American homes have come to look bright and attractive, which once were most severely destitute of anything that approached the ornamental. There is still much that might be accomplished to raise the general standard of taste, and especially to instruct and guide the increasing army of home workers, who are asking themselves what they can do in a truly artistic way. During the coming year, the *Art Amateur* will devote even more attention than heretofore to this interesting and practical subject of house decoration. The other departments, relating to Art in the household, are so numerous and are all so admirably treated and illustrated in each number, that we cannot but hazard the assertion that any family that has ever had a single number of the magazine in the house will not be satisfied till it has become a monthly visitor. Price \$4 a year; single number, 35 cents. Montague Marks, 23 Union Square, New York.

WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

THE SEYBERT COMMISSION ON SPIRITUALISM.*—As we are told in the address to the trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, with which this book opens, “the late Mr. Henry Seybert during his lifetime was known as an enthusiastic believer in Modern Spiritualism.” Shortly before his death he gave to the University a sum of money sufficient to endow a chair of philosophy, on condition that the University should appoint a Commission to investigate, among other religious systems which assume to represent the truth, particularly the one in which he so ardently believed.

The report of the Commission appointed is easily summarized, although the evidence on which the conclusion is based is extended through one hundred and fifty pages. The Commission made every effort to have professional mediums exhibit before them the mysterious phenomena in which their art consists, but discovered nothing but proofs of the most vulgar and generally clumsy fraud. They render a verdict, in terms of concealed or overt sarcasm, according to the facts which they observed. For this they are not to be blamed, although in certain places they have indulged in an unnecessary lowering of the dignity of tone befitting a commission so constituted and authorized.

It cannot be expected, however, that this report called “preliminary” will satisfy anyone. The verdict of mere fraud doubtless belongs to the case of those whom the commission had the opportunity of investigating. But it has too often shown its powerlessness with reference to the entire class of phenomena to which Modern Spiritualism appeals. Indeed, of late, certain glimpses into possible connections of many of these phenomena with those of hypnotism, hallucination, and various neurological conditions of a pathological kind, have tended greatly to broaden the field of possible inquiry. We advise the Commission to magnify their office and enter this larger field.

The only contribution of any value to the general subject made by this Commission thus far, is the report of Professor Fullerton concerning Zoellner’s spiritistic experiments with the medium Slade. This report, on the whole, tends to weaken the value of Zoellner’s testimony. It does not, however, explain the phenomena. We wait for more light.

* *The Seybert Commission on Spiritualism.* Preliminary report of the Commission appointed by the University of Pennsylvania to investigate Modern Spiritualism, in accordance with the request of the late Henry Seybert. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1887.

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.*—“The aim of this work,” says the author in his Preface, “is given in its title: First, it is an ‘Introduction’ only, and does not go into the details or the literature of the subject. . . . Secondly, it is an introduction to psychological theory, and aims less at a knowledge of facts than at an understanding of principles.” Accordingly, after an opening chapter on the nature and method of Psychology, we have treated in Part I. “the Factors of the Mental Life,” and in Part II. “the Factors in Combination.” This division results in no little repetition and crossing back and forth in the discussion of the separate topics. Thus sensation is treated in part first, and perception in part second; the mechanism and cerebral theory of reproduction are topics forming chapters in part first, but the forms of reproduction are reserved for part second; the “thought factor” is got ready for action in part first, but it apparently gets itself into action as a “thought process” only when part second is reached; the subject of the mental life, which certainly requires that the factors should be in combination, is nevertheless polemically discussed among the factors of the mental life, at the very beginning of the book, while its interaction with the body is considered at nearly the close.

The excellences of this work are those which mark the other productions of the author. The statement of views is clear and rhetorically effective; and is not infrequently decidedly brilliant and even epigrammatic. It is never “dull” philosophy which we come across in these pages, although it is sometimes “crabbed.” The polemic in which the book abounds is for the most part sharp and spirited, whether or not it be judicious and convincing. Some of its criticism is subtle; and a fair, perhaps a generous, amount of information on current psychological questions is in general displayed.

We feel confident, however, that the more thoughtful, intelligent, and truth-seeking readers of this book will lay it down with a feeling of disappointment. Its method is not that of patient, candid seeking, and cordial reception of truth; nor does it show the calm, well-balanced mind which philosophy requires. Its language is often needlessly irritating and offensive to those whose points of view and conclusions differ from the author; it is sometimes undignified,—the jaunty, semi-jocose manner, with which

* *Introduction to Psychological Theory.* By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887.

we are familiar in newspapers not of the highest order. Thus we have references to the "circle-squaring type of minds," those who have not yet abandoned "the attempt to tell how or why, nervous action is followed by sensation" (p. 41); and we are told that "concerning the particular form of the nervous action nothing can be known!" (p. 46); though, since "vibrations are always fashionable, we may view it as a species of vibration, etc." Indeed, we cannot help feeling that it is a pity to have acerbity of judgment and temper, and smartness of tone, mar so much in Professor Bowne's book which would otherwise be good and helpful reading.

"The plan of the work," we are told in the Preface, precludes much attention to physiological psychology. As a matter of fact, however, considerable attention is given to this branch of the science, and that by no means of the most polite, not to say flattering kind. Indeed, a by no means small portion of the book consists either of polemical treatment of the contributions made by physiology to psychology, or of a re-statement, for purposes of the author's theory, of these same contributions. We do not believe that a single intelligent adherent of views at all resembling those against which Professor Bowne directs his shafts of irony and ridicule will be influenced to modify them by this criticism; and we fear that inquirers into the truth on those subjects with which physiological psychology deals will be little informed or helped by it. Surely, from whatever point of view the author is inclined to consider his book, he might have spared himself the trouble of remarking upon the exploded "separate cell theory" as a current form of materialism in cerebral localization.

We have not space to consider the treatment which Professor Bowne gives to the subjects of the separate chapters. His treatment of the "sensations" is quite unsatisfactory. The division of them into extra-organic, organic, and subjective, is untenable (p. 40); and indeed, he seems himself to depart from it later on (p. 59). Here facts and opinions in physiological psychology are constantly referred to in a way to confuse and mislead the uninformed reader.

The later chapters on the thought factor and on perception are much better than the earlier chapters. Perception is correctly stated to be a process into which all forms of mental activity enter to a greater or less degree. An attack, showing acute reasoning, is made upon that "common-sense realism," which has until re-

cently been a kind of standard or orthodox philosophy in this country, as an importation largely from Scotland; but which is now rapidly everywhere being abandoned as most untenable. But perhaps the best chapter in the book is the one entitled "The Thought Factor"; in this chapter (as elsewhere, and notably in treating of space and of the connection of body and soul) Professor Bowne has followed Lotze closely and somewhat minutely.

We note, in closing, that the author also adopts the view of the same German thinker in denying the "natural immortality" of the soul, and bases the claim to immortality for man solely on the formal principle: "Those things that have perennial significance for the Universe will abide" (p. 316 f.); therefore, since only moral goodness, or the moral personality, has absolute worth, we must rely on moral nature and revelation for our argument, faith, or hope, touching this subject. Metaphysics is agnostic here.

THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT.*—Under this title the celebrated author presents us with no compact and systematic treatment of the human thinking faculty, such as to merit the word "Science," but with a number of rather miscellaneous essays somewhat loosely hung together upon the thread of a theory. Accordingly the book, although abounding in interesting and suggestive passages, has the appearance of being made up for the disposal of material collected in the "workshop" of the philologue rather than constructed out of resources won by genuine philosophical research. The first volume, after two chapters on "the constituent elements of thought," and on "thought and language," discusses Kant's philosophy, Darwinism as falsely holding that an animal with language can have been developed from one without it; and then spends many pages in defending Heyse's view, that the sounds of roots are derived from the rings, given out by different substances when struck (the so-called "ding-dong" theory of the origin of language), and in commanding and expounding Professor Noiré's tenet, that "no concept can be framed without a name, and no name can be framed without a concept." The second volume contains nearly two hundred pages of technical philology, concerning "the roots of Sanscrit," and "the formation of words." The book then closes with a short chapter on "propositions and syllo-

* *The Science of Thought*; by F. MAX MÜLLER. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1887.

gisms," and a somewhat lengthy recapitulation. Numerous shorter or longer excursions occur.

Müller's statements in this book as elsewhere, are often so unqualified as to be striking without being convincing to reflective minds. In the Preface (p. x.) we are told that the outcome of his system may, "not unfairly" be represented as being that "there is no such thing as intellect, understanding, mind, and reason, but that all these are only different aspects of language." Later on (p. 27) the remark of the Indian commentator is quoted with approval; "when one thing cannot exist without the other, the two are said to be identical." By language, says Müller (p. 28), "we mean what the Greeks called Logos, word and meaning in one, or rather something of which word and meaning are only, as it were the two sides." In his historical Introduction to Müller's Translation of Kant, Professor Noiré, whom the author of this work on the "Science of Thought" commends so highly, frequently represents the relation between thought and language as one of identity. The only satisfying way to study the growth of mind is in the history of language. Language is "subjective nature."

Now, strictly speaking, such a claim as that mentioned above, is not simply doubtful or untenable, it is even unintelligible and absurd. For what can be meant by identifying language and thought, or—in the simplest case—the conception and the root which serves as its name. Words, apart from the feelings, mental images, volitions, or forms of abstract thought, which they support and express, are not a whit essentially different from all other physical changes. They are *motions*, mere motions, in molecules and masses of matter. On the utterer's part they are molecular changes in certain cerebral areas; then in certain down-going nervous tracts; then in the vocal organs or muscles of hand and arm (in the case of written words). Between the utterer and the receiver of these words are nothing but acoustic waves or waves of luminiferous ether. On the receiver's part, words are vibrations of the ear-drum, connecting chain of bones, fluids, and otoliths, etc., of the inner ear; then molecular agitations of the organ of Corti; then nerve-commotions in certain up-going nervous tracts, and finally in certain cerebral regions. In all this their being, from one brain, mid-air, to another brain, words are no more to be identified with thoughts than sensations of blue and red and green are with nerve-action in the retina, the corpora quadrigemina, and "sight-centres" of the cerebrum. To speak of language as *identical* with thought

is indeed another one of the many instances of mistaking mere words for real, clear conceptions. We are curious to know what thought in Müller's mind is identical with the word "language," what conception with the word "word."

But probably the author's statement must not be taken seriously. If, however, he intended simply to maintain that the relation of language and thought is one of the most close and complete dependence (although not identity), so that we can form no conception except as belonging to a name, we can discover in his treatise no sufficient proof even of this. It appears to add nothing whatever to the discussion and comprehension of the old and much debated problems. Moreover, what little evidence we can appeal to, of the nature of fact, seems to show that some appreciable progress *can* be made in thought—i. e. in the forming of abstract conceptions and logical judgment—without use of the power of naming.

As for the author's peculiar form of Monism, it is certainly not a legitimate deduction from any genuine discoveries touching the real relations of thought and language, but may be considered a quite foreign affair.

Messrs. HENRY HOLT & Co., New York, have just published

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OF

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NEW ENGLANDER

AND

YALE REVIEW

NULLIUS ADDICTUS JURARE IN VERBA MAGISTRI

MARCH, 1888.

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
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NEW ENGLANDER

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YALE REVIEW.

No. CCXVI.

MARCH, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE LITERARY LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES; AND ESPECIALLY AS IT IS AT PRESENT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT.*

It is always good to get back here, gentlemen. The privilege of coming occasionally and being one of you is really among the important advantages of a Yale education. Yet I

* The following paper by MR. HENRY HOLT, of New York City, is substantially the lecture which, by request, he delivered at Yale University in March, 1887, as one of a series of lectures before the Yale Political Science Club. At that time, Mr. Holt consented to furnish it for publication in this Review; and also consented to refrain from eliminating some passages which he had inserted in the freedom of colloquial address to an audience that he knew would be composed, to a large extent, of friends, but which he said might be considered to be of too personal a character if presented to the public without explanation. It should perhaps be added that the necessity of sending the proofs to Europe has delayed the publication of the Article, and that Mr. Holt's continued absence from the country has prevented his adding anything which might apply to the existing state of the discussion of the important subject of an International Copyright.—ED. NEW ENGLANDER AND YALE REVIEW.

feel that this time I come under circumstances which call for something very like a word of apology.

When this course of lectures was planned, it was intended—or at least I so understood—to present to the students some of the practical experience of those who had once, like themselves, been here for theoretical education. So understanding, I readily consented to come.

But as the plan developed, circumstances seemed, not unnaturally, to modify it a good deal, and when I saw the course formally announced as primarily for graduates, under the auspices of the Department of Political Science, and that it was to be opened by a really scientific lecture from one of the very first of Political Economists, and that he was to be followed by a specialist of great authority, I felt that you were to come here to-night with the expectation of receiving really profound instruction, and were to be disappointed.

But I had agreed to come, with honest intentions at least; and I am consoled with the thought that your field of Political Science is so broad as to touch one side of every human activity, and with the realization that I shall probably be dull enough to lead some of you who do not follow me closely to suspect that I may be profound.

I was very deliberate in saying that I should talk to you of some of the *aspects* of the literary life. I mean some of the things apparent to an outsider. I am not in the literary life, but am simply an observer of it with, perhaps, exceptional opportunities. Nevertheless, as a mere observer, I shall, before I get through, have something to say of a few political and economical facts that are of the first importance to American literature.

But first I want to tell you some things which I wish somebody had told me when I was in college, but which I have had to learn in the tardy school of experience.

Some of the older of you have had books published. Perhaps all of the younger of you expect to have. When you consider the dozens of young men—would it be too much to say the hundreds!—who leave American colleges every year with the same hope of making some figure in literature, and then realize that in every generation of Americans there are hardly a score

who do, you must realize how difficult the task is, and what care and work success demands.

Here of course you ask: "Can care and work do it? Must it not be born in a man?" Care and work can not do as much as most stupid men think they can; but they can do a great deal more than most bright men think they can. Regarding one of the first dozen American literary men of our time—a man who succeeded respectably in poetry, fiction, and narrative, and whose name is known to every habitual reader in the civilized world—his long-headed publisher once said to me: "That man's neatness, punctuality, carefulness, and general reliability have been large factors in his success." And I want to add my testimony to the same effect. I knew the man intimately, and know that a large part of his genius was a genius for regular, careful work. In the groups of fairly intelligent men where I have met him, he has shown no more genius than pretty much anybody else.

While no man has succeeded in literature without some spark of the divine fire, many have succeeded better by taking good care of a small spark, than others have who have been careless with a generous flame.

Taking care of that spark means, primarily, taking care of your health. Possibly you've heard something of this kind before! It is not a question of being able to get off a good thing occasionally, but,—the ability to get off good things at all being granted,—it is a question of having vitality enough to get off good things often. If a man is sleepy and dull, he can do almost any other brain work better than he can do literary work. The negotiations of commerce, the wranglings of courts, even the painting of pictures, all bring something from the outside to hold a man's attention. But the writer who has to depend upon his own impulses, needs—to make those impulses spontaneous and constant—good blood steadily and vigorously pumped into his brain.

When I was in college, there was still around something of the ascetic notion that mortification of the flesh tended toward insight into spiritual things. Since then there has raged a good deal of conflict as to what spiritual things really are, and the strongest arguments seem to show that there is a spiritual thing

behind every material thing, and that our true avenue into spiritual things is through doing our duty regarding the physical appearances they put on, including, primarily, the physical apparatus of one's own consciousness. A man's duty to his body is almost as important in literature as in athletics. If we look into the facts, we find that, as a rule, the pale and sickly scholar has not made much of a place or held it long. Despite some conspicuous exceptions, most great authors have been the possessors of a vigorous physique.

The first thing a brain-user must do, is to sleep. Sir Isaac Newton said that he could not do a day's work without eight hours sleep. Probably the rest of us then, if we want to use our brains, had better try to get nine. The most efficient literary brain, perhaps, in America to-day, I have often noticed, is taken to bed early, and is also kept a large part of the time in a row boat or on horseback.

Now as to the equipment best for literary success to-day, as to what in the way of education the world is actually using, perhaps a publisher's opportunities fit him better than most men for venturing an opinion. There is not much conflict over any question but that between classics and modern languages. My observation has steadily built up the conviction that a man is at great disadvantage in his English, without so much of Greek and Latin as are living in English. If Greek and Latin are studied with constant reference to English, probably a boy could get as much as that before he enters college, and as he is constantly using that portion in his English, he would not forget it. That portion is all that is remembered ten years by forty-nine graduates in fifty, while knowledge of French and German, if one has any, tends to increase every day. Yet if you don't happen to be an academic student, with an elaborate drill in classics, don't feel that you are at a fatal disadvantage regarding a literary career. A book that some good judges consider as fine a piece of literature as has been produced by any living American, was written by a graduate of this Sheffield Scientific School. I don't know of anything better by any graduate of the Academical Department.

One enormous item in equipment for literature, one which I specially want to impress upon you because it was so little ap-

preciated by the students when I was in college, is the power to do uncongenial things—the power to take hold of a mass of facts in which you feel no interest whatever, and master them and their relations. No man can get an intimate and comprehensive view of any subject without the power to do this. There is no subject large enough to be of consequence which is not large enough to include something uncongenial to any one taste. So to master any large subject, every man has got to master some things for which he has no taste. Even poetry and fiction run very thin indeed from a brain not stored with some wide and accurate knowledge. Think what study it must have cost Thackeray to write *Esmond*, or George Eliot to write *Romola*, or Browning to write *The Ring and the Book*!

And now one thing more. In watching pretty large arcs of the careers of a good many literary men, I have found one thing grow plainer and plainer—that is that honest work pays and meretricious work does not. There are many kinds of honest work. There's honest blood-and-thunder as well as honest philosophy. Look at “Treasure Island” and “Kidnapped.” Shakespeare himself is not more true to nature! Unless you follow nature, you are sure to get mixed up, and, sooner or later, to break down. This is a tremendously orderly universe—the Cosmos within as well as the one without. Its sequences are absolutely the same, absolutely to be relied on, whether they impel you in a splendid career, or whether they crush you. You cannot avoid them and you cannot cheat them. Honest literary work is to study them and to delineate them with such art as you may. I remember an art critic saying once: “Don't try to make iron pillars look beautiful by imitating marble pillars. You lie, and you cheat nobody. Cast capitals are not carved capitals. Mould yourself an honest iron cylinder, give it flanges on the top and bottom to widen its hold, and decorate that.” So in writing, get the habit of doing your own work, not of making cheap imitations of other work. Your material may be only cast iron while another man's is marble, but yours is an honest material if you use it honestly and don't try to make it look like something else. Study the orderly universe—in dumb nature and in speaking men. If you find nothing

that has not been abundantly told to everybody before, keep still. The world is very busy. But if you find any worthy truth that seems to you new, or that seems to take on in your mind a worthy new aspect, tell it as truly as you can, and with such fit decoration of phrase that will not belie or obscure it, as may naturally come to you. But don't pump your imagination for meretricious novelty. In literature, the function of imagination is not to supply truth, but to decorate the expression of it. There are few truths so commonplace that they may not be told in new forms and impressed with new eloquence. Evolution is moving each truth into new relations every day. Study what these new relations really are. If they are new aspects of life, and if you have the gift of fiction, make your characters true to them and illustrate them truly. But don't build your work with things that do not naturally hang together, or with mere tinsel. Such work can't stand, and in the long run, it can't pay.

And now, supposing yourself to have got your equipment, and formed the habit of honest and needed work, what paths in literature are open to you?

If you have got to make a living, there is at the start only one that is at all direct, though it may branch into others. This is a pretty important point to realize, and very few young people do realize it before experience has shown it to them. Many start with the hope that they can support themselves by writing poems or novels, travels or histories, or even by translating them. Now abandon that at the outset. As to translations, I know a publisher—whom you know at least by sight—who has had to get a letter printed with which to decline translations, and who, before that letter had killed off large crops of budding translators, had a sign put outside of his office door which read: "No translations wanted." The principal reasons that translations seldom succeed, are that people generally read what is nearest to their personal interests. Those of you who are old-fashioned enough to have read Dickens, remember how fond of reading dear old Joe Gargery was, when all the reading he could do was to pore over the newspaper without being able to make out a word until he came to J. O. E.

Joe, and that made him happy. We're all like that. We all like to read about ourselves and the things close to us. Americans prefer American novels and adventure and history first, then English, then, I suspect, German, especially since we grew so proud of our cousins in 1870; next, probably, French, and lately Russian; that last too, perhaps, because we had some political sympathy with Russia developed in our own time of trial. Now perhaps these statements that so few translations are read, and Russian translations least of all, surprise you a little, but you are not very well placed to know what the majority of people are reading. Your associates are almost exclusively cultivated and cosmopolitan people. Yours is a narrow section of the social pyramid, pretty close to the top. If authors depended upon that small section, they would starve. You find most of the people you go among, reading for instance, Turgénieff and Tolstoï. But the other people don't read them; don't read Turgénieff at least; for the publication of his works in this country has not paid; and I know if anybody does. Of course one translation in a hundred does pay, but it will not pay you to spend time making the other ninety-nine on the chance of catching that one.

Remember, I am talking to you of the *practical* aspects of the literary life, not of its spiritual privileges. When I tell you that translating Turgénieff does not pay, I am not telling you that it is a foolish thing to do. It is only a foolish thing to do for the purpose of making money. I have been told that there are nobler functions in life than making money; but there is no honest place for them until enough money is made to support life in working order and with a margin for needed recreation. And how to make that amount of money by literature is what we are talking about now. The privilege of opening up new fields of thought and inspiration to your fellow-men, may have to be a subsequent affair. It certainly must be, as far as regards such fields as your fellow-men won't pay for, unless fortune has happened to make you independent of their pay.

As to novels, I doubt if any American is making a comfortable living by novel writing now; virtually all the novelists get a large portion of their income from other work, and if any one

of them is making a comfortable living, it is by publishing the novels in the magazines first, and that, as a rule, can be done only after a reputation is made. But our question at present, is of the ways to make a reputation.

In regard to travel and adventure, if a man has money for travel and adventure, the question of making a living is not crowding him. But, before his reputation is made, no publisher is going to advance him money to get the material for such books.

History and the other forms of literature near the line of science, of course require beforehand long periods of study, during which a man must live. As to works of science and philosophy, of course they demand still more years of study, and the demand for them is small.

As to magazine writing, the magazines, in the nature of things, must compete with each other for the most attractive tables of contents, and therefore must be mainly filled by writers of reputation already established. They cannot give enough space to new writers to do much toward their support.

This about uses up all book work outside of compilation—of cyclopaedias, dictionaries, &c. The work here is important, but there is but little of it, and that little is irregular, and requires special training.

What literary work that pays from the start, then, is there left for our aspirant? Simply that of the newspapers, daily and, with vastly less chance of a place, weekly. When he leaves college, if he is half as conceited as I was, he will expect to write leading editorials. But probably not many will be required of him at that stage of his career, and even the faculty for criticizing books, pictures, and music which has made him an ornament of the *Lit.* Board, will at first hardly compel the admiration of the great world. The chances are that if he wants, at the outset, to get on a big paper in a big city, his only way to make a living with his pen, will be as a reporter. And it won't hurt him a bit to do it, if he will only remember that brain power depends mainly on sleep, that sleep depends largely upon digestion, that digestion depends largely on temperance and regularity, and that he has a mother, or had one. There's great danger to a young man in a reporter's life. He has

to go to so many bad places in so many bad hours, and live in so much excitement that many young reporters succumb. But I have not learned that many who go out from here do; certainly no one will who lays to heart a lecture which President Dwight gave in Linonia Hall a few months ago.

Of course if your ambition is to be a writer of books, you are starting a long way off, as reporter on a newspaper. But not further off, perhaps, than many successful men start from the objects of their ambition. I have not much faith that a man with literary capacities who begins earning his bread in a career alien to literature, stands much of a chance of developing his literary powers. He had better earn his bread just as near to literature as he can. Our own roll of honor appears to contain a conspicuous example to the contrary, in a graceful poet and subtle critic who stands high in Wall street as well as on Mount Parnassus. But the truth is, he did not begin his active life in Wall street, but in a newspaper office, and did not drift into his present business until he had had a long education on the press, and had formed habits and powers of literary work strong enough to withstand the distractions of a business career.

The necessity of beginning in a modest way as a newspaper reporter may not be very stimulating, but there is at least one probability that is stimulating, namely, that your genius is going to be appreciated. Things are not now as they were when Milton sold the manuscript of *Paradise Lost* for fifteen pounds, or even as they were when Dana sold the manuscript of "Two Years Before the Mast" for two hundred and fifty dollars. There are many more avenues into publicity—more magazines and more publishing houses; and vastly more discrimination at the head of them. Why, twenty-five years ago, there was hardly a college-bred man in the publishing business; now there is hardly a publishing house which is not presided over by one. So far from there being any truth in the frequent impression that in the business-offices of literature, the aspirant is treated with neglect, the truth is that if there is any promise in him, it is encouraged and nursed. Not a few of the articles in the magazines are re-written in the editor's office, because they have been found to contain good material badly dressed. Not a few

books have been labored over in the offices of publishers as if they were bright but sickly children. I have heard of an author of some reputation saying that if her books were well written, it was because her publisher had re-written them.

And why should not editors and publishers foster genius in that way? Does not their living depend upon it? And is not genius rare, and yet somewhat susceptible of development? Of course mistakes are made regarding manuscripts, in accepting as well as in rejecting. So far as my personal experience goes, not more than one per cent. of those offered are accepted, yet there have been more mistakes in accepting than in rejecting. Of course every business man wants to do business, and where one big success will wipe out a dozen moderate failures, he is a little more apt to err in taking chances for the one big success than in avoiding the chances of the dozen little failures. Be assured then, that if you can produce anything worth publishing somebody will appreciate it, and works of genius are always worth publishing, unless they are in very narrow technicalities. The first one or two persons to whom you offer your work of genius may make the mistake of rejecting it. A certain margin for mistakes has got to be allowed in all human processes, and possibly that margin may come in at the beginning. Publishers' readers are fallible like all other human beings, and I sometimes am tempted to suspect that even publishers themselves may be, and even if they were not, considerations of time alone would force them to delegate most of their reading. All people, no matter how widely cultivated, have their hobbies, negative as well as positive. I knew a very accomplished and reliable reader to recommend, at intervals, three novels that were not worth publishing. It appeared that every one of them turned on the Salem witchcraft, and that that was a subject that the reader was simply unable to resist.

Don't be perfectly sure that you are a heaven-born genius if your first manuscript is accepted on the first offer. But, on the other hand, don't be sure that you are not at least fairly capable if your manuscript is rejected on the first two or three offers. While the merchants of literature are eager to find genius, it is also inevitably true that they are very skeptical regarding the chance that any particular manuscript contains it. Certainly not one in a

hundred does, and therefore it is inevitable that a reader should approach any work by an unknown author, with a sense of immense probability that it is good for nothing. And of course if this *a priori* impression comes on top of too much dinner, or too little, or too much sleep or too little, or any one of the thousand disturbances that flesh and spirit are heir to, the chances are that unless the work is the great stroke of its decade, the *a priori* probability that it is good-for-nothing will appear to the reader confirmed. But the next editor or reader, or the next one still, is pretty sure to be found in judicial condition, and the work to get its deserts.

Before I leave this topic, I want, partly for selfish reasons, to give you a word of advice. Don't bore publishers. Busy men hate to be interviewed ; especially when, as in the case of manuscript, the chances are ninety-nine to one that the matter is of no consequence whatever. An author's desire to expound or explain his manuscript awakens at once an impression that it has been written by a man not over wise. A reasonable man must realize that he can't expound or explain his book to the public. It must explain itself, and if it can't do that to the publisher's reader, it certainly can't to the public. When a manuscript is offered in a way that shows a realization of these facts, the presumption is at once aroused that the author has, at least, common sense and good taste ; and it is the sad truth that even these qualities are so rare that they at once lead the manuscript to be approached as something out of the common. On the contrary, a manuscript is apt to have short shrift, if it is backed up as many are, by such arguments as that it is the work of a meritorious lady in reduced circumstances whose grandfather invented a well-known horseshoe. To save any possible pain, I don't name the exact invention, but this is the exact parallel of two long letters which I had to read one terribly busy day a few months ago, regarding one utterly worthless manuscript. Another time I had given as a reason for accepting a manuscript, that the author was only fifteen years old.

Yet there is a converse notion just as absurd, that the intrinsic merit of a manuscript ought alone to lead a publisher to undertake it whether many people want it or not. There are

not a few ready to heap scorn upon a publisher because he refuses to give a few people what they want, in his line, at his own expense. Of course it is flattery to a man to expect a great deal of him, and as nobody expects such philanthropy from the butcher or baker, perhaps the publisher should consider himself proportionally honored. But the fact is: the publisher is not the public. He simply tells you whether, in his trained but not infallible judgment, the public wants a given book. If it does not, he certainly is not to blame. Yet I have often heard publishers blamed for lack of literary enthusiasm, when it was simply the public that lacked the enthusiasm, and I have heard publishers blamed for lack of public spirit, when it was the public that lacked its own spirit.

But to return to your supposed literary aspirations.

You had better seek your first rejection from the magazines, because there's one chance in a million that you may not get it, and if you don't—if your manuscript is accepted, you will get vastly better pay than you can by publishing in book form first. The public taste is setting more and more toward periodicals.

I shall have more to say about this later, but first I want to say a word about writing for periodicals. In one respect, it has been one of the most injurious practices literature has had to contend with, I mean in respect to continued stories. The literary life has not been found always to contribute to the business virtues, and authors are sometimes hard up. Consequently novel writers are very apt to want pay for their novels before they have finished them. So they sometimes sell them to magazines even before they have begun to write them. If the author keeps well, and no accidents happen, and the flow of inspiration is steady, he may get through with such a story all right. Though even then the early part of his work cannot have the benefit of the afterthoughts during the progress of it, or of revision of the early part to make it better develop the conclusion. As he goes on, many happy suggestions are apt to strike him which a slight modification of what has gone before would enable him to introduce, but which he cannot introduce if what has gone before is already rigid in

print. This is not the worst of it, however. Health is not absolutely reliable, accidents do happen, inspiration is unsteady. But the weekly or monthly appearance of the periodical is a fixed certainty, and publication day is apt to come sometime when the author is dull, or anxious, or ill. And then comes hasty and ill-considered work.

Evidence of this can be seen too often in important places. For instance : I don't believe any body admires Thackeray more than I do, yet there are passages in some of his novels (not in Esmond), which if they had been sent into my office in an unknown manuscript and been among the first passages to meet the reader's eye, would have led to the rejection of the whole manuscript on the ground that no man writing so carelessly *could* write well. Those passages, I have always assumed, were thrown off while some magazine was waiting for copy.*

I have more than once said to a new author : "Your future is secure, if you will never publish the beginning of a story before you have written the end," and I have more than once known brilliant prospects clouded by disregard of the hint.

One way to steer clear of the greatest temptation to make this capital blunder, is not to sell your work outright—but to prefer a royalty to payment in the lump. What money you get for this year's work, you are apt to regard as this year's income, and spend it, leaving next year to take care of itself. But next year, you may not be able to work, or your work may not be taking, or there may be extra demands on your purse. A man may be able to work at almost anything else, and yet be in no trim to work at literature. I've heard of eminent soldiers and politicians who did not sleep well. I never heard of an eminent author who did not, at least during effective periods. I know an author, whose works, if paying royalty, would give a comfortable income and be a safe provision for old age. Old age is coming and the author has nothing. All his books have been sold outright and the money spent in an unnecessarily rich scale of living. The author is generally in trouble, and selling books before they are done, the work is deteriorating, the public is supplied with more of it than it has ap-

* Since this paper was read, the newly published letters of Thackeray prove it regarding some of the very passages referred to.

tite for, and each manuscript sells for less than its predecessor. Moreover, of course each manuscript has been sold for vastly less than, on a royalty basis, it was worth. Where the publisher has to take the risk of a book's success, he has to discount the probabilities at what capital is worth in business, which is vastly more than capital is worth to a mere investor like the author.

I said that I should have occasion to speak of periodicals paying more for manuscript than can be got through publishing in book form alone. It is the general belief of the trade that a book will sell as many copies if it first appears in a periodical as if it does not. If this view is correct—and it cannot be very far from correct—an author who can publish first in a periodical gets double market.

The great development of periodicals in the past forty years is worth a moment's attention. It is one of the consequences of the great increase in means of communication. The same kind of person who used to sit and read *Pamela*, or the essays in the *Spectator* on manners and other home topics now wants daily telegrams from India and Africa. Why, even thirty years ago, speculations regarding the intentions of the Kaiser, the Sultan, and the Czar, were aroused only by weekly mails. Now every issue of a daily paper contains long telegrams and editorials regarding them. A man is to-day more thoroughly a citizen of the world than, thirty years ago, he could be of his own country. To keep alive to these wide interests, he must read vast amounts of matter which would be stale long before it could get between the covers of a book. This rapidity of intercourse is backed up by the rapidity of scientific discovery and of legal adjudication, until now men of science and lawyers, after their preliminary training, depend more upon the journals of their professions than they do upon the books. Even legal decisions can no longer wait for the old fashioned annual volumes, but are published in monthly and even in weekly pamphlets. Political science is no longer confined to books. At least two of the universities publish periodicals devoted to it, and it is even crowding practical politics in the daily press. It is literally true that many eminent scientific investigators think it a waste of time to

write any more than announcements of their discoveries in the periodicals read by their confreres, and even look askance at scientific men who write much. In view of this, then, begins to come up the question in relation to the remote future: "Will the coming man read books?"

Well, one is not as ready to set up for a prophet when he has been out of college twenty-five years, as he is before he cracks the college egg shell, but I will risk it so far as to say that the knowledge of the future is going to be stored much more generally than the knowledge of the present is, in vast sets of bound periodicals with elaborate indexes. The drift in that direction is very plain in the libraries now. The proportion of bound periodicals is rapidly increasing, and instead of the one moderate volume of Poole's Index that used to help us read up for our compositions when I was in college, there is a large quarto, and two other series of indexes are published monthly. But as to any material falling off in the demand for books, the facts seem a little paradoxical. Of the great increase of the periodicals there can be no question, but until the circumstances which took place about ten years ago, which I am soon to describe, there was no noticeable falling off in the book-buying habit, and I have not heard of its falling off in England, where such circumstances have not affected it. It looks then as if the periodicals stimulate book buying on the one hand, while they compete with books on the other, and as if they really found their own market in a great increase of the reading habit.

Now of course, there are plenty of people grumbling at the growing tendency to read periodicals, just as there are plenty of people to grumble at any other change. Some times they are right and they are partly right in this. A person mainly confined to periodicals, if he has had no previous training, is apt to be unsystematic, discursive, superficial perhaps. But why should he be confined to them? Voltaire said, or at least he is the last of the dozen men I have heard the saying attributed to, that an educated man knows everything about something and something about everything. Now we can take it for granted that the number of men who know everything about something is very small, and we can take it almost

equally for granted that they are going to find it out for themselves in very calm independence of what means the world sees fit to supply them. It makes little difference to genius whether it depends on books or periodicals or, in some things, on Nature at first hands. It will learn its everything about something anyhow, but as for people who are not geniuses, our chance of learning our little something about everything seems to me enormously increased by the increase of periodicals. To turn a man loose among them without any training whatever, is, of course, to diminish the chance that he would have had in an old fashioned library, of getting fastened to some book that would make him so strong in some one subject that it might be a rallying point for his whole intellect. But we are not turning people loose without training, as much as we did. We are not only educating more people, but we are giving them a more saving education. After we get a boy rough-hewn into the shape that enables us to recognize him as human, we are beginning to try to find out what he is really good for, and to train him for that. We have got over the old notion of my college days that to make a thing useful you must make it disagreeable; and under the elective system, a boy stands a good chance of developing an abiding interest in some department. A boy so educated will be safe in the coming flood of periodicals. He will simply pick out from it what he can use, and, instead of being overwhelmed, find himself nourished and sped along by the actual current of the age.

Not only is the great increase of this class of publications unlikely to do any harm, but in some ways it is sure to do great good. It is making good reading more accessible and cheaper. Moreover, the mails carry pamphlets to fifty times as many places as the bookstores and news-stands can reach, and they carry a year's issue for less postage than a single book. The cost of authorship, type setting, engraving, and the difficult preparation of the press for the illustrations, is distributed over so many copies that each copy has to bear but a trifle of it. If a number of *Harper's Monthly* or the *Century* did not have a wider circulation than that of an average book, it would have to cost ten times as much as it does.

If the periodicals really do kill off more books than they

stimulate to the reading of, note the effect on the character of literature. The books that are killed are, of course, mainly those that are least fit to survive. On the other hand, the literature furnished by the periodicals is, on the whole, the best of its kind, for the enormous circulation possible to the magazines enables them to bid high—to pay the good author better than books alone can.

While the periodicals are sometimes supposed to do something to account for the fact that relatively to the increase of population, the sale of books is falling off, the causes that have produced the periodicals have been working too long to account for the remarkable falling off in the past ten years. The railroads have been working for periodicals and against books over fifty years, the land telegraphs over forty, and the ocean cable over twenty, and the magazines have come up gradually. Since they reached a substantial development some thirty years ago, they have no more than kept pace with our general progress, while the distinct revolution in the sale of books of which I speak began only some ten years ago. Since then, there has been a sudden and tremendous falling off in the demand for books of all kinds. There are not relatively as many published, and there are not as many of each sold. In poems, travels, essays, histories, biographies, the publishers find that they can, as a rule, place but about one third as many copies of a new book as they could ten years ago, and in English novels worth keeping, and in a form worth keeping, only about a tenth.

There was ten years ago a book-buying habit, which was a good habit, because it led to a book-reading habit, and because it made a demand so wide that many books could be published that could not have been if they had depended for their sale only on those who read them. The favorite dissipation of many a substantial citizen, even in out of the way places, was to drop into the bookstore of an evening, look over the stock, and take home some book in a shape that would be a permanent possession in the family. Now most of those bookstores no longer exist, at least as bookstores. They are now toy shops and ice cream saloons with piles of "Seaside" libraries in one corner, and the substantial citizen, instead of taking home an

occasional volume of Irving, or Emerson, or Macaulay, or even of Timothy Titcomb or the Country Parson (two excellent men of whom the younger of you probably have not heard much, but they did some good in their day), he takes home a toy, or a pound of candy, or a pamphlet copy from (the chances are even) some minor English author, which if it had had to be reprinted as a book, would not have been considered worth reprinting at all. The thing is soon torn up, but the family remains the poorer, not only by it, but by the good book which, ten years ago, would have been in its place.

But this is not the worst of it. When a good book does get into the house, the chances are stronger than they used to be that it is not an American book. Our authorship has not been keeping pace with our growth in other things, and its pace is growing slacker. We are not without respectable authors; but there is too much point in the frequent question: "Where are the successors of Irving, and Hawthorne, and Motley, and Longfellow, and Bryant, and Emerson?" Certainly they have not appeared in such numbers as our growing civilization would justify, and, what is worse, they have not appeared in such numbers as the future healthy growth of our civilization can actually depend upon.

Did you ever reflect how important it is to a nation to have its own literature? It is not merely a source of amusement—intense and inspiring—but it is a foundation stone of a nation's greatness and permanence. It first awakens the patriotism of the child, and it informs the patriotism of the man. To a nation at war, poetry is almost as essential as powder. It was a deep thinker who said: "Let me write the songs of a nation, and I care not who makes its laws." But the man of letters does his part to determine what the laws shall be, as well as what the poetry shall be, and both unite to determine who shall win the battles. No man who lived through our war for the Union and who takes a sound view of its inspirations, can fail to attribute a mighty share of them to Holmes, and Lowell, and Emerson.

And now to come from heroic things to ridiculous things. Do you suppose that if our literature had its old grip on the interests of our people, our leisured classes would now be

aping the English as they do? Such a question is too subtle and complex to justify a very positive answer. Whether *post hoc* or *propter hoc*, this outbreak of Anglomania has gone on with the recent weakening of our literature, and no one questions the influence of literature on manners any more than on morals or on laws. And our literature *is* loosing its grip all around.

Now what has brought it to this condition? Simply calm and patient Nemesis, standing in the background while we were lagging behind other nations in perhaps the most significant step that civilization has yet taken. We alone have given no protection within our borders to the literature of other nations, and at last our own literature is suffering.

What has been the process by which nature has, as she always does, worked out this penalty for neglect of right? Or, a more mysterious question, how is it that we have been going on for a century without paying any regard to the rights of foreign authors, and have not felt any disastrous effects until within a decade, but are feeling them now?

The reason is that during our period of safety, the rights of foreign authors were quite generally respected, but it was by a voluntary arrangement of the American publisher, which had no law to support it, and which, about ten years since, naturally broke down. The arrangement arose because the publishing business is perhaps of all businesses, the one in which illegitimate competition is most disastrous. Experience has shown that where a book is not a monopoly, competition will surely lower its price to a point that destroys its value to author and publisher both. It comes about in this way. A certain number of books must be sold before the cost of type-setting can be paid, and in the case of nineteen books in twenty, they must be sold within a few months of publication, before new ones crowd public attention away from them. I am speaking now of current literature, of course. Now if a book is not copyrighted, and two publishers set the type for it, twice as many copies must be sold to pay for the type-setting. But the sale is not apt to be forced up to double or even half-as-much-again by the production of two editions; but the price is sure to be forced down, so that even if the sale is forced up, the loss is sure to come all the same, and the market to be flooded with

cheap copies of the book—author making nothing, publisher making nothing, but the public (illegitimately, though, as I shall show) temporarily benefited at the expense of both.

Moreover, the prices of books cannot be, even in the absence of competition, like the prices of objects of universal demand, such as nails and sugar—a trifle above the mechanical cost of production. Of books by untried authors, not over one in five, if one in ten, awakens any remunerative demand ; and even of books by approved authors, not all are sure to succeed. A demand for more cannot be forced by making the prices of all exceptionally low. The one book in five that people want, they will pay a reasonable price for, the other four they won't have at any price. Now no human being can tell in advance which book out of the five by new authors, that good judges call worth publishing, is going to succeed. Therefore the only way to make it possible to publish them, is to put the prices of all so high that the one which succeeds will pay a reasonable profit on the five. But even if this were not so, the price could not bear the same low ratio to mechanical cost that the prices of nails and sugar do. Books are not merely mechanical productions, but at the very outset they must spring from the rarest and most highly organized brains of the race, and those brains, to do their best work, must be assured a certain immunity from material cares. Their owners must be decently paid and must be paid out of the excess over mechanical cost brought by an article in limited demand. The publisher, too, must be paid, or at least he thinks so, out of this article in limited demand.

For the reasons I have given, it early became a question with American publishers how, in the absence of an international copyright law, they were to avoid suicidal competition over the works of foreign authors. At that time,—say thirty-five years ago,—there were so few publishers that it was comparatively easy to agree upon methods. As I am often questioned about these methods, I suppose you may care to know them.

Their first agreement was,—roughly speaking,—that no one should reprint a foreign book after another had done so. So they began to compete for the first printing of each foreign book, buying early proof sheets from England in order to

publish a book here as soon as it should appear there, and, of course, before any rival here could get it on to the market. But it was not practicable always to buy advance sheets. Hosts of books by untried authors, and some uncertain books of tried authors, were too risky to buy, and were still open to competition, and when copies came over, two or more houses might begin printing them at once, and all but the one first ready would lose, or else would violate the agreement. It became necessary, then, in the case of such books to decide ownership in advance. It was soon arranged that,—other things even,—in the absence of an agreement with the author, the book should be left to him who first publicly announced his intention of printing it, and that there might be no dispute as to what was a sufficient announcement, it came to be agreed that the announcement should be made in the *Commercial Advertiser*, which was, some thirty or forty years ago, the leading literary daily in New York, and now under a new administration is happily striving for its old dominion. But if copies of a promising English book came here, the day after the steamer arrived, there might appear simultaneous announcements of it by several publishers. Who was to have the priority then? This question led some houses to establish agents in England who should arrange for safe books, and send in advance of publication the names of all books that they could hear of from publishers and printers, and these names were announced. So far was this carried that forthcoming American copies of books, whose titles were learned in England, were sometimes announced as "in press" by one American publisher, when another already had contracted for them. Even more, the titles of some American copyright books that had already appeared here and received some attention in England, were sometimes sent over from England with a batch of English titles by agents there, and inadvertently announced as in press here by one house, after another house had already published them. The houses that made their announcements in this sweeping way did not print a fifth part of the books they announced, and yet their announcements prevented other houses from taking up the books. Moreover, this enterprising method of announcement was a game that all could play at. So it became neces-

sary to modify it. Consequently one great house refused to recognize any announcement that was not made with the book actually in hand here. Soon another point was set up, that when one house had taken the risk of introducing an unknown author, that house should have the first right to reprint the author's subsequent books, even if the author, indifferent to the service done him in his first book, should sell advance sheets of later books elsewhere, the claimant, of course, assuming the contracts of the buyer. Thus through self interest, backed up by considerable clear insight and not a little openness of spirit, there gradually grew up quite a code of custom which, as custom always has been, was a primitive makeshift for legislation.

It was called "The Courtesy of the Trade." Its total effect was to stimulate the making of contracts with foreign authors, and it is safe to say that while it lasted—for about the last twenty-five years of our first century as a nation—most American publishers acted, as the same ones act still, very much as they would have had to if there had been an international copyright law. But, for reasons which I shall soon explain, the "Courtesy of the Trade" was broken down about ten years ago. While it lasted there were defects and miscarriages enough, but British authors of any consequence generally had their rights here, although in a lame way, and American authors did not have to compete with them on unequal terms.

Now note this tremendously significant fact. Those twenty-five years of virtual international copyright—say from '51 to '76—were by all manner of odds, the best twenty-five years of American literature.

This proof from experience regarding the beneficent effect of even a makeshift for international copyright is confirmed by a second proof from experience with another substitute. I mean Stage-right, which foreign authors have here by a quirk of law. Our judicial decisions treat a foreigner's manuscript as his own property, just as they treat his watch, and in the same way they prevent the taking of any liberties with it. As you have no right to learn the time from a foreigner's watch without his consent, so you have no right to learn any fact from his manuscript without his consent. If he sees fit to make

you acquainted with anything that the manuscript contains by any means other than parting with it or a copy of it, you cannot get more than he sees fit to give you. You cannot copy it even from memory unless he permits. Hence a play or opera can be acted, so long as the text and score are not published, without the author losing his right to restrain the making of copies. As a consequence, some of the most popular foreign plays and operas have been produced here solely under license of their creators and upon payment of royalty. Thus writers for the stage are reaping, from a judicial decision, the same benefits of international copyright, that writers of books had from the old "Courtesy of the Trade." Now note the effect! The theatre is in a flourishing condition while the book-trade is languishing, and *American* authors can make vastly more money out of plays than out of books. Our people spend more money on the theatre probably twenty times over, than they do on books. Those who object to giving a dollar and a half for a book that will last, think nothing of giving it for a single evening at the theatre. And yet there is no cry that the foreign author of a play must be pillaged, that our people may have their drama cheap. And the stage is flourishing while books are not.*

The old "Trade Courtesy," beneficial as it was, depended upon the voluntary and informal consensus of a small body of men, a body, too, exceptional in being in constant contact with letters. Of course such a state of affairs was in very unstable equilibrium. The miracle is not so much that a set of established houses and one or two seeking establishment by the same methods should respect each others rights mutually conceded, as that for so long a period, no new comers should attack the salutary monopolies those houses had helped each other build. Any fool could make money, for a few years

* Since I made these statements we have had what I assume to be an illustration, in this very particular, of the way Nature always works her revenges. Sarah Bernhardt lately played Theodora in New York. The "book of the play" was merely a summary of it. To have given the exact words would have vitiated the stage-right. Therefore it seems fair to assume that it was our lack of an international copyright law which put it out of the power of nineteen-twentieths of the audience to follow the play.

at least—and that is a long way ahead for a fool to look—by reprinting George Eliot, or Charles Reade, or many other books, and the miracle is that for so many years, no fool, not to say no sharp man without standing to lose, did not do it. An occasional spasmodic attempt was made, but the regular publisher at once reduced his prices to the ruination point and the attempt was short lived. Conditions favorable to such attempts were ripening, however, and about 1876 they matured.

The code of "Trade Courtesy," evolved some ten years prior to the civil war, had been protected from outsiders by the diversion of industry and attention incident to the war. But after its close, the progress of manufactures, unhealthily stimulated by the protective tariff, in time led to gluts in the paper mills as in everything else but America's chief legitimate industries—agriculture and mining. By the early seventies, paper-makers, press-makers, type-founders, for the sake of getting rid of their surplus wares were ready to trust almost any adventurer who came along; and the growth of railroads and of mail facilities made the transportation of floods of pamphlets without covers a very easy thing. Under these conditions, an adventurer in Chicago, who has since failed, made more of a success in cheap piracy than had ever been made before, by using a second time the type of the continued foreign stories in his weekly paper, for reprinting them in pamphlet form. About the same time, the proprietors of some of the New York weeklies, and of the Sunday editions of the dailies, began to do the same. These reprinters of novels in the well known flat quarto pamphlet, paid no respect to the old courtesy of the trade among the publishers, or to the rights of foreign authors. Harper's Franklin Square Library was an exception to this, which I shall explain presently. A crop of new publishers arose on strictly piratical principles, and they were not restricted to the pamphlet series, but some of them went into wholesale piracy in bound books.

The profits which British authors had been deriving from their legitimate publishers in America, fell to virtually nothing. Under the competition of these floods of stolen goods, the sale of books by American authors fell off two-thirds. How many

people were going to pay a dollar and a-half for a book by Howells when they could get one by Norris or Hardy for twenty cents?

Now it may naturally be asked why, if the pirates could make money publishing in this way, the authorized publishers could not. In the first place, only one of the pirates has made money. The others have all or nearly all, failed, most of them at least twice. But selling books at ruinous prices that pay authors nothing, has of course stopped the sale of books at remunerative prices that do pay authors, just as effectually as if the pirates had made money. They failed because of a fallacy. For reasons given earlier, a book usually retails at four or five times the cost of paper, printing, and binding. This fact has been stigmatized by people who do not understand the necessity of it, as a fraud on the public, and one philanthropist appeared as the defender of the public against the extortions of the publishers. He said, substantially: "Why, these vampires are bleeding the public to the extent of three or four hundred per cent. One hundred per cent. or fifty per cent. ought to be enough for any man. Five per cent. is enough for a dealer in flour or metal, why should people have to pay more for its intellectual and spiritual food than for its gross material necessities? Go to! I will change all this." And elaborate circulars were issued to that general effect. Now this philanthropist saw, in the first place, that about forty per cent. of the retail price of a book was going to the wholesale dealer and the retailer; or rather to the wholesale dealer, the retailer, and the customer, for, as you all know, the customer generally gets twenty per cent. of it now-a-days. So this philanthropist's first step was to say that he would save the reader the forty per cent. by having nothing to do with the jobber and retailer, but would deal with his readers direct. Then he knew that he would not pay anything to the author, so that saved him ten per cent. more, and he had got his price reduced fifty per cent. already. Well, he managed to get it a good deal lower still; but we need not follow him further before noticing the fallacies in what he had already done. He had left out the fact that the customer was used to a reduction from any price named. This had become so on

account of the foolish competition of the regular publishers in giving discounts to their customers, until at last the retailers got so much discount that they began giving it away to the readers, in competing for *their* custom. Our philanthropist also forgot that the fifty per cent. which he had cut off, up to the point when we left him, also included the packing and transportation. His third fallacy was that he could get along without the wholesale dealer and retailer, and he soon found that after all, out of his greatly reduced price, he had to allow the dealers discounts and to pay transportation. But perhaps the most important item that he left out was the vast uncertainty of the business—the fact that I explained earlier, that prices have got to be high enough to allow four books out of five to pay no profit. It was true that he reduced this uncertainty to a minimum by mainly taking books that other publishers had already had the risk of proving successful, and letting their failures alone. But even in that case, he had to meet their competition, for they, of course, lowered their prices, even to a loss, rather than submit to having another take the fruit that they had grown. But not only had the philanthropist left the author out of account, but apparently he had left the printer out too, and the paper maker and binder as well. For he failed, largely in debt to them all.

The same story, with variations in detail is true, I believe, of all the pirates but one, though some of them have apparently been put on their legs again, even more than once, generally by some glutted paper maker whom they have saved out of the wreck, and who finds a handy means of getting rid of his superfluous product in the indirect selling of large masses of books and pamphlets at about the cost of the paper in them. Whether author, printer, binder, and the other creditors of the so-called publisher are paid, is, of course, none of the paper-maker's affair.

But the American trade in books of general literature—books outside of the literature of knowledge and of picture books and toy books and fancy editions, has been killed. Not only has the revenue of foreign authors from America been destroyed, but, in nature's strange revenge, the revenue of American authors has gone with it to an extent that makes literature,

independently of journalism or other distractions, at a desperate disadvantage in America.

I said that one of the pirates has made money, and in connection with this fact I promised to explain why none of the regular publishers established before him and connected with the very authors whom he pirated, could make money by his methods. It is obvious, of course, that other things even, as they paid the authors, and he did not, he could sell at lower prices than they. That would be somewhat offset, however, by their being supplied by the author with early proofs of a book and so being able to publish it a few days before the pirate. But this on the other hand was something of an advantage to him, because the regular publisher gets the book well advertised by the time the competing edition is ready, and so saves the pirate that expense, and people have learned to wait for the cheap edition. But we have yet to speak of the pirate's main advantage which is that he can lay hands on the authors of all the regular publishers, while each regular publisher restricts himself to his own authors. This enables the pirate to issue a vastly better collection than any regular publisher can. Probably no one of you begins to appreciate the commercial value of a series like the Seaside Library, for instance, as distinct from the same books straggling independently. It's the old story of the faggot and the single sticks. Each book contains a list advertising all the others. When the issue is regular, people get in the habit of looking for the books in a series instead of buying books not in it, and moreover, the postal law gives to publications thus issued periodically, the benefit of the same cheap postage that applies to magazines and weekly papers. But a special point here, is, that for these reasons, dealers will order *in advance* a quantity of each book that is to appear in a series, irrespective of what the book may be. Now of course each dealer will prefer the best series —the one containing most of the best books, and will neglect the other collections. The public acts in the same way. If Appleton publishes a series and a reader asks for "A daughter of Heth" in it, he won't find it, because Wm. Black's works are published by Harper, and Appleton and Harper respect each other's rights and the rights of each other's authors.

Similarly, if the reader asks for "Cometh up as a Flower" in the Franklin Square Library, he wont find it, because Rhoda Broughton is published by Appleton. But if the reader asks for both books in the Seaside Library, he will find both there, because the publisher of the Seaside Library respects no right of Appleton, or Harper, or Wm. Black, or Rhoda Broughton, and consequently he has a better series than either of the other publishers, and his series pays well while theirs does not.

Other collections to include everything, have been attempted and failed, while the Seaside has succeeded, simply because it was earliest in the field in New York and was pushed with an energy that left all competitors to defeat. Some collections like the Franklin Square Library, for instance, are issued by publishers who do respect authors' rights and therefore cannot include everything, but they are kept up more for the sake of holding on to connections and not losing a visible place in the field, than because there is profit enough in them to make them worth while.

I trust it is now plain to you, how, although American publishers once did, as some do still, respect foreign authors' rights and did not steal their books to compete at the prices of stolen goods with books of American authorship, it has naturally come about, in the absence of a copyright law, that success should largely depend upon not respecting foreign authors' rights, and so seriously damaging our own authors' rights.

There is still another feature of this wholesale cheap piracy, that is of perhaps more importance than any feature I have yet explained. That is, the vast quantity and consequent poor average quality of it. Before these cheap libraries appeared, only such books were published as, for some reason, could be expected to pay author as well as publisher. But the libraries have flooded the country with stuff that under healthy conditions would not justify reprinting,—books that were undoubtedly published in England at their authors' expense by hack publishers. The reason for this is, that the series must appear regularly like a magazine. Unless it does, it is not entitled to cheap postage, and it will disappoint its customers. Nothing is more fatal to a periodical publication of any kind than irregularity of appearance. So these cheap series, to keep up regular and

rapid publication, at times when good authors were infertile, have had to fill in with poor ones, and even with forgotten ones. And all this, of course, is in competition with authors of merit—authors prepared to instruct on living questions, and above all, authors prepared to make their theme our own society's needs and hopes.

Authorship at best is an ill-paid pursuit. Most of its rewards are in glory ; and, in modern life, fervid and ingenuous souls can find many other avenues to glory, even outside of the old ones marked by the sword and the cross. What wonder then that in the state of affairs I have depicted, the quiet paths of authorship are less and less sought by able men ?

The question is then, plainly enough it seems to me, not merely, are we to have an international copyright law because we want to do justice to the men in other lands who have laid us under the heaviest obligations that any one portion of mankind can lay upon the rest, but it is a more selfish question, or at least a more patriotic question—and patriotism is after all but the largest form of selfishness—whether we are going to have an international copyright law in order that we may have a national literature.

The demand for international copyright has been resisted by those who are solicitous for what they are pleased to call the interests of American industry, that is the industry of American mechanics. The industry of American authors is not covered by their philanthropy.

Every time the matter has been up for discussion, just as every time free trade or an honest dollar has been up for discussion, the well known howl has gone up from Philadelphia. When the senate committee on patents was listening to arguments on this subject in the spring of '86, a petition was sent against it in charge of representative walking-delegates from that city, which contained the names of ten times as many printers, paper makers, and binders as ever had had a dollar's interest in a reprinted work. All professed to be interested, yet most of them were manufacturers of blank books and other stationery, or proprietors of job printing offices that seldom got beyond a bill-head or a circular. Yet all these people were claiming that an international copyright law, at least one that

should not require that all books sold here should be manufactured here, would destroy their means of support. There are hosts of people, especially in that favored centre of the manufacturing interest, who are seized with a frenzy whenever the cry is raised that America is to have the benefit of foreign labor, or even of foreign capital.

The sober truth is that but a very small portion of even the paper and printing interest of the country would be affected by the removal from American soil of all reprinting of books copyrighted in foreign countries. The newspaper offices of New York alone would more than equal the whole industries affected, and I incline to believe that any two of the largest offices would.

On the other hand, consider the colossal importance of the development of our national literature which would offset the trifling disadvantages that even unrestricted international copyright would bring.

There now seems no immediate chance however, for an unrestricted measure. It takes a pretty sanguine soul to hope for even one restricting manufacturing to this country, and if such a one were to pass, it is doubtful if other nations would reciprocate so that it could stand here. Such a restricted measure would, of course, necessitate the expense of doing the type work twice—both abroad and here—and our Philadelphia friends are clamoring that even the engraving shall be done twice, and this double expense must of course be paid by the people. Yet the very loudest clamorers for this burden on the people, are also the loudest clamorers for leaving the foreign author to be robbed and our own author to be left to the competition of stolen goods, in order that the same dear people whom they want to make pay for duplicate type-setting and duplicate engraving, may have their books cheap. Verily labor with a big L, not to speak of demagoguery with a big D, is a good advocate of help to the needy!

It is claimed by the opponents of international copyright, that it is not a natural right which a country is bound to protect, even in an alien, as it would his person or his personal belongings, but that it is a right made by law and not existent until the law makes it. Though this is quite the popular

shape of the discussion, no real authority, on either side, admits its validity in this shape. There are, as most of you know, two schools of authorities, one of whom would claim that all rights are, in a sense, natural—copyright as well as any other—and that the law, so far as it goes, merely recognizes and protects natural rights; while the other school claims that there are no natural rights, and that man has no rights except those created by law—that the function of law is not the recognition of abstract principles, but has to do simply with the practical question whether the greatest good of the greatest number will be promoted by any piece of concrete legislation or adjudication. Now in the light of recent knowledge, these two old-time conflicting opinions, between natural rights and legal rights, like many similar pairs of opinions, look very much like the two sides of the same shield. If you admit evolution and admit rights—natural or legal—all rights which conform with evolution must be natural rights. On the other hand, what is the claim that a right which you propose to make legal is for the greatest good of the greatest number, but an admission that it is in conformity with the course of evolution, and is therefore natural? In fact, in the modern view, until it seems demonstrated that a right is natural, there is not much thought of making it legal. We simply study the indications of evolution, and try to confirm them by law.

Now what has been the course of discovery so far regarding property rights? Very early it was found that a society cannot develop without securing to every man the result of his labor when applied to material things. The bow or boat the savage makes must be his own. From the recognition of that fact, civilization begins, and there is no rational line to be drawn between a savage's right to have only whom he pleases use his bow, and an author's right to have only whom he pleases read his book. Some time back, I called an international copyright law perhaps the most significant step in civilization. I did so because it is the acknowledgment of the most abstract right yet recognized by law, and it is also the most altruistic of acknowledgments. Primitive intelligence recognizes rights only in material things. Later, are recognized rights in ideas applied to material things and they are protec

ted by patent laws. It is a still later step to recognize rights in such immaterial things as combinations of words. There are plenty of writers and speakers to-day who are not civilized enough to do that. Moreover, the rights of strangers are never recognized by barbarians. They do not even generally respect a stranger's right to his own person. A community protects the material property of its own citizens at a much earlier stage of civilization than it protects the property of strangers. Domestic patent laws preceded international patent laws. Domestic copyright laws have preceded international copyright laws. All civilized nations have domestic copyright laws, and all but one have international copyright laws, and in that one, whenever such a law is proposed, plenty of its writers and legislators proclaim the ancient right of pillage of the foreigner, in order that the native may have his property cheap. The great nation not yet civilized beyond such doctrines, is ours!

I have before alluded to a very significant fact, and I know that of which I speak. Our most active agitators against international copyright include the most active agitators against international trade and against an honest dollar.

I hope I have, even if at the risk of boring you, done something to show you the vast importance of this question of international copyright, and its difficulties. It is of the utmost moment that such a question shall be well understood by such persons as yourselves, and to explain it was one of the chief motives that led me here.

Another strong impulse however was one of pure affection for this spot, and of desire to contribute *anything* from my experience that could be useful here. I ventured in the earlier portion of this address on considerable of what might be called professional advice, and perhaps on some things that might be called personal. Bear with me while I say a parting word of a more intimate nature still. Speaking purely with reference to your happiness and success in life, if my experience is good for anything, it will be well for you while you are here and after you are gone, often to have one feeling I have not yet named. Love this place! Do not regard it merely as a dead machine for turning out young men with academic attainments.

Regard it more as an influence that devotes attainments to high ends. Such a university as this is no soulless thing. No mere mechanical combination, no mere ingenuity, no mere fiat could make it. It has had to *grow* through all these generations, and to grow from the labors and sacrifices of devoted men. Its traditions are of respect for learning, but they are of respect for manhood first. It is the one place of all I ever knew where a man's accidents, however brilliant, are subordinated to his essentials, however sober—the one place where the democratic phrases of Burns and Jefferson are facts. Love it then for these things, but love it more than all because its greatest education is the education of the heart. You who sit here in its sheltered calm and hear the exultant throbs of victory blending into rhythms of music afar off, think it is all victory there. But wherever there is a victory, there is a defeat. Each one expects to share the triumph. But no one may be certain that he will. Out in the world, even amid the victories, there are disappointments too; and those who know them best tell us that even triumphs are often empty. Those who feel the disappointments and emptinesses, and every man feels them sometime and too often, know the need of something stronger and warmer than mere power of intellect and will. Now there is no place where men assemble,—I verily believe,—where the heart can so freight itself with those better and enduring things, as it can here. This is one place where meretricious selfishnesses are torn aside and where men really meet face to face. Here you can really know each other, here you can really be free from the prejudices that keep men apart, and you can grow close together. Work, for none can be a man without work, but feel too! Feel the splendid traditions which surround you, feel all that is true and spontaneous and generous in each other, and you will take from here something that will be a solace and an inspiration all your days.

HENRY HOLT.

ARTICLE II.—THE PECUNIARY VALUE OF A COLLEGE EDUCATION.

FOR such a title one feels almost compelled to make an apology. Education, the true and large development of manhood, is so clearly of supreme worth in itself, that there is incongruity in estimating it, or any course of discipline which ministers to it, by a pecuniary standard. To the frequent charge that college training is not, in the sense of fitting a man for business, practical, the advocate of liberal education is ordinarily content to reply that such is not its aim; that it seeks, rather, the higher result of a full grown man, training for any specific pursuit being secondary and subsequent. The position has in it truth and dignity. It is wise on every proper occasion to assert the superiority of man to his activities. He is more than a productive force. It is the noble service of the college, inculcating a high conception of man, to counteract the overweening mercantilism of the time and to lift society out of the mire of interests and gains. The whirl of business rapacity is something terrible. It drags the boy, just entering his teens, away from school, and presses him into a servitude that generally precludes any considerable expansion of his being or pleasure. This is true, not merely of those whom poverty compels, but of a very large number actuated by the simple desire to get on. It is the office of the college to infuse into life higher and broader aims and a nobler spirit. But affirming all this and the consequent priceless worth of intellectual training, the bearing of college education on a business career is of importance. For the man made for business by constitution and circumstance, it is proper to inquire whether or not college training is favorable to efficiency. Many young men go from college every year into business. Have they made a mistake in tarrying so long at their books? Many more youth every year enter business with no such delay. Have they done more wisely? It is the affirmation of this Article that college education is promotive of business success; that, with due allowance

for exceptional conditions, such an education will pay the young man purposing a business career, for all the time, money, and labor necessary to secure it.

The contrary opinion has the sanction of tradition and general acceptance. Our colleges were founded primarily for the three learned professions, the predominant impulse being to provide an educated ministry. It was believed, that men who were to have special charge of the bodies, or souls, or rights of person or property of their fellows, should be intellectually trained; but in that day no other functions in society seemed imperatively to demand generous mental equipment. For most people the round of life was narrow and required but limited intelligence. The work to be done was simple, having more need of brawn than of brain. That what was necessary for public services might be advantageous in private activities was an easy inference, but the struggle for existence was too severe to admit of its practical recognition, the question how to get on better, being excluded by the more pressing inquiry how to get on at all. That in such conditions it was often the frail boy of the family who was selected for college and professional life, is neither so strange nor so absurd as is popularly supposed. It was a wise economy of social forces. By reason of his physical disability, he could be best spared from the severe effort to supply the common wants, while a reasonable degree of mental activity was more conducive to health and longevity than the excessive toil of the farm. To send him to college was to make the most of him for the general welfare.

Under such circumstances, the notion that higher education is not for the business man became firmly rooted in American life. In our day it is an inheritance unthinkingly accepted, and fostered by similar conditions among large classes of people, and by the observation of the failure of some men with education and of the success of some men without it. But this inference is from very limited data. Large success in business is the exception, while the failures of one kind or another are surprisingly numerous, but the ratio of failures to success among educated men is without doubt smaller than among untrained men. Education may not prevent failure, but it does not cause it. Lack of intellectual training is often the source of defeat.

It may be admitted that a college course may create a taste for something else than business and draw a man away from it. Such a result is incidental to the influence of the college in opening to him a higher range of life. Without disqualifying him this may moderate a man's ambition and energy in business. Content with lower business attainment, he may find his good in something higher, but this does not affect the proposition that for a young man who adheres to his purpose to enter business, college life affords valuable pecuniary advantages. There is money in it.

The world of organized productive forces is a vast one, and inconceivably vast is the outcome of their ceaseless operation. The practical question of the young man on the threshold of life is, how much can I offer, what service can I render, by which to command for myself and my own, my share, a liberal share, of all the products of human effort throughout the earth. The short question is, can I render such services as the world calls for? Can I render those higher services which command the larger rewards?

The answer to these personal inquiries is in the answer to two general questions, viz: what is the nature of those higher services which the world calls for, and what are the qualifications necessary to render them?

Not to lose ourselves in generalities, it may be well to consider the testimony of a man of affairs. A gentleman, who, in response to the call of his country, gave up his college course, achieved distinction as a general officer in the war, at its close entered with limited, if any, pecuniary vantage ground, into business, and is now widely known as in charge of one of the most important enterprises in the United States, being asked as to the financial value of a college training, replied substantially as follows: "When I was a boy, there were in the vicinity of my home a number of graduates, who having started as professional men, had for one reason or another left the work of their choice and gone into business. Their success was generally moderate. Often they did not seem to care about it, finding their satisfaction in something else. They came to their business late, at least in middle life, and there always seemed to be more to them than they had use for in their work. The

general inference from their experience was, that it was of little use for a man to go to college if he was to follow business, and that indeed it was probably a disadvantage. But times are changed. It is not enough that a man be able to follow a well-defined routine ; he must have versatility, range of vision, grasp upon the details and the whole of a thing at once ; must see the matter in wide relations, and have power to conduct many lines of activity at the same time. This, only a largely trained mind can do, and a college training is worth no end of money to a man who wishes to go into business, as distinguished from following a trade. And so far as I have observed, nothing is better for these higher purposes than prolonged courses in Latin, Greek, and mathematics." Then, he gave a surprisingly long list of college men in his own acquaintance, who had naturally and gradually risen to important administrative positions in business, passing right over men who by reason of length of service, and command of capital, might seem entitled to the higher responsibilities. It was made clear that whatever may affect political appointments, it is fitness by reason of superior ability to conduct affairs wisely and efficiently, to which men from motives of self-interest confide the direction of pecuniary enterprises. Then he added, " There is great clamor for technical education, but that is not the principal want. If it were, the way is not to pursue long courses in special training. If I had to fit a young man for mining, I would not send him up here to the Columbia School of Mines, at least not at first. I would send him to Yale, and have him take the whole course in literature, philosophical and scientific studies, then bring him down here, get hold of the best teachers and the right books, and master mining in a very short time. That is the way I did it. I have owned and conducted mines, and found it necessary to understand the theory and practice of mining, and I compassed the whole thing in the midst of the pressing cares of other lines of business."

This opinion, important because of the eminence of the gentleman who gives it, because it considers the matter in its principal relations, and is representative of the views of a large and increasing number of men of similar opportunities and standing, touches upon the main points involved in this discussion. An

essential one is in the simple statement, "The times are changed." What sufficed in the days when the inherited and adverse opinion arose does so no longer. The business world of to-day is so vast in its proportions, so intimate yet so complex in its relations, so intense in its spirit, so rapid in its movements, and so resistless in its momentum, so uncertain and fluctuating in its promise, at one time borne along on ocean tides of prosperity, and at another whelmed beneath cyclones of disaster, that the contemplation of participating in it may naturally excite solicitude, and should certainly induce prudence. When the farmer shod his own oxen, cobbled the shoes of his children, and clothed them from the products of his own farm, woven beneath his own roof, he was solitary and independent, and life was a simple affair. But when he began to employ the shoemaker, the blacksmith, and the power loom of the factory, he became dependent on others, and society really began. The application of science to the arts in the extensive introduction of machinery in all material production, has not only brought about minute division of labor in the manufacture and distribution of each particular commodity, but has necessitated the division of capital, and its direction in large aggregations to the promotion of single but immense departments of activity. This extended division of labor and capital has multiplied the mutual dependencies of each upon all and of all upon each. The intimacy of association afforded by the post office, the railway, and the telegraph, has given to these dependencies continental and even international breadth, until each line of activity recognizes itself in its separateness, knows its own opportunities, facilities, and laws, yet knows also its relation to others, tends to correlation with every other, and finds its prosperity conditioned upon the prosperity of all. So though immensity and complexity appear at first and do indeed marvellously exist, there is yet an equally wonderful simplicity and solidarity. It is but the last outcome of this order and tendency of things that the recent phenomenon known as a "Trust" has appeared. We have been long familiar with corporations, and have been jealous of their power. But here is a practical incorporation of all the corporations engaged in a single line of production or traffic, for the purpose of controlling the production and the price of a certain commodity

throughout the land and world. In treating recently of the operation of one of these organizations, a daily paper fittingly entitled its article "Taxing the World." Of the motives which govern such organizations, of the methods of their procedure, or of their relation to the general welfare, nothing here is pertinent; but their existence illustrates the widest extension of the division of labor and the complete solidarity of human activities, as well as the stupendous audacity of enterprise to which in these days we have come.

Now it is possible for a man to get along without much brain if he will shovel gravel, or take some handicraft or clerical work, which, requiring limited thinking, affords uncertain and limited results. But to whatever some may be compelled, such service is not a fit object of a young man's ambition. Business has for its essential idea administration, not routine mechanical activity. Any one who will ally himself significantly, with the existing august organization of economic life, will find thousands of positions demanding large intellectual power and versatility. The mental equipment required is of a high order, no mere routine habit of following in the steps of others, but ability, while holding clearly to the experience of the past, to learn from the present opportunity and adapt itself to new conditions with smooth facility. Necessary elements of this equipment are a keen and quick discernment of details, firmness of grasp, breadth of view, the habit of seeing things in their larger relations, a cool, sound judgment, a certain mental fortitude, that can stand steady and firm against the swaying tides of current opinion and feeling, in short, an intellectual independence and courage which is the result of consciously trained and tried powers. "But," says the doubter, "these are the qualities needed in the public spheres of life." Certainly, and in many business relations there is wanted as much intellectual breadth and grasp, as in the conduct of a government, as much intellectual insight, energy, and promptitude as in the command of an army. There are railroad systems in this country, insurance companies, commercial and mercantile houses, in the conduct of which as much intellectual power is exercised as in the administration of the government of the United States. The latter goes on largely according to a cer-

tain historic and partisan drift. It receives less than half of the attention and ability of the men to whom its conduct is entrusted. The other half is expended upon personal and partisan affairs. If the government is not carried on in the best manner, the evil is little felt. But the personal interests of the men who have charge of the colossal business enterprises of the day, are involved in the success of those enterprises, and hence there is a concentration of vigilance and power which is at once the admiration and the envy of the civil service reformer. The ideal of his hopes is that the government shall be conducted by those having it in charge, on the same principles and with that singleness of devotion to its own proper ends, with which the Mutual, or Equitable, Life Insurance Company, or the New York Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads are favored. This comparison is not made here in the interest of Civil Service reform, but to suggest that if governmental reform is looking to business life for its models, the latter certainly is worthy of the highest intellectual training that a man may acquire. It is sometimes felt that an educated man who does not go into one of the professions, or some public service, is throwing away his powers. But positions are of dignity according to the power which may be beneficently used in them, and it is easy to see that there are many business relations which call for as large beneficent power, as do political or other public stations. For economic society has come to a point, where not only opportunity opens in business for the highest attainments, but where its progress actually depends on having the service and leadership of such powers. Here and there a defaulter embarrasses or destroys a bank, or mercantile house, or some other financial institution, but oftener ten such establishments come to ruin for lack of intellectual power in those who conduct them. It is not capital, it is not labor that are wanting in the economic world, so much as brains and character.

Now this is not an undiscerned state of facts. It is widely felt. It has found expression in a demand for a better training of men going into the arts. It has given rise to other and shorter courses than the traditional classical course of study. Institutions, scientific schools, have been started partly under

this impulse. But even these are not content with technical training, they join with it literary education to a considerable extent. But as intimated in the opinion quoted above, they do not meet the need in the best manner, because they do not develop the breadth and versatility demanded in the conduct of business. An eminent paper manufacturer, a college graduate himself, recently declared that he could get men enough to do the details, who knew the processes of making paper. He could find skill, but he could find no one to take his own place and direct the whole concern, and that his difficulty was the general one in the business. But the fact is not peculiar to the paper mill. This is the crying want everywhere. In business, as in the professions, there is always room at the top. How to get there is the question, and in accordance with implications already made one interesting example, full of suggestion and promise may well be given.

It is that of a young man who inherited an opportunity—that is, if he could prove equal to it—to participate in the manufacture of certain widely demanded iron products. Most boys would not have taken the course which he did to qualify themselves for it. They would at the age of sixteen or eighteen have accepted some clerical position, with the hope that after a time, when enough other men should die, their capital would place them in a station of control. Instead of that, the gentleman in question fitted himself for and graduated at one of the largest colleges in the country. Having gone so far, one might have thought him ready to enter gradually into general relations to the concern. But a scholarly temper of mind wants to be thorough in business as elsewhere; accordingly, a few weeks after graduation, he went to Sweden to acquire a knowledge of all the processes in the manufacture of iron related to his own line. Three months he devoted to the acquisition of a practical command of the Swedish language. Then he began work at the Domnarvfet iron works, the largest in Sweden, where he had the opportunity of seeing several processes at the same time; he put on old clothes, rolled up his sleeves, and worked like a regular laborer, first at a blast furnace, then on refining fires, and after that on a steel furnace, for several months standing his regular turn as it came, until

he had mastered the practical part of iron-making in those branches. Spending several weeks in the summer of his second year in visiting iron works in various parts of Sweden, he returned in the fall and continued work at Domnarvfet. In October he entered the Royal School of Mines at Stockholm as a special student. Here he attended lectures and worked in the laboratory, where there was every facility for careful and extensive training in metallurgical chemistry. The specialties of which he availed himself, were in metallurgy in iron and steel, and general metallurgy under very able instructors. In the spring, when the course in the School of Mines was completed, he went with the graduating class with whom he had been associated, to some extensive iron works, where the Swedish government provides facilities for practical work of various kinds, and where the students have the instruction not only of one or more of the professors of the School of Mines, but also of several practical men, who are engaged in that department of government, known as the Iron and Steel Association. Remaining at those works about two months, at the close of June, two years after college graduation, he finished his practical work in Sweden. Several weeks were then spent in Germany among iron works in the Rhine provinces, and a short time in France. And now, in less than a decade after graduating at college, this young man is one of five directors of a company whose capital is one million and a half dollars; he has especial charge of all its several rolling mills, and does the purchasing of the company, besides having a great deal of oversight and work which naturally connects itself with the central office.

In answer to an inquiry he writes, "There is no doubt, but that the thorough training which I received in college was of the greatest importance to me in preparing to deal with the many and weighty questions, which are coming to me in every day business life. I am sure that that training has made me capable of grasping with greater ease, and I hope more intelligently, subject matter of all kinds, than I believe I could have done with any other training."

To any one reading this account, it will occur that this young man was exceptionally fortunate in that he had money enough to procure all this education. But so long as about

one-third of our college students are dependent on their own earned resources, and this third seem to gain as much from college as those more generously furnished, this appears to be only a convenience, not an essential advantage. And after the completion of the college course, any one will have little difficulty in studying any art or business, and at the same time earning his living, if he will roll up his sleeves and not be too fastidious to encounter dirt and toil. On the other hand this young man's pecuniary expectations were a temptation, to which many yield, to exempt himself from all hardship either in study or work. The excellence of his example is in his use of his money not to relieve himself from work, but to enhance his power for it. He was not content to be made by circumstances, but to render favoring conditions triumphant. The most splendid thing in it all, was his noble self-restraint from that impatient and fatal haste to begin, to begin prematurely, to begin without preparation, which in so many cases results in only disappointment. To begin unprepared is to end defeated. Years ago the boy of fourteen or sixteen counted a seven years' apprenticeship in the learning of a trade an excellent opportunity. In these days he may take three years for preparatory studies, four years in college, and in two more, master an entire business of an hundred-fold more significance than any handicraft ever was. With such prospects is it wise to slight either the general or technical training? The instance given above is an effective answer. But the prejudice against classical education in relation to common affairs is so inveterate and persistent, that it may be well to observe how directly it bears upon them.

It is not pretended that the youth just out of college has all the mental equipment that has been indicated as desirable; but his mind has been so exercised that it may be fairly expected to attain such equipment with maturity in the exigencies of life. It is strange that it is so generally assumed that a proper training for an activity is only that activity itself. Men do not reason so in regard to anything else. It is merely a convenient plea against classical study. Here are young men in New Haven, trotting for miles every day. One might infer that they are preparing to follow a life of trotting; but they

are not even training for a foot race. They are planning to beat Harvard next summer in a boat race at New London. This is a part of their regimen, affording them something which their regular practice with the oar does not. So there may be something in Latin and Greek for the mind that is going to sell goods. If running is good for rowing, study may be good for trading.

In considering the bearing of college on business habits, it is to be seen as a life, and not merely as the performance of a round of tasks. Entering college, the youth comes into intimate connection with highly trained men as instructors, and with a large number of minds like his own in process of rapid development. A characteristic of this life is intensity. There exists a wide-awake alertness of mind, which, continued for four years under exhilarating influences, becomes a habit. The intellectual temper becomes tense and strong, a priceless endowment for the exigencies of coming years. In a large college the association of the student is with minds from every part of the land, of every variety and tendency of thought, so that he gains an insight into the quality and drift of the men who are to be active during his period of action, and a subtle sympathy with the life in which he is always to mingle, which will be of immense, yet almost unthought of use, to him in all his business career. The college puts one *en rapport* with specimen minds; a very important matter in practical exigencies. There is no intimacy like college intimacy, and no better opportunity for seeing to the bottom of human nature.

Closely related to this is the deeper knowledge of our modern civilization which is gained by the study of ancient languages and literature. Ours is not an original civilization. Three great streams have flowed together to form the river on which we are borne along. The Semitic, through the Bible, and the Greek and the Roman, through their respective literatures. By the study of these one gets bathed in the current of things. The study of language, even the study of words, is the study of thoughts, and the elementary study of the ancient languages does more to initiate one into the inherited and settled notions of our civilization than can be done in any other way. If a

man is going to mingle with the world, his judgments will be the more sound, if he have a keen sense of the underlying forces of the entire body of social life.

It is another bearing of this kind of study and life that it emancipates one from inherited prepossessions. It relieves the mind wonderfully of its burden of prejudices, and renders it open to enlightenment, and hospitable towards truth and knowledge from all quarters. The youth coming with his home and village notions is rid of them, and not so much supplied with new ones as freed from the tyranny of any. What can be better for a business man than to be ready to receive a new fact and adapt himself to it. Thus he makes facts his servants. Facility of adaptation is one secret of success.

Another practical outcome of discipline is the possession of one's own faculties, the ability to direct intellectual force where one will. This affords safe confidence in one's own mental operations and sets him free from the methods of the past and of the judgment of others. This independence and courage are necessary in the higher functions of business, and particularly in those exciting crises, when so many lose their heads and their fortunes at the same time. In such exigencies the level headed man finds the time of others' trial the time of his triumph. He converts perils into opportunity.

But turning from the general influences of college life let it be observed, that the studies pursued exercise the mind in just those ways in which it is called to act in the conduct of affairs, and some of the studies furnish important knowledge for every day use. Look at the study of language. With what contempt the question is asked, "Of what use is Latin or Greek to the dry goods clerk?" The answer is to train him in just that kind of thinking which he is asked to do constantly in business. It is often alleged that the study of language exercises the memory, but leaves the reasoning powers in abeyance. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The memory holds certain data, but the principal mental activity in translating one language into another is the judgment. There is a constant observing of details and the drawing of inferences. This is done too in the realm of probabilities, such as the mind handles in ordinary affairs. For instance, the first sentence of

Caesar's *Commentaries* contains twenty-one words, in determining what part of speech each of these is, there are twenty-one acts of judgment. In fixing their meaning, as many more. There are seven nouns. In affirming the kind of each of these, its declension, gender, number, person, case, agreement, and the rule applicable, there are eight judgments, making for the seven nouns fifty-six judgments. There are nine adjectives and pronouns, each involving the same number of acts, making seventy-two judgments. There are three verbs, in determining the kind of each of which, its voice, mood, tense, person, number, agreement, and rule there are eight judgments, making twenty-four in all. The single preposition requires three more. So that in translating this short sentence, in gathering the details and putting them together, the mind performs more than two hundred acts of the judgment, the most used function of the intellect in ordinary life. This is nice and exacting work too, one cannot get on with a partial view of details or an erring inferring power. One detail omitted, one erroneous inference, and the translation is faulty. And if three lines require more than two hundred acts,—and if the process were closely analyzed there would appear many more—to read the four books, which constitute a small portion of what is required for admission to college, will involve more than two hundred and fifty thousand such mental acts. And when the amount of this kind of study in college is considered, can any training, more effective in fitting the mind for ordinary uses than this, be suggested? The youth in his studies performs ten thousand times more mental acts of this common sort, than does the youth during the same period in business. There is no comparison in the measure of gymnastic drill received in the two spheres of action. "Of what use is the study of Latin to a dry goods clerk?" It is to train him more vigorously than actual service can, make him a superior clerk, and enable him to rise from clerkship to mastership. A single fact will illustrate the case.

The proprietor of one of the largest dry goods houses anywhere advertised for a clerk. At the suggestion of a friend, a young man, recently graduated, applied for the situation and was refused. His adviser meeting the merchant said; "You

did not take my young friend into your store." "No! I don't want any college boys round me. They know too much of everything else, and too little about work. They may be very nice fellows but they aren't good for anything." To this frank and frequent utterance the other replied, "I think you are mistaken. Your statement is not based on experience, and now, as a favor to myself, I would like to have you take this young man on trial for three months. It will cost you nothing, it will give him a good chance and may disprove your opinion." "Very well," said the merchant, "send him along; I will give him a trial." The young man went, began work at the bottom, took hold of the boy's end of it, and did whatever came to hand for the time agreed upon. Then a bargain was made for the future and in less than a year, this distrusted graduate had gone up through all the necessary steps, and was placed in charge of the department of silks. "And now," said the merchant, "I have learned something; it is not necessary for a boy to begin as a clerk at sixteen. If he spend his youth in college, he can master the business more readily and thoroughly and reach a higher point in it at the age of twenty-three than in the ordinary way. This young man has gone right above men whom I have had in my employ for years, since they were lads. Hereafter give me college boys for clerks."

But other studies are just as effective gymnastics in different ways. Mathematics compels severer and longer processes, and develops the power of vigorous sustained thinking, which is necessary in the larger activities, and in the more trying situations and crises of business life. The regimen found in physical science is equally helpful in the same direction. It brings the mind into immediate contact with the world of fixed laws, and naturally dispels the fatal reliance on chance. It also furnishes the student with the elements helpful to the entrance upon any technical training for the mechanical pursuits.

To many, even of those who study it, psychology seems wholly unrelated to practical affairs. The notion is singularly shallow. Without some metaphysical acumen, many matters of thought, literature, and life are closed to a man. The study is the gymnastic for subtle and close thinking. It affords the materials for a sound knowledge of human nature. Psychol-

ogy is the science of man, of his motives, passions, modes of thought. The mastery of it furnishes one with the general principles, under which all his concrete observation is to be brought for practical generalization. This is of inestimable importance to the man who is to deal with his fellows.

Political economy is the science of business. It deals with the facts of business, its laws, and forces. It trains men to study and observe the economic situation, to make wise and safe generalizations, which are the security of men engaged in traffic or production. This is a peculiarly attractive branch of investigation, but one in which grave liability to error exists. It is so easy to be superficial, to leave out of view elements important in any given problem, that one needs to be well practiced in the work of inquiry, in order to arrive at his conclusions independently and solidly. When he can do this he is a king in the realm of finance. The study affords discipline in thinking in a peculiar sphere, and furnishes the mind with general laws needful for guidance in it.

The study of history will give the business mind breadth and foresight, a large way of looking at things. Here is a power of seeing what the many do not, and having therefore an advantage over them. A man needs to take into consideration the whole world. Things outside of the path of a man's business continually occur to make themselves felt within it. Nothing like the study of history, especially in connection with political economy, will give a man such a living sense of the solidarity of mankind. This is fundamental to foresight. Hon. David A. Wells notes the fact that the opening of the Suez canal destroyed millions of capital invested in sailing vessels employed in the carrying trade to the East. A largely thoughtful mind will anticipate such effects from movements going on at various times, and not only save but make a fortune. The careful reader of history will be wise.

There is a power of address which comes with culture—not solely of value in public life. It is a great attainment to be able to put the case effectively in business as well as at the bar or on the platform. It is worth spending time to acquire. It is however largely the incidental outcome of intellectual pursuits.

Thus far attention has been directed to the intellectual equipment for a business life which is furnished by college training. But it also forms moral character which is of no less practical value. True, many imagine that college is a dangerous place, exposing the young man to exceptional temptations. The inference is from single instances of moral downfall, often sensationaly reported. The mayor of a large city testifies that one in four of the youth that come from the country into business make shipwreck of character and happiness. According to the observation of college life, not one in fifteen within its influences falls to such a depth. There is no safer transition from the boyhood's home to the conflicts of the world than through the portals of a University. Students are a picked class. As a rule they are of excellent parentage, and constitute a body for reciprocal influences upon each other of exceptionally high order. Withdrawn from most of the temptations which assail youth in other lines of activity, they are guarded against their own peculiar temptations by a high public opinion among themselves, by the personal influence of the scholarly Christian gentlemen who instruct them, by the organization and steady demand of regular duties, and by the religious agencies in constant operation among them. That occasionally one breaks away from all these unequalled influences for good, and becomes a scapegrace, no more proves college to be unsafe for young men than does the sad spectacle of a vicious son from a virtuous home show such homes to be undesirable for right training. That the angels fell does not make it evident that heaven is a wicked and dangerous place. As a rule, the steady and weighty movement of a rightly tending institution sends young men forth with a strength of conviction, a steadiness of will, a moral fiber, a tone and dignity of moral character, which, of inestimable worth as the crown of true manhood, has a permanent and growing value as a business qualification.

These various studies are here touched upon, not to show their whole worth, but simply that they do contribute to efficiency in business. As a man has but one race to run, it is desirable that he so prepare as to run successfully. The view here set forth is gaining recognition more and more. More than one department of business has already naturally drifted into

the hands of highly trained men. What goes on in the army engaged in war goes on in the conflicts of civil life.

A few years since, Mr. Charles F. Adams delivered an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University, in criticism of the study of Greek. His argument was, in fact, rather against the mistaken modes of teaching it. But the Greek qualities of the address in form and structure, in clearness of thought, in grace and force of diction, were a mightier plea for the study of that marvellously perfect language, and a testimony to the worth of a Greek studying ancestry. And it is now a well authenticated rumor that this eminent gentleman, who is showing how to run a great railroad, looks for young college graduates to associate with him in his great enterprise, and has an especially soft side towards the sons of his own Alma Mater, who so abused him and them in requiring them to study Greek.

When young men first leave college for business, finding themselves ignorant of what many boys, who entered business early, know, having some difficulty in adapting themselves to new conditions, are likely to think that less Latin and Greek, and more enlightenment on present affairs and in technical work, would have been better for them. But time remedies these defects, and in about ten years the young man begins to appreciate the classical training his Alma Mater gave him. His education has found opportunity to show its worth. He finds himself with a poise and staying power, like that of a thoroughbred horse, which can every time do its work, and meet a rebuff with an equanimity, which snatches conquest from it. Graduates of twenty-five years standing are generally hearty in praise of what college did for them. Whatever dissent from the views of this Article may be felt, little will come from men who having put their college training to the test of experience, know what they are talking about.

S. H. LEE.

**ARTICLE III.—DARWIN'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
vs. HIS THEORY OF EVOLUTION.**

The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin; including an Auto-biographical Chapter. Edited by his son, FRANCOIS DARWIN. Two vols., 12mo., pp. 558, 662. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

THERE are many reasons why the *Life and Letters of Mr. Charles Darwin* should attract general attention. Whatever may be thought of the man or his influence, there can be no question that he made one of the most important scientific discoveries of his generation in a century made brilliant by such discoveries—the discovery of the tendency to variation in the transmission of the forms of animal life, coupled with the law of natural selection, as explanatory of what had previously been held to be permanent species as fixed by the creative fiat of nature or God. We limit ourselves to this unquestioned achievement of his scientific genius, and leave out of view the suggestions or conclusions in respect to the origin of man and the history of the universe which have been superinduced by himself or others upon this discovery. The Darwinian theory thus limited is one thing, and the confident expansion of the same, whether by himself or others, under the vague and elastic appellation of Evolution is quite another. The one may be taken as scientific truth; much of the rest is speculation and theory and as such is more or less plausible.

We are confident that all lovers of science will read this memoir with the warmest sympathy and the most excited interest and readily respond to the claims which it asserts for their admiration and gratitude. As the story of a rarely gifted personality it is a work of surpassing interest. The material for the narrative was of the rarest quality and it has been wrought with excellent judgment and taste. While much has been left unwritten which we should have been delighted to read, so far as it has gone it has given a faithful and vivid

portraiture of Mr. Darwin such as will meet the wishes of all who are interested in the man.

We do not propose to give a sketch of the man or his memoir. Nor do we propose to settle the question What is Darwinism, proper or improper?—much less what is true and established in each. Naturally enough we are especially interested in Mr. Darwin's personal attitude towards Theism and the Christian faith, and the intellectual application which he made of his scientific conclusions to both. This subject is by no means overlooked in the memoir, and is treated with the utmost frankness and courtesy by Mr. Darwin's biographer. His views at different periods of his life are largely given in his own words and are supplemented by explanations so ample and frank as to leave little to be desired.

The topic is treated most frankly and fully in Chapter viii. of the first volume, under the title of Religion. This chapter is made up of replies to letters asking for his opinions and personal attitude in respect to religion with a somewhat extended history of the phases of his own religious faith, which formed a part of an autobiographical sketch which he prepared for his children. In 1879, he says in a letter: "What my own views may be is a question of no consequence to any one but myself. But as you ask I may state that my judgment often fluctuates. In my most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in the sense of denying the existence of a God. I think that generally (and more and more as I grow older) but not always, that an Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind." In 1876: "Although I did not think much about the existence of a personal God until a considerably later period of my life, I will here give the vague conclusions to which I have been driven. The old argument from design in nature as given by Paley which formerly seemed so conclusive fails now that the doctrine of natural selection has been discovered." "There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection than in the course which the wind blows," etc. "This very old argument of the existence of an intelligent First Cause seems to me a strong one; whereas as just remarked the presence of much suffering agrees well

with the view that all organic beings have been developed through variation and natural selection." In the same strain he writes at some length, confounding obviously enough the evidence of design or intelligence in God with the indications of his goodness. Similarly he seems incapable of distinguishing his intellectual convictions that the physical universe had an intelligent Creator from the feelings which its grandeur inspires. Indeed he resolves the moving experiences of his soul in the presence of the sublimer aspects of nature, very largely, into moods of feeling. "The state of mind which such scenes formerly excited in me, and which was ultimately connected with a belief in God, did not essentially differ from that which is often called a sense of sublimity, and however difficult it may be to explain the genesis of this sense it can hardly be advanced as an argument for the existence of God, any more than the powerful though vague and similar feelings excited by music." The obvious jumble which is here made between an intellectual conviction of a grand truth, and the emotions which such a conviction is fitted to excite, is too transparent to require any comment. He seems to reason that because his belief was so vivid and controlling as to flame into absorbing emotion, therefore his intellect had no convictions and indeed had no part in the process. Most men would reason to the opposite conclusion. They would certainly be very slow to believe when Coleridge in presence of Mont Blanc gave expression in his immortal ode to the feelings which he experienced, that therefore his intellect did not apprehend the mountain as present to his senses or a reality to his knowledge. To the same effect Mr. Darwin proceeds to say: "Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason, and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind, about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote 'The

'Origin of Species,' and it is since that time that it has very gradually with many fluctuations become weaker. But then arises the doubt, *Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?*"—we are tempted to complete the question by adding, *as the doctrine of development itself.* We think it fair to urge—if the mind of man, though developed in the way that Mr. Darwin would have us believe, and from such a starting point, is competent to believe in the doctrine of its own development from a few supposed self-existent lower species, or the original star dust, why may not it "be trusted" to believe that it originated with a Self-existent Creator?

Mr. Darwin has here unwittingly laid bare a very tender point in his theory of atheistic evolution, if indeed he has not demonstrated its suicidal character. It would seem from his own suggestion that this theory is loaded with all the difficulties of self-existence without any of the advantages of Theism; in other words Darwin's theory of knowledge on his own confession breaks like an impotent wand in the hand of its chief enchanter when he attempts to lay the spell which he has raised. The true philosopher will not fail to urge the question if the mind of man, which has been developed from such humble beginnings, may trust the reasonings which justify its faith in the Darwinian Evolution, why may not the same mind trust itself when it not merely feels but believes that both man and the universe had their origin in a self-existent intelligence of a higher order, i. e., were created and not evolved? Mr. Darwin's distrust of the intellectual processes of his own mind, if it had such a history as his theory provides, may be very natural when it is called to grapple with the problem of creation; it were perhaps reasonable to inquire whether this distrust might not also be transferred to the Darwinian theory itself.

NOAH PORTER.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

CLASSICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF YALE COLLEGE.

Feb. 6, 1888, Mr. Van Name presented a communication on Volapük, prefaced by an account of Bishop Wilkins' "Essay toward a real character and a philosophical language" published in 1668, the most celebrated of the early attempts to construct a universal language. In this scheme the various objects of thought, abstract and concrete, were first grouped under forty different heads, the order of each individual object being fixed by successive differentiations. The genera were then represented by symbols composed of straight and curved lines, the specific differences by minor strokes, and grammatical relations by still other signs. By these means Bishop Wilkins obtained what he called a "real character," i. e., a language capable of conveying its meaning without words, which was addressed to the eye only, and not to the ear. By substituting alphabetic for geometric symbols this was to be converted into a spoken language.

However attractive to a philosophic mind such a scheme may be, it needs no argument to prove that it is altogether impracticable. A universal language must first of all be simple and in its essential features Volapük answers this requirement reasonably well. Its starting point and method are quite the opposite of that already described. It follows in its structure to a great extent the analogy of European languages and draws the material of its vocabulary almost entirely from them.

The alphabet of Volapük while giving in general, as it should, to each separate sound its own character, and to each character a constant value, in some cases departs unnecessarily from this rule. Objection has also been made to the use of the modified vowels *ä*, *ö*, *ü* as foreign and difficult to the organs of speech of some nations, among them the English. If Volapük were likely to become to any considerable extent a spoken language the

objection would be serious. But of this there seems to be no great danger and on the other hand these vowels afford a welcome means of multiplying the possible combinations and so of increasing the number of monosyllabic stems which form the basis of the vocabulary. The normal stem consists of a vowel preceded by one or two consonants and followed by a single consonant. Since the prefixes are either vowels or syllables ending in a vowel, and the affixes are likewise vowels, or syllables beginning with a vowel, harsh conjunctions of consonants are prevented. The only exception to this rule is the plural ending *s*, and here the danger is averted by avoiding the use of stems ending in a sibilant. Although Volapük runs counter to the prevailing tendency in language to substitute independent words in the place of prefixes and affixes to mark grammatical relations, we should not be disposed to condemn altogether its use of inflections. Those of the noun and the simpler verbal forms are well enough. But the refinement to which the verbal inflection is carried, the number of possible forms for each verb in the several moods, tenses, numbers, and persons, amounting to many thousands, is little short of absurd. It is safe to predict that the new language will not have proceeded far on its voyage round the world before they will be thrown overboard as useless baggage.

But is Volapük likely to have an extended career? It would not be safe to infer this simply from the interest at present aroused in it. Much of this must be due to simple curiosity to know something about a language which makes such magnificent promises and the grammar of which can be mastered in an afternoon's study. It is possible, we should hardly venture yet to say probable, that it may be employed, where no better medium of communication is available, in commercial correspondence, but beyond this its use can hardly extend.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

In the "LIFE OF WASHINGTON STUDIED ANEW," * Mr. Edward Everett Hale has attempted to describe what he calls the "human Washington." He has written especially for young people, but the oldest readers, however well acquainted with the works of preceding biographers, will be grateful to him for presenting some new aspects of a character which will always be regarded with pride and affection by the American people.

We heartily sympathize with Mr. Hale in what he has proposed to do, and congratulate him and his readers on his success. Yet we are not prepared to accept his criticism of the earlier biographers of Washington. He says: "It was the habit of the writers of the beginning of the nineteenth century to keep out of view as far as they could whatever was human or simple in the character of Washington; and, if they were Americans, to hold him up before their countrymen almost as a demigod to worship." He says that Washington "was on the whole so magnificently successful, that all his biographers, without an exception known to me, have treated him with a certain deference, as if, indeed, he were hardly a man. It is not simply that they are unwilling to speak of faults. For we may 'make too much of faults,' as Mr. Carlyle says wisely. But they seem to suppose that he had not the ordinary fancies, feelings, habits, affections, or motives. They lift him, step by step, in a mechanical way, over the board, as you might move a piece of chess when your turn came."

Now we cannot think that these biographers had any idea of "keeping out of view" whatever was human in the character of Washington. When they wrote, it was with the feeling that Washington was so much like the other men of his times, in the respects that Mr. Hale has in mind, that they never thought of calling attention to things that now have an interest and even a value to

* *The Life of George Washington Studied Anew.* By EDWARD EVERETT HALE. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1888. 12mo. pp. 392.

us. They were simply intent on relating the story of his career; and it never occurred to them to describe his personal peculiarities. Undoubtedly it would have been better for us if they had done so. Mr. Hale is right in saying that such things help us to understand his character. For instance, he tells us that, on one occasion, in a postscript to a letter, Washington asks his correspondent what has been the fortune of some lottery tickets that he had bought. Now the knowledge of this fact may help a person who has the true historic sense, to get a more correct conception of what kind of a man Washington was. And yet it is also to be remembered that a person who has *not* the true historic sense might draw an entirely wrong inference from this fact. However this may be, the point which we wish to make is, that the buying a lottery ticket, and the feeling an interest in its success, was a thing so common at that time, among all classes of people, that the early biographers could not have conceived that to mention it would throw any light on the character of Washington. As a matter of fact the people of that age would have been more likely to have laughed at a biographer who laid any stress on such a simple affair.

Is not Mr. Hale, then, really criticizing these earlier biographers for not adopting a style of writing which at that time was unknown, and for that generation certainly unnecessary. Mr. Hale well remembers with what delight Macaulay's description was received of the "human" side of English social life in the times of James II. of England. But such a description was at that time something new. No historian had ever attempted anything of the kind before. We do not think, then, that the biographers of Washington were making any "apotheosis" of him. They simply wrote according to the style of their times, as other English and American biographers wrote the lives of the men of their day.

But we have said that, in writing for this generation, Macaulay and Mr. Hale are right. We live in a different age from that in which James II. and Washington lived. We stand in relation to the men of all former ages as children do in relation to their parents. And how difficult has it ever been for children to understand what may be called the "human" side of their parents! Take even the children of the men who fought in our civil war. How hard for them to realize that their fathers, who seem to them so sedate with the weight of years—while perhaps they

"halt with honorable scars"—once felt the blood of youth in their veins! It is not enough for these children of another age, that the strategy of the campaigns in which their fathers served should be described, or even the hardships which they endured. It is not enough that even the story should be told of that wonderful "uprising" the moment it was known that the flag had been insulted, when their fathers, with thousands, tens of thousands, and many hundreds of thousands of others, marched away from their homes with that elastic, swinging step—which those who witnessed it will never forget—singing "John Brown's body lies moldering in the grave," while the mighty chorus went up all along the ranks, "Glory! Hallelujah!" Better than all this, for making them comprehend the "human" side of their fathers, will be some trifling incident of their school-boy days, as of some snow-ball fight, or some game of ball, or some victory in a boat-race, or an old letter written "from the front," the night before some great battle, with only a few brief messages of love—which might be the last—to mother, or sister, or sweetheart, or wife, not forgetting even the dumb beasts who made a part of the far-off home. It is in this way, by incidents trifling in themselves, that Mr. Hale has sought to show that "there never was a man more absolutely human than Washington." He says: "He was a man of hot passions, of strong impulses, of vigorous determination, a man who forecast the future, kept it in sight, and meant to have his own way."

The space at our command will allow of but a very meager reference to the contents of the book. But what Mr. Hale says of the advantages that Washington had, "in his years of education," of acquaintance with cultivated society is worthy of notice. It was not alone that among his relatives and neighbors were many families of more than usual refinement, with whom he was on terms of great intimacy, but he had the additional advantage of the friendship of Lord Fairfax, who became very fond of him as a boy, and interested himself personally in his education. Lord Fairfax, who had come to reside on his Virginia estates, belonged to a very different class from that of most of the needy "English noblemen" who were so often sent to this country—some of them with reputations pretty well damaged at home—to rule over the royal provinces, and retrieve their broken fortunes. He was an educated and wealthy gentleman, "versed in the best accomplishments of the age," and accustomed to the best English society.

In England he had won the respect of some of the noblest among his countrymen. He had been the companion and friend of Addison and of Steele, and had himself contributed papers to the "Spectator." He had left England "with a broken heart from some misadventure of love." He early made the acquaintance of the boy Washington, and interested himself in his training. It is certainly a pleasant thing to know that "for the clear and simple English in which Washington expressed himself later in life, he was, in part at least, indebted to the personal tuition of the friend of Joseph Addison." So, too, Mr. Hale says: "The thorough good breeding which characterized George Washington in his intercourse with the highest or with the lowest, and his training in that side of morals which we call manners, had such assistance as could be given him by one of the best trained gentlemen of his time." Mr. Hale offers some convincing reasons for the supposition that the "Rules of Conduct," which Washington wrote out when quite young, and which are expressed in a boy's vocabulary, though many of them relate to experiences which he could hardly have had himself, were derived from what he had heard laid down in conversation by such an experienced man of the world as Lord Fairfax. Perhaps it is owing to the example of that accomplished gentleman, and the views of what is gentlemanly which were expressed by him, that Washington never used tobacco in any form or in any manner.

The story of Washington's assuming the office of Commander-in-chief of the "American army around Boston" will never grow old. Blood had flowed at Bunker Hill. The ununiformed colonists who had poured in from all New England had received the fire of the British "regulars," and had stood their ground till every charge of powder was exhausted. Gage was cooped up in his lines. It was indeed an auspicious omen that, at that time, "the wealthiest man in America," respected in all the colonies as the "Virginia Patriot," and known as a soldier who had smelled powder in more than one campaign, was ready to stake life and honor on the wager of battle which has been so boldly offered. On his journey northward, he landed in the city of New York, at four o'clock of the afternoon of June 16th, "dressed in a uniform of blue and buff, which had been the uniform of the English army in the old days when England was a commonwealth and was really free, and which was retained through the colonies, from old memories of Fairfax and Cromwell, as the color to be

worn by free men." At Cambridge, he was received with enthusiasm; and, Mr. Hale reminds us, by none more cordially than by the officer whom he superseded,—Artemas Ward,—who never showed the slightest jealousy of him. Mr. Hale adds: "It is indeed a melancholy thing to say that in the revenge of time, and in the carelessness of history, the name of the man whom Massachusetts had honored with the first command of her first army, and who had taken, as a matter of course, the command of all the armies of the four New England provinces, should now be almost forgotten by his countrymen. A cruel accident has transferred the name from him to be the name of a merry jester, and it is difficult now to make even a skillful printing-house spell rightly the name of the great soldier who once commanded the only army of America."

We can follow Mr. Hale no further. We have already said that he has been very successful in what he has attempted; but, for all that, there will always be people who will not appreciate even the "human Washington." There is an insuperable difficulty. There will always be people who will be utterly lacking in the ability to appreciate any great character. Many years ago, the daughter of a distinguished citizen of Massachusetts, from a family of the straitest sect of the Federalists,—well known to Mr. Hale,—horrified a group of young ladies on the piazza of a summer hotel, by announcing that she hated and despised Washington. This was repeated soon after to the present writer, who quieted their excitement by saying that her object was either to startle them and acquire a reputation for originality, or there was a deficiency in her mental and moral capacity. In due time, this being reported to the young lady, he gained her lasting and very pronounced enmity. Many years ago, also, there was published in a New York newspaper, a letter from a correspondent—now a prominent "politician"—who gave an account of a visit that he had just made to Mt. Vernon, where he had seen a plaster cast of the head of Washington. In this letter, he gave it as his opinion that it was impossible that any one who had such phrenological developments could have had any special ability. There will always be such people.

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AS A MAN OF LETTERS.*—From the title of this volume the reader will learn that he is not to expect anything of the nature of a complete Life of Franklin, but only a sketch of so much of it as relates to him as a man of letters. We will add that the sketch is somewhat brief, and there is little told that is not already generally known. Yet so true is it that every part of the career of this wonderful man is like a romance, that, well known as the facts are, most persons who begin to read this book will feel like going through it at a single sitting.

The story at the very start is invested with a kind of fascination. Who can avoid a smile as he has the old picture held up once more of the boy Franklin—of all boys in the world—forming a taste for letters, and trying to satisfy his youthful appetite, on Willard's "Body of Divinity," Mather's "Essay to do Good," and the polemical discussions of Increase Mather, and Solomon Stoddard † on the theological questions of the day? What more interesting picture than that of the young printer's devil—in that age when boys early learned the lesson that they were to be only seen and not heard—writing by the light of a tallow dip, in his garret, the "Dogood Papers," and modestly thrusting them under the office door, and then, as they became the town talk, listening to the discussions which went on within his hearing about their probable authorship! What other man of letters ever had such an apprenticeship in the art of writing as this boy of all work in the newspaper offices and job offices of Boston and Philadelphia? But it was just the experiences of such an apprenticeship that made Franklin what he was, with all his peculiarities and all his unfortunate limitations. There is a striking unity in his whole literary career. The relation of cause and effect is very manifest. Never was it more true than in his case that the boy is the father of the man. All this is made very clear in the book before us, but the space at our command will admit of but a single brief illustration.

Here was a boy whose life was as far removed from the life of a student of the schools as possible. He had to study man, and

* *Benjamin Franklin as a Man of Letters.* By JOHN BACH McMaster. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1887. 16mo. pp. 293. Series of American Men of Letters. Edited by CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

† As admirers of the Puritans, however, we cannot but beg of the Boston publishers to correct at once, in the plates, the erroneous spelling, twice repeated, of the name of this ancient New England theologian, still a familiar and honored name in Massachusetts.

the ways of men, the motives which influence them, and the means by which they achieve success. All this he learned so well that few have ever excelled him. He learned besides the important lesson that it is best to be industrious, temperate, and honest. He learned that, in the long run, idleness, knavery, wastefulness, lying, fraud, do not pay. But could it be expected that his conception of literature would be a very high one? Could literature be anything else to him than something very practical—something to help him in making money, in getting rich? His position in a newspaper office kept him informed with regard to all the questions which interested the public, and tempted him to express his own views upon them. As the way to learn to swim is to swim, so Franklin learned to write by writing. He wrote on the practical subjects that men were most interested in, and always wrote with the knowledge that whatever he said would be sure to be read in a few hours by those who were full of interest in that particular subject. He had the advantage of writing anonymously. If he failed in any way to-day, no one knew it, and seeing where he had failed he had the opportunity of trying to write better the next day on the same subject. He always wrote to meet an immediate emergency, never to make a name for himself. No man ever lived more truly in the present. He never thought of the morrow or of posterity. No one ever took so little care of his reputation as a writer. His aim in writing was simply to convince and persuade the men about him. To this end, he used the plainest, the most familiar, and the most direct language. He used short words and wrote in short sentences. What he wrote abounded in wit and playfulness, but he never used a metaphor or a simile. His style was that of plain statement and hard argument; and, when these were insufficient, he tried banter and ridicule. This was all he ever thought of doing when he began to write in the printing office of his brother in Boston, and, with the exception of that remarkable book, his "Autobiography," this was all he ever thought of doing during his whole career. What more could be expected of a mere printing office education? As the years went on, his sphere became immensely enlarged. At forty-two, he had made what was then considered a fortune, and retired from his printing office. He became a scientist, a politician, a statesman. He was employed in the public service in the highest stations. He wrote on all sorts of subjects. He held the pen of a ready writer. His collected "Works" fill ten solid

octavo volumes. But in all that he ever wrote, the marks of the lack of breadth of his early education are plainly to be seen. For instance, when Washington assumed command of the army in the Revolutionary War, Franklin was put on a Congressional Committee to draw up a "Declaration" to be issued by him. Mr. McMaster says: "In place of a grave and dignified document, he produced a paper that began with idle charges and ended with a jest." For such work he was wholly unfit. There is certainly much to admire in Franklin's style. His *Autobiography*, though it has been so tampered with, ranks as a classic in English literature. Yet we cannot say that he had a refined literary taste. He had not even refinement of character. He was a coarse man. From the beginning to the end of his career he was of the earth, earthy. True, he found out the way to wealth and distinction, how to get on in the world. He became the very personification of his own shrewd maxims. But it is a question whether he ever conceived a higher motive for observing them than that honesty is the best policy. Perhaps there is some excuse for all this in the fact that the age was a coarse one. But he was conspicuously coarse. Mr. McMaster says that "long after middle life, he continued to write pieces so filthy that no editor has ever had the hardihood to print them."

Mr. McMaster gives the reader also abundant opportunity to see how great was Franklin's lack of method. He took no sort of care of what he wrote, even of state papers. Speaking of his mission to France, Mr. McMaster says: "Business might drag, contractors might grow impatient, letters might accumulate, his papers might lie around in hideous confusion, but he must have his afternoon at Moulin Joly, or his evening chat with Morellet at Auteuil. Strangers who came to see him were amazed to behold papers of the greatest importance scattered in the most careless way over the table and floor. A few went so far as to remonstrate. They reminded him that spies surrounded him on every hand, and suggested that half an hour a day given to the business would enable his grandson to put the papers out of the reach of prying eyes. To each his invariable answer was, that he made it a rule never to be engaged in any business that he would not gladly have generally known, and kept his papers as carelessly as before."

Yet what American has ever been more successful, as Franklin counted success, than this printer's boy? The story of his recep-

tion in Paris when he was sent by Congress to make a treaty in 1778 with the French king will ever read like a chapter from the Arabian Nights. Mr. McMaster says: "Princes and nobles, statesmen and warriors, women of rank, men of fashion, philosophers, doctors, men of all sorts, welcomed him with a welcome such as had never yet fallen to the lot of man. To his house came Turgot, now free from the cares of state, and Vergennes, who still kept his portfolio; Buffon, first among naturalists, and Cabanis, first among physicians; D'Alembert and La Rochefoucauld, Raynal, Morellet, Mably, and Malesherbes, for the fame of Franklin was great in France. Philosophers ranked him with Newton and Leibnitz. Diplomatists studied his answers in the examination before the commons of England. The people knew him as Bonhomme Richard. Men of letters pronounced 'The Way to Wealth' '*un très-petit livre pour des grandes choses*,' and, translated and annotated, it was used in the schools. Limners spent their ingenuity in portraying his features. His face was to be seen on rings, on bracelets, on the covers of snuff-boxes, on the prints that hung in the shop-windows. His bust was set up in the royal library. Medallions of him appeared at Versailles. If he made a jest, or said a good thing, the whole of France knew it. To one who asked him if a statement of Lord Stormont, the English ambassador, were true, he replied, No, sir; it is not truth, it is a — Stormont. And immediately a Stormont became another name for a lie. To another who came to lament with him over the retreat through the Jerseys and the misery at Valley Forge, he replied, '*Ça ira, Ça ira*,' (it will all come right in the end). Frenchmen took up the words, remembered them, and in a time yet more terrible made them a revolutionary cry. To the people he was the personification of the rights of man. It was seldom that he entered Paris. But when he did so, his dress, his wigless head, his spectacles, his walking stick, and his great fur cap marked him out as the American. If he went on foot, a crowd was sure to follow at his heels. If he entered the theatre, a court of justice, a public resort of any kind, the people were sure to burst forth into shouts of applause. Their hats, coats, canes, snuff-boxes, were all *à la Franklin*. To sit at table with him was an honor greatly sought. Poets wrote him wretched sonnets. Noble dames addressed him in detestable verse. Women crowned his head with flowers. Grave Academicians shouted with ecstasy to see him give Voltaire a kiss. No house was quite in fashion

that did not have a Franklin portrait over the chimney-piece, a Franklin stove in one of the chambers, and in the garden a liberty tree planted by his hand. The "Gazette" of Amiens undertook to prove that his ancestors had been French."

Mr. McMaster inserts in his book an amusing letter from the wife of John Adams—afterwards President Adams—in which she describes one of the French admirers of Franklin, at this time, Madame Helvetius, who was then a favorite in the literary society of Paris. Mrs. Adams had gone with her husband to dine with Franklin on Sunday afternoon, and it was not till after the rest of the company were assembled that Madame Helvetius made her appearance.

"She entered the room with a careless, jaunty air. Upon seeing the ladies who were strangers to her, she bawled out, 'Ah, mon Dieu? where is Franklin? Why did you not tell me there were ladies here! How I look!' she said, taking hold of a chemise made of tiffany, which she had on over a blue lutestring, and which looked as much upon the decay as her beauty, for she was once a handsome woman. Her hair was frizzled. Over it she had a small straw hat, with a dirty guaze half-handkerchief round it, and a bit of dirtier gauze scarf thrown over her shoulders. She ran out of the room. When she returned the doctor entered at one door, she at the other; upon which she ran forward to him, caught him by the hand; 'Hélas Franklin!' then gave him a double kiss, one upon each cheek, and another upon his forehead. When we went into the room to dine she was placed between the doctor and Mr. Adams. She carried on the chief conversation at dinner, frequently locking her hand into the doctor's, and sometimes spreading her arms upon the backs of both gentlemen's chairs, then throwing her arm carelessly upon the doctor's neck. I own I was highly disgusted, and never wish for an acquaintance with any ladies of this cast. After dinner she threw herself upon a settee, where she showed more than her feet. She had a little lap-dog, who was, next to the doctor, her favorite. This she kissed, and when he wet the floor she wiped it up with her chemise. This is one of the doctor's most intimate friends, with whom he dines once every week, and she with him."

Mr. McMaster suggests that Franklin probably did not notice her fashionable follies, and saw only her mental qualities.

The most remarkable proof of the indifference which Franklin always showed with regard to what he wrote is to be found in the story of the manuscript of his Autobiography, which was brought to light, after being lost for years, by Mr. John Bigelow. It had been with the greatest difficulty that the friends of Franklin had been able to persuade him to begin to write his Autobiography. At last, in 1771, a few chapters were written; but in 1776, it was

supposed that they were irretrievably lost. Some years after, however, they were found, and were sent to Franklin, who was then in Paris. In 1784, he was persuaded to take up the work again; and, by 1788, after he had returned to America, he had brought the Autobiography down to 1757. The manuscript was then sent to his friend, M. le Veillard, in Paris, who had persuaded him to begin it, and a copy was sent to some other friends in England. But hardly had the manuscript reached Europe, when Franklin died, leaving all his papers in the utmost confusion, having never even gathered or identified his various writings. His grandson, Temple Franklin, at once announced that he was about to publish these papers and the Autobiography. But, Mr. McMaster says, Temple Franklin was thoroughly incompetent. "He was fussy, he was slow, he was cursed with the dreadful curse of putting off. What the duty of an editor was he never knew. His time was squandered in sorting, arranging and rearranging, reducing here, adding on there, cutting a piece from one place to paste it on at another, till the manuscript was a mixture of paper, paste, and pins, till the work was neither his own nor his grandfather's." However, after labors of this kind for twenty-seven years, six octavo volumes of Franklin's Works were at last published, and it is this edition which Mr. Sparks and others have followed in their subsequent republications. But after this publication by Temple Franklin in 1817, the manuscripts which he had used mysteriously disappeared from sight till 1851, when, after a strange series of mishaps, they were discovered in London by that indefatigable collector, Mr. Henry Stevens. "By him they were sorted, repaired, arranged, the pins were taken out, the pasted pieces were soaked apart, and the manuscripts restored to the state in which Benjamin Franklin left them." Mr. Stevens sold them to the United States Government. Subsequently, in 1867, Mr. John Bigelow, then minister of the United States in Paris, succeeded in obtaining also the le Veillard manuscript of the Autobiography from the person into whose hands it had finally come after so many years, and then, on comparison of these two manuscripts with the printed Autobiography, it appeared that more than 1200 separate and distinct changes had been made in the text, and the last eight pages of the manuscript had never been published! Mr. Temple Franklin seems to have thought, among other things, that his grandfather's language was deficient in elegance, and the character of the changes he made may be gathered from a few of

the examples which Mr. McMaster has given. "Notion" has been changed to "pretence;" "night coming on," to "night approaching;" "a large one," to "a considerable one;" "very oddly," to "a very extraordinary manner;" "guzzlers of beer," to "drinkers of beer;" "footed it to London," to "walked to London." So that now whoever would read Franklin's Autobiography, as it was written, must go to the Bigelow edition. And it further appears that in all the fifty editions which have been published at various times, many pieces have been inserted which were not Franklin's, and that many papers which he did write have never yet found a place in any of his collected works.

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

THE CONNECTICUT ALMANAC FOR 1888.*—Those curious in such matters may have been struck by the fact that for '87 and '88 the tidal predictions of this almanac indicate that at times of each month the interval from morning to evening tides is less than twelve hours, so that the evening tide should then come at an earlier rather than a later hour than the morning tide of the same day. This is however sanctioned by the Tide Tables of the U. S. Nautical Almanac Office and results from a new analysis of the tidal constants for New London, based upon a more extended series of observation. The predictions being based upon and verified by observed facts it is safe to accept them.

The fact has also been commented on that whereas the Yale-Harvard boat race last summer was set for a time just after the flood tide for New London, in fact the tide was found to be still flowing up stream when the race began. Were it not for the varying influence of wind and storm and the delays which usually attend boat races, a like circumstance might have been observed in former years. It is to be explained by the fact that high tide at the mouth of a river acts like a dam, changing the river for the time into a reservoir to be filled, which filling is effected more by the tide than by the current. The comment of the Tidal Bureau may be quoted:

"The phenomenon of the tidal current turning an hour or more after the turning of the tide has long been a matter of observation near the mouth of tidal rivers—the current will be up stream, until the river above is tidally saturated so to speak,

* *The Connecticut Almanac for 1888.* H. H. Peck & Co., Publishers. Edited by Prof. A. W. PHILLIPS. Calculations by H. H. WHITE.

and this requires that the whole river to the head of tide water be raised from three to four feet above its level at low water, and the water to do this is largely supplied by the current from below."

In a popular ephemeris like that of the Connecticut Almanac the highest numerical exactness is not usually expected, nor is it perhaps right to expect it, since the additional labor necessary to secure the increased perfection is disproportionately greater. It is therefore due to this Almanac to say that in it no pains are spared to secure precision. A careful examination of the details of the work by which its numbers are derived shows that in the accuracy of its predictions it is to be ranked next to the official publications of the U. S. Nautical Almanac Office.

RECENT SCANDINAVIAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.—The increasing immigration from the north of Europe will naturally lead to a better acquaintance on the part of American scholars with the languages and literature of the Scandinavian countries. The well-endowed and well-manned universities of Copenhagen in Denmark, Upsala and Lund in Sweden, and Christiania in Norway are steadily making contributions to the literature of the world. Among the more important theological works issued in these countries within the last two or three years may be mentioned; in Denmark, "Jerusalem in the time of Christ and the Apostles,"* by Professor Francis Buhl, embracing an account of the recent excavations and explorations there, and "The Life of Bishop Otto Laub,"† containing the interesting correspondence between him and the Danish theologian, Martensen, between 1855 and 1882; in Norway, a second and revised edition of Professor Frederick Petersen's "Investigation and the Christian faith,"‡ designed to show that there is and can be no antagonism between science and faith, because on the one hand science can never show what God is and what he has done for man. This revelation does. On the other hand, revelation gives no account of the course of the natural world. This belongs to the investigations of science. In a work "On creation, preservation, and government,"§ the same author discusses with freshness and

* *Jerusalem paa Kristi og Apostlene Tid.* Copenhagen, 1886. 8vo, pp. 135.

† *Biskop Otto Laubs Levnet: en Livsskildring i Breve.* Copenhagen, 1886. 8vo, pp. 407.

‡ *Forskningen og den Christelige Tro.* Christiania, 1886. 8vo, pp. 241.

§ *Om Skabelsen, Opholdelsen og Styrelsen.* Christiania, 1885. 8vo, pp. 231.

force the subjects of creation, miracles, and prayer. In Sweden, "The Theological Sciences,"* by Peter Eklund, which is essentially a work on the Encyclopedia of Theology, is a labored and too abstract discussion of the relation of the several branches of theology to philosophy and other sciences. C. E. Johansson, a Docent in the University of Upsala, has published a creditable essay on "The Holy Scriptures and the negative criticism,"† in which he discusses the assumptions of the negative critics, and presents the answers he would give to the recent attacks upon the Old and New Testaments. Professor W. Rudin of the same university, who is engaged on the revision of the Swedish version of the Old Testament, has published valuable "Commentaries on the Minor Prophets, Obadiah, Joel, Jonah, and Amos,"‡ and also an "Introduction to Old Testament prophecy."§

The January number of the *Theologisk Tidskrift*, edited by Professor Martin Johansson of Upsala, contains articles on justification, church movements in Norway, cremation and the objections to it, and the relation of the clergy to politics, together with reviews of late publications. The article on Norway gives an account, among other things, of the growing free-church feeling in that country, and states that the revision of the new Norwegian translation of the Old Testament is at length completed. The revision of the New Testament will be carried forward by Professor Bugge, who has become generally known as an able and accomplished student of New Testament Greek. The January number of the *Tidsskrift för kristlig tro och bildning*, which has now reached its sixth year, has articles on Christianity and Lutheranism, the perfection of the Christian religion, the modern spirit of the age, musical dilettantism, and other subjects. The prize questions, on which answers must be sent to the editor, Professor Von Schéele, before the first of May, are (1) Is it really desirable that the thousand years' connection between the church and the state in Sweden should be dissolved? (2) How should the doctrine of freedom from sin, as presented in I. John, iii. 6-9, be understood?

GEORGE E. DAY.

* *Den Teologiska vetenskapen*. Stockholm, 1885. 8vo, pp. 312.

† *Den Heliga Skrifft och den negativa kritiken*. Upsala, 1886. pp. 241.

‡ *De Mindre Profeterna, översatta och utlagda*. Upsala, 1884-1887. 3 Delen.

§ *Inledning till Profetian i det Gamla Testamentet*. Upsala, 1884. pp. 92.

BOISE'S NOTES ON THE EPISTLES OF THE IMPRISONMENT.*—In the years '84 and '85 Dr. Boise issued through the American Publication Society of Hebrew two small hand-books containing notes on the Greek text of Romans, Galatians, and the so-called Epistles of the First Imprisonment. The books at once attracted the attention of many students and teachers, but the discontinuance of the Publishing Society referred to made it uncertain as to where the volumes were to be had. We doubt not that it was in response to an increased demand for these compact and scholarly annotations that the volume upon Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon, and Philippians is now re-issued by the Messrs. Appleton with the addition of notes on the Pastoral Epistles and in connection with the Greek text.

From constant use of these notes for several months in connection with class-room work, we can speak in the highest terms of their merit and usefulness for the purpose which they are intended to serve. That purpose is the initiation of the student into an understanding of the force of the Greek words and constructions, as a basis for interpretation. The notes are almost exclusively linguistic; they are brief and clear; they serve as a guide to interpretation rather than discuss the doctrinal and ethical contents of the epistles. They are similar in character and range to the notes which are found in school text-books of the classics, and Dr. Boise's experience and success as an annotator of the classics have enabled him to meet exactly the wants of theological students. These notes fill a place never before exactly occupied. They present a brief, philological commentary which is not so extended and detailed as to wear out the student's patience and exhaust his time for other studies, nor so easy as to afford him explanations without study and thought. Without close attention to the text the student carries nothing away from these notes, but with such attention, he can carry away a great deal in a short time.

The book—and its promised companion, covering Thessalonians, Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, when it shall appear—will be admirably adapted to the use of those studying the Greek Testament in college, as a text-book, while it will be equally useful to theological students as a hand-book of reference in connection with courses of lectures which treat more extensively the interpretation

* *The Epistles of St. Paul*, written after he became a prisoner. Text of Tischendorf, with comparison of the text of Tregelles and of Westcott and Hort, by JAMES R. BOISE, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Morgan Park, Ill. D. Appleton & Co. New York. 1887.

of the epistles. It is a wonder that more such practical and available helps for the study of the Old and New Testaments have not been produced. They would in no way diminish the importance of elaborate commentaries, and they would supply a kind of help which is in its own way as necessary, and do much to prepare the way for the appreciative use of more extensive works.

GEORGE B. STEVENS.

HUTHER ON THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES.*—This volume completes the American edition of the Meyer series, thus placing the whole work before the American public at about one-third the cost of the English edition of T. & T. Clark. No commentary on the whole New Testament compares with this great work for the purposes of the scholar and critic. It is a mark of progress in American theological study that a work so rigidly scientific and offering so little ease or comfort in the way of interpretation presented ready to the student's hand, but rather demanding the closest attention and most patient tracing of acute argument, should meet a wide and increasing demand among teachers, students, and clergymen.

President Dwight has greatly enhanced the value of all the numbers of this series which he has edited, by the addition of notes sufficiently connected and extended to make almost an additional commentary on the text. It need hardly be said that these notes have an independent value of their own and can be used to good purpose by the student of the text who has not time to go through the more extended exposition of Meyer and his continuators. Particularly is this true of the volume under review, in which the notes are gathered together at the end of the volume, instead of being, as in all previous cases, placed directly after the chapters to which they relate. Dr. Dwight's annotations refer solely to the exposition of the text and do not take up the questions of Introduction.

It will be of interest to New Testament students to know what positions Dr. Huther takes upon some of the vexed questions connected with the Catholic epistles. Regarding the "brothers of the Lord," he says: "According to the New Testament, the brothers of Jesus, to whom James belonged, are the children of

* *Meyer's Critical and Exegetical Hand-book. Commentary on the Epistles of James, Peter, John, and Jude*, by J. E. HUTHER, Th.D., with supplementary notes by PRESIDENT TIMOTHY DWIGHT. Funk & Wagnalls. New York. 1887.

Mary born in wedlock with Joseph, after the birth of Jesus" (p. 6). The writer of the epistle is James, the Lord's brother, the "bishop" of Jerusalem, who figures so prominently in the Apostolic conference at Jerusalem. Respecting the genuineness of II. Peter, the author expresses no confident opinion, but seems to lean toward an unfavorable judgment. He says: "If, then, the grounds for and against the authenticity are thus evenly balanced, there is here presented a problem which is not yet solved, and which perhaps cannot be solved" (p. 371). The author holds that Jude, the author of the epistle, is a brother of the James whom he believes to have written the epistle bearing that name; that he was, therefore, the brother of Jesus mentioned in the Gospels. (Matt. xiii: 55; Mark vi: 3.)

GEORGE B. STEVENS.

MACLAREN'S "COLOSSIANS AND PHILEMON."*—This volume is one of the early numbers of a series of expository treatises issued under the name of "The Expositor's Bible," edited by Rev. W. Robertson Nicoll, editor of "The Expositor." The contents of the book appeared as articles in the magazine just named, beginning Jan., 1885. They are in the form of lectures or sermons and have doubtless served the purposes of the pulpit as well as of the magazine before their appearance in book form. They have doubtless proved useful in all these ways, but we think chiefly so in the pulpit. They *are* sermons, whether called so or not. They are good specimens of expository preaching, but we do not think that any of them reach the height of some of Dr. MacLaren's sermons published in other volumes, "The Secret of Power," and "The Pattern of Service," for example. Dr. MacLaren is one of the best living examples of an essentially expository preacher, and this volume will do good service if it shall stimulate the clergymen into whose hands it may fall to undertake the practice of this much-neglected art.

GEORGE B. STEVENS.

In "SEÑORA VILLENA†" Mr. Wilcox again brings forward the characters which won so many friends in "Real People." There is much boldness and originality in his departure from conven-

* *Colossians and Philemon.* By ALEXANDER MACLAREN, D.D. A. C. Armstrong & Son. New York. pp. 493.

† *Señora Villena and Gray: An Oldhaven Romance.* By the author of "Real People," New York. White, Stokes & Allen. 1887.

tional rules in the construction of the new story. And this suggests one of Mr. Wilcox's strongest points: he is never an imitator. If he is to obtain success it shall be by no catering to the tastes of an audience already created by some one of the fashionable writers of the day. The successful writer, the one who inspires enthusiasm among his readers, must make and win his own audience. It is natural then that, as in the case of all independent beginnings, the value of his work has received various and most contradictory estimates. "Real People" won a company of ardent admirers, his new volume will hold them and add to their number. In Spanish-American fiction we recall no one who may be called a rival. Edward Everett Hale has long held the field as his own, but Mr. Wilcox has created a new field, and in method, manner, and matter the work of the two authors suggests but the slightest comparison.

Both *Señora Villena* and *Gray: an Oldhaven Romance*, have a certain artificial interest for New Haven readers because their scenes are for the most part laid in the Elm City. The second story, while containing nothing of the Spanish-American flavor, is yet slightly linked after the manner of Balzac to the chain of earlier stories. In some respects it is his best work. There are powerful scenes, characters, and plot conceptions in it, and the written style seems better than in any former work. It takes hold of one powerfully; a well known Boston critic said to a friend that after reading it late at night it was only by a strong exercise of self-control that he could stay in his haunted room alone that night. This, however, does not suggest its best strength. We do not believe it will be rightly appreciated by half its readers because too much is demanded of the reader. While this might not indicate a fault in a poem it does not indicate virtue in a novel. The novelist's motto should be, "He that runs may read." The novel reader seeks for recreation; the novelist should endeavor to give the best of recreation and at the same time ennable or better his reader as he may. But as the average reader gives only passing attention, a simplicity and directness which might seem impertinent under other circumstances is really necessary. Too much analysis and interpretation may be a fault, as in some of George Eliot's later works, where an occasional chapter reads like one of Shakspere's plays with the observations of German critics cleverly worked into the context. But the noble moral allegory in *Gray* suffers in effectiveness from

a lack of what we have seen may become faulty in excess. It is only after attention and thought, which few stop to give, that the whole purpose and force of the work is realized. Hawthorne would have enjoyed and praised the story, but he would not have allowed the reader to miss the effect of a point in it. If Mr. Wilcox has done so it is because he has preferred to give his own method a fair trial.

GEORGE SAINTSBURY'S "HISTORY OF ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE." *—It is too much for one man to make an extensive and adequate history of so vast a literature as ours. Taine, Craik, Morley, and others, with all their excellencies, have established the truth of this. Macmillan & Co. for some time past have held forth in their catalogue the promise of a History of English Literature from which much is expected. It is to be made on the coöperative plan, and the names of the four specialists chosen for the work are such as to heighten every expectation. Mr. Stopford Brooke is to trace the development of our literature down to the Elizabethan age; Mr. George Saintsbury has done the second part of the work in the volume now issued; the Eighteenth Century is assigned to Mr. Edmund Gosse; and Prof. Edward Dowden will complete the series with a volume on the Modern Period. As the first published part, Mr. Saintsbury's share of the important work will be read with attention. "My only excuse," he says, "for undertaking to write on the greatest period of the greatest literature of the world is that I have been diligently reading the productions, small and great, of this period for some five-and-twenty years with ever increasing admiration, and that I find the increase of my admiration due in no small degree to the comparison with other periods and other literatures, ancient and modern, which I have been enabled to make in the meantime." And one feels that he has read the literature as one should read any good novel or poem, for its own and his own sake. His reading, also, seems to have included the best part of what has been written about the Elizabethan age and its men. With such preparation he aims to give independently and originally a descriptive and critical history, and he wins our respect at the very beginning. There is, in the book, an indifference to dates and details, upon

* *A History of Elizabethan Literature*, (being Volume II. of a History of English Literature). By GEORGE SAINTSBURY. Macmillan & Co., London and New York, 1887.

which he does not set so high a value as many do. In his own words he is nothing if not critical, and the criticism is "warranted" to be Mr. Saintsbury's. Of course when more emphasis is given to matters of opinion than to matters of fact, an author is free from such an attack as the *Quarterly* made upon Mr. Gosse a year or so ago,—there is no final court to settle disputes over matters of opinion. And it is plain to the reader that Mr. Saintsbury never expects anyone to agree with him in all his literary judgments; probably they are not entirely the estimates he himself held twenty years ago, or will hold twenty years hence. But what of it, provided one does not depend wholly upon Mr. Saintsbury for knowledge of the Elizabethan age? If a critic should catalogue his particular objections to the author's conclusions, likely as not the next reviewer would differ from each. It is ordinarily conceded that every one may respect his own opinion in literary taste at least, but Mr. Saintsbury occasionally seems to dispute this, as when he anticipates possible disagreement with such words: "This estimate will only be dismissed as exaggerated by those who are debarred from appreciation by want of sympathy with the subject, or distracted by want of comprehension of it." In fact, generally he writes with a breezy freedom from humility, and as one having great authority, and the force of the work generally gains thereby, but not in all cases. Such valuable and at the same time such sincere and independent criticism is too rare in books of the kind, and there are few faults in it which the most critical would not forgive for the sake of the whole. Advance is continually made in the study of Elizabethan literature by the band of enthusiastic men devoted to it, and this book is abreast of the times. As it is only within a few years that it has been possible to treat at all some of the topics here included, one finds matter contained in no similar work. Again, in dealing with subjects long familiar, Mr. Saintsbury gives suggestions, observations, and expositions of fresh and stimulating character. The work is evidently not intended as a text-book for ordinary classes, but for the reading courses for more advanced students it is the best of its kind. The style, purposely unpretentious, is straightforward and business-like though many of the sentences must be followed with slow and careful footing under penalty of missing the way. And the writer has a peculiar and regrettable fondness for "seld-seen," but not therefore "costly" words. To use one of his favorite phrases, there

are not many "purple patches" in the work, but perhaps its best piece of writing is the passage three or four pages in length, beginning on p. 93, with, "It seems to me that putting Shakespere aside as *hors concours*, not merely in degree but in kind, only two English poets can challenge Spenser for the primary. These are Milton and Shelley."

Such errors of fact as we have noticed seem to be due mainly to typographical misfortunes. For instance, on p. 157 the date of Shakspere's baptism is given as April 24, instead of 26; on p. 434 is a slight mistake based on an error in the date of the birth of Dryden, on the questions of whose life and works Mr. Saintsbury is perhaps the best of authorities; and in the index, which, by the way is very inadequate for such a book, there seem to be several errors, one of which is the giving of the date of Milton's death as 1672 instead of 1674, and another is in the date of Barnfield's birth.

ERNEST WHITNEY.

The *Art Amateur*,* for January, comments on the seizure, some weeks ago, at the instance of Mr. Anthony Comstock—the agent of the Society for the Suppression of Vice—of certain "cheap, lewd," French photographs, found in the stock of Knoedler & Co., of the Fifth Avenue, New York City. It will be remembered that these pictures were, some of them, duplicates of those that had already been before the courts of New York, and adjudged to be "obscene and indecent," and, for the sale of which, one Muller had been not long ago convicted. Others were declared to be of such a character that even a description was objectionable. We quote a single paragraph from the comments of the *Art Amateur*.

"It has been urged that some of the prints seized were those of paintings from the Paris Salon. That says little for their decency. Yet we hope that Parisian toleration of lewdness under the guise of Art will never set the standard of decency in this country. Every year there are canvases by the score, in the Salon, which should be taken out and burned by the police; and, as a rule, the worst of them are photographed and imported into this country to be reproduced in cheaper form, so that your little boy or your little girl can buy them out of their pocket money, if they choose to do so. I dare say some of them are painted chiefly with the view of profit from the copyright. The idea

* *Art Amateur*. Montague Marks, 23 Union Square, New York City. Price \$4 a year. Single numbers, 35 cents.

that in this photographic form they can serve any legitimate purpose of Art, every artist knows to be absurd. The painting of the original may have done so in a degree, because it may have helped the technical education of the painter—and more is the pity that the wretched fellow does not put his education to better use—and, with all its shamefacedness, the contemplation of the picture may have given aesthetic pleasure to the visitor at the Salon, by the beauty of the modelling and the delicacy of the coloring—supposing it to possess those charms. But, reduced to the uncompromising black and white of the photographic print, it becomes something wholly different, and has nothing to recommend it on the score of Art."

If anything more were needed to prove that pictures of the description thus indicated can be of no value for the purposes of Art, the very cheapness of these photographs, with which the country is now being flooded, is a proof that they are intended to be sold among people who have not the slightest thought or appreciation of Art, or intention of using them for artistic purposes. The retail dealers who are supplied by the wholesale importers, it seems, have actually been selling them among the boys and girls of the public schools. For some years past, the "Society for the Suppression of Vice" have been seeking to bring the facts to the knowledge of the proper public officers. In the year 1887 alone, books, papers, figures, pictures, circulars, songs, and "articles of indecent or immoral use" have been seized, literally by the tens of thousands. The law is very specific on this subject. It deems whatever is obscene, lewd, or indecent to be injurious to the public morals, and as such undertakes to suppress it. Whether obscenity is displayed in speech, in literature, or in Art, the law makes no difference. It undertakes to suppress it wherever it is found. And yet, as the newspapers state, during one of the prosecutions in Philadelphia, a few weeks ago, Judge Biddle sought to throw discredit on the agent of the Society by asking him if he had studied Art as a specialist! We have no information at hand as to what the point in question was. Possibly this is the *one* case in which there appears to have been some mistake, among the one hundred and twenty-one cases successfully prosecuted by the Society in 1887. But the law is very explicit on the general subject. It is not necessary to be acquainted with Art as a specialist any more than with literature, or philology, or medical or surgical science. Whether—in any particular case—speech, or a book, or a picture, or a statue, is obscene is a question of fact to be determined by a

jury.* And can it be supposed that any jury will hesitate to decide what is the character of pictures of "naked women in postures and expressions which cannot be described without offending decency?" The law is so strict, that if even the *tendency* of a book is of this character, a good motive on the part of the man who wrote the book, or made the picture, does not affect the case in the least.† The Society for the Suppression of Vice have shown great judgment in the course they have pursued. As we have said : "Out of one hundred and twenty-one indictments secured by them in 1887, a judgment of conviction has been secured in one hundred and eighteen cases. Two that escaped were clerks and were dismissed because their principals were discovered and convicted ; while the other was a case which was prosecuted upon evidence brought by others." It is not at all surprising that, as we learn, attempts have been made in Paris to ridicule the Society for the Suppression of Vice, yet it is encouraging to know that even in Paris itself efforts are now making to obtain the suppression of pictures of this description. As a matter of curiosity, we have taken occasion to inquire of artists who are considered to be authorities in Art, whether pictures of the character indicated can be of any value for artistic purposes, and have been assured that they are not of the slightest worth.

* We need go no further than the case of *Com. vs. Landis* tried in Philadelphia in 1875 (8 Philadelphia R. 454). The jury were here instructed that it was for them to determine the character of the book in question.

† See case of *Regina vs. Hicklin*, in 1867. In 1870, the principle was reaffirmed (*Steele vs. Bannon*, L. R. 7, C. P., p. 266) even with regard to the publication for general circulation of a legal proceeding which related to what was impure and filthy, though the object of those who put forth the publication was admitted by the court to have been not only innocent but praiseworthy and intended by them to advance the interests of religion and morality. Chief Justice Boville held : "There is no doubt that all matters of importance may be made the subject of full and free discussion, but while the liberty of such discussion is preserved, it must not be allowed to run into obscenity, and to be conducted in a manner which tends to the corruption of public morals. The probable effect of the publication being prejudicial to order, morality, and decency, the appellant must be taken to have intended the natural consequence of such publication, even though the book was published with the best intention." See also (*U. S. vs. Bennett*, 13 Blatchford, p. 28.) In this case which was brought before the U. S. Circuit Court in Banc, Mr. Justice Blatchford (now of the Supreme Court of the United States) presiding, said that the views "laid down by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and a full bench of the Queens Court, in this Hicklin case, seem very sound." In the March number of the *North American Review*, Col. Robert J. Ingersoll says, "The artist who tries by hint and suggestion to enforce the immoral becomes a pander."

THE MAGAZINE OF ART is invaluable to any one who would keep himself informed with regard to contemporary Art in Europe. The frontispiece in the March number presents a photogravure from James Bertrand's "Virginia," which portrays the dead body of the heroine of Bernardin de St. Pierre, washed up by the tide. An important paper describes the work of Auguste Rodin, the French sculptor, who is now engaged on an unfinished monument, destined for, and commissioned by, the town of Calais, in commemoration of the noble act of self-sacrifice accomplished by its burghers when it was forced to submit to the victorious Edward. The Article is illustrated by engravings of some of the figures which form part of his design. Another Article deserving of notice is a profusely illustrated description of a new book by Mr. P. G. Hamerton—"that wondrous art critic without an enemy," as he has been called—on "the river Saône as a sketching ground." These form only a part of the rich contents of a single number. Cassell & Co. (Limited.) Price 35 cents monthly; \$3.50 per year.

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J. H. Hyslop, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

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NEW ENGLANDER

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YALE REVIEW.

No. CCXVII.

APRIL, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—LIFE AND LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN.

The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin; including an Auto-biographical Chapter. Edited by his son, FRANCIS DARWIN. Two vols., 12mo., pp. 558, 662. New York: D. Appleton & Co.

CABOT's "Life of Emerson," and the "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," edited by his son, Francis Darwin, are two biographies of rare interest issuing from the press about the same time, and affording a marked contrast in the characters of the persons of whom they treat. The man of introspection and the man of outward observation will be found contrasted in these two works in a typical and representative manner.

The chief interest in the Life and Letters of Darwin lies in the autobiographical chapter. This is preceded by a sketch of the family. To his grandfather, Erasmus, Charles Darwin bore considerable resemblance both in physical characteristics and in certain mental traits.

Robert Waring Darwin, the father of the naturalist, followed his father's profession ; he studied medicine at Leyden, where he took his degree. He married the daughter of Josiah Wedgwood, the distinguished potter. Charles Darwin (born in 1809) had the strongest affection and admiration for his father. He describes him, in his "Recollections," as possessing remarkable powers of observation, and as very sympathetic. He was successful in the practice of his profession, amassing a fortune. Of his characteristics his son Charles writes : "The most remarkable power which my father possessed was that of reading the characters, and even the thoughts of those whom he saw for a short time. We had many instances of this power, some of which seemed almost supernatural." His memory was such that once having heard a date in connection with the birth or death of a person, he never forgot it, and the power was annoying, as it became a burden to him.

The sketch which Darwin wrote of himself he terms "Recollections of the Development of My Mind and Character." It was written in the sixty-seventh year of his age, and is one of the most interesting and valuable bits of autobiography extant. He refers to his early characteristics as a boy, to his fondness for fishing and hunting ; and the first intimation of his future career was his fondness for collecting eggs, which was without method or system, but a decided passion. Of his early school days he speaks slightly, regarding them as a blank in his education. "During my whole life," he says, "I have been singularly incapable of mastering any language." His memory was good, therefore he had no difficulty in performing his tasks in committing lines of Homer or Virgil, which he forgot, however, almost as rapidly as he learned them. His father rated his early attainments rather low, saying : "You care for nothing but shooting dogs, and rat catching, and you will be a disgrace to yourself and your family."

Looking back on his early school life, the only traits of character which he thought promised well for the future were his strong and diversified tastes, his zeal for whatever interested him, and his keen pleasure in understanding any complex subject or thing. He read poetry at this time—Thompson's *Seasons*, Byron, and Scott. Later on, he comments on the fact

that this taste for poetry entirely disappeared. At a later day he refers to his liking for Wordsworth and Coleridge. Milton's *Paradise Lost* he read twice through, and carried the book with him on the *Beagle*. Later on he remarks, "up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds gave me pleasure," and he took especial delight in Shakespeare, especially in the historical plays. "But now, for many years," he adds, "I cannot endure to read a line of poetry. I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also lost my taste for pictures and music. Music generally sets me thinking too energetically on what I have been working at, instead of giving me pleasure. I retain some taste for fine scenery, but it does not cause me the exquisite delight which it formerly did. On the other hand, novels which are works of the imagination, though not of a very high order, have been for years a wonderful relief and pleasure to me, and I often bless all novelists. A novel," he adds, "according to my taste, does not come into the first class unless it contains some person whom one can thoroughly love, and if a pretty woman all the better." He comments on this decadence of his taste as a curious and lamentable loss, "which is all the odder, as books on history, biographies, and travels (independently of any scientific facts which they may contain), and essays on all sorts of subjects, interest me as much as they ever did."

But to return to his earlier years. In 1825, his father sent him to Edinburgh University, where he remained for two years. His knowledge of the fact that his father would leave him in independent circumstances was a sufficient check, he says, to any strenuous efforts to learn medicine. Nevertheless he actually began its practice in a small way, on his return from Edinburgh, but gave it up from disgust. In later years he regrets keenly that two important things were neglected in this period of his education, viz: that he was not urged to practice dissection, and that he was not taught drawing. He says, the practice of dissecting and of drawing would have been of invaluable service to me in all my future work, and this neglect has been an irremediable evil. The sight of blood in the dissecting room drove him away in horror, which he was unable to overcome; what he saw there was before the days of chloroform, and the impression haunted him for many years.

A significant remark is dropped concerning his Edinburgh experience. One of his associates was Dr. Grant, who afterwards published "Some First-rate Zoological Papers," and became professor in University College, London. "One day," he says, "we were walking together, when he burst forth in high admiration of Lamarck and of his views on evolution. I listened in silent astonishment, and, as far as I can judge, without any effect on my mind. I had previously read the 'Zoonomia' of my grandfather, in which similar views are maintained, but without producing any effect on me. Nevertheless it is probable that the hearing, rather early in life, such views maintained and praised, may have favored my upholding them under a different form in my 'Origin of Species.'"

He refers to his taste for art while at Cambridge, and for his liking for music, while unable to perceive a discord, or keep time, or hum a tune correctly. It is a mystery, he adds, how I could possibly have derived pleasure from music.

At Cambridge, he became acquainted with Prof. Henslow, with whom he used to take long walks. The influence of Henslow, he says, was of benefit to him, for his superior moral qualities. The summer vacations were passed in collecting beetles. He became intimate with Professor Sedgwick, with whom he went on a short geologizing tour. He makes the remark that it is surprising how easy it is to overlook phenomena, however conspicuous, before they have been observed by any one.

In Dec., 1831, he started on his voyage around the world in the Beagle. This voyage, conceived for scientific purposes, lasted five years, and it was the means of giving direction to his scientific tastes.

In July, 1837, he opened his "first note-book for facts in relation to the 'Origin of Species,'" about which he says he had long reflected, and upon which he never ceased working for the next twenty years. On his return from his voyage he attended the meetings of the Geological Society, of which he became an officer, and saw a good deal of Sir Charles Lyell; one of whose chief characteristics, he remarks, was his sympathy for the work of others. He took great interest in Darwin's views on coral reefs, and encouraged him

greatly by his advice and example. Lyell and Hooker became his most staunch friends, and greatly contributed to the acceptance of his views and the success of his works. At this time he also saw a good deal of Robert Brown. During these earlier years he says he took several geological excursions, and published, in the *Philosophical Transactions*, an account of the Parallel Roads of Glen Roy. This paper, he says, was a great failure, and he was ashamed of it. "Having been deeply impressed with what I had seen of the elevation of the land in South America, I attributed the parallel lines to the action of the sea; but I had to give up this view when Agassiz propounded his glacier-lake theory. Because no other explanation was possible under our then state of knowledge, I argued in favor of sea-action; and my error has been a good lesson to me never to trust in science to the principle of exclusion." At this period, being in ill-health, he read poetry with delight—particularly Wordsworth and Coleridge. In 1839, he married Miss Wedgewood, grand-daughter of Josiah Wedgewood. His continued ill-health greatly interfered with his scientific pursuits, and this continued to be the case throughout his whole life, so that he was good but for three or four working hours out of the day; often for but half this time. Of his work on Coral Reefs, published in 1842, he says, "no other work of mine was begun in so deductive a spirit as this, for the whole theory was thought out on the west coast of South America, before I had seen a true coral reef."

He struggled continuously against ill-health; going but little into society, and husbanding his strength for his pursuits. Often a slight excitement would occasion violent shivering and vomiting attacks. He enjoyed society and dinner-parties, but was obliged to give them up, which he regarded as a deprivation, for he says, "they always put me in high spirits."

Following the publication of his work on Coral Reefs, he devoted himself exclusively to arranging his huge pile of notes, to observing, and to experimenting in relation to the transmutation of species. From his observations during the voyage of the Beagle, he had been impressed by discovering in the Pampean formation great fossil animals covered with

armour like that of the existing armadillos ; secondly, by the manner in which closely allied animals replace one another in proceeding southwards over the continent ; and thirdly, by the South American character of most of the productions of the Galapagos Archipelago, and more especially by the manner in which they differ slightly on each island of the group ; nine of the islands appearing to be very ancient in a geological sense. It was evident, he says, that such facts as these, as well as many others, could only be explained on the supposition that species gradually became modified, and, he adds, the subject haunted me.

In 1862, he published his little work on the Fertilization of Orchids which cost him 10 months work, but the facts for which had been accumulating for years. During the same year he published papers on the "Two Forms, or Dimorphic Condition of Primula," and five other papers on dimorphic and trimorphic plants. Of these, he says, "I do not think anything in my scientific life has given me so much satisfaction as making out the meaning of the structure of these plants." Then followed a paper on "Climbing Plants," which cost him four months in the preparation. The paper was little noticed, he says, when published in the proceedings of the Linnean Society, but when corrected and published as a separate book it sold well. This was followed by a work on the "Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication." "It was a big book," he says, "and cost me four years and two months hard labor. It gives all my observations and an immense number of facts collected from various sources." In 1871, "The Descent of Man" was published.

His next work was on the "Experience of the Emotions in Men and Animals." Of this he says, "I had intended to give only a chapter on the subject in the 'Descent of Man,' but as soon as I began to put my notes together, I saw that it would require a separate treatise." He began his observations in this connection with the birth of his first child, and "at once commenced to make notes on the first dawn of the various expressions which he exhibited." He says he was convinced, even at this early period, that the most complex and fine shades of expression must all have had a gradual and natural origin.

Then followed a work on the "Effects of Cross and Self-Fertilization in the Vegetable Kingdom," and another on "The Different Forms of Flowers." The crossing of flowers in an illegitimate manner, he says, he believed to be very important in its bearing on the sterility of hybrids. Of his work on the "Power of Movement in Plants" he says, that it was a tough piece of work, "for in accordance with the principle of evolution it was impossible to account for climbing plants having been developed in so many widely different groups, unless all kinds of plants possess some slight power of movement of an analogous kind." This he proved to be the case, and was led to rather wide generalization, viz: that the great and important classes of movement, excited by light, the attraction of gravity, etc., are all modified forms of the fundamental movement of circumrotation. "It has always pleased me," he says, "to exalt plants in the scale of organized beings."

From his earliest youth, he says, he had the strongest desire to understand or explain whatever he observed—that is, to group all facts under some general laws. This gave him the patience to reflect and ponder for a number of years over any unexplained problem.

The autobiographical sketch is decidedly the most interesting chapter in the "Life." It reveals the habit of mind and method of work, the character and temperamental qualities of a great observer. There are two classes of mind so widely separated in their sympathies, tastes, and habits of thought that they are wholly unfitted for forming correct estimates, one of the other—that which is grounded in reflection and introspection, and the mind that is formed by outward observation; the ideal, or perfect mind being well balanced in these respects. Darwin's power of generalizing from his accumulation of facts is exceptionally strong, and to this is due the great contribution he has made to knowledge.

A characteristic sign of the advent of a new truth, in a form which renders it appreciable to the understanding, is the intensity of the opposition with which it meets. When this opposition manifests itself in heated animosity, in scorn or ridicule, we may be sure that there is fire where there is so much smoke; that there is truth where there is so much bitterness of op-

position. The advance of truth has always occasioned, and will always occasion, this antagonism on the part of the conservative, or institutional order of mind. And it is by this means that the truth is adequately tested, tried, and "nailed to the cross," before it can become acceptable to the general understanding; especially if it occasions a reformation, or a revolution in thought. Whatever may be the nature of the criticisms urged by mere pedants in science or philosophy as to the antiquity of the theory of evolution, or to the priority of claims for its distinct enunciation, it is destined to be identified with the name of Darwin in the same manner that modern astronomy stands related to Copernicus, or that the earth's movement stands related to Galileo. He who gives adequate expression to a new truth and relates it to previous knowledge, so that it may be distinctly grasped and apprehended by the mind, is justly the father of the discovery, no matter how often it has been previously hinted in vague terms.

Few things are more interesting than observing the methods of a close observer following with keen scent a suggestive generalization running like a line of drift on the surface of the stream of fact, and culminating in the acquisition of a great truth. This "power of keeping a subject or question more or less before him for a great many years," evinced in Darwin a remarkable vitality and persistency of mind. His son remarks, "there was one quality of mind which seemed to be of special and extreme advantage in leading him to make discoveries—he never let *exceptions* pass unnoticed. Everybody notices a fact as an exception when it is striking, or frequent, but he had a special instinct for arresting an exception."

His power of sticking to a subject "was such that he almost thought it necessary to apologize for his patience, saying that he could not bear to be beaten, as if this were a sign of weakness on his part." He often used the expression, "Its dogged as does it." This he was tempted to say when he had passed the bounds of perseverance. He claimed that no one could be a good observer unless he was an active theorizer. He regarded the "Origin of Species" as his great work. A crisis arose when he found himself likely to be forestalled by Wallace. In his letter to Lyell he shows a struggle to repress the feeling of

disappointment at what he thought was Wallace's forestalling of all his years of work. His sense of literary honor comes out strongly in these letters, and his feeling about priority is shown in the admiration expressed in his "Recollections," concerning what is termed Wallace's self-annihilation.

Wallace prepared a paper on "Man," in which the leading idea was expressed that during later ages the *mind* will have been modified more than the body. Darwin is interested in this view, and says that he had got so far as to see, with Wallace, "that the struggle between the races of man depended entirely on intellectual and *moral* qualities. This was before he had himself prepared his work on the "Descent of Man." In the second volume, there is a great deal of correspondence with Wallace, Lyell, Hooker, and others.

In 1871, the "Descent of Man" was published, the preparation of which for the press had occupied him for three years. In a letter to Hooker, he says, "I finished the last proofs of my book a few days ago. The work half killed me, and I have not the most remote idea whether the book is worth publishing."

No one can read the "Life" without being impressed with the genuine simplicity of character and humility of mind in Darwin. He is a representative observer and generalizer, a true "man of science." The absorption of all his energies in the single aim of his life was complete; even to the detriment of his aesthetic tastes and his religious nature. From a like cause, doubtless, they suffered in common. But as a naturalist he stands as the most conspicuous figure of recent times, and his name marks the beginning of a new epoch in physical science, and in numerous trains of thought thence derived.

ARTICLE II.—THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND RUSSIAN DISSENT.

The Russian Church and Russian Dissent: Comprising Orthodoxy, Dissent, and Erratic Sects. By ALBERT F. HEARD, formerly Consul-General for Russia at Shanghai. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1887.

THOSE who are interested in social and political questions find in Russia a rich field for their investigations. To them the account of its religious history which is given in the book under review should be most acceptable. For Russia, since its political system is theocratic, is still in that stage of development where the religious and political affairs of a nation influence each other profoundly. In fact the theory of government which Nicholas strove to carry out, and to which Alexander III. has adhered hitherto is best expressed by the motto “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality.” Moreover, one reason why the peasantry are so generally indifferent to the cause of civil liberty is to be found in their reverence for the Tsar as the Vicar of God. Nor is the bitter hatred with which the Nihilists regard the imperial administration lacking in striking religious elements. These men and women, professed atheists though they are, manifest a self-abnegation so admirable and a devotion so fervid that they cannot be said to be without a religion. As M. Leroy-Beaulieu remarked in his brilliant Articles in the *Revue des deux Mondes* last year: “The Russian spirit . . . has kept, unconsciously, the habits, the emotions, the generosities of faith, so that in becoming revolutionary it has, so to speak, only changed its religion.” “To the worship of the invisible has succeeded the worship of what may be touched, and to the promises of the heavenly Jerusalem the visions of an earthly paradise.”

Mr. Heard, as the title of his book indicates, describes the history and present religious condition of the Orthodox Church of Russia, and then passes to a discussion of the origin and growth of dissent, together with the rise of various erratic sects.

The religious condition of large parts of the Russian population is hardly more advanced than was that of the peoples of Western Europe in the fourteenth century. Dark superstitions and pagan survivals still exercise a strange power over the minds of the lower classes. The gods of the woods and the rivers have not yet lost all their devotees. Old heathen divinities masquerade as Christian saints. Elias performs the duties which formerly were the care of the Russian Jupiter. One of the most popular of these canonized deities is St. Nicholas who, some of the people say, will take God's place when He grows old. Nor has sorcery, though driven from Western Europe, yet deserted the huts and fields of Russia. M. Beaulieu tells us that "in the eyes of many a peasant the rites of the church are only the solemnest charms, and her prayers the incantations best adapted to conjure real or imaginary dangers. For him the priest is most of all the depositary of holy formulas and the master of heavenly exorcisms; Christ is, in a manner, merely the mightiest and sweetest of enchanters; God is only the supreme magician." And yet existing beside these superstitions we find a rare combination of qualities essentially Christian. The Russian peasants are among the few who have preserved the idea of sanctity. "The cross is not only about their necks, but it is in their hearts." So strange a mixture of what is best and what is most degrading is in a large measure accounted for by the way in which Christianity was established among them.

Their conversion was after this manner, to use the words of Dr. Schaff, "As soon as the Grand Duke Vladimir [980-1015] was baptized preparations were made for the baptism of his people. The wooden image of Perun (the Russian Jupiter) was dragged at a horse's tail through the country, soundly flogged by all passers by, and finally thrown into the Dniepr. Next, at a given hour, all the people of Kieff, men, women, and children, descended into the river, while the Grand Duke kneeled, and the Christian priests read the prayers from the top of the cliffs on the shore. Nestor, the Russian monk and annalist, thus describes the scene: 'Some stood in the water up to their necks, others up to their breasts, holding their young children in their arms, the priests read the prayers from

the shore, naming at once whole companies by the same name. It was a sight wonderfully curious and beautiful to behold ; and when the people were baptized, each returned to his own home.’’

Nor was this change as superficial as we might be led to suppose. These outward measures were supplemented by the circulation of the Scriptures in the Slavic version of Cyril, missionary to a kindred people dwelling in the northern part of what is now the Austrian empire. Since, however, Russian paganism was not in its decay, but in its formative state it maintained a hold on the people and reappeared under Christian forms. “Polytheism represented their beliefs and Christianity their worship.”

Passing, now, over Mr. Heard’s graphic account of the heroic age of the Russian Church we desire to call attention to the curious and interesting phenomena which are presented by the heretical sects. And in thinking of this subject it is necessary to bear in mind that while the Russian Church in matters of ecclesiastical organization stands midway between the Church of Rome and the various Protestant bodies, in matters of ritual it is far more extreme than the most ardent Romanists. It was this obstinate attachment to what the people believed to be the ancient rites, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries led great numbers of them into bitter antagonism to the Church and even to the government. The circumstances were as follows. Nikon, one of the noblest figures in Russian history, resolved to do away the abuses which, in the times of ignorance and confusion, had crept into the Church, and to purify the ritual from all its superstitious accretions. By the aid of ancient manuscripts he corrected the errors of copyists and restored the old forms of service. But these changes, as well as his rigorous discipline, aroused the distrust and hatred of a large party. What their fathers had taught them they mistook, as do many other better informed people even now, for primitive Christianity. Nikon was overthrown ; although his reforms were finally adopted. In his footsteps, but with too reckless violence, followed Peter the Great. “It is difficult, at the present day,” says Mr. Heard, “to realize the impression this monarch made upon his subjects. It was more

than wonder and amazement ; they were scandalized by his acts. He trampled under foot their most cherished customs and traditions ; openly and brutally assailed ancient and venerable institutions, held in tenderest respect ; . . . enforced regulations which shocked their national prejudices and religious belief ; . . . and dared even raise a sacrilegious hand upon the holy Church." To the minds of many "He was the Anti-christ, whose coming had been foretold by the prophets, and his reign was the reign of Satan."

The Raskolniks, or schismatics, who now sprang into being, were divided into two classes. The first did not deny the sacred character of the Russian Church, nor the validity of its ordinations ; and therefore simply withdrew from it as tainted with heresy. Believing, however, in the necessity of a regularly ordained priesthood they were driven, during the early period of their existence, to employ for the most part priests who had either been expelled from the orthodox body or who had been bribed to leave it. This deplorable state of affairs lasted until nearly the middle of the present century, when through the good offices of certain Polish agitators, who believed that an organized dissenting church would be a useful political weapon, they succeeded in establishing a regular episcopate of their own.

This party, called the "Popovsti," or priest-possessing, is to be distinguished from the "Bezpopovsti," who have no priests. To the minds of these fanatics "the National Church had become heretical, and lost all claim to divine favor and authority, it was accursed, and its ministers were children of the Evil One; any communication with them was a sin, and consecration or ordination by them was pollution." Their subsequent career forms some of the most curious, though by no means the most agreeable, pages of religious history. Many of them "have wandered from Christian truth and ordinary morality, ramifying in every conceivable direction, following out, with inexorable logic, to their most extravagant conclusions the vagaries and eccentricities of individual opinion."

And yet we Americans must not be in haste to cast the first stone. Let us rather judge Russian vagaries only after glancing at some of our own peculiar communities ; at the

Shakers on the one side, and, on the other, at Oneida and Mormondom. We may learn a lesson in charity and humility, also, when we consider that in one of our large divinity schools there were a few years ago, among one hundred students, seventeen sects represented.

Many of the Russian dissenters are distinguished for sobriety, industry, and those quieter virtues which characterize the good citizen of the middle class.

In the limits of a short review it is quite impossible to touch on the varied aspects of the subjects which Mr. Heard so entertainingly and ably discusses. There is not a dull page in his book. Prefixed to it is a list of authorities for the direction of those who wish to study deeper into the subject. We will say in addition that in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for the year 1887, vol. ii., p. 808, seq.; iv., p. 840, seq.; v., p. 821, seq., there is a series of instructive Articles by M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu of the French Academy on the latest phases of Russian religion.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

ARTICLE III.—IS A FOREIGN MISSIONARY IN SPECIAL DANGER OF HERESY?

THIS question will be met, no doubt, with a smile. A few years ago, no one would have thought of asking it. Even now it will be immediately answered, by most Christians, with a prompt negative. But certain considerations bid us beware of returning too hasty an answer. Perhaps the times have changed, in this respect. New and dangerous influences may have come in. There may have been movements tending to turn the minds of missionaries more than of old in heretical directions, or at least towards the study of heretical doctrines.

This last supposition, at least, is not without warrant, as regards the foreign missionaries of the Congregational churches. A certain novel and tentative theory, or hypothesis, had been suggested in Andover Theological Seminary, for the relief of minds that were perplexed as to the fate of the dead, unevangelized heathen; especially in view of the universality of the atonement of Christ, which might be supposed to place, in some way, the whole race in a salvable condition. It was that, before these were finally judged, they might, in the next world, have Christ offered to them.* This being pre-

* That there was a practical as well as a theoretical inducement to "speculate" on this point, will appear by the following extract from a letter of an English Episcopal missionary in Japan :

"One of the things which most of all pains and torments these Japanese is that we teach them the prison of hell is irrevocably shut, so that there is no egress. They grieve over the fate of their departed children, parents and relatives, and often show their grief by tears. They ask us if there is any hope ; any way to free them by prayer from that eternal misery, and I am obliged to answer there is absolutely none. Their grief at this affects and torments them wonderfully, they almost pine away with sorrow. They often ask if God cannot take their father out of hell ? and why their punishment must never have an end ? They do not cease to grieve, and I can hardly restrain my tears at seeing men so dear to my heart suffer such intense pain. Such thoughts have, I imagine, risen in the hearts of missionary teachers of all churches. Again and again, I and my brother missionaries were questioned by people about their dead parents and forefathers who had not heard the gospel. These distressed hearts asked if they could pray for their ancestors. I have had most painful scenes, as I think many American church missionaries have had."

sented, however, not as a dogma to be believed and taught, but only as a possible supposition, it was not generally supposed, that much practical harm could result from the suggestion ; or indeed that it would attract more than a temporary notice. Hence, when it was proposed, in the meetings of the Creed Commission, to insert, in the new creed, language which should necessarily exclude such a hypothesis, one of the three strong objections prevailingly urged against that course was, that it was unwise to give prominence to what, if left unnoticed, might prove to be a limited, transient, and harmless idiosyncrasy. And so the new creed appeared without any contradictory dogma on this point.*

But now came an extraordinary movement from opposers of the theory, which has operated more than all other influences combined, to draw attention to the alleged heresy, and to secure for it wide and sympathetic consideration. Certain brethren, who believe in the "heroic treatment" of every malady, were quite unwilling that this error should be left to die of neglect, or be considered not fundamental if it survived. No, indeed ; it must be publicly stamped out of existence before the on-looking world. There must be a great battle fought over the issue. The suggesters of the new hypothesis must be branded as teachers of pernicious heresy, and be

* The two other objections to inserting the proposed phraseology were these: 1. The suggestion being to adopt Scriptural language, and to declare that all would be judged according "to the deeds done in the body," it was shown, that, as the Apostle personally expected the speedy advent of Christ, and was both addressing and speaking of Christians, when he used those words of "the judgment seat of Christ," even conservative, old-school Biblical critics had conceded, that they could not be used as a proof-text in the case of the unevangelized heathen. The exegetical professor in Hartford Theological Seminary was quoted to this effect. 2. It was urged, that, in case such phraseology were inserted, it would no sooner be printed, than we should all begin to explain it away, so far as any universal application seemed to be intended. For who believes that those dying in infancy, or in idiocy, are to be "judged according to the deeds done in the body"? And the exception thus made would embrace half of the human race. Rather too large an exception for a clause that was to make part of a creed, as a dogmatic affirmation about mankind. The deeper investigation shall go, the more clearly will it appear, that the Creed Commission had abundant reason both for what it did, and for what it omitted to do.

driven from their chairs in ignominy. Andover Theological Seminary must be carried by assault, and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions must be turned into a battery to make a breach in the walls. And so the annual meetings of the Board for the first time resounded with theological war trumpets, signaling the tribes of our Israel to defend the imperilled faith, to crush the forces of incipient heresy, and to use the Board to perform the disfellowshiping act, which the Creed Commission and the ordinary ecclesiastical councils of the denomination had refused to perform. They thus succeeded in diverting the Board from its proper work, and engaging it in theological controversy; so that the Prudential Committee were instructed to refuse all applicants for missionary service, who should be found to hold this "Andover heresy."

The result has been, to fill the land with debate on the question of a possible continued probation for heathen dying without hearing of Christ; to excite inquiry about it, in thousands and tens of thousands of church-members, who previously had never heard of the speculation; to put all theological students, in particular, upon its careful consideration; to compel every missionary and missionary-candidate to take it up; to draw attention to the refusal of one-third of the Board thus to exclude it from toleration; and to create for the "Andover heresy" that powerful sympathy, especially among youthful minds, which always gathers, at the present day, around new views which are harshly assailed. If, in the end, the Andover hypothesis should gain a wide currency, if it should have a success in five years, such as would not ordinarily have attended it in twenty, the result may be attributed to those superserviceable brethren, who have done their best to advertise it to the world. They will have to mourn over the work of their own hands.

And so it may well be that, through such a movement, foreign missionaries are peculiarly in danger from this alleged heresy. It has been forced upon their attention, and, it may be said, upon their sympathetic attention. For, in this nineteenth century, ecclesiastical thunders and mere majority votes of close corporations, on questions of doctrine, inspire little ter-

ror, and the attempt to use them generally results in failure. No vote of the American Board can re-enthrone intolerance among the Congregational Churches; but it may operate to make the condemned error attractive to enthusiastic minds disgusted with illiberality. And this seems to have been the effect in the instance just named.

But there are those who seem to think, that a foreign missionary is always in special danger from heresy; so that precautions need to be taken in his case, which would not be required in the case of a pastor at home. He must be more strictly examined as to his doctrinal belief; he must not be accepted as sound in the faith even if ecclesiastical councils pronounce him such, and extend to him the right hand of denominational fellowship; he must not, in case of idiosyncrasy, be trusted to modifying and corrective influences, to which it would be safe to trust a home missionary, or the pastor of an ordinary parish. Remarks were made at the last meeting of the American Board, and articles have been published in the religious journals, gravely arguing to this effect. The occasion for such statements was, that it appeared that the men rejected by the Board, for foreign missionary work, are welcomed by our churches as pastors. Dr. Pentecost said, in his speech at Springfield: "There are a great many young men, who come out of our theological seminaries, who are approved by our Councils—Councils which see and recognize in those young men deficiencies, not as to education and training, but deficiencies as to their theological views—and they consent to their ordination and advise their installation over churches that are strong and bold, in the belief that the young man being surrounded with the whole consensus of Christian truth, will gradually work himself into line with the truth. But to take that novice, who is deficient in his theological education (belief?), and send him out among the heathen to preach, is quite another thing. . . . I do not think that the cases of the foreign field and of our churches at home are analogous at all." (Report in *Independent*, Oct. 13, 1887.) This idea has been allowed to go almost unchallenged, as if it were self-evident. And then, to crown all, the American Board at Springfield voted down, by fifty-two majority, the following resolution offered by Rev. George P. Fisher, D.D.:

"The missionaries of this Board shall have the same right of private judgment in the interpretation of God's Word, and the same freedom of thought and of speech, as are enjoyed by their ministerial brethren in this country. In the exercise of their rights they should have constant and careful regard to the work of their associates, and to the harmony and effectiveness of the missions in which they labor."

The underlying idea of the opposition to this declaration of equality of ministerial rights, at home and abroad, would seem to be, that, for some reason, it is not safe to trust a foreign missionary in matters of faith, as his brethren are trusted at home; that germs of religious errors, if once admitted, are specially apt to grow to dangerous proportions in his mind; and that thus he would make trouble for his brethren in the mission and with the converts, and, being in distant lands, could only with difficulty and expense be controlled or removed. The latter part of the liability, however, is plainly conditioned on the former; since no special trouble or expense need be feared, if there is no special liability to the embrace of heresy. This fairly raises the question as to the comparative danger of the growth of the seeds of heresy in a foreign missionary, and in a minister at home. Is the danger so much less with a pastor, or a home missionary, that fewer precautions need to be taken by churches, by councils, and by the appointing committees? Let us carefully scrutinize the facts related to this question.

1. Consider the man himself. He is the great factor in the case. The characteristics of his mind and heart will principally determine the result. What are his probable tendencies? What is his comparative strength to resist dangerous error? In reply it may be said, that usually a foreign missionary may be regarded as a Christian of special earnestness and consecration. There is, indeed, but one fundamental principle in Christian work of every kind, and the laborers in all lands must have a common spirit of devotion to the Master. Nevertheless certain fields of labor test this spirit more severely than do others. To say that all the soldiers of an army should love their country is in no wise inconsistent with affirming that the privations and the dangers encountered at certain posts, or in

responding to a call for volunteers on a "forlorn hope," demand and create a special and exalted patriotism. It requires true love to Christ and the souls of men, to be a faithful minister anywhere. To take charge of the weak home-churches, and to follow the settlers to the frontier, is a severe test of this love, and has often indicated the highest fortitude and devotion. But to leave native land, to go to Arctic frosts or to torrid heats, to place continents and oceans between one's self and all one's relatives and friends, to acquire a foreign and difficult language for constant oral and written use, to lose Christian and civilized society and live in a degraded and repulsive community, to be subject oft times to persecution, and to be specially exposed to disease and death requires a heroic Christian spirit, beyond that which many seem to possess. Else why has it been so difficult to recruit the foreign missionary forces? Why has it cost so many, who have offered themselves, a previous struggle, which shook the very depths of their being? Why, when we want to speak of men of eminent consecration, do we repeat the names of Martyn, Judson, Marshman, Carey, Bingham, Goodell, Winslow, Moffat, Livingstone, Pattison, and Hannington? The foreign missionaries stand first on the roll of honor.

But does this personal character have nothing to do with religious belief and with resistance to every tendency to serious error? Did not Jesus teach that it has, when he said: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine?" Will not a special consecration render the soul sensitive to the approaches of false doctrine, and responsive to the attractions of "the things of the spirit of God," which Paul tells us, "are spiritually discerned?" By so much, then, as a foreign missionary may reasonably be supposed to go forth to his field under a stronger pressure and with a more burning spirit of consecration than will usually characterize him who engages in the customary, quiet, routine work of the home field, by that much is he the safer man of the two, in respect to heretical tendencies. He has the purpose and the temperament which will cling naturally and closely to the great evangelical truths, which are the inspiration of the missionary enterprise. The fire of his love and zeal will consume all really antagonistic errors, as the flame does the dry thorns of the Orient.

2. Consider his work. All work reacts on the workman, physically, intellectually, and spiritually. In intellectual and spiritual respects we daily see that certain occupations are more helpful than others to high toned character and to clear-eyed vision of religious truth. They develop the man on every side. They save him from the dryness of mere abstractions. They show the practical influences of truth as well as the logical relations. They add experience to scholarship. They appeal to moral intuitions and religious instincts, and to the softening and corrective effect of direct intercourse with fellow men, and thus check an undue tendency to rely on bare deductions. A pastor is happily situated in this respect. But so is the foreign missionary; in fact peculiarly so. His work is direct in its spiritual bearings. He deals with fundamental religious truth. He exalts the Scriptures, which, as his chief business, he translates and interprets and refers to as the decisive authority on controverted questions of morals and religion. He is daily in a hand to hand fight with anti-Christian error and gigantic forms of sin, and is made to feel that, in such an evil world, Christianity is the only hope of the race. In our recent civil war, it was not the courageous men at the front, baring their breasts to bullet and bayonet, and wearing out strength on the march and in the swamps and the trenches, who felt sympathy with treason, or who doubted whether the government had constitutional power to put it down. That was reserved for comfortably housed and well fed "statesmen," who sat in their libraries, and excogitated ingenious theories of the constitution, favorable to the act of secession, or unfavorable to its forcible prevention. Every blood-bought victory for the Union had a vast power to interpret the Constitution. The work of the foreign missionary is to him a perpetual refutation of skepticism and heresy. Here are lost men with no surrounding influences which have power to regenerate character, or assure of pardon and eternal life. The case is not met by any form of paganism, nor by Mohammedanism, nor by a scientific skepticism or agnosticism. Christ must save, or the world is doomed. This conclusion is not something reached by a logical process in his study, nor yet by a mere recital of texts of scripture; but it is Bible doc-

trine elucidated and enforced by the facts of human life; by an induction that interprets the experience of millions. His work compels him to reject religious error because of its utter impotence.

Now it is this powerful influence of practical Christian work, which is trusted by Councils to correct erratic tendencies of a young candidate for the pastorate, who may not be as clear as is to be desired on some point of evangelical doctrine, but who seems to be truly earnest and devoted. They reason that, when it comes to converting men from sin, and building them up in holy character, amid prevailing worldliness, such a man, engaged in such a work, will soon learn that there is but one gospel of power. But if this be true, in a land of Christian civilization, how much more must it apply to the work carried on in the face of heathen corruption.

Did not Jesus, when he rebuked his disciples for forbidding a man, who was not of their number, to cast out devils in his name, combine character and work into a sufficient vindication of his liberal policy? His words were (*Mark*, ix. 39): "Forbid him not; for there is no man who shall do a miracle in my name that can lightly speak evil of me." A missionary facing and exorcising the devils of heathenism, in Christ's name, is not likely to get into antagonism to the Master, and deny essential truth.

3. Consider his circumstances. This was Dr. Pentecost's plausible point, by which he convinced all who were ready to believe. He had great faith in the conservative power of the circumstances in which a home pastor labors; such as would be the case of a doubting minister in the atmosphere of a "strong and bold" church and an evangelical community. But the young man, who is defective in some doctrinal tenet, by no means always or generally falls into the hands of a church "that can take care of him." He often goes to a small church, which, naturally looks to him for guidance, and which, if he is a man of talent, is usually influenced by him. Even a "strong" church frequently does not avail. One of the preceding speakers at Springfield, on the same side with Dr. Pentecost, and a layman, bewailed the insufficiency of these home restraints, and told of an unsound man, who was settled over

their church—one of the most prominent in the West—and retained his alleged heresy, till he chose to go elsewhere. The corrective influence failed to operate. Dr. Pentecost's reasoning was one-sided. He forgot to mention the circumstances unfavorable to straightening out the young home-heretic; who does not always consort with those strong older brethren, having usually others of his own age and tendency, among whom to seek a congenial companionship. Nor is he always as fraternally received by his seniors, as wisdom would dictate, when he seeks their society. He is often looked upon coldly, and is made to feel that he rests under a cloud of grave suspicion. Thus instead of being drawn toward orthodoxy, he is in danger of being driven away from it. And who does not know how omnipresent and powerful are erroneous tendencies in our country, at the present time? The labored argument or the obvious implication in their favor is in all the literature of the day. It meets this doubting theologian at every turn; when he takes up the latest volumes at the book-store, when he consults the public libraries, when he reads his favorite monthlies and quarterlies, when he goes to hear a popular lecture, when he discusses topics at the literary club, when he peruses his daily newspaper, and even when in the weekly pastor's meeting, or in the local Association, a report is made of the books recently read, and of the latest positions taken by the liberals or by the agnostics. And then there is the popularity often to be gained by a reputation for eccentricity. Thanks to the grace of God, that results are not more often deplorable on the home field than they are!

But having omitted this numerous class of unfavorable home influences, Dr. Pentecost turned to indicate his opinion (omitting again to state the facts) that the foreign missionary, who has some doubt on a certain doctrinal point, is the more likely of the two to make trouble for himself and others; his surroundings being so especially unfavorable. But first, Dr. Pentecost gave a dreadful description of him, as a young man going abroad, "with a half dozen important and fundamental questions largely undecided and undetermined." Who would recognize, in this dismal portrait, the case of two young men, who, after careful examination, were found to be thoroughly

orthodox on all the important and fundamental questions on which our creeds usually express themselves, and who proposed to preach to the living heathen, to whom they asked to be sent, the very same method of salvation as did their brethren? They simply hoped that Christ had some way of offering his salvation to the unevangelized, dead heathen. Now what special peril for or through these young men is to be found in the circumstances of a foreign missionary? These are, for the most part, such as shut out the aforementioned influences, which undermine faith within the limits of Christendom. Not but that something of them comes in, with such literature as reaches the more prominent stations. But it is impossible for the circumstances to be equally unfavorable. And then the practical refutation of any seriously heretical suggestions lies before the missionary in the concrete form of the evil systems which have sprung up in the absence of Christianity. The very limitations, in social, scientific, and literary respects, which are a sore trial to the foreign missionary, withdraw him also from many influences which tend to error; while he can make little selection of friends and associates, being confined to the missionary circle of devout and orthodox ministers.

4. Lastly, consult the testimony of facts, as to the field of comparative danger. There is no perfectly safe place of work. Error may find opportunity to grow anywhere. But where is it most likely to find favorable soil and climate? What say the facts? We are not missionary experts. We can speak on this point only from general impressions made by observation and reading. There have been men of loose views produced on the foreign missionary field, as there have been men of loose lives. Every reader will bethink him of Bishop Colenso and his views of the unhistorical character of the entire Pentateuch; his difficulties having come upon him in the very work of translating the Bible into the Zulu language, and of interpreting it to the people and answering their objections. But it was the Episcopal functions of the missionary and the rareness of such an exception which made it impressive. It may be, that if one had access to the private documents of foreign missionary societies, he would learn that difficulty has often been experienced from a similar source. But it would be hard, one

would suppose, to preserve the secret, and certainly we seldom hear of such facts, and never of any wide-spread evil results.* But how often painful cases of this kind arise at home! They spring up among pastors in the oldest parts of the country. They show themselves in the newer States. We expect them in every section, as a matter of course, from time to time, in this day of rationalistic thought.

It may indeed be said, that men inclined at all towards un-evangelical beliefs are not likely to seek the foreign field, and thus few cases of unsoundness develop there. That is true; but the fact only shows how little danger lies in that direction, and how unnecessary it is to erect our highest walls on that side. If, therefore, one had a personal friend, of beautiful Christian character and genuinely consecrated spirit, but with some idiosyncracy in his theological belief, to which would one counsel him to go, as the safer field for himself and others—to the churches at home, or to the work among the heathen? Judgments would probably differ, but to us it seems that the danger is far greater at home. But if such be the truth, why should the American Board be afraid to act in accordance with it? Why not concede an equal liberty of thought to faithful laborers in all fields? We are filled with grief and shame, that our noble band of foreign missionaries should be placed under special suspicion, and be treated with peculiar distrust.

WM. W. PATTON.

* The *Oberlin Review* gives a case in hand, which points in quite a contrary direction. Speaking of the Oberlin theological graduates (supposed to be more orthodox than those of Andover) it says: "C. D. Tenney, one of the original members of the China Band, who resigned from his position under the American Board because he felt that he could not conscientiously subscribe to their standard of doctrine, is engaged in a work in China which promises to be the most influential and useful ever performed by a foreigner in that great empire. The success with which he organized and conducted a private academy for Chinese boys in Tientsin, the seaport of Pekin, attracted the attention of the Viceroy of China, Li Hung Chang, who has committed to Mr. Tenney the tutorship of his three boys. The influence for good which through them may be exerted can hardly be overestimated. It is expected that within a year the Government will establish an Anglo-Chinese college, and Mr. Tenney has been chosen to be its head. He has the cordial sympathy of the different missionaries in Tientsin, and is a frequent preacher in the Union Church in that place."

ARTICLE IV.—LIMITATIONS OF EVOLUTION IN ETHICAL PROBLEMS.

WHEN Darwinism was first proposed the sagacious mind of Prof. Clifford was quick to observe that the revolutionary influence which it was likely to exercise would be most profound in the sphere of ethics. Nor was he alone, although among the first, in this forecast of its tendencies. Moralists of both schools seem to have simultaneously realized the situation, and in a decade ethical speculation had assumed an activity and a vigor without a parallel for interest and importance since Plato had found it necessary to counteract the destructive influence of the Sophists in the same matters. With the character of this literature that sprung from the controversy we are not concerned: nor have we any disposition at present to take sides. On the contrary, we wish to discuss the limitations of evolution in ethics without raising a dispute about the doctrine itself, unless it is involved in the limits which must be assigned to its application.

In order to accomplish this end it will be necessary to sketch very briefly the psychological development of certain general assumptions and beliefs which are so much affected by evolution. Historical matters will be incidental, and the analysis can be conducted upon the general character of speculation. We may, therefore, summarize the tendencies of evolution in its antagonisms to two classes of preexisting theories, the philosophical and the theological: distinguished here for a particular purpose, and not because they are essentially occupied with different problems. The theological theory opposed by the doctrine is that of man's distinct and independent creation: the philosophical theory opposed by it is that of certain "intuitive" and "universal" moral conceptions. The setting which these views gave the problem will appear in the course of the discussion. At present it suffices to know from what point the examination must begin. And hence we must ascertain why and how evolution has so much affected ethical problems.

The assumptions of English thought in ethics have been much influenced by circumstances which it is important to mention, because they illustrate an error into which both schools of philosophy have fallen. The intellectual forces which seem to have permeated the English mind and to have paralyzed its later efforts to meet dangerous tendencies are the practice of its law, the ethical philosophy of Hobbes, and the psychological philosophy of Locke. Had it shaken itself free from the shackles of a false method involved in these systems it would have saved much painful controversy, and the shock given to ethics would have been less violent. In the first place, Hobbes traced the ultimate authority of right to the law of the state, practically substituting it for the *voluntas Dei* of scholasticism. But in doing so he simply restored in another form the favorite maxim of the sophists, "the law of custom" (*νόμος ἐθεος*), and, although an absolutist in politics himself, prepared the way for Rousseau's *contrat social*. This last is only the democratic application of Hobbes' principle. It makes right and wrong conventional, purely empirical and changeable with circumstances. Such a view of the question coincided admirably with the practice of common law which is not only a changeable expression of moral ideas, but is also the most accessible and the most practical criterion of right and wrong to which the ordinary mind can appeal. Hobbes set up as a theoretical basis of ethical conceptions what had been a practical recourse for them without raising the question whether there was a deeper reason for common law and custom. But the spirit and example of such a view, in entire harmony with his whole philosophy, requires us to seek the ground of ethical principles in *positive* institutions. Now, Locke's psychology and philosophy are the lineal descendant of this position, and only carry this doctrine into the theory of knowledge. He demands that the test of all original and necessary conceptions shall be their "universal" acceptance, the universality of their actual belief by men and a necessity of their occurrence like that of sensation. All other conceptions are contingent upon experience. Both schools of philosophy, the empirical and the "intuitive," accepted this method but differed in regard to the nature of the facts which it supplied. Again, conceptions inherited and

transmitted from the Platonic system made "universality" the criterion of *validity* for knowledge. Ideas which were not "universal," but which were peculiar to individual experience were not regarded as objectively valid. These were called "empirical." The associations and implications of this conception were, therefore, calculated to discredit the authority of ideas which were "acquired by experience," and which were not "universal." Every reduction of the ideas contained in the last category was a conquest for the former, and hence when Locke assigned an "empirical" origin to all our "complex ideas," among them the most irresistible and inexpugnable of our conceptions, he implied, consciously or unconsciously on his part, that their authority was weakened. Validity, being assumed to depend upon "intuitive" origin and "universal" acceptance, was by supposition impaired if the idea turned out to be "empirical" and of a conventional character. Now evolution, more particularly in comparative psychology and sociology, has confirmed to a great extent the claims of Lockian philosophy; namely, that many conceptions previously assumed to be "universal," especially moral ideas, were not so. It will be very clear from this why the doctrine is so much associated with destructive tendencies in ethics.

There is another important psychological development of philosophic thought which shows why the doctrine of evolution has created so much apprehension and controversy. It comes from the long-standing antithesis between the ideas of "nature" and of God. The stoics undertook to found ethics upon the "law of nature" (*νόμος φύσεως*) as opposed to the "law of custom" (*νόμος ἐθεος*) of the Sophists, the former fixed in the constitution of things, and the latter conventional. Their ethical doctrine in this respect as well as its antagonism to epicureanism, and their conception of the universal brotherhood of man, in spite of their materialistic pantheism in metaphysics, harmonized very readily with Christianity. The latter corrected their pantheistic position by substituting theism, and then construing the "law of nature" as the law of God. That is, Christianity identified them in the higher sense, so that either could be appealed to more or less interchangeably as a criterion for moral law, with the proviso always that the law of

God should be the ultimate tribunal for decision when it was necessary to interpret the purpose of "nature." We see there is latent here the antithesis between the *natural* and the *supernatural*, which was so sharply drawn by Christianity. But its full significance was not generally appreciated, or if appreciated, was not a general source of speculative difficulties until after the revival of learning when scientific conceptions came rapidly into prominence. In the meantime the stoical conception had passed over into the *jus naturae* of Roman law, and became widely distributed and accepted as a political and ethical norm. But whether clear or obscure, the human mind in its jurisprudence and its ethics became accustomed to regard the conception as the ultimate basis of its distinction between right and wrong. Conformity to the "law of nature" was synonymous with moral obligation. In this way the conception remained the common heritage of philosophic thought, one of those petrifications of human experience and civilization which will hardly bear disturbance or criticism without endangering the fabric of society and its institutions, merely because, if once discredited, a reaction could supplant it only with the conception of conventionalism. On the other hand, as soon as the antithesis between "nature" and God is assumed, or the distinction between the natural and the supernatural consciously affirmed, the idea of "nature" reverts immediately to the conception of mechanical causation, or its equivalent, the invariable sequence of phenomena. The storm lay brewing in mediæval philosophy until the Renaissance, when that event threw upon Europe the literature and philosophy of Greece to begin a systematic and persistent assault upon the sphere of the supernatural. Copernican astronomy, Newtonian gravitation, and lastly Darwinian evolution, the latter doing for time what the others had done for space, are simply a continuation and extension of this influence for restricting the supernatural, until there seems to be no hope of retaining it at all, except after the manner of Carlyle's "Natural Supernaturalism." The effect of all this has been to turn the attention and associations away from the idea of God to that of "nature" without subjecting the last to that critical examination which philosophy is ultimately forced to undertake. But connected as science and philosophy

were with the phenomena of the physical universe, the conception, "law of nature," passed at once from the sphere of jurisprudence and ethics, where it was associated with the injunctions of a supreme power, into an expression to denote the mechanical and invariable regularity of physical sequence, a conception utterly devoid of any ethical import, although it might not in the economy of the universe be opposed to it. It became, however, the representative of impersonal causation, the embodiment of a remorseless exercise of power. Hence it remains to the human mind, when viewing the phenomena of the physical world, as the type of an indiscriminating and impartial exhibition of mere force, performing its evolutions without respect to any ideal ends, intellectual or moral, which constitute the postulates of ethics. The "law of nature" is thus not a command, but a fact: the metamorphosis of the Greek Fate. It means nothing but the uniformity of causation. For this very reason it was well calculated to supply the want felt in the impersonal character and interests of science, which caught up the conception of invariable physical "law" as the best expression of opposition to irregularity and caprice. It was the only possible resource for obtaining a systematic view and explanation of phenomena upon which we would base our expectations for the future, and our understanding of the present and the past. In this way the phrase "law of nature" obtains a purely scientific as opposed to an ethical import. But at the same time human thought pays the penalty of the confusion which inevitably accompanies the association of two distinct conceptions in the same term, especially when its speculative interests have been identified with them. Hence, although the scientific has become the dominant conception of the case, the mind has not lost sight of the implications transmitted from the spheres of law and ethics, and we have the psychological anomaly of seeking conformity to the "law of nature," on the one hand, as the basis of conduct, and on the other, of being forced to acknowledge that no criterion whatever for distinguishing right and wrong can be furnished in the scientific conception of it. The uniformity of physical phenomena and sequence contain no injunctions which we do not read into them from a moral law otherwise obtained. It will be evident from

this, therefore, why evolution, founded as it is upon a mechanical conception of things awakens scepticism as to its ability to reconstruct ethics. By the very terms of its data, the "law of nature," it excludes every distinction which is essential to an ethical postulate, and hence, however true it may be scientifically, as a causal explanation of the origin, it does not solve the problem concerning the truth and validity of moral conceptions. Of this again. For the present we are satisfied with having ascertained how the question was psychologically developed.

It is possible to limit the right of evolution to interfere with ethical problems by maintaining its incompatibility with moral responsibility and the freedom of the will, facts which we may assert upon other than historical evidence: we may accuse it of being a mechanical and materialistic philosophy: we may insist upon its inability to develop conscience, or the sense of duty, from the sense of pleasure and pain: we may make the best use of the contradictions and disagreement among its supporters: we may urge that it is too vague and ill-defined to accept it without qualifications that impair its value and efficiency: we might even urge with some its inadequacy in the sphere of natural phenomena to supply the sole cause of their existence. Indeed these are the customary modes of attack upon it. In all such objections we should be assaulting the truth of the doctrine itself. But in our present discussion we shall utterly disregard all such considerations, and shall grant, at least for the sake of argument, that evolution has been successful in making out its case regarding these questions. We shall not join issue with it upon them. On the contrary, we shall "imitate the valor of those ancient knights who offered to joust with their antagonists and give them the advantage of sun and wind." We accept the doctrine in its historical aspects without qualification, so far as the present problem is concerned. Moreover, we shall use the term "evolution" in its most comprehensive sense, the sense in which all are agreed that it can be applied, and which includes all that relates to the ethical problem. This is, that all structures and functions are the embodiment with modifications of antecedent phenomena more or less like them, and represent in nature a perfectly continuous series of phenomenal changes, and that all additional elements of a

complex organism in later periods are but modifications of simpler and preëxisting forms. Its characteristic idea is the *origin* of all organic beings and functions, or their genetic explanation in simpler forms of kindred phenomena. In this view of the case, which all would admit, and some would supplement by special principles to account for the process itself, we omit to assume or to determine whether it is natural or supernatural. We want only to ascertain the broadest field to which it may be applied, and to accept it in the sense which its most radical supporters adopt while demanding the reconstruction of ethics upon its basis. In their admission its postulates are the origin of things in antecedent existences, and their explanation by the "readjustment of matter and motion," or by "natural selection," and the "survival of the fittest." It is with these assumptions that we have to measure its capacity to deal with and to affect ethical problems.

It is important to remind the worshipers of evolution, as the "open sesame" of all mysteries, that we shall require them either to admit the limitations of their doctrine, or to give up certain moral conceptions which the theory of evolution does not supply, and for which there is no warrant in the universal solvent of physical causation and the "law of nature." We shall see whether evolutionists ever display any real willingness to accept the latter alternative. Its inadequacy to provide any system of ethics ought to be evident to the merest tyro in philosophie thought. It may discover the origin of that which we have, but its maximum and laws cannot be applied without reducing civilization to chaos again. The whole principle upon which evolution is founded is in direct antithesis to what human society from its very origin has made the basis of justice and morality.

The "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest" afford a very poor spectacle of virtue when we look into the phenomena of animal existence. The strong are the victors and the weak are the victims: no respect is paid to the law of mercy or of justice. It is not merit that insures its proper reward, and demerit punishment. It may be the reverse. The "survival of the fittest" may represent only the success of the individual who is bad and strong enough to disregard the rights of others. Indeed the maxim of "nature" seems to be that others have no

rights that the stronger are bound to respect, and the application of such a maxim in the physical world only reveals the melancholy fact that the service of power will not discriminate between the survival of good and of evil. Mere force will ally itself as readily to the protection of evil as of the good, and be as successful in the one as in the other. There is nothing in the nature of physical force and its applications to guarantee its allegiance to the cause of the right. Its interests are not necessarily identified with goodness because it may be a means for making the right effective. It has no inherent tendency to diminish the amount of moral wrong in life. On the contrary, so far as its affinities are concerned, its impartial administration and protection may leave to "evil an abiding root in the system of the universe not less awfully exempt from change than the mysterious foundations of God." To give it any ethical value or import at all there must be something to direct its operation and to transmit or apply its efficiency to fruitful instead of destructive ends. The theory of evolution effectually removes all our fine sentiment about "nature," lovely enough to the eye of poetry; but science goes behind the scenes and rudely discovers the illusion which has colored history with a beauty it did not possess. It shows our ancestors right, and Tennyson wrong in his judgments:

The past will always win
A glory from its being far,
And orb into the perfect star
We saw not when we moved therein.

If we can only have the courage to look into its fierce alembic we shall see that the doctrine of evolution presents us only with a remorseless and merciless display of physical force, a scene of perpetual carnage where innocence and weakness are sacrificed to gratify the greedy maw of power: Kronos devouring his own children. Pity and sympathy are an exceptional relief to the monotony of universal cruelty and serve only to heighten the contrast between the actual triumphs of the strong and the rights of the innocent to protection. "Might makes right" is the only maxim which we can draw from the example of "nature" if we consider nothing but the "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest." Is this the basis

upon which we are to reconstruct ethics? Is this the gospel of evolution to the 19th century? As a matter of fact, every time that we perform an act of humanity we violate "the law of nature" and the maxim of evolution: we refuse to be guided by it.

These facts are important because they enable us to see where the enthusiasm for evolution arises; namely, in its explanatory power, and to see how ineffective it must be for controlling and satisfying the mental craving for means to vindicate moral aspirations and ideals. It is true that the larger number of scientific inquirers in the present generation get all their inspiration from evolution, and its power to gratify the curiosity for causes. They can talk of nothing else, and when they imagine it harmless they are never able to separate from their emotional enthusiasm about it, traditional and inherited conceptions which are really no part of the doctrine itself and which begin to relax their hold upon the mind, as soon as this is discovered. Heredity, natural selection, environment, the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest, etc., are flung about with the most reckless ignorance of what they signify in the moral world, and as if they only solved and did not create problems. As a fact, evolution creates more problems than it solves. Some one has remarked that each age has its idol, its special object of interest, its "hobby." Now it is theology, now it is literature, now it is art, again it is politics, and again it is science. Within these fields it may be some particular theory which disturbs the equilibrium of previous conceptions and throws the importance of all others into the shade. It is at present the doctrine of evolution, fast acquiring that universal idolatry from scientific minds which resembles in extent its real application to the physical universe. "Great is Diana of the Ephesians," is the shout as of old against which all moral earnestness has to contend. Diana may be a very respectable object in a museum, and may satisfy the instincts of Demetrius. But some of us have a reverence for more than a doctrine which is only a modification of ancestor worship can supply us. *Vox scientiae* is not necessarily the *vox Dei* to us. The triumphs of several centuries have inspired science with that confident dogmatism which construes criticism of its defects

and exposure of its limitations as blasphemy against the most high and puissant pope of empirical knowledge. It is as intolerant of scepticism, although it began in it, as a more venerable institution had been of heresy. Fortunately it burns nobody, and yet its usurping disposition would appropriate to itself the right to dictate all the terms of human knowledge, and stifle the veneration that looks upward instead of downward for the conditions of ethics; which concentrates its efforts upon the ideal not yet attained rather than stoop to the idolatry of polyps. "There is a fixed connection," says Taine, "between what a man admires and what he is." If he can find no enthusiasm except in what is below him the law of evolution itself will force him to degenerate. It is the ideal, the unattained hope and *ought*, which is the condition of all intellectual and moral progress.

Nor must this spirit of criticism be construed as a wish to refute evolution. We are engaging in no such efforts. We merely remonstrate against its assumption of supreme and exclusive authority over human thought. Some attitude of caution and warning needs to be urged in order to check the tendency of men to extend their sympathies to the maxim that "might makes right." If evolution has no other gospel to proclaim, the attempt to produce ethics from it, and to obtain exclusive guidance from the "laws of nature," can issue only in something worse than Caesarism in politics, and persecution in religion. We do not deny that power has an important place in social and ethical systems. It is not to be wholly condemned. It is even essential where evil is to be overcome. But it is the means of making ethics effective, not of constituting it. This the benighted evolutionist can never be gotten to see. Might is indispensable to enforcing the right where evil has to be averted, but it does not constitute that which it is employed to realize. It has first to obtain its legitimacy from the sanctifying influence of right. These are simply truisms, but none are more ignored by evolution, and none can avail so much to restrict the sphere of its importance and application. The genesis of phenomena is not the only problem in which the human mind is interested. Its origin does not decide for us the value which we assign a fact. We require a distinct method for each

of these ends. It is one thing to decide *what* a phenomenon is, and what it means for us: but it is quite another to decide *how* it came into existence.

But the most important facts which exhibit the limitations of evolution in ethical problems are its exclusively historical method and its object to determine the purely efficient causes of phenomena. These are two features which describe an impassable chasm between evolution and the proper office of ethics. It is quite true that all our ethical conceptions have an origin, and we may grant without dispute that they have been developed in precisely the way Darwin, Spencer, and evolutionists generally would have us believe. We need not contest this for our present purpose. But moral philosophy has something more to do than to find when man first manifested certain so-called moral ideas. This is a very insignificant and comparatively easy part of its problem. It has the more difficult and much more important task of determining the character and value of those ideas after we have gotten them. It must either know what they are in their nature before it investigates their causal origin by the evolutionistic method, or it must apply a distinct method to decide their validity and imperativeness after it has found the circumstances under which they first appeared. Evolution is disqualified from solving the last problem because it explains the origin of the true and the false, the right and wrong upon precisely the same principle. It merely accounts for facts and does not need to inquire whether they are morally legitimate or not. All that its method can do is to tell us *how* moral ideas came into existence, not whether they are valid or not.

This is conclusive for proving the great difference between the historical and moral sciences. The former are defined by the sphere of facts, the latter by the sphere of ideals; the former have to do with *what is*, the latter with *what ought to be*; the former explains past achievements, the latter enjoins the pursuit of future improvement; the former have to do with the *causes* of things to satisfy intellectual curiosity, the latter with *ends* which are to be the imperative objects of conscience, or the sense of duty. If these functions are not distinct and if their exercise is not determined and accompanied

by distinct methods, then there can be no distinction between history and ethics, no difference between the historical causes of phenomena and the character of their contents. No more effective consideration can be presented against the usurpations of evolution than just this inability to validate and promulgate moral ideals. The best that it can furnish as a maxim for conduct, the right of the strong is not even an approximation to the ideal. On the contrary, it is the very antithesis of it, and even when it possesses an incidental legitimacy from a fortunate coincidence with right, it is a dangerous instrument to trust implicitly. For in actual experience its affinities are as great for moral obliquity as for equity, perhaps greater. Indeed almost the only hostility which has difficulty in meeting is the domination of mere power. Hence the theory of evolution can provide no ethics. Its expectations come from confusing the means of making the right effective with the fact of right itself.

We may put this difference between the questions of origin and validity in another way. Evolution assumes that progress has been achieved in the course of history: otherwise there is nothing but a sequence of phenomena, one conditioning another without any advance in character upon what is antecedent. If there is no advance upon the past forms of structure and function, of ideas and conduct, there are no differences which call for an explanation in simpler and earlier forces. In that case there is nothing to *develop*. We have only a perpetual succession of the same phenomena, change without increment. Hence evolution has to assume the general character and contents of progress before it undertakes to deduce its origin, or the circumstances under which the first steps of advance were made. It has to start with the fact of superior moral ideas already given whose value the postulate of progress must assume without awaiting the issue of investigation by development. A very different method, therefore, from the historical has to be applied for the determination of this fact. The theory is consequently in a dilemma regarding the matter. If it knows nothing about the character of its data until the issue of its inquiry, it has nothing to develop and no reason to ask a philosophic question. On the other hand, if the character

and contents of the data are antecedently known the most important question for ethics is decided before its investigation begins.

The secret of the confusion lies in the double signification of the term "origin," which no one seems to have observed. This distinction to be mentioned ought, perhaps, to have been drawn before separating the questions of origin and validity. But we can only rely upon retrospective habits to throw light upon the discussion as it has proceeded, and perhaps remove the confusion best by first having conducted the argument as if there had been none. Now evolution never undertakes to define explicitly what it means to do when ascertaining the "origin" of moral conceptions. It is readily observed from its attempts that it wants to find out when and how the sense of duty and obligation came into existence. Hence the evolution of moral conceptions endeavors to show that they "originated" from the experience of pleasure and pain; that we would never have had those conceptions but for certain pleasures which we desired to enjoy, and certain pains which we wished to avoid. They may have been expressed in the form of some individual or tribal interest. But in all cases the end in view was supposed to be determined by the pleasure or pain accompanying the act or prohibition. After making a position of this kind quite clear by illustrations of indisputable force in common experience, it was at once concluded that the conceptions of right and wrong, the sense of duty and oughtness, were only modifications of the idea of pleasure and pain, or as Herbert Spencer would have it, "transfigured self-interest." But right here we interpose a *distinguo*. Not to say anything about surrendering the point at issue in the controversy by admitting the qualification "transfigured," we call attention to the fact that we cannot conclude from the *causa efficiens* to the *causa materialis* of ethical conceptions. This is precisely what the evolutionist does when he supposes that he has dissolved conscience into a calculus of hedonistic motives, because he has shown the invariable influence of pleasure and pain in determining conduct, or our ideas of it. We must make this clear.

We may admit that ethical conceptions "originate" from the experience of pleasure and pain, if we mean by that

"origin," that such experiences are merely the efficient causes of those ideas, because in such a view, the two phenomena would sustain the same relation to each other as a stimulus and the act of perception, or the rays of light and the picture they produce upon a sensitive plate. They act, therefore, as conditions for awakening some other psychological function which has as characteristic qualities of its own as the sense of pleasure and pain compared with their efficient causes. The evolutionistic doctrine of the "relativity of pleasure and pain" shows this. For if "pleasure increases life" and "pain decreases" it they are but indices of ends beyond them instead of being absolute ends themselves, besides being subject to the valuation which another power imposes upon them. But if we mean by "originating from pleasure and pain" that such experience constitutes the nature of duty or moral conceptions, we demur at once to the supposition that it is proved merely because its historical antecedents were experiences of pleasure and pain. The necessity of admitting them to be "transfigured" confirms the validity of such an interposition. What "transfigured" them? It could be nothing but a psychological conception which would determine the moral worth either of a given pleasure, or of some end of which that pleasure is an index, if we can assume that the conceptions "pleasure" and "pain" are unequivocal in their import, which in fact they are not. In both cases there is a power to estimate the value of an experience, or of an end which is itself not necessarily constituted by that experience. The pleasure, or pain is only an occasion for its display, or the efficient cause for its activity. The ideas of right and wrong represent, in this view, distinct psychological functions from pleasure and pain, and are concerned with the worth of these phenomena, involving a larger range of mental faculty and experience than the individual "reflex of impeded and unimpeded energy," as pleasure and pain are usually regarded. It is precisely for this reason that there can be variations in the moral perceptions of different individuals. On no other supposition would there be a difference of moral character and judgment between men. The material cause of moral conceptions; that is, the qualities which constitute them are the expression of the moral nature itself, "transfiguring"

a pleasure, if such be the case, by reflecting upon it a quality which it does not have as pleasure, considered as a reflex: or determining some ideal end in reference to which any experience of pleasure and pain must be estimated.

This can be made more forcible, perhaps, by an illustration. The vibrations of light are the efficient, but not the material, cause of a visual sensation. We never would have a normal sensation of color without them. Take them away and no sensation exists. They are as indispensable conditions to the sensation as ever pleasure and pain can be supposed to be for moral conceptions. But so far are they from being a part of the sensation, or of our knowledge of it, that it is not till very late in the development of civilization that we come to know anything about them, and even then they remain largely a probable hypothesis. The character of the sensation is determined by the nature of the subject of which it is a modification. It is constituted by the activity of the sensorium, although it is conditioned externally by the phenomena mentioned. The sensation, of course, "originates" in one sense from the external cause. But this is only its *historical* origin from an efficient cause: it does not contain or produce the character of that which it conditions. In another sense, the sensation has a *psychological* origin. Its material cause is what the subject makes it; that is, the nature of the subject's reaction in response to the stimulus makes the sensation *what* it is, although it is not the sole cause *that* it should exist.

Now, although pleasure and pain do not sustain in all particulars the same relation to moral ideas that etherial vibrations sustain to visual sensations, there is enough resemblance to justify the comparison. The analogy fails only in the fact that both terms are subjective in the former case. Hence we could better have compared the phenomenon with the relation of sensation to intellectual conceptions, or sympathetic knowledge. But our principle could be made clearer in the illustration we have chosen. We have only to modify it slightly in order to apply it to the matter in hand. Take the relation of sensation to higher knowledge. It is merely the occasion for calling into activity the intellectual functions which give it meaning and significance. While in one sense it may be the matter of

knowledge, it is in another only the efficient cause of it. It is not the condition of intellectual activity at all. But it does not constitute that function and hence cannot be the material cause of the significance which intellectual activity assigns it, or constructs upon the occasion of it. Now pleasure and pain may sustain the same relation to the moral functions of the mind. They may be the stimulus for their activity and hence the indices of what they do, but do not constitute the nature of their activity, or exhaust the qualities of their product. They are efficient only in arousing the moral faculty into action, but do not supply the material nature or conditions of that which the moral idea represents, the sense of duty. The same experience of pleasure or pain in different persons may be the efficient cause of two very different conceptions of value as applied to them, or to an end, the character of the last being borrowed or constructed from the material activity of the moral ideal which reflects its coloring upon every experience according as it approximates or recedes from it.

In this way we may do something to remove the difficulties which beset both parties in the discussion of the problem and at the same time limit the method and conclusions of evolution to the purely historical question regarding the "origin" of our *particular* moral conceptions, while the more important function of ethical inquiry will be applied to determine their *nature, worth, and validity*. The method here is not historical and genetic: but it is psychological and inductive to ascertain the conformity of a particular moral idea, having claims to that quality, to a principle and to rational experience. Otherwise we have no alternative to resolving the sense of duty into pleasure and pain, a procedure which so violates every clear and spontaneous conception we form of it, that even the evolutionist has to qualify it with a transfiguration. To leave utility unqualified by the moral character which the mind assigns, or may assign it in making its attainment obligatory, or to consider pleasure and pain without estimating their value, or the value of the end of which they are indices, is only to explain away every characteristic by which the conceptions of right and wrong obtain dignity, obligation, and authority. The imperative to pursue even a pleasure, or to avoid a pain, is the

added quality of a moral nature to the contents of the pleasure or pain. To attempt the resolution of the imperative into this experience is only to deny it to be what it is, or to affirm that the mind is not able to distinguish between a duty and a pleasure while it can decide between the values of different kinds of pleasure, and pain. It is merely to reduce the conception 'I ought' into 'I may, if I want,' an attempt which will meet with very little success or approval. "To say that the conscience is but the compressed contents of an inherited calculus of the agreeable and the serviceable, is no better than for one who had been color-blind, to insist that the red which he has gained is nothing but his familiar green with some queer mask. It cannot be denied that the sense of right has earned its separate name, by appearing to those who have it and speak of it to one another essentially different from the desires of pleasure, from the perceptions of related means and ends, and from coercive fear. Why not, therefore, frankly leave it its proper place as a new differentiation of voluntary activity. Why pretend, against all fact, that it is homogeneous with self-interest, instead of accepting it as the key to a moral order of cognition and system of relations, supplementing the previous sentient and intellectual and affectional experience? Unless we so accept it, we are driven to the unsatisfactory task of *explaining away* the characteristics of our nature which are admitted to lie on the meridian of their culmination; of plucking off the mask of Divine authority from duty, and of human freedom from responsibility; of cancelling obligation except in the vaguer sense, 'If you want to walk you are "bound" to move your legs: of interpreting altruistic claims as transfigured self-concern; and of reducing moral law from ultimate to instrumental; so that whatever of higher tone and more ideal aspect is superinduced upon the sentient and instinctive foundation comes to be regarded as a species of rhetorical exaggeration and æsthetic witchery, by which we are *tricked* into serving one another and forgetting our self-love. For my part, I object to be led blindfold, through the cunning of nature, into sham sacrifices and heroisms, even though they should land me in a real heaven; much more, when I find that they replace me among 'appetising' creatures, with only the added knowledge that I am a dupe into the bargain."

But it is not necessary to limit the inquiry to the question whether moral conceptions are or are not modifications of the desire for pleasure and of aversion to pain. It is true that this is the most generic form which the discussion can take, and is made crucial by some philosophers: hence if we can vindicate the possibility that pleasurable and painful experiences are the efficient, but not the material causes of moral ideas, we have the case proved for all conceivable incidents of human experience. It would seem that the sense of duty and sacrifice, and indeed all altruistic sentiments, were decisive proof of the matter, because so far from being a desire for personal pleasure to the agent, they may and often do mean only pain for him, and no compensation of a so-called higher pleasure appears to take its place. But our problem does not require us to insist upon this view of the case. Suppose we grant that the sense of duty is only a preferred pleasure as compared with any other experience which is possible at the time and which might be either a pain, or a less degree of pleasure. Our general argument will not be altered on this account, because the problem may be directed to the *nature of the conduct*, which is to be regarded moral, rather than to the *reasons for our knowing it to be such*. Hence it will only have a different application. While evolution and its method may determine the latter, and how the idea "originated," they will not decide the character of the conduct which depends upon the uniformity of sequence and has its moral value *per se* before as well as after it is known. The test of its character, therefore, will be an induction into its uniformity as a "law of nature" related to any approved or disapproved end, and not an investigation of the historical causes which produced our knowledge of it. The former is an essential element in the ethical problem, and is not even approached by the method of evolution. Hence we shall insist that evolution is concerned with the efficient causes, subjective and objective, which condition the appearance of a judgment about the value of any given act, or course of conduct, but neither constitute the material character of that idea, nor affect its psychological value by making it a mere contingency of the particular circumstances under which it originated, nor determine the moral nature of the conduct which thus becomes the object of the idea. To

illustrate this we take up the most general moral conceptions at hand: e. g., veracity, respect for person and property, chastity, benevolence, and their opposites, lying, murder, theft, etc.

When and how did they originate? What historical and social circumstances, and what psychological experiences conditioned the recognition of one set as right, and the other as wrong. Evolution may answer these questions by pointing out certain primitive social conditions and certain phenomena of pleasure and pain as the reason for the existence of moral ideas, and it will also show at the same time that they are far from having been always and everywhere recognized. For instance, some races pride themselves in their skill at deception, and never suspect it a wrong. Hence, when any people come to regard it wrong, special causes determine their belief. But had the act no moral character before it was thought to have it? Does its ethical nature depend upon the causes for our knowing it as such? Do those causes either constitute the character of the conduct, or prove the validity of our knowledge regarding it?

On the contrary, the value of the newly discovered course of conduct is derived psychologically from the perception of its relation to an ideal end already existing, it may be pleasure or it may be duty, and not historically from the circumstances which incited the activity of moral functions. Respect for property may have originated in the historical sense from self-interest; that is, on a certain occasion an individual or a tribe may have found that self-interest made it prudent to respect the rights of property and to condemn theft. But this does not prove that the act has the moral character of selfishness afterward, when it is respected altruistically *because of the rights of others*: nor does it prove that we ought to abandon it when the motive of self-interest becomes suspected. It is not merely a question of knowledge and motives, nor of their "origin," but it is a question of the nature of the act and the validity of our conceptions when they have once appeared. The conformity of an act to our interest is one thing, and the interest may have occasioned our perception of the relation between the act and the end to be realized. But the annunciation of this conduct as a universal moral law, and the enforcement of it as obligatory is another fact which is not involved

in its historical causes, nor justified by them. Veracity is not a virtue because we discovered it on a certain occasion, nor because it served our interest at a particular time; but because of the right of others to know the truth, and because of its conformity to some ideal end which cannot be realized without it. If this end be a pleasure or an interest instead of anything supposed to be higher, the argument is not altered. For our power to declare it a virtue for all time depends upon its uniform relation to an end, upon its being a law of things, or expressing it, and not upon the contingency of its "origin." Besides also it has its character affected, if not determined, by the *rights* of others, and so the circumstances of its actual historical genesis will not bespeak its validity as a "universal law." When others have no right to know the truth, as in the case of the robber, the murderer, the sick and the insane, and when it contributes nothing to some other valuable end than itself, it may cease to be a virtue. So with the moral qualities of all other acts and conceptions. They are not derived from our knowing them, indispensable as our knowledge may be for determining the extent of moral responsibility; but from their uniform relation to some approved or disapproved end, a relation that is not determined by the historical origin of our knowledge concerning them, but by the method which determines the validity of any scientific conception; namely, induction and experience, if we are empiricists; or rational and moral insight interpreting experience, if we are transcendentalists. The validity of our belief about wages, about the nature and use of money, about the right to vote, about the evil of intemperance, about the value of courage, etc., does not depend upon our knowing how it "originated," but upon our knowing the relations of these objects of belief in the nature of things. Evolution can only furnish the former and it is absolutely silent on the latter. As a matter of fact we may be entirely ignorant of the historical origin of our beliefs in the investigation and determination of their validity whose method has to be assumed and applied before any valid conclusion can be reached in regard to the question of genesis. The validity of all truth cannot be held in suspense and abeyance until its origin has been determined; for in that case we

could come to no certain conclusion about its origin. Now it is with the character of conduct and of moral conceptions for us at present and in all civilized states with which ethics is principally occupied, and only in a subordinate way with the question of genesis. Evolution by its own pretensions is concerned with the latter problem, and when it is successful in ascertaining the conditions under which a given moral idea primitively appeared it does not and cannot on that account pronounce upon its imperative character for us. We must ascertain in addition whether it has universal application. The method for deciding this will be the same as that by which we endeavor to show slavery to be wrong, and not that by which we show when and how it first came to be practiced. It is the method of determining its present relation to a recognized moral end and its binding character upon all rational beings.

J. H. HYSLOP.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

CLASSICAL AND PHILOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF YALE UNIVERSITY.

March 6, 1888, Mr. J. E. Whitney presented a paper on a

RECENTLY RECOVERED ALLEGORY IN THE FIRST BOOK OF THE FAËRIE QUEENE.

In 1521 Pope Leo X. rewarded Henry VIII. for his able defence of the Roman Catholic Church by conferring upon him the title of Defender of the Faith, and all Christians were commanded to address him by this title. A dozen years later Henry VIII. had become the enemy of the Romanish church and the champion and defender of the Protestant faith. The title of Defender of the Faith as it was variously understood by papist and protestant seems to have furnished Spenser with material for an allegory which runs through each adventure of the Red Cross Knight in the first book of the Faërie Queene, and is carried out with considerable detail. Its main points are about as follows : The R. C. K. is identified with St. George of England, representing the nation or its line of sovereigns. His shield of faith is emphasized particularly in the first fourteen lines of the poem, and in each of his several combats its symbolic use is noticeable. From the first, the R. C. K. is a champion of Una or truth, but Una is veiled : So at first England saw the cause of truth in the church of Rome only. After the tempest of the Reformation has driven the R. C. K. and Una into the wood of error, where all Christians were for a time, Archimago, or papal intrigue, persuades the R. C. K. to believe in the utter foulness of Una or the reformed faith and he deserts her. After this, the defender of faith conquers Sans-foy or the defender of faithlessness, and in all sincerity of purpose he becomes the champion of Fidessa, not knowing that she is Duessa, or the false faith of the Romish Church. Each adventure thereafter is a new trial of the Knight's faith. It is not until he is strengthened by Fidelia that he is fitted to fulfill his mission.

By overcoming the great dragon he frees England from papal power, and in his betrothal to Una is typified the complete adoption of the true church in England.

Mr. H. F. Roberts presented a communication on the

ATHENIAN WILL.

The will was unknown in the primitive Aryan Societies; children possessed property in common with their fathers, and at their death came naturally into the possession of it. The family, not the individual, was the unit; dead ancestors were worshiped, and common sacrifices were offered at their graves. A passionate desire was felt that the family line be kept unbroken and that these offerings be continued. In order that this might be done, a childless man was permitted to adopt into his family a child of another stock; this was the germ of testamentary power. It was developed independently among the Greeks, the Hindoos, and the Romans, and differed in each: among the Hindoos the religious element predominates, the right to make a will being co-incident with adoption; the Romans developed the pure will; the Athenian will occupied a middle ground.

Permission to execute a will was first granted at Athens by the law of Solon, B. C. 594, and was restricted to the childless. In practice this restriction was not observed: legacies were left to others and especially to the sanctuaries; but sons could not be disinherited by will, and there is but one case on record where the son did not receive at least one-half of the father's property. Besides disposing of property, wills frequently contained provisions in regard to the marriage and dowry of the wife and daughters of the deceased, the liberation of slaves, and directions in regard to funerals. The wills were sealed with the testator's private seal and deposited with a relative, a friend, or sometimes the Archon. Witnesses were usually present at the depositing of wills but generally did not know their contents. Sometimes two or more copies were made and deposited with different persons, to prevent the production of forged or altered wills. All claimants to property by will were obliged to make formal claim before the Archon, accompanied by a deposit equal in value to one-fifth of the amount claimed. The opportunities for the production of forged wills were greater, the claims of relatives were regarded as stronger, and consequently the will was held in less esteem in Athens than it is with us to-day.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CLUB.

During the last two years there has been a marked increase of the interest in philosophical studies at Yale. The undergraduate electives in Physiological Psychology and the History of Philosophy have been well attended, and in the Graduate department the various courses offered have attracted an unusually large number of students from different parts of the country, several of whom are studying with reference to the degree of Ph.D. Glancing at the list of courses in philosophy designed for graduate students, we find the following open for 1887-1888.

With Ex-President Porter, a course in Ethics, including special questions in the theory of knowledge and in the relations of Ethics to Political Economy; attention is also given to the scientific grounds of Theism.

Professor Ladd conducts a course in which Schopenhauer's work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, is read in an English translation, and discussed in lectures by the Professor and in special papers combined with general remarks on the part of the students.

He also reads Kant with a few advanced students, taking up Max Müller's translation of the *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, and reading also Kant's works on Ethics, including the Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals.

Professor Ladd also delivers a University lecture every Wednesday afternoon on the Philosophy of Religion, with some introductory lectures on the Encyclopædia of Philosophy. The dictated portions of Lotze's lectures—which Professor Ladd has recently translated in a number of small volumes—are used as the basis of the discussion.

Graduate students are also free to enter the classes of Professors Harris and Russell of the Divinity School, who lecture on Theism and the Philosophy of Religion.

The class in Schopenhauer is a remarkable one from the fact that it is largely made up of men from the West and elsewhere who have been out of college life for some years, and many of whom have had special training in metaphysical studies. As a consequence of this, the papers and free discussions in the class are unusually interesting as well as profitable. Schopenhauer's work—being a philosophy of Life rather than a philosophy of Mind—besides inquiring into abstract metaphysics, touches upon nearly all the

great questions in aesthetics and practical philosophy, affording room for both skirmishing and hand-to-hand combat on all subjects of this nature.

The college year opened with so many men engaged in the study of philosophy and with the interest so manifest, that it was deemed advisable to found a Philosophical Club. Starting with so favorable auspices, the club has been thus far one of the most lively and flourishing in the University. The meetings are held every other Tuesday evening. Professor Ladd presides as President of the club. After miscellaneous business is transacted, a paper is read prepared either by some member of the club, or by some one invited from outside its membership. At the conclusion of the reading of the essay, the whole subject is thrown open to the club for questions, remarks and general discussion.

A word more as to the history of the club. It was organized Sept. 26, 1887, at which meeting a constitution was adopted. In addition to the election of a President and Secretary, a committee of three on Program was chosen, whose duty it is to procure papers for the regular meetings. The club was organized with eight members: it now numbers over twenty. A glance at the subjects which have been treated in special papers may be interesting.

Oct. 11. "Modern Phases of Idealism," by Professor George B. Stevens.

Oct. 25. "The Methods of Stoicism," by Mr. H. S. Gale.

Nov. 8. "Science and the Supernatural," by Professor A. J. DuBois.

Nov. 22. "Review of I. H. Fichte's Anthropologie," by Mr. G. W. Stibitz.

Dec. 7. "Some Conflicts in the History of Philosophy," by Mr. J. H. Tufts.

Jan. 10. "The Character of Berkeley's Idealism," by Mr. W. L. Phelps.

Jan. 24. "Hume's Theory of Causation," by Mr. R. Nakashima.

Feb. 7. "The Realism of Sir William Hamilton," by Mr. E. C. Sage.

Feb. 28. "The Prophets and the Law, or Religion Become Self-Conscious," by Mr. A. B. Curtis.

March 6. "Hypnotism," by Mr. J. F. Morse.

March 20. "'Nature' and 'Natural' in Aristotle's Politics," by Mr. W. I. Hunt.

The club is doing fairly good work, and its special value lies in the fact that it affords opportunity for the freest discussion of questions which could not conveniently be brought up in the class-room.

WILLIAM LYON PHELPS.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB.

The Political Science Club met March 9. Mr. Harlow Gale read a paper on the Origin of Holidays, in which it was shown that our stimuli expend their force in three channels, viz: thought, feeling, and involuntary or reflex action. Owing to the small capacity of primitive man's thought and feeling, the larger part of his stimuli found vent in expressive muscular action. Thus we find the primitive holiday began as demonstrations and feasts occasioned by unusual domestic events, e. g., deaths, births, marriages, circumcisions, and extended with political growth and coherence to tribal affairs as death and inauguration of chief, arrival of distinguished visitors, treaties, preparation for war, victories, inter-tribal contests and festivals. A hunting and agricultural stage of life led to game and harvest feasts of various sorts. All these may be called occasional festivals or holidays. The transition to periodic days came with stronger minds and memories when certain phases of the moon or seasons of the year prompted by suggestion a renewal of demonstrations which had originally occurred at the previous phase or season. The new and full moons were widely greeted with feasting, and a subdivision of a lunation into new, quarter, and full moons gave the magic number seven and the permanent periodic holiday which became the Hebrew Sabbath and our Sunday. Long before this, however, the supervision of most periodic and some occasional holidays had through accretion of religious ceremonies fallen into the hands of the priesthood, from whom they again tend to separate. By the increasing capacity of man's quiet feeling and myriad-sided thought, holidays in their evolution have come to lose their calendar individuality, so that for a few persons now, and for the future more and more, *every day* by being lived in all the depth of its thought and feeling will continue the essential life of holidays.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

RECENT WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

PHILOSOPHY OF THEISM.*—The ground covered in this book corresponds closely to that mapped out by Lotze in his “Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion;” and all the more important positions as well as the shaping of the argument are apparently modeled after this German thinker. The purpose of the author is defined as not being “a philosophical deduction or speculative construction of religion, nor yet a genetic unfolding of religion;” “we aim,” says he, “only to analyze and understand the data of the religious consciousness” (p. 7.) His conclusion is stated in almost the opening words of the Preface. “Kant pointed out,” according to Prof. Bowne, “that the ontological argument properly proves nothing, and that the cosmological and the design argument depend on the ontological.” This is certainly a far stronger statement of the necessities of scepticism, to which the critical examination of the speculative proofs for the object of all religion leads, than we can admit to be true. But with the much modified form in which the conclusion is immediately expressed—namely, the argument (that is for the Being of God) “is not demonstrative,” and yet theistic faith is based upon essentially the same postulate which “underlies our entire mental life”—we believe the most thoughtful and fair-minded theists will agree.

Professor Bowne’s argument concerns the nature of the “World-Ground,” or that unconditioned Being to which all the world of experience must be referred as its ultimate explanation and source. In separate chapters he maintains that this Being is a “unitary Being,” is intelligent, personal, ethical, and has the various metaphysical attributes which theistic theology is wont to ascribe to God. He also discusses the relations of God and the world, and of theism and life. His treatment of the teleological

* *Philosophy of Theism*; by BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1887.

argument (p. 91 f.) is somewhat acute. The discussion of the "metaphysical attributes of the World-Ground," where he follows Lotze with particular closeness, is perhaps the best thing in the entire book.

The discussion of Professor Bowne is characterized by two very grave faults which will certainly, to a large extent, weaken its force with all those thoughtful readers whom the author of a treatise on the rational grounds of religion ought most to desire to win. It is full of strong and epigrammatic but indiscriminating statements which will not bear the test of a calm and careful scrutiny. Surely it is a very inadequate representation of the case to declare that Kant's criticism of the theistic argument "rests on two pillars: (1) the traditional prejudice of intellectualism that demonstration is necessary to belief, and (2) the Kantian principle that the forms and ideals of the reason have no objective significance;" and that "both of these views are outgrown." In dealing with the views of monism and of agnosticism,—to give other examples—Professor Bowne, as a rule, makes the impression of one intentionally belittling and understating the argument of his opponents, instead of adequately appreciating and fairly meeting them. Nor is this method confined to atheists and agnostics alone. Even the ancient and respectable popular dogma of creation out of nothing is spoken of as though it represented God as taking "a mass of nothing and making something out of it." (See p. 179.) Now the relation in which the "unitary Being," whom philosophy calls the Absolute and faith calls God, stands to the world and all in it, forms the most profound and dangerous problem of philosophy or theology. And when Professor Bowne holds things to be "phases or modifications" (p. 56) of God and regards their connection with Him as equivalent to existence in "a unitary being which posits and maintains them in their mutual relations," he is himself making use of language so dubious and equivocal in its meaning that he should, in fairness, not interpret the language of others without honest and painstaking discrimination.

The second grave fault of this treatise on the philosophy of religion is its perpetually recurring flippancy. Of unseemly flippancy there are many instances; and some of them, considering the character of Professor Bowne's themes, are pitiful enough. Thus we are told "that nature when driven out with a fork always comes running back is a discovery of ancient date (p. vi. f.)

Certain speculations were wont to embarrass the modest critic by the view they gave him of a "state of paradisiacal innocence;" but "happily, there is an advance toward clothing and a right mind." (p. viii.) Certain objections to the theistic argument are declared "infantile in the extreme;" they properly belong to the "paleontological period of speculation." (p. 27.) The "stuff-like nature" of God ! is referred to. We believe it to be difficult to express the repugnance which a refined, reflective mind finds to a style such as this when employed in the treatment of themes of philosophy and religion. Until the author definitely abandons it he cannot hope to speak effectively to the best audience upon these themes.

GIORDANO BRUNO.*—The strongly individual character, stormy life, and tragic fate of this Nolan, have of late been studied with an increased interest. Of the several books which have treated him and his writings as their theme, none is at once so entertaining and helpful for the reader of English as the one made the subject of this notice. For a biography of a philosopher of three centuries ago it has drawn to itself everywhere somewhat remarkable attention. This is not by any means wholly due to the epoch-making character of Bruno's thought; for we doubt whether he can properly be spoken of—though this is the claim of his biographer in the opening sentence of the book—as "marking out a new era in philosophy." It was not so much the impression made by the thought, much less by anything like a philosophic system, of the Nolan, as the sentimental interest attaching itself to his fight for philosophic freedom, and to his ill treatment at the hands of the Church, which made him powerful in history.

The time of Bruno's development was one of strong mental excitement on the part of a few leading minds. He was born eight years after the death of Copernicus and thirteen years before the birth of Bacon. In his case, as in the case of every one of those thinkers who were to usher in the "modern era" of philosophy, the tie between the physical theories of Copernicus and the newly forming metaphysical and theological principles was close and vital. In his case also, as in the case of many of his collaborators, the influence of reaction against Jesuitical training was powerful. In Nola was one of the two most ancient and

* *Life of Giordano Bruno, the Nolan*; by I. FRITH, revised by Professor Morris Carriere. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1887.

flourishing of the convents of the Jesuits; the other was at La Flèche in France—the place where Descartes was prepared, by reaction and repulsion, for his career as a thinker.

Bruno had a fiery, untamed nature, and a poetic mind. The latter shapes the expression of his philosophical reflections; the former dictates its occasions and renders inevitable its results. Such a mind was fitted to be influenced by Plato; and, in fact, the Greek poet philosopher had no small influence upon the philosophy of the Nolan. In the neo-Platonic doctrine of the World-Soul as "God and Nature at the same time, for in God Nature lives, and moves and has its being," Bruno discovered that new and higher unity which he sought. Carried away by his discovery, "he declared war against antiquity, broke through all the traditions of the schools, and called upon men to behold in Nature the image and superscription of its maker."

The story of Bruno's arrest, trial, and execution is a stirring and pathetic story. His denunciation to the Father Inquisitor in Venice, by a pupil, Mocenigo, whom he had offended, was an act of gross treachery. On the 29th of May, 1592, Bruno appeared before the tribunal,—"a small man, meagre, with a small black beard, about forty years of age" (as described by Cioto.) His nature appears in the fact that when admonished to speak the truth, he cried of his own accord: "I will speak the truth. Many times I have been threatened with this Holy Office, and I have always taken the threat for a jest, for I am one ready to give an account of myself." It has been thought that his promise of amendment and desire to be reconciled with the Church might have secured the sparing of his life, if the scene of the trial had not been removed from Venice to Rome. But on the 27th of February, 1593, he entered the prisons of the Inquisition in the Eternal City. Bruno had little mercy to expect from the "ravenging wolf" which he had publicly apostrophised as having its seat at Rome. He received no mercy. When he heard the hypocritical words in which the Church required the temporal power to proceed "most mercifully and without shedding of blood," he said menacingly: "It may be you fear more to deliver judgment upon me than I fear judgment." He refused to receive priestly consolation, protesting that he died a "martyr and willingly."

This most interesting and instructive biography is not written for students of philosophy alone. From it the intelligent reader may gain much information concerning not only the philosopher

of Nola, but also concerning the times in which he lived, and concerning the obstacles through which the modern free philosophic thought fought its way into that position of supremacy from which it will never again be cast down.

ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION.*—"This work of Professor Baldwin," says Dr. Wm. T. Harris in introducing it, "is intended by its author expressly for elementary classes." It attempts to give, as is explained in the Preface, "subject-lessons or mind-lessons" for youths of the age found in the third year of the high-school course and the second year of the normal-school course. Every student of the science of Psychology will admit that the task which the author sets before him is no easy one. It requires the best efforts of a trained psychologist who is also an adept in the methods of teaching pupils of the age addressed. The latter of these requisitions it is only fair to assume that Principal Baldwin possesses in a high degree. But he certainly is not a trained psychologist. It could not be expected, then, that he should produce a satisfactory work upon this science, to whatever age addressed. Primmers on chemistry must be written by chemists; primmers on psychology require the best efforts of psychologists.

The lack of thorough acquaintance with psychology is shown by this book in no respect more convincingly than by the way it deals with its definitions. These are almost without exception faulty and sure to mislead the young pupil. Attention is said to be "the capability to concentrate, prolong, and change effort." Memory is "the power to reproduce our acquisitions just as we experienced them." Phantasy is "the power to represent spontaneously our experiences in new forms which seem to be realities." Conscience is "the power to feel ethical emotions in view of right." The effort is obviously made to frame clear and simple definitions; but to attain this is the supreme triumph of science when it becomes didactic. It does not belong to the teacher who has not first mastered his science.

The frequent use of diagrams is intended to be an attractive and helpful feature of the work. The judicious and limited use of diagrams may without doubt be made helpful in teaching psychology to young pupils. The Herbartian psychology and

* *A text-book for High Schools, Normal Schools, etc.; by JOSEPH BALDWIN.* International Educational Series. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1887.

"mathematical" psychology, so-called, have—as is well known—made a considerable use of symbols in assisting the discussion of the more difficult problems of the relations of ideas. But Principal Baldwin's diagrams are by no means always well selected or well constructed. To insert Luy's diagram of the sensorimotor processes of cerebral activity and teach it as physiological truth to young pupils is about as bad judgment as could well be shown. Nor can we regard the various trees which exhibit how the soul is divided up into "powers," and the various pyramids of "powers" with will at the apex, as anything better than "poor stuff" for beginners in psychology. In general, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the International Education Series would have done far better to have taken some treatise like President D. J. Hill's "*Elements of Psychology*" for its text-book on that subject.

THE EDUCATION OF MAN.*—A hearty welcome and wide circulation should await the translation of this work by the great educational reformer Froebel. Its mastery should be required of all students and teachers of the Kindergarten in this country. One great evil of this method of early education, as it has hitherto been practiced here, has been the almost complete lack of knowledge, on the part of the practitioners, of the philosophical principles on which it was based by its originator. Dr. Harris, in the Editor's Preface, calls attention to the fact that Froebel, unlike Pestalozzi, was a philosopher. His supreme principle was that of "inner connection." As Froebel himself expresses the thought, man is formed for faith in, and insight into, the all-controlling law which is "necessarily based on an all-pervading, energetic, living, self-conscious, and hence eternal Unity. . . . This unity is God. . . . Education consists in leading man, as a thinking, intelligent being, growing into self-consciousness, to a pure and unsullied conscious and free representation of the inner law of Divine Unity, and in teaching him ways and means thereto."

The work of the translator appears to be fairly well done. Most of the annotations are judicious and likely to prove helpful to the ordinary teacher or student of the science and art of teaching. We make an exception, however, in respect of those pas-

* *The Education of Man*; by FRIEDRICH FROEBEL, translated from the German and annotated by W. N. Hailmann. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1887.

sages, in the early part of the work, in which Superintendent Hailmann has so highly praised Herbert Spencer for his "essential agreement" with Froebel. We believe the parallels between the two writers on education to be almost wholly superficial. With Froebel the Divine, self-conscious Personality, (we might almost say the doctrine of the Triune God), the spiritual authority of Jesus, and the free, spiritual communion of men with the Divine, are fundamental and controlling ideas. His system is avowedly an ethical and religious ideal. It would be difficult indeed to prove the same true of Mr. Spencer.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE AND OF HISTORY.*—This volume is the second of Professor Morris' contributions to the Griggs series of philosophical classics,—the earlier one being an exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It seems to us that the later is also the superior piece of work; for it is both more sympathetic and more closely confined to the effort at interpretation. Even here, however, we are by no means confident that the interpretation has always been exact;—for example, Hegel's "Absolute Spirit" is the equivalent of Professor Morris' "self-conscious and self-revealing God."

The two treatises of Hegel, with an exposition of which this volume presents us, are of unequal merit and value for an understanding of his philosophical system. As we are informed in a note, p. 110, "Hegel's 'Philosophy of the State' ends with a number of paragraphs on the logic (philosophy) of Universal History, which is also the subject of the independent work, to the exposition of which the remainder of this volume is devoted." But the philosophy of State has been, not unjustly, reproached for regarding "the practical and political conditions existing in Prussia in 1821" as the perfect work to date of civic reason. On the contrary, the philosophy of history is generally, and justly, regarded as containing so mature an epitome of Hegel's philosophical system that it may be used with almost equal profit, both as a review of the entire system and as an introduction to it. The exposition of this work of Hegel by so competent a scholar as Professor Morris is therefore a very valuable help to the study of the German thinkers.

* *An Exposition*; by GEORGE S. MORRIS, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co. 1887.

MISCELLANEOUS.

WHAT IS THE BIBLE.*—In this volume of 491 pages Professor Ladd has condensed and put in popular form the substance of his elaborate work “The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture.” It will be reserved for a future number of the *New Englander* to discuss its merits. Let it suffice for the present to say that it is designed and is well fitted to aid candid students of the English Bible in their efforts at a more intelligent comprehension of it. It will be found of inestimable value to pastors who are seriously perplexed with the problem how to adjust their Biblical teachings to the results of modern Biblical investigation, and to the great number of intelligent lay members of our churches who are studying the Bible in our Sunday Schools; and especially to enterprising Sunday School teachers, who are anxious to give their pupils a more comprehensive and valid conception of the character of the Bible than is commonly given. All material that is not adapted to the wants of such readers is ruled out. The book is easily intelligible to the average student of the Bible. The style is clear and strong, and its spirit eminently Christian. It meets a real and urgent want in our churches, and will without doubt have wide circulation. The publishers have secured an attractive page and appropriate form for the book, and have offered it at a price that puts it within easy reach of all who desire it.

GREEK LIFE AND THOUGHT.†—Professor Mahaffy’s “Social Life in Greece from Homer to Menander” was a distinct addition to our means of understanding and appreciating Greek life. Its deserved popularity has prepared a large circle of readers to welcome the sequel to that work which will introduce them to an important but comparatively unknown period of Greek history. The school books following the lead of Grote practically stop with the death of Alexander. The history from that point to the Roman Conquest where Finlay begins, a period of nearly two hundred years, is extremely vague and obscure to most readers, notwithstanding the light which has been cast upon its great political movement by Prof. Freeman’s “History of Federal Gov-

* *What is the Bible?* An inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testament in the light of Modern Biblical Study. By GEO. T. LADD, D.D., Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. New York: Chas. Scribner’s Sons, 1888.

† *Greek Life and Thought from the age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest.* By J. P. MAHAFFY. New York: Macmillan & Co.

ernment." Prof. Mahaffy in a characteristic passage in his introduction comments on this ill-judged neglect as follows: "The Conquests of Alexander, the high culture of Seleucia and Alexandria, the profound thinking of the later schools, the deep learning, the splendid art, the multiform politics of Hellenism—all this is shut out from the school boy, as forming no part of the Greek he is to know, and none of it is ever again taken up—with the exception of Theocritus—by the superannuated school boy who holds fellowships and masterships at English Colleges, and regards himself as a perfectly trained Greek scholar. A man may consider himself, and be considered by the classical English public, an adequate and even distinguished Greek professor, who has never read or even possessed a copy of Strabo, Diodorus, or Polybius, who has never seen the poems of Aratus, Callimachus, or Apollonius, and who does not know a single date in Greek history between the death of Alexander and the battle of Cynoscephalae." Doubtless there is a measure of exaggeration in this, as Prof. Mahaffy is not moderate in his references to that fashionable classical scholarship in England which so highly esteems the mechanical facility of writing Greek and Latin verse. Yet his jibes at pedants agree too closely with Prof. Freeman's for us to assume that the clever but narrow classicist is a character of the past. But the general ignorance of this important period in the history of civilization, Prof. Mahaffy has powerfully contributed to dispel. His "Story of Alexander's Empire" published last year is a brief sketch of the political history of the time and consequently the proper introduction to the present volume. It is difficult to give an idea of the variety of interesting matter comprised in the six hundred pages of "Greek Life and Thought," and impossible to discuss it within the compass of a notice. It will be sufficient to call attention to some of the topics. Among the interesting features of the time was the increase of town life so like the influx of population to the cities in our own day. Prof. Mahaffy says "it seems to have been a sort of religion in those days for every king or dynast to found his own capital." These did not lack for population and there was a marked growth of older towns. In fact we are struck with similarities between that age and our own, and so wide-awake a writer as Prof. Mahaffy does not miss the opportunities for effective comparisons, many of which he has set forth in a very spirited and striking manner. For instance he compares the Roman toleration of the new comedy to the English toleration of French nov-

els; he tells us that philosophers were called in to give consolation as the modern clergymen are; and the economic effects of Alexander's Conquests are shown to have been strikingly like those which followed the discovery and conquest of America. Not the least interesting features of Prof. Mahaffy's work are the vivid and life-like historical portraits which he has drawn of the great men of the time, such as Alexander's successors and Pyrrhus. The Jews and their Hellenistic literature receive considerable attention. The books of the Maccabees are drawn upon to show the attitude of the East toward the rising Roman power and for other side lights upon the time. The book of the son of Sirach (*Ecclesiasticus*), *Ecclesiastes*, and the *Wisdom of Solomon* are discussed and utilized to illustrate three separate stages in the progress of Hellenistic influence over the Jews. *Ecclesiastes* is regarded as the work of a Jew who has been strongly under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy yet who is still Hebrew and Oriental to the heart. The full index and the elaborate chronological table of the period will prove of great convenience to the student.

EDWARD G. BOURNE.

CHADWICK ON THE GOSPEL OF MARK.*—This is the second number of the series issued under the name of the "Expositor's Bible." The plan is to extend the series over the entire Bible, publishing six volumes a year and selling them by subscription at the low rate of \$6.00 for the annual issue. The work is, in no sense, a critical commentary and will add nothing to the outfit of the specialist. It is designed to present in the form of lectures or essays a popular exposition of the meaning and suggestions of the various narratives or teachings. Dean Chadwick's book admirably attains this purpose. It is written in a clear and graphic style and brings the scenes of the Gospel and the words of our Lord vividly before the reader's mind and sets forth the lessons to be drawn from the passages in hand with striking gracefulness and force. The essays which compose the work evince study and thought on every page. They are not careless and superficial because they are rhetorical and popular. This volume, which we have reason to believe, is representative of the character of the series to which it belongs, will serve a useful purpose in the clear

* *The Gospel according to Mark.* By the Rev. G. A. CHADWICK, D.D., Dean of Armagh. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. pp. 446.

and vigorous statement of the content and meaning of Jesus' words and deeds and especially to clergymen, will serve as an aid and example of popular and, yet painstaking and scholarly exposition of Scripture. It is our hope that this series of volumes will do much to stimulate a revival of the well nigh lost art of expository preaching, not in the line of the superficial and haphazard methods of the modern Bible reader, but in the line of logical, genetic treatment based upon scientific interpretation.

GEORGE B. STEVENS.

THE NICENE AND Post-NICENE FATHERS, VOLS. I. AND V.*—A new illustration of the *Unternehmungsgeist*—that spirit for new undertakings—undertakings, it might be added, of a highly useful character, which distinguishes Dr. Schaff, is presented in the series of patristic writings, to be issued under his editorial superintendence. They are to include the principal works of the principal fathers of the Nicene and Post-Nicene eras. The translations have been previously published, in one form or another, in Great Britain; but they are to be reproduced in revised editions and to be accompanied by introductions and expository notes. The 1st volume, which comprises the Confession and the Letters of Agustin, is edited by Dr. Schaff himself. The Prolegomena are from his own pen. In these opening pages a great deal of instructive information respecting the life and works of the prince of the Latin Fathers is clearly presented. Vol. V. is made up of the Anti-Pelagian writings of Agustin. The translation is revised and judiciously and ably edited, in a scholarly spirit, by Professor Warfield. It is a pleasure to commend this series of works to the attention of ministers, and of students, whether lay or clerical. They will be a substantial and highly valuable addition to the literature of Church History.

GEORGE P. FISHER.

KER'S "PSALMS IN HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY."†—This little book is not a commentary on the Psalms, yet it is illustrative of their meaning and application to the human heart in all its experiences. By various incidents gathered from history and

* *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church.* Edited by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., LL.D. New York: The Christian Literature Company.

† *The Psalms in History and Biography.* By REV. JOHN KER, D.D. Robert Carter & Bros.

biography, the author shows what he terms the "intense humanity" of the Psalms; how they have pervaded human life, and asserted their power to comfort the soul in all times of tribulation, and give wisdom to all who look for divine guidance; thus making for themselves a new record in the experience of Christian men and women, who have found in them the humblest expressions of penitence and the highest notes of praise which the human soul can utter. Every pastor will find this little volume helpful in the application of the Psalms to the devotional and practical duties of the Christian life. The book also contains an account of the different metrical versions which have been used in the Reformed churches.

MACDONALD'S "*GOD'S WORDS TO HIS CHILDREN.*"*—Here are twenty-four discourses by Dr. Macdonald, gleaned from various periodicals and volumes containing the work of this famous author and preacher. They cover a great variety of subjects, they are written in a clear and simple style, and are full of plain practical truth. The charm and magnetism of Dr. Macdonald's writings are seen in these sermons. One seldom reads a book containing so large a proportion of Anglo-Saxon words. Of three hundred and forty-seven words on one page taken at random two hundred and seventy-nine are words of one syllable, fifty-five of two syllables, eleven of three, and only two are polysyllabic. The same average would hold throughout the book. Its study is well worth the time of any one who wants to perfect himself in the use of Anglo-Saxon words.

THE FIGHTING VERES.†—This book, whose very title can hardly fail to attract attention, is scarcely less interesting to Americans than to Englishmen. It takes the reader back to the times of the great war for freedom in the Low Countries, in the 16th and 17th centuries, which was so intimately connected with the important events which took place in England itself in the 17th

* *God's Words to His Children.* By GEORGE MACDONALD, LL.D. Funk & Wagnalls.

† *The Fighting Veres.* Lives of Sir Francis Vere, General of the Queen's Forces in the Low Countries, Governor of the Brill and of Portsmouth; and of Sir Horace Vere, General of the English Forces in the Low Countries, Governor of the Brill, Master-General of Ordnance, and Baron Vere of Tilbury. By CLEMENTS R. MARKHAM, author of the "Life of the Great Lord Fairfax." Boston. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1888. Large 8vo. pp. 508. Price \$4.

century. It was in the Low Countries that so many of the men were trained in arms who dared to resist Charles I. in his attempt to destroy the liberties of England, and rule without a parliament. Men who had learned to disregard the fulminations of the once dreaded Pope, and who had stood up against the best soldiers of Spain on many a hard fought field, and had at last seen them skip like lambs before their victorious arms, were little inclined, on their return to England, to submit to the Stuart tyranny. The old fighting blood of these men was stirred once more, as they recognized as by intuition that the contest of the Parliament with the King was in reality the same contest in which they had been so long fighting with Spain, and it was for this reason that they named it the "good old cause."

Mr. Markham says that at the close of the war there was scarcely a man in England who had not either himself served in the Low Countries, or who had not a relation or a neighbor who had. Among all these Englishmen, there was no name more conspicuous than that of the Veres. No less than ten of this family crossed the seas to take part in the war of independence. Five were slain in battle. Two became great generals, and the period of their services corresponds with that of the whole war. "While others came and went, the Veres remained steadfastly at their posts, devoted their lives to the cause, and saw their work completed." It is the story of the career of these two famous men—Sir Francis and Sir Horace Vere—that Mr. Markham has written. Sir Francis Vere is the first great English general in modern history. He founded a school which was further developed by his brother Horace. It was in this school that many of the men were trained who came to this country with the earliest settlers of New England. Miles Standish was a pupil of the Veres. So was Lion Gardiner. So was John Mason, the hero of the Pequot war, and so were many others.

Mr. Markham has called attention to the fact that Mr. Motley, in his valuable history, has inadvertently been led into some grave errors with regard to Sir Francis Vere, which reflect upon his character. After refuting these charges in detail, Mr. Markham adds: "It is curious that Mr. Motley's daughter should since have married a lineal descendant of Sir Francis Vere's sister. Sir William Vernon Harcourt, descended from Frances, sister of Sir Francis Vere, and wife of Sir Robert Harcourt of Nuneham, was married to Elizabeth, daughter of John Lothrop Mot-

ley, in 1876. They have a son Robert, born in 1878, who is grand nephew of Sir Francis Vere and grandson of Mr. Motley. 'Blood is thicker than water,' and if the great historian had been spared longer, he would probably have reconsidered his estimate of Sir Francis Vere. In that case, a different conclusion might confidently have been anticipated, based on the merits alone." The volume is abundantly illustrated with portraits and maps.

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

THE BOOK OF JUBILEES.*—A book written by a Jew of Palestine, at the time of Christ's preaching, or of Paul's, gets from that very fact, a peculiar historical significance. The Book of Jubilees makes just this claim upon our attention. It was probably written without reference to Christianity, but it was a product and expression of the Judaism in the midst of which Christianity arose, and against which it first contended. For the history of New Testament times and for help in New Testament interpretation, it is therefore a source, though not the most important, yet of decided value. The book consists of a reproduction of Genesis and a part of Exodus from the standpoint and in the spirit of later Judaism. By the use that the author makes of the sacred text, by omissions and supplements, by explanation and correction and emphasis, he reveals both the beliefs and the usages of his day. Aside from certain interesting peculiarities, he represents correctly the temper and ideas of Pharisaism. He is a Jew of the narrow type with which Paul makes us familiar. Characteristic marks are his proud national exclusiveness, his scrupulous regard for times and seasons, and his insistence upon the heavenly origin and eternal validity of the law. He represents, it is true, only one of various directions of thought and life in his time, but it is the main direction, and it finally prevailed. Some writings of the age, such as the Parables of Enoch and the Psalms of Solomon, seem to mark steps toward the Gospel, but the Book of Jubilees is a distinct step toward the Talmud. Such, in brief, is the historical character and value of the book which Prof. Schodde has put in our hands.

* *The Book of Jubilees*; Translated from the Ethiopic, by Rev. GEORGE H. SCHODDE, Ph.D., Professor in Capital University, Columbus, Ohio. (Reprinted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of 1886, 1887.) Oberlin, Ohio: E. J. Goodrich. 1888.

In order that we may understand what is here attempted, and decide whether it is well done, it will be necessary to give a somewhat exact account of the form in which the book has reached us. Although written in Hebrew or Aramaic, and first translated into Greek, the book now exists, entire, only in an Ethiopic translation, of which there are three manuscript copies. (1) The Tübingen codex, (T); found in 1844, and translated into German by Dillmann in 1850-51. (2) A copy obtained by d'Abbadie, of Paris, (A). On the basis of T and A, Dillmann published a critical edition of the Ethiopic text, without translation, in 1859. (3) A manuscript in the British Museum, (B), which Dillmann has collated, (1883 ?), but, as he has not published the results, this copy does not come into consideration. In 1861, Ceriani found and published fragments of an old Latin translation, amounting to about one-third of the whole book. Rönsch, in 1874, published a critical edition of these fragments, together with a Latin version, prepared for him by Dillmann, of the corresponding parts of the Ethiopic text. Up to the present, then, the book has been accessible only in a German translation of a single and imperfect manuscript, and in a Latin translation of only one-third of the revised text. Evidently there is a need, not only for the sake of popularization, but for scholarly uses, of an accurate translation of the best Ethiopic text. This is the need that Prof. Schodde has set out to meet. His book aims to be not merely popular, but critical. He wishes "to enable scholars" to make "a careful and patient study of every chapter and verse," to "investigate the book in its whole length, depth, and breadth." This translation is to supersede that of Dillmann, upon which investigation has hitherto been based. Such is its claim. But judged by this standard it must be declared decidedly unsuccessful and inadequate. The following particulars will put this beyond doubt.

1. Dillmann divided the book into chapters, but not into verses. References have therefore usually been made to the volume and page of Ewald's *Jahrbücher* in which the translation appeared. Schodde should have indicated these pages in the margin of his book. This is simply indispensable, for by omitting to do so he has put his edition out of connection with all that has been written upon the book hitherto. The references, for a single example, which Schürer in his History of the Jewish People makes to the Book of Jubilees cannot be found in Schodde's edition.

2. Schodde divides the chapters into verses, a proper thing to

do, but he unaccountably ignores the fact that Rönsch has already made verse-divisions, not only for the Latin third, but, by implication, for a much larger part of the book. Schodde's divisions are independent and introduce a new and vexatious source of confusion.

3. A much more serious fault, and one that makes critical use of this book quite out of the question, is the failure to give the necessary information about the text, and to note alternate readings. It is known that both manuscripts, T and A, are imperfect, and that there is often little ground for deciding between them when they differ. Such being the case all significant variations must be given, and an edition that is without them has no critical value. Schodde not only gives no variants, but does not even suggest that the text which he renders is at any point doubtful. The introduction leads one to infer that Dillmann's text of 1859 has been followed. Now Dillmann's Latin contribution to Rönsch's book appears to be a translation from the same text. It is furnished with full textual notes. Comparison, however, discloses the fact that Schodde very frequently holds to readings which Dillmann has rejected. This means either that Schodde has re-edited Dillmann's text, or that Dillmann, in 1874, had changed his earlier judgment in numerous instances. The latter explanation is more probable. But in any case the Latin represents Dillmann's latest published decisions upon the Ethiopic text, and the readings he prefers deserved at least to have been mentioned if not adopted. Furthermore, the Latin fragments, which stand probably as near as the Ethiopic to the original, frequently offer a better text, and explain what is obscure. (cf. e. g. 20 : 6, 8 [Schod. vv. 5, 7]). They should, of course, in all such cases find mention in notes. Schodde seems to have followed, in these matters, the example of the German translation, which was made when there was but one manuscript, and when the Latin was yet unknown. This utter lack of critical apparatus makes it impossible to use his book for any scholarly purpose.

4. Comparison with Dillmann's Latin leaves little doubt that there are not a few instances of inaccuracy in translation in the book before us, but the discussion of these would lead us too far, and cannot be here undertaken.

5. The editing of the book is inexcusably careless. In 4: 32 we read *fifty-fifth*, for *twenty-fifth*, and similar errors in numbers occur repeatedly. (cf. 3:8, 20:1, 45:12). In 18:18 we find *head*,

for *seed*; in 19:19 *removal* for *renewal*. There are many slips in the numbering of verses. (cf. 6:30, 7:10, 19:8, 21:7, 21:15). In 29:8 the words "and Astaros" have fallen out; and, in 46:13, the words "of Israel." In 20:5 a difficult word has conveniently disappeared. But minor mishaps, such as these, distressing though they are in a book which invites us to "a careful study of every chapter and verse," fade into insignificance in view of a greater and truly appalling calamity,—the omission, evidently by pure accident, of almost the last third of chapter 30. (Latin vv. 19–27, German, vol. iii., p. 38).

In view of these five facts, and especially of the third, the scholarly rank and quality of this book can be easily determined.

It may be added that there are a few notes, very few considering what has been contributed by Jewish and Christian scholars. Many of those given are borrowed from Dillmann, a fact which should have been more clearly indicated. Rönsch's classical work does not appear to have been used in the preparation of this volume. This will seem incredible, but internal evidence suggests it as a plausible supposition.

There is left no room even to enumerate the various questions of interest connected with this ancient book. We can only repeat that for their investigation the volume before us does not furnish the necessary assistance.

F. C. PORTER.

JAMES MARTINEAU'S "STUDY OF RELIGION."*—These two volumes have followed very speedily two volumes of another work by the same author entitled *Types of Ethical Theory*, and are in some sense a continuation and a completion of the same. And yet though presenting on every page the impress of the same brilliant genius, they seem to surpass the earlier series in almost every feature of thought, imagery, and diction. If the two are regarded as one, we doubt whether English philosophical literature, rich and various as it is, can show many treatises which deserve a higher place of honor. Those of our readers who are familiar with the author's earlier critical papers and sermons will recognize the ripened fruits of the same discriminating acuteness and brilliant yet facile eloquence which have distinguished his previ-

* *A Study of Religion*; its sources and contents. By JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D., L.L.D., late Principal of Manchester New College, London. Vols. I. and II. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. New York: Macmillan & Co., 112 Fourth avenue. 1888.

ous less pretentious writings, and will be impressed by the comprehensive grasp with which he has taken hold of the great philosophical or theological questions which at present agitate so sorely the thoughtful men of our times. They will at once admire the clear yet facile diction, the penetrating analysis, and the cogent reasoning which so distinguish Dr. Martineau as a master of the field in every passage at arms to which he challenges his antagonists. Of course he takes his choice as to the positions which he will assume and assail and the methods in which he will make his assaults and defences. The points discussed are few but they are vital. They respect the foundations of religion and yet they are philosophical in their essential nature, while the discussion of these has little to do with ordinary theological polemics, being limited to four comprehensive topics, viz : I. The limits of human intelligence; II. Theism; III. Review of opposing systems; IV. The life to come; each of which is treated in a separate book, under several subordinate divisions.

Under the first title Dr. Martineau discusses the form and conditions of knowledge by a remarkably lucid statement of the salient points of Kant's theory, followed by a sharp criticism of the same in which the singular mastery of the writer over choice and flowing English stands forth in striking relief by contrast with the uncouth and laborious diction of the sage of Koenigsburg. Noticing Schopenhauer in passing, as the emendator of Kant, he next directs his attention to the empirical idealism of Helmholtz and J. Stuart Mill and deals them trenchant blows; blows none the less effective as coming from a former earnest disciple of the physiological and sensuous school. He passes next to the Relativity of Knowledge as defended by Mr. George Grote, then to the doctrine that we know phenomena alone, and finally to the question of the Unknowable as discussed and disposed of by Mr. Herbert Spencer.

Book II. is entitled Theism, and consists of three chapters entitled God as Cause, God as Perfection, and the Unity of God as Both. In the first chapter the nature of force in matter, of activity in spirit, and of purpose in both are discussed at sufficient length and with singular clearness and effect, with no lack of courage in the treatment of the several problems as they rise. In the second chapter God as Perfection is treated, involving the discussion of the moral relations as they respect the Creator and the creature and the connections of the two. Chapter third,

entitled *Unity of God as Cause and God as Perfection*, discusses the various problems that are involved in the existence of evil both natural and moral, and the final issue of the conflict of evil.

Book Third consists of a review of anti-theistic or opposing systems, beginning with Pantheism, which the author discusses in a more than usually intelligible method, avoiding scholastic terminology, as a reaction from Deism, as evolved from Kant's *innere Zweck-mässigkeit*, as approached from opposite paths of entrance, and as contrasted with Theism. In Chapter Second he discusses Determinism and Free Will in their several relations.

Book Fourth discusses the life to come in three chapters, treating respectively of Death in its Physiological Aspect, Death in its Metaphysical Aspect, and Death in its Moral Aspect; or, Vaticinations of the Intellect, of the Conscience, and Vaticinations Unadjusted.

The reader of this table of contents will very readily surmise that the treatise is very unlike an ordinary treatise upon Natural Theology in respect of its themes or its handling of them. Its title, *A Study of Religion*, would seem to imply that it is more or less affiliated with topics that are formally theological or practically religious, whereas it has the least possible to do with either. And yet it is most appropriately so styled in so far as it is a preliminary study of those principles of philosophical truth without which religion as a subjective affection or as objective truth is well-nigh inconceivable. The title might very naturally lead the reader to expect a discussion of religion as a universal phenomena of human nature, whether psychological, historical, or critical, after the prevailing German fashion, whereas it is neither more or less than a critical examination of those philosophical truths which religion assumes and reaffirms. It is called a Study of Religion, and so far as the grounds on which religion is assumed to rest are argued in the light of philosophy, whether these grounds are truths of consciousness or truths of consistency.

What adds greatly to the charm and power of the treatise is the fact that the writer was trained in a different school of philosophy from that to which he now gives his passionate though rational adhesion and to which he was led, in part at least, by the logical necessity of his own religious convictions. Of the changes which he underwent in this transition he has given a modest and yet most interesting sketch in the Preface to his *Types of Ethical Theory*, from which it would appear that he has made

full proof by trial of the strength and plausibility of the philosophy of Mill and Spencer and Bain, which was once his own both as a student and an expounder, and from which he was delivered by his deeper insight into nature both as matter and spirit, and his nobler conceptions of the moral universe and its God. The able criticisms which have proceeded from his pen in controversy with these high priests of materialism, seem to have derived not a little of their pungency and their power from that complete mastery over the theories of the universe and of man which he exemplifies such as nothing can impart so completely as the previous mastery of his own convictions by the theories which his subsequent revision had led him to reject.

We notice also as something quite admirable in its way, the thorough individuality and independence with which he both expounds and restates the German writers whom he criticises, notably in his extended exposition of Kant. While not a few able and well-read English critics of Kant and Hegel are content to *transfer* rather than to *translate* the writers whom they criticise, Dr. Martineau merely prefers to translate them, and therein displays not only his thorough mastery of the principles which he criticises, but his intelligent confidence in the criticisms which he urges against them. While we cannot find it in our hearts to repress the wonder rather than the admiration which the imported dialect often extorts, we confess to a profounder admiration for the genius which Dr. Martineau exhibits or rather for the marvellous facility with which he reproduces Kant in the English vernacular. There is not a little unaffected modesty and perhaps a slight strain of irony in his disclaimer of any attempt to follow the Anglo-Hegelian school in its attempt to manipulate the Hegelian terminology, but it is fully justified by the masterly facility with which he restates and criticises Kant. There is something almost pathetic in the allusion which he makes, in the conclusion of the Preface, to the overpowering numbers of those who affect the materialistic philosophy, and urges the claims of the pieties of the old religion as against the chilling and materialistic creed which in the name of science rejects the elevating spiritualities of faith. Such an appeal comes with an eminent force and propriety from a writer whose theological position is so unique as that of Dr. Martineau.

In the general very cordial laudation which we have given to this admirable treatise we have not cared to express our dissent

or offer our criticisms in respect to some important positions which we cannot accept. We are as little disposed to call attention to any defects of treatment or style. We are content to express the conviction that since the days of S. T. Coleridge perhaps no work of the kind has appeared in the English language of greater significance than Dr. Martineau's *Study of Religion*.

NOAH PORTER.

THE STORY OF THE SARACENS.*—The Story of the Saracens is told in a neat volume of a little over five hundred pages, with about sixty illustrations, among which are outline maps of Damascus and Constantinople, with the surrounding regions, a restoration of Mecca in the seventeenth century, and a table of the genealogy of the Kalifs, from Abu Bekr (632 A.D.) to Radi (934-940). There are also double-page outline maps at the beginning and end of the book, one of the Saracen empire at its greatest extent, in the eighth century of our era, the other of Arabia and the surrounding countries. Besides these, and a good index, the work contains Nöldeke's chronological arrangement of the suras of the Koran ("pronounced Kórān," p. 481), and a chronological table of Saracen history, that of the adjacent nations being placed in a parallel column for comparison. This table extends from the invasion of Hejaz by Abraha, viceroy of the Christian king of Abyssinia in 565, six years before the birth of Mohammed, to the recovery of Constantinople from the Latins by the Greeks in 1261. This latter date is three years after Bagdad was taken by Hulaku, grandson of Jengis Khan, the conqueror who slew the last of the kalifs and sacrificed, "according to the exaggerated accounts long believed, sixteen hundred thousand citizens of the great capital!"

A valuable addition to the work is the "List of Books used in preparing the Story of the Saracens; together with the titles of others of value to the student of the subject," pp. 451-469, with brief notes which enable us to form some idea of the character of most of the authors and of the scope of their works. The list includes the names of almost 240 books in English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic, by 190 authors, from Masudi (in a French translation, however), who died 956 A.D., to the ninth edition of the *Encyclopedie Britannica*.

* *The Story of the Saracens*, from the earliest times to the fall of Bagdad. By ARTHUR GILMAN, M.A., author of "A History of the American People," "The Story of Rome," etc., pp. xvii., 493. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. The Knickerbocker Press.

The author makes no formal division of the history into periods; but from the work, with the accompanying tables, it is not difficult to make out the following:—

I. The Times of Ignorance, down to 565 A. D. Under this head is given an account of the mythology of the Arabs before Mohammed.

II. Mohammed and his successors, at Mecca, Medina, and finally at Kufa. This period extends to the fall of Hasan, son of Ali, and the accession of Moawia, 661 A. D.

III. The Omiades, from 661 to the battle of the Zab, 750 A. D.

IV. The Abbassides, at Bagdad, from 750 to the fall of their capital, 1258 A. D.

From so vast a mass of material the author has perhaps done as well as the nature of the case would allow in making such selections as would give a clear account of the rise, progress, and fall of the Saracen power. The story is too long for detailed review; but his estimate of the character and work of Mohammed cannot fail to be interesting at the present time when attention has been called afresh to the missionary power and value of Islam. The work before us seems to deal fairly both with the man and the system. Thus we read:—

“The reforms that he wrought were relative, not absolute. They raised the standard in Mecca and in all Arabia; but they were lower, if he had only known it, than the perfect law of purity and love which a greater than he had laid down. It was his misfortune not to have seen Christianity in its full brightness, and it has been the misfortune of his followers ever since. . . . No more could have been expected of Mohammed short of the miraculous” (pp. 212, 213). “Many another thinker, without for a moment claiming that he has been the subject of supernatural communications, has nevertheless been entirely unable at times to explain the genesis of his own works, or perhaps even to feel that they proceeded from his own mind; they had been produced after mental throes, often perhaps with physical pains, and when once brought to the light they seemed to their composer like something entirely outside of his own being; they were as fresh and interesting to him as to any one else. Such, in a transcendent degree, was the case with Mohammed” (p. 214).

At the close of the chapter on the religious teaching of Mohammed (“Islam,” pp. 129–137), the author, instead of giving his own opinion, quotes from several authors. Thus from Barthe-

lemy St. Hilaire: "With the exception of Christianity the world can boast no religion that may properly compare with Islam, or that merits even a remote comparison with it." And from Dr. Weil, that Mohammed "must be considered in some sense commissioned by God."

The author makes no attempt to estimate the extent, population, or wealth of the empire of the Saracens. His map would seem to indicate an extent of nearly or quite 5,000,000 square miles, the boundary on the side towards the African desert being of necessity somewhat uncertain. This is for about 715 A. D., and does not include the additional conquests of the Turks, nor the Mohammedan dominion in India, nor the later expansion of Islam in North Africa. Our author estimates the total Mohammedan population of the globe at 180,000,000 (p. 441). A manuscript discovered not very long ago makes the annual revenue of Harun al Rashid about \$55,000,000, and shows that then as now, the East inclined to a silver, the West to a gold standard.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of compressing the work within reasonable limits, one can hardly help wishing that space could have been found for at least a short description of the wonderful language of Arabia, and a sura of the Koran in its native dress. Youthful eyes and ears, for which these Stories of the Nations are largely designed, are always delighted with new forms and sounds, and the Arabic has always been celebrated for beauty of form and sound. Mohammed, honestly disclaiming other miracles, appealed to the Koran as a standing miracle in proof of the truth of his mission; but we may well believe that a part of this miracle lay in the charm of a language which would make even common thoughts resplendent.

The only things which call for unfavorable criticism are occasional misprints, and now and then a hastily constructed sentence, things which do not seriously mar the excellence of the work and can be easily corrected in a subsequent edition. The most important slip is perhaps "Nineveh on the Euphrates" (p. 4); though a valued friend of the writer had (while he lived) a theory, which he supported by very plausible arguments, that Nineveh was really situated on the Euphrates rather than on the Tigris.

The work contains a few specimens of Arabic poetry, one of which, addressed by an outspoken poet to Harun al Rashid ("Aaron the Orthodox"), "on the occasion of one of his pilgrimages," might find a place in a Christian hymn-book:—

" Religion's gems can ne'er adorn
 The flimsy robe by pleasure worn;
 Its feeble texture soon would tear,
 And give those jewels to the air.

" Thrice happy those who seek the abode
 Of peace and pleasure in their God;
 Who spurn the world, its joys despise,
 And grasp at bliss beyond the skies."

WILLABE HASKELL.

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NEW ENGLANDER

AND

YALE REVIEW.

No. CCXVIII.

MAY, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

AFTER the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the states of Germany, more than three hundred in number and ranging from great powers like Austria and Prussia to states a few square miles in extent and with a few hundred subjects, were practically independent, although the Empire to which they owed a nominal allegiance lingered on till the beginning of this century. Germany emerged from the Napoleonic era with the number of its states reduced by mediatisation to thirty-nine, which now that the Empire was no more, possessed the name as well as the substance of sovereignty. The Confederation or league of states, established in 1815 under the presidency of Austria, was far from satisfying the national aspirations which had been quickened by the struggle against Napoleon. The rivalry between the two leading states of the Confederation, Austria and Prussia, had to be settled before satisfactory institutions could be established. It was not until the Prussian victory of Sadowa had excluded Austria from Germany that, under the leadership of Prussia, the North German Confedera-

tion was formed, which after the victory of Sedan and the accession of the South German states, became the German Empire, though without any change in its fundamental principles.

It will thus be seen that there are marked points of resemblance between the history of Germany and that of our own country. After the abolition of the Empire the states were sovereign and as sovereign states established a league, the organ of which was the Diet at Frankfort, just as the American states established the government under the Articles of Confederation in which the sovereignty of the states was expressly recognized. In both cases this loose union was found inadequate and the league was converted into a federal state. The federal state, to which class the United States, Switzerland since 1848, and the German Empire belong, lies midway between a simple state and such a state as Austria-Hungary. Italy was formed by the union of several states, but the states were absorbed in the new kingdom leaving it not a compound but a simple state. Austria-Hungary, at the other extreme of state formation, is not one state but two, united under a common monarch and by mutual obligations voluntarily assumed. The federal state, however, is a real state; but the states by the union of which it has been formed, far from being absorbed in it, retain their individuality and continue to exercise in their own name and by their own authority many of the powers of government.

But while the United States and the German Empire are both federal states, there are between them many points of difference. In our American system the powers of government are divided in such a way that the possession or at least the exercise of any particular power by the United States, excludes its possession or its exercise by the states. Each government acts with perfect freedom and with complete authority on its own side of the line which forms the common boundary of the two jurisdictions. The United States can not prescribe to the states the manner in which they shall exercise their reserved powers. It is because the authority of the states is, within these limits, original and absolute that jurists usually designate it as sovereignty. In Germany also some subjects belong exclusively to the competence of the Empire and others to the competence of

the states ; yet in regard to the greater number of the powers of government an altogether different principle prevails. Even in respect to these subjects the states act in their own name and on their own authority, but their action is regulated by imperial legislation and subject to imperial control. Administration and the making of minor regulations belong to the states, while legislation, at least in so far as it establishes the general principles and modes of action, belongs to the Empire. With the exception of the Imperial Court at Leipzig and the courts of Alsace-Lorraine all the courts are state courts and administer justice in the name of the state, while their officers are appointed by the state government and paid out of the state treasury. But in order to establish uniformity in the administration of justice the Empire has by legislation not only prescribed the organization of the state courts but has also established a system of civil and of criminal procedure. Moreover while in this country the state courts administer as a rule state law, and the federal courts, except where their jurisdiction depends on persons, administer federal law, the Empire has already largely occupied with its legislation the field of criminal law and to a considerable extent also that of civil law. The legislative activity of the Empire especially in this department shows the progress and the direction of centralization and indicates the possibility that, if this tendency should gather strength, the states may become in course of time the administrative districts of a simple state.

Another illustration of this peculiar relation between the Empire and the states is to be found in the subject of citizenship. While in America citizenship is bestowed by the Federal Government, in Germany state citizenship is the primary relation, and whoever is a citizen of a German state is in virtue of that fact a citizen of the Empire. As a result of this it might be supposed that imperial citizenship could be obtained or forfeited on different conditions in different states, and this would be the case if the Empire had not established by legislation the conditions on which state citizenship may be gained and lost.

But perhaps this relation between the Empire and the states is nowhere more clearly brought out than in the military organization. Although the German Empire is a great military

state and has a standing army numbering about four hundred and fifty thousand, yet the Empire has no war department or war minister, and a leading publicist has actually expressed the opinion that there is no imperial army but that what is called the army of the Empire would be more correctly described as the armies of the states which compose the Empire. What formerly were the armies of the states have become contingents in the imperial army, while, at least according to the theory of the Constitution, the right of military administration still belongs to the states. The union of these armies to form one imperial army has been effected by means of three important constitutional provisions. The Emperor is declared commander-in-chief and there has been introduced into the oath which the troops take to their own ruler the pledge of unconditional obedience to his orders. The right to legislate on military subjects belongs to the Empire so that the states must exercise their right of military administration in accordance with imperial laws. Moreover the cost of the army is part of the budget of the Empire. While, however, the right of military administration belongs according to the Constitution to the states, yet in fact all the states except three have entrusted their military administration to Prussia, so that, instead of an imperial war department or as many war departments as there are states, there are four, those of Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria and Würtemberg, all of which conduct military administration according to the laws, subject to the oversight and at the expense of the Empire. The two states last named, but especially the latter, occupy in this, as in other respects, an exceptional position on account of concessions made to them when they became members of the Empire.

The organization of the executive offers another point of contrast between the German Empire and the United States. When the Federal Constitution was formed there were several states so nearly equal in importance that there could be no thought of giving any one of them an exceptional position in the new state. Prussia forms in area and in population considerably more than the half of Germany, while Bavaria, the state next in importance, falls behind it in the ratio of about one to five. It would be incorrect to say that Prussia has absorbed

Germany and that the Empire is merely a larger Prussia, but it was necessary in establishing the Empire to take into consideration the relative importance of the states and, by connecting indissolubly the imperial crown with the crown of Prussia, to obtain for the former a firm support in the might of the Prussian state. Inasmuch then as the imperial dignity is annexed to the crown of Prussia, the laws of Prussia regulating the succession to the Prussian throne regulate indirectly the succession in the Empire and the latter neither is nor can be regulated by imperial laws. But just as the German Empire has no laws of its own regulating the succession, so it has no laws providing for the establishment of a regency. Whether and how a regency shall be established is not a question for the Empire but for Prussia, and whoever as regent wields the authority of the crown of Prussia wields also the imperial authority, which is inseparably united to the Prussian crown. The Emperor as such has no veto power, but as king of Prussia he has seventeen votes in the Federal Council, and fourteen adverse votes in that body are sufficient to prevent any change in the Constitution, while there are many subjects upon which no measure can be adopted unless the votes of Prussia are counted in the affirmative. Prussia has also by right the chairmanship of all the important committees in the Federal Council.

It is often said that in the German Empire the bicameral system prevails, according to which the legislature is divided into two chambers, but this statement is not strictly correct, despite the fact that the Federal Council serves in some respects the purpose of an upper legislative chamber. The position of the Federal Council resembles more closely that of the crown than that of a branch of the legislature. To appreciate its position we must remember that in Europe the crown is not merely the head of the executive department but the embodiment of the state and the organ of its sovereignty. The king, it is true, can no longer make laws without the advice and consent of the representatives of the people, but while the legislature advises and consents, the crown gives the sanction to laws in behalf of the state. This function of giving sanction to laws is performed in the German Empire, not by the Emperor, who is bound to promulgate laws that have been legally enacted, but

by the Federal Council, which is a joint organ with the Emperor of the sovereignty of the Empire. If a legislative measure originates in the Federal Council, which shares with the Reichstag the initiative in legislation, it must, after having passed the Reichstag, be returned to the Federal Council to receive the sanction of that body, without which it would be no more authoritative than the resolutions of a debating society. Nor is it difficult to see why this function should be assigned to the Federal Council rather than to the Emperor, for sovereignty lies, as Bismarck has pointed out, with the totality of the confederate governments. But this does not mean that the rulers of the states as such are even collectively rulers of the Empire. As well might it be asserted that the king of Prussia wields the imperial sceptre as king of Prussia and not as an organ of the Empire. Although made up of the rulers of the states, the Federal Council wields the authority not of the states but of the Empire. It no doubt seemed fitting that the associated rulers should sustain the same relation to the Reichstag, the legislature of the Empire, as each sustained to the legislature of his own state. Hence while the several rulers give the sanction to state laws as the organs of their several states, the Federal Council, the assembly of these associated rulers, gives its sanction to imperial laws as an organ of the Empire. The numerous administrative functions of the Federal Council, especially in the domain of the finances, its authority to decree with the consent of the Emperor the dissolution of the Reichstag, and its sole authority to decree federal execution against a state, are further indications of its position. While in the American Senate the states are equally represented, in the Federal Council representation is unequal, Prussia having seventeen votes out of a total of fifty-eight. The members of the latter body are envoys, and they enjoy in Berlin the privileges usually accorded to ambassadors. Each state has the right to send as many delegates as it has votes, but may send a less number or may even be represented by the delegate of another state, but in any case the delegates cast the entire vote of the state, not according to their own discretion, but according to the instructions which they receive from their government. The Constitution of the Empire provides that

the Chancellor of the Empire shall be president of the Federal Council, but since the Emperor is a member of this body only in his capacity of King of Prussia, the Chancellor must be Prussian delegate in order to gain admission to the body over which he is to preside.

The Imperial Chancellor is appointed by the Emperor and is his sole responsible minister. At least such was his position until experience showed the necessity of modifying this arrangement. When the Chancellor was temporarily incapacitated it was found necessary to empower some one to act for him throughout the whole range of his duties, or, in other words, to appoint a general substitute for the Chancellor; but so great was the burden resting on the Chancellor that it was also found necessary, even where there was no such incapacity, to designate men who should act for him and share his responsibility in certain parts of his work, and accordingly it is now customary that the heads of the more important departments should be partial substitutes for the Chancellor. In neither case is the Chancellor altogether relieved of responsibility, for he is still Chancellor and as such shapes the policy of the government and the general course of the administration, and he has both the right and duty to interfere in order to prevent any deviation from his policy and to keep the administration true to its traditions.

The responsibility of the Chancellor, which is assumed by affixing his counter signature to the decrees of the Emperor, is responsibility to the Reichstag, but it is something altogether different from ministerial responsibility as it is understood in England. It is not the Reichstag but the Emperor who determines the policy of the government. The Chancellor is not the minister of the Reichstag but of the Emperor, who can uphold him in the face of a hostile majority. What Bismarck once said of the King of Prussia, "The real actual Minister-President of Prussia is, and will continue to be, His Majesty the King," describes equally well the position of the Emperor. But if the Chancellor is not responsible for the policy of the government, for what is he responsible? The answer to this question is to be found in the character of the Constitution, which defines the position and prescribes the duties and func-

tions of the Emperor and of the Federal Council and which provides, not for the control, but for the coöperation of the Reichstag in the manner marked out by the Constitution itself. It is then not for the policy of the government but for the due observance of the Constitution, for keeping within the limits that the Constitution has established and for obtaining the coöperation of the Reichstag where the Constitution makes such coöperation necessary, that the Chancellor is responsible.

It is by its control over the budget that the English House of Commons has gained control over the government, and since the Constitution of the Empire provides that the budget shall be enacted yearly in the form of a law, it might be expected that this provision would assure a like position and authority to the German Reichstag. But such an interpretation would overthrow the Constitution itself, which, while providing for the coöperation of the legislature, is far from having handed the government over to that body. Shall the refusal of the Reichstag to exercise this right of coöperation, or even the failure to agree upon a budget before the beginning of the fiscal year, a failure which may imply no fault on the part either of the government or of the Reichstag, have the effect of suspending the operation of existing laws and of striking with paralysis the institutions of the Empire, which rest upon laws as authoritative as the budget and even on the Constitution itself? The budget, far from being such a formidable constitutional weapon, is an agreement between the government and the Reichstag in regard to the accuracy of the government's financial proposals and the necessity and expediency of the several items. If, then, the object of the budget is to determine the necessity and expediency of appropriations, it follows that even without a budget the government can continue to levy the taxes provided for by existing laws as well as to defray the expenditure of any institution or service legally existing. But the government would have no right to levy taxes or to incur expenditure the only authorization for which would have been contained in the budget that has failed to become law. But ministerial responsibility even with these limitations is deprived of much of its value, since the Constitution of the Empire, following in this respect the example of Prussia

rather than that of the other German states, has made no provision for its enforcement.

In the German Empire amendments to the Constitution take the form of ordinary laws with the sole difference that they fail if fourteen votes are recorded against them in the Federal Council. Inasmuch as in this body the votes are cast by states the opposition of a few states, unless indeed of the smaller, can in Germany as in America prevent the adoption of constitutional changes. But it is not necessary there as it is here, that any measure which involves constitutional changes should be preceded by a formal change in the Constitution. Such a measure becomes law if there are not more than fourteen votes against it in the Federal Council. This indirect method of amending the Constitution makes it less easy than it is in this country to determine at any given time the precise condition of constitutional law.

In Germany the judiciary does not play such an important part as the guardian of the Constitution as is assigned to it in this country. Strong governments which deal out rights sparingly to the representatives of the people, are less likely than our own to submit questions involving the limits of their competence to an impartial tribunal. It has also been thought that judicial interpretation passes imperceptibly into judicial revision of the Constitution, and that the technical training of the judges is not the best preparation for the decision of questions that have a political bearing. Moreover the peculiar relation between the federal government and the states, to which attention has already been called, raises questions which are not judicial in their character. Where the position of the states in their relation to the federal government is, in regard to many of their functions, analogous to that of administrative districts, the system which works so admirably in this country of maintaining intact the boundary between the federal and state jurisdictions by means of judicial decisions, is inapplicable. The right of control over state administration possessed by the Empire, cannot be exercised through the courts. It should be remembered also that part of the revenue of the imperial government consists in contributions from the states and that there must be a method of enforcing their payment other than an

appeal to the courts. But whatever may be the explanation, the fact cannot be doubted that no German jurist has the opportunity of gaining such a position as in this country belongs to Chief Justice Marshall as expounder of the Constitution.

The question whether the courts have the right to pass upon the constitutionality of imperial laws has occasioned much controversy, but the prolonged academic discussion which it has provoked indicates that they do not actually exercise this authority. Those who deny that the authority belongs to them hold that the promulgation of a law by the Emperor is conclusive evidence of its constitutionality, for although he has no veto power yet he has the right and the duty to refuse to promulgate as laws, measures which have not been enacted according to the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution of Prussia expressly denies to the courts the right to pass upon the constitutionality of Prussian laws.

While the courts are bound to give to the laws of the Empire the precedence over state laws, which, according to the Constitution, belongs to them, yet this is far from being the only method of maintaining the authority of the Empire as against the states. It is the duty of the Emperor to call the attention of the states to any law enacted by them or to any act or omission on their part in violation of the Constitution or laws of the Empire. In case of a difference of opinion the decision lies with the Federal Council, which as the assembly of the associated governments seems best fitted to deal with such delicate questions and to show proper respect to the rights and wishes of the states. If the state still refuses to yield, the Federal Council may decree execution against it, which is to be carried out by the Emperor with the military resources of the Empire. The coercion of states is foreign to American constitutional law and does not seem in harmony with that uncontrollable power residing in them which is so closely akin to sovereignty. The War of the Rebellion was carried on, not to coerce the states, but to compel the citizens of the United States to remain true to the allegiance which they owed to the Federal Government.

RICHARD HUDSON.

ARTICLE II.—IN MEMORIAM. NATHANIEL J. BURTON.

Yale Lectures on Preaching and Other Writings. By NATHANIEL J. BURTON, D.D., Pastor of the Park Church, Hartford, Conn. Edited by RICHARD E. BURTON. New York : Chas. L. Webster & Co. London : Chatto & Windus. 1888.

WE welcome this volume as a memorial of affection and a monument of fame for a friend who was beloved and honored amongst us. We have long felt that our literature should be enriched by the affluent thought and the suggestive imagery and opulent diction of Dr. Burton. And now that we are to hear his voice no more, we are glad to have communion with him through these practical and edifying Writings, which will perpetuate his influence with us and widen it with those to whom he was not personally known. The Lectures on Preaching are unique and characteristic and will hold a high place in the series of lectures on the Lyman Beecher foundation which have employed the talent of a succession of very able men ; while they will be instructive and profitable not only to students of theology, for whom they were specially delivered, but also to ministers and pastors in the actual service of the profession. The "Other Writings," in their wider range and variety, will give stimulus and uplift to many minds, carrying comfort, and hope, and abounding gratification to sufferers and toilers and the great company who are walking and working by faith in those things that are invisible but vastly real.

NATHANIEL JUDSON BURTON was born in the State of Connecticut in 1824 : he was nearly 29 years of age at his ordination for the ministry of the Gospel, and was nearly 63 years old at the time of his death. His father was a Methodist clergyman, so that from early life he was accustomed to hear theological conversation and discussion and to share the inconveniences of the Methodist itineracy. His academic education

was pursued at the Wesleyan University, but he came to Yale for theological study, having intelligently decided in favor of the Congregational polity for himself.

During his senior year in the Seminary he was called to the pastorate of the Fair Haven Second Church in New Haven, in which he remained three years and a half. Then he accepted a call to broader work and to larger influence as the pastor of the Fourth Church in Hartford. For thirteen years he served that church, and then for seventeen years he was the pastor of the Park Church in the same city. From that post of usefulness his personality became more observed and he was a recognized power in the ecclesiastical affairs of the Commonwealth. He was the leader and the life of the ministerial gatherings in the Capital, while in the State Association and Conference his presence was a continual benediction and his voice carried cheer and guidance to his brethren. Dr. Burton was frequently invited to public service beyond the limits of his parish. He was the preacher at ordinations. He was appointed to the Lyman Beecher Lectureship at Yale. He was elected a member of the Corporation of Yale University. Seven days before his death he was chosen to preach the sermon at the next annual meeting of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at Cleveland.

We can here but very briefly touch upon some of the more prominent traits of Dr. Burton's personality and character. It was apparent that he was a man of large affectionateness. He was great-hearted. Full of sympathy for all who were in distress, prodigal of tenderness and of benefactions such as he could render to the miserable and needy, he could not endure the sight of others' sufferings. He had the qualities of the divine Master by which He is represented as the Physician of souls. He carried the sorrows and bore the griefs of other men, in ready imitation of his Lord. When the Humane Society was formed, he became an active officer in it, and he plead for the dumb animals as if he were their chosen advocate, saying too that he sometimes felt as though he ought to be one of them. His overflowing benevolence went out to all overburdened men, and the oppressions and wrongs of the world roused his consternation and his indignation. Most gentle to

the sufferer, he scored and scorched the wicked inflictors of agony with the lightnings of his humane anger. Like the loving Christ, he wielded the scourge of cords to drive out of the sacred place that which was a profanation of it. I believe that, like Christ also, he would have suffered, if it might be, to reform and save those who sinned against light and knowledge. He loved men, pitied them in their sins and in the sorrows that come from sins, and mourned for the guilty and the wronged who were innocent.

It was apparent also that he was a man of strong intellectuality. His mind was of great range and power. His views were broad and embraced all sides of a subject. He had a vivid and soaring imagination. He had the poetic faculty. If he never expressed his thoughts in rhymes or in measured stanzas, there was a rhythm and melody to his sentences which made them truly poetic. His words were pictorial and suggestive and they took on a grandeur of diction and a musical flow which were Miltonic. Sometimes they swept out on a wide excursion bringing in riches from many points and illustrating the matter by much induction. Then they were like the march of a caravan with loads of rich commodities from foreign lands, all destined for the business of a common emporium. But his words did not overload his thought; they expressed it. His thought was large; there was munificence to his ideas. His fancy gave his thought wings. He soared with it and looked down upon the landscape that he would describe from such a height that he took in all its environment and all its details. So he invested every subject that he touched with a wonderful charm and he gave it a breadth and connection that made it large. The subject was in large hands; he saw the possibilities of it; and he presented it in a large way.

He saw meanings in little things. He used to say that the gift of a single rose touched all his sensibilities. There was a fragrance in the friendship which made it a gift, sweeter than any that inhered in the odorous bloom. Though it were small, the love that it represented filled a great space and was all the world to him.

In the great themes of Revelation his mind found room and verge enough for its freest and grandest effort. He was a pre-ordained preacher of the Word of God. In the sublimities and mysteries which inspiration has committed to human study and reflection he found a field ready for the severest use of all his faculties. They met and gratified the demands and aspirations of his intellect and gave free wing to his delighted imagination. He reveled in them. He walked among them as a seraph might walk among the stars. Each truth was a round world in itself; and all the truths were concordant spheres of a vast and complicated, but harmonious, system. He explored them as an astronomer would explore the heavens. And he found them to be as infinite as the universe. World on world, system after system, were revealed to his investigation. Each particular was boundless and the whole would state a program for eternity. At Easter he spoke of the Resurrection. But once having launched on that sea of thought, he sailed till he saw that the sea was without a shore. One grand feature of it absorbed his mind; that led to another which was as absorbing; and so the roll of revelation uncoiled with ever-enlarging views. One who should have heard his discourse on the Church, would have come into new conceptions of that divine institution which has been set up among the systems of this world; would have felt that heaven is represented in it, that the glory of God is revealed in it with a splendor and awfulness like that of the shekinah of old, that it has attributes of duration, and conquest, and power, and universality, which make it foremost among the victorious forces of the world and that membership in it is the highest honor and privilege that are given to men this side of heaven.

He had great conceptions of God, and of Christ as the Revealer of God, and of the Holy Spirit as present in all the world and putting forth divine energy in all souls of men. Dr. Burton made much of his pulpit. His sermons were upon great and vital themes. He was too great and cultured a man, he had too much respect for his sacred office, to introduce crude notions into the sacred desk. He could not court popularity, nor lower himself, nor prostrate his calling, to dishonor

the Word of the Lord and the message he was commissioned to give, by announcement of sensational oddities as topics for the pulpit. To him the Sabbath was holy day, and worship was communion with the infinite Father, and the message was from the inspired Word. The whole service, as conducted by him, had uplift and spirituality and the fore-look of heaven in it.

I suppose that eternity seemed inexpressibly precious to him because there would be boundless opportunity in it to pursue investigation and to acquire truth and to gain satisfaction, instead of being hampered by the limitations of time and human weakness, and exhaustion, and our imperfect vision: "For now we see in a mirror, darkly; but then face to face." Like other luminous souls, he was drawn to the light beyond and he longed to see those things that are not unveiled, and cannot be, before our mortal sight. Death had no terror for him. It was the messenger to whom it is appointed to open the door which he would enter. He was like a traveler who has journeyed long and far to a city of renown where his friends reside and where his home is to be. Its glories rise before him: the splendor of its palaces and its temples salutes his sight: bells of welcome fill the air with music; and on its walls friends call and beckon with glad greeting. Does he regret that its gates shall be opened and that he shall be permitted to enter in?

Dr. Burton's death was a mournful surprise; but his life had been a long preparation for it. Several times he visited the old lands; and among the memorials of old civilizations and the refinements of present culture, he found the greatest delight. He enjoyed, with all the wealth of his nature, the monuments and the men of the countries whose history is so largely our own. He thought that if he could visit Palestine and live among the scenes of the Saviour's life he should be content and never care to come back to his native land any more. Now, he has gone where the Saviour is, where he can see His face, where he can hear His voice, where he can feel the touch of the hand that shall guide His people, where he can behold His glory! With highest delight do those scenes, which he had adoringly anticipated, open before him. With

vaster range and in clearer light, he can investigate the sublime truth that he loved so well. Dear to him are now the friends, so many, who went on before him. And the Christ, Author of our redemption, Purchaser by death of our life, Center of heavenly bliss, how closely does our friend press to that dearest Friend, who is all in all to him !

BURDETT HART.

ARTICLE III.—SPIRITUAL LAW IN THE NATURAL WORLD.

By the term “Spiritual Law” nothing more is meant than the law of mental activity. By “Natural World” is meant the physical world of modern science. Thesis—The natural or physical world—of science—is not so directly known as the supernatural world—of mind or spirit.

It is the object of this Article to call attention to the fact that, in the alleged conflict between science and religion, the fundamental assumptions of the former are not necessarily more reliable than those of the latter. To this end the following points will be considered :

1. Science has a metaphysical or “supernatural” basis.
2. Science is self-contradictory, except as it assumes the existence of spiritual law in the natural world.
3. It is not less subjective than ordinary metaphysics.
4. It can not be affirmed that its fundamental notions are more trustworthy than those in regard to the supernatural world.
5. Scientific skepticism, when sufficiently thorough-going, issues in the notion of a supernatural world.
6. It is only by making this assumption that modern science can exist at all, even on the skeptical basis of Hume.
7. The natural or physical world—of science—is more “transcendental” than the supernatural world—of mind or spirit—in the sense that the latter is more directly known.

We are in full and hearty accord with the scientific spirit. It is doubtless true that the modern world since the time of Bacon, Luther, or even of Descartes, has emphasized experience as the necessary test of theories. We wish to avoid air-castles. We prefer to keep to solid earth. It is urged that we are free, at last, from the thralldom of metaphysics and theology. We welcome science as guide and redeemer.

But is it not possible that science is taking, in many minds, precisely the position formerly occupied by a hierarchy of an

other sort? When such an authority as Haeckel says: "an atheistic doctrine of evolution should be required by the Government to be taught in all German schools," is it not time that science should be "secularized?"

This Article is no effort to construct a theory. It attempts little more than illustration of a fact which every intelligent thinker, perhaps, would admit,—but a fact often overlooked in current literature—namely, the obvious truth that science is not only fallible, but also based on assumptions such as are ordinarily termed metaphysical, or spiritual, in the sense of being subjective, and even superstitious, in the sense of being accepted without evidence, and in spite of manifest, serious, and profound contradictions.

1. Science has a metaphysical or "supernatural" basis. That is, it transcends phenomena at every step in its progress. Its mode of procedure is that of spiritual law in the natural world. The entire work of science consists in attempting to explain the world of sense by transcending it. Hume has clearly explained that it is only by transcending the impressions of sense that we recognize such notions as causation, persistence of force, and the like. Indeed the law of evolution itself is a good illustration of this point. Understood in any materialistic sense that law rests upon the extremely transcendental doctrine, however true it may be, that "perceiving organisms were evolved from a world itself neither perceiving nor perceived." The reply of certain English philosophers to Kant that our surest convictions are built up gradually, through infancy and countless past generations, may be true. But it is beside the point. For we do not deny that our "a priori" notions may have been derived from so-called "matter." But so-called "matter," like the doctrine of evolution, is of course not only itself a notion, but a notion that could never be derived from bare phenomena. It rests upon a wonderfully manifold and complex series of inferences. We do not reject it. We simply recognize its transcendental character, which will appear further on, more clearly.

2. Physical science is self-contradictory, except as it assumes the existence of spiritual law in the natural world. It is no disparagement to science that it transcends phenomena and has

a metaphysical basis. "The question is not whether it is metaphysics or Mohawk, but simply, is it true?" But science is not only metaphysical. Its metaphysics, as such, is self-contradictory. Science begins with the assumption that things are what they seem. It concludes with the assumption that things are not what they seem. Doubtless this last conclusion is true, but it thoroughly contradicts the premise that things are what they seem. And it is science which refutes itself. We need not go back to Kant to learn that all perception involves judgment—that perceptions are blind without notions. If the most recent science itself, and the one which bears most directly on the subject—namely, psycho-physics—proves anything, in the study of the mechanism of perception, it is that nothing is more illusive than sense. (Ladd's *Physiological Psychology*, p. 676.)

Consciousness arises only in the nerve-centres of the brain. Vibrations are sensed as color. In the words of Balfour, in his defense of doubt: "Our science does rest on the data given in perception, and its conclusions are in contradiction with those data." Science starts with the premise that the only real being consists of the things that are seen. It ends with the conclusion that the only real being is the atom, which no man hath seen or can see. It can avoid self-contradiction only by dropping the premise that things are what they seem—material—and by keeping to its conclusion that things are not what they seem, but are, like the so-called atom, mental hypotheses, at least so far as known to science; in other words, products of mind—spiritual.

3. Science is not less subjective than ordinary metaphysics, so-called. It may be replied that of course science is not confined to the bare feelings, red or blue, nor even to groups of feelings; that its entire progress consists in the interpretation of phenomena. But, it may be urged, it adheres as closely to phenomena as possible, while metaphysics and theology are altogether transcendental. Very well, let us adhere as closely to phenomena as possible. Let us meet the objector on his own ground. What results? Out of thine own mouth will I convict thee. In the very process of adhering as closely to phenomena as possible, we find that, so far is science from

being free from transcendental elements, that it is altogether transcendental. We are now to adhere as closely to phenomena as possible. But what is a phenomenon? The question reminds us of the words of a modern novelist: "Phenomenon, how plastic to cover whatever one does not understand." But let us try to define it. Suppose we say with Hume that there is nothing in any object considered in itself that can warrant us in drawing a conclusion beyond it. (Green's Hume, p. 267.) Then let us observe, not by metaphysics, but by modern psycho-physics, that "the sensation of hardness testifies not to the present, but only to the past existence of the table we press." That the present feeling is the only phenomenon. Then of course the present feeling or phenomenon distinguished from the past and future would be nothing appreciable whatever. Hence the so-called phenomenon is a transcendental assumption, if anything, and a self-contradictory one at that. What has become of our phenomenon of which it was said, other foundation can no man lay? Where is the phenomenon we were not to transcend, or were at least to cling to as closely as possible? Even now while we seem to have it at last within our grasp it escapes us like the shade of Creusa from Aeneas, "equal to the light winds and most like a fleeting dream." "Let us adhere to fact," is easily said. But there is no proof whatever of mere matter of fact. And after all mere phenomena, apart from inferences, would be devoid of truth because devoid of meaning—signs that would signify nothing.

In the bare succession of states, if such there could be, the dry chronology of the soul, nothing would be true, not even the names and dates—would exist. "What could be a percept distinguished from all others?" Like the witches of Macbeth, it has no name on earth. The bare state as a mere phenomenon, would certainly mean nothing. "It would be no truth at all. It could not be stated even in a singular proposition. The supposed difference between immediate and mediate knowledge is no absolute difference." One is somewhat startled to find that science, which is often said to be free from metaphysics, is altogether metaphysical. One is reminded of the feeling of Captain Donnithorne in the novel—"Arthur felt a startled

uncertainty how far Adam was speaking from knowledge, and how far from mere inference." We speak of the transcendental element in sense, but we now see that sense is altogether transcendental, and that nothing can be more thoroughly subjective than science. It is "of imagination all impact."

4. The fundamental notions of science are no more trustworthy than those of religion.

A. It can not be maintained as practically tenable that scientific knowledge has the highest degree of probability. It is sometimes said that scientific hypotheses are fruitful in discovery and invention, while religion, like philosophy, is "a barren virgin." But this could hardly be put forward as an argument, by a serious and thoughtful mind. For there is no gigantic fraud, pious or otherwise, that may not be said to have enjoyed success in practice. Religious hypotheses may have been as fruitful in the religious world as scientific hypotheses have been in the physical world. Be that as it may, nothing furnishes a better illustration than science of the fact that what are now called erroneous theories succeed in practice. The following facts are taken, almost at random, from Whewell's history of the inductive sciences, and are characteristic rather than exceptional:—The Hipparchian theory is now acknowledged to be false, but as a system of calculation it is not only good, but in many cases no better has been found. The tables based on the Heliocentric doctrine of the Copernican system were adopted even while the doctrine itself was rejected. Experts in science seem to be quite as fallible as experts in theology. Bacon rejected, while Milton accepted the doctrine that the earth revolves around the sun. Newton's hypothesis, the law of universal gravitation, was accepted by Dr. Bently, a theologian, but rejected by Flamsteed the astronomer royal. Galileo was doubtless a Christian and a Catholic. Copernicus himself was an ecclesiastic. There was a time when the doctrine of spontaneous generation was opposed by leading scientists, but defended by the theologians as scriptural. "For did not the carcass of Samson's lion bring forth bees?" (Harris's Phil. Basis of Theism, p. 325).

Suppose we attempt to pin our faith to the name of some eminent man who has had success in practice—to the champion

of some one of the numerous scientific sects. Which shall it be? Shall it be Newton, who rejected the undulatory in favor of the emissive theory in optics? or shall it be Lord Bacon, who refused to accept the hypothesis that the earth revolves around the sun? Who shall guard the guards? The older scientific creeds are fast becoming obsolescent. Says Cuvier, "Future generations may include in their physiology propositions as far above the circulation of the blood as the doctrine of gravitation, as an explanation of the motion of the heavenly bodies, goes beyond that of epicycles." Some eminent scientists have accepted and others rejected, the doctrine of spontaneous generation. Thus do the authorities of one age "differ from those of an other, and the authorities of the same age differ among themselves." If science is infallible, then it is fallible, for science itself has so declared it.

Scientists have been in many respects an "amiable and useful body of men." "But many of them are ignorant of the controversies that rage round the very foundation of their subject." And one regrets that intellectual honesty and the "progress of criticism should have left us no choice but to count physical science, as a criterion of the validity of knowledge, among the beautiful, but baseless dreams, which have so often deluded the human race with the phantom of certain knowledge." (See Balfour's Defense of Doubt, p. 306).

It may be urged that there are some essential doctrines on which men of science substantially agree. It may be said that physical science is at least approximating ultimate truth. Now if there is anything in which modern scientists agree, it is in accepting the doctrine of evolution. If any system of philosophy may be called the philosophy of science it is that of Mr. Spencer. But is not the doctrine of evolution by the hypothesis only a product of evolution—a passing phase of the opinion of a generation or two of men? How could that be said to be the most highly probable, the practical standard of all knowledge, the nearest approximation to absolute truth, even at the scientific millenium, which has its principle, its source, its center, and its end in that which is utterly and forever unknowable—"A headless body and a nameless thing?" If "scientific" evolution is true, it refutes itself as a theory

of knowledge, and evolution is, by the hypothesis, a dream of Herbert Spencer. Mr. Spencer has taken something of which he confessedly does know and can know nothing whatever, and made it the soul of his entire system. Here is the final philosophy, which, by the hypothesis, is not and can not be valid for reality at any point whatever. Hence, it goes without saying that no amount of experience, in this process of evolution, could establish the hypothesis, even as practically tenable, that scientific knowledge is the particular kind that has the highest degree of probability. If science is probable, then it is improbable. For aught that appears to the contrary, religious notions may have already drawn nearer to the goal, if such there be.

And yet it is doubtless the success of science, and of eminent scientists, in practice, that convinces most of the really superstitious devotees. See the steam-engines and electric lights! We desire to make no insinuations in regard to "intellectual self-respect, prejudice, and education, the fear of losing a lucrative position, or of differing from the majority." (See Balfour's Defense of Doubt, p. 305). Certainly the intelligent scientific philosopher knows that this is no argument at all. It is not only true, as we have seen, that erroneous theories succeed in practice, or at least share the prestige of the success of true ones, but any hypothesis is of course revisable, perhaps to an incalculable degree.

More worthy of consideration, because nearer the real question, is the great argument from common consent.

It is said that science must be true because it has the vote of the majority. Well, the notion that the earth is flat, or that the sun literally rises and sets, was, at one time, universal—of course in an unscientific age. But it is precisely the unscientific part of modern science that the majority of men understand and thoroughly believe in. Probably there is not one man in a thousand who really believes the scientific theory that the atom—a mental hypothesis—is the most real being in the universe. And we must not forget that the ablest scientists of the day rejected Mr. Young's undulatory theory in optics because it was difficult, and accepted the emissive theory, as Whewell says, because it was easy. Common consent can not

make science even probable, for science educates us only by making us skeptical of the opinions held by common consent.

But are we not now drawing nearer to the real question at issue? Do not the arguments from success in practice, authority, and common consent, so far as they are supposed to make science plausible, rest on the argument from common sense?

Is not the real question this: Are the phenomena of science, that is, of so-called common sense, more "coercive" than those in regard to the supernatural world? This raises the question of relative theoretic validity.

B. It can not be maintained as theoretically probable, that the fundamental assumptions of science are more valid than those in regard to the supernatural world, for the phenomena of the former are no more "coercive" than those of the latter.

If Hume was an absolute skeptic, even in regard to science, still he had a right to maintain that so-called phenomena as impressions are "coercive." For he does not attempt to show that they are rationally valid or free from ultimate contradictions. If the psycho-physicist should point out that the sensation can not be examined by introspection at all, that it is infinitely complex, that it came down from past generations, from metaphysics, or the fire-mist, that the dream transcends the dreamer, or, what is doubtless true—that so-called phenomena are more "transcendental" than the assumptions on which they rest, all of his shot would fall harmless before Hume. He would simply reply that in spite of all manifest contradictions, one can not help believing in so-called phenomena. Whether they are possible or not they exist, and are certainly coercive as phenomena. Belief in events constitutes their reality. (Green's Hume, vol. i., p. 276). The world is a world of impressions merely, and needs no tortoise whatever to support it.

But the subjective character of all systems is illustrated even in Hume. Hume is one of the fairest of philosophers. He awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. But, if the whole world consists of mere impressions and notions, every system must, of course, be dogmatic. And he who has done most to overthrow dogmatism, errs in one point, but a vital one, namely, in dogmatism itself—when he affirms, without evidence, that the notion of red or blue is more coercive than

the assumption of self or unity, not to say of causation. At this point Hume pronounces his adversary non-suited, without even the form of a trial. Hume "smote upon the chord of self" with quite as much dogmatism as those who hung the witches on the hill at Salem. The idea of self or spirit may have all the validity and coercive force of an impression—for aught Hume has told us may be an impression. (Green's Hume, voi. i., p. 176). Nothing but sheer dogmatism could prevent Hume from admitting that the idea of spirit or self is as valid as that of "resemblance" or of any so-called impressions. We do not complain that Hume is too skeptical, but rather that he is not skeptical enough, in the sense of being free from the dogmatic spirit. The thorough-going skeptic, who holds that all knowledge is justified by faith, if at all, should be the last man to exclude, as invalid, the assumption of self, spirit, or even that of freedom. And it can not be maintained, as theoretically valid, that the phenomena of science or of common sense are in the slightest degree more coercive, reliable, or probable than those of spirit. Indeed, as will appear in the next paragraph, an examination of the phenomena of the natural world shows that they themselves belong to the spiritual world.

5. Scientific investigation or scientific skepticism, when it is sufficiently thorough-going, issues in the assumption of a supernatural world.

We have seen that Hume—and this is true of modern "scientific" philosophers as well, Clifford, Moleschott, Mill, and Huxley (Harris's *Phil. Basis of Theism*, p. 431)—resolves the world into a world of subjective impressions, which, as we have seen, are no more coercive than certain other notions which he dogmatically banishes from the world. Now, what is a subjective impression or an assumption, however false, illusive, phenomenal, or skeptical, but a mental or spiritual activity which is not even claimed for so-called matter, as such? By the hypothesis, a world completely skeptical would be a world completely spiritual. And thorough-going skepticism, *ipso facto*, issues in the assumption of a supernatural world. That modern science inevitably leads to this conclusion we shall see in the next paragraph, for:

6. It is only on the assumption of a mental, spiritual, or supernatural world that modern science exists at all, even on the skeptical basis of Hume.

To premise that things are what they seem, and to conclude that things are not what they seem, may not be fatal to a system. All progress in knowledge consists in proving the first statements false or inadequate. The conclusion may contradict the premise. Induction always at least goes beyond what is observed to what has not been observed. The partial theory may be reversed by the larger view—the Ptolemaic by the Copernican system. An incorrect notion may suggest a correct one. Perhaps science has a right to assume a natural world, provisionally, even if it afterwards converts it into a spiritual world. It has a right to show that what seemed to be extra-mental reality is only an assumption made by mind itself. (Ladd's *Phys. Psychology*, p. 672.) But after it has pointed out that it is only by means of spiritual law that the natural world is known, it can not exist at all if it rejects that spiritual law by means of which that natural world—the world of science—is known. For it confesses that mental activity—no matter how illusive—is the beginning, middle, and end of all its knowledge. And this is true even of Mr. Spencer's system. For Spencer insists that he is not a materialist. (First Principles, Appendix, 578.) And when his notion of the "unknowable," his "transfigured realism" (of which even his friends say, as was said of Bottom, "verily thou art translated"), which, however justifiable, is a notion of his mind which probably transcends phenomena farther than any other notion imaginable, is pruned off from his system, it remains simply idealism. We are in a world of ideas. There is a revision of hypotheses. Science repents. It dies to live. It moves from stage to stage. Its champions are idealists. Its evolution means the evolution of ideas. Its entire progress is that of spiritual law in the natural world. We are not trying to refute skepticism. We are not denying that the notion of spirit or of self may be a mere seeming. We are not even trying to enforce the maxim, "*cogito, ergo sum.*" But to seem anything at all, true or false, to think even "perhaps so" or "perhaps not," is what we *mean* by mental or supernatural activity. We

do not speak of the clod as capable of saying, "it seems," but if we can, then the clod is supernatural also. And, after all, can the finite mind imagine, within itself, any other conceivable ground of reality? For aught that appears, seeming may be the realest kind of reality. Seeming may be the Rock of Ages. Hence, it is only on the assumption of a mental or supernatural world that modern science can exist at all even on the skeptical basis of Hume.

7. The natural or physical world—of science—is more "transcendental" than the supernatural world—of mind or spirit—in the sense that the latter is more directly known.

If in every "phenomenon" there is a reference to self or spirit, which can not be said to be less coercive than the phenomenon itself, if all phenomena, so far as known, are mental, if the brain, as the substratum of mental phenomena, is an inferred reality transcending those phenomena, if the only way out of solipsism—the only bridge from self to the external world—is an irresistible conviction or assumption made by mind, if the only defense of so-called matter is in idealism, if the rose, which is sensed by the child as color is known to physical science, as such, only in terms of luminiferous ether; if the atom—a mental hypothesis—is the most real being known to physical science; if the entire fabric of science rests upon a far more indirect and doubtful process of inference than that by which the individual postulates real being as the subject of his mental experiences; if distance, matter, motion, force, thing, brain, an external world, human minds, the fire-mist of ages ago, as well as the assumption that things are or are not what they seem, are all metaphysical notions built up by the mind in a wonderfully manifold and complex mental process, and if these results are arrived at by psycho-physical science in the study of the mechanism of perception, as well as admitted, or rather maintained, by the leading scientists of the day, then we are driven by science to the conclusion (See Bulwer's *Kenelm Chillingly*, p. 99): "It is the supernatural within us—namely, mind—which can alone guess at the mechanism of the natural, namely, matter." Says Lotze: "Of all the errors of the human mind, it has always seemed to me the strangest, that it could come to deny its own existence, or take it at second hand, as

the product of an external nature, which we know only indirectly, only by means of the very mind to which we would fain deny existence." And we see that science tacitly and expressly assumes the obvious truth, which, however, is often overlooked in much of our current popular and scientific literature, that the natural or physical world—of science—is more "transcendental" than the supernatural world—of mind—or spirit, in the sense that the latter is more directly known.

When science, in exceptional cases, or for purposes of discussion, denies the existence of mind, it of course denies its own parentage, destroys the only foundation it ever had, and saws off the limb which alone attaches it to the tree of human knowledge.

It was the object of this Article to call attention to the fact that the fundamental assumptions of the natural world can not be shown to be more reliable or trustworthy than those of the spiritual world as above defined. This is not the place to raise the question as to the validity of the religious notions of God, freedom, and immortality. It is not our business to affirm the freedom of spirit, but simply to recognize the fact that of course science can not refute the assumption. Our work has been negative rather than positive, and we should think it hardly worth while, were it not for the fact that some of the most eminent of modern writers seem to think that fundamental faith is less reliable than science.

It is doubtless the outward magnificence, the visible glory and success of science, as well as of the papacy, however important the function of each as a schoolmaster, that will prevent for ages, perhaps forever, some of the ablest minds from doubting the ultimate infallibility of either. Tyndall's reply to Canon Mozely is in precisely the style of argument employed by Rome to prove the infallibility of the church, and by Protestants to prove the verbal infallibility of the Bible. Says Tyndall, in effect, "Induction is true because induction says so." And if this is true it may apply as well to religious as to physical phenomena.

Let us not fear great names. Let us call no man master. Bacon always rejected the law of universal gravitation. Nearly all of the eminent scientists of the day rejected the undulatory

theory in optics, partly because Newton believed in the old emissive theory, partly because the new theory was difficult. Practical preachers, scientists, or lawyers, however eminent, can not always be expected to be philosophers. The great Sir Matthew Hale, whose very business was weighing evidence, always believed in witches. It was the fashion. Not realizing that science is justified by faith, if at all, even George Eliot gave up her early faith in favor of science. It was the fashion. One should not be easily panic-stricken. Science has no theory of the universe. Mr. Spencer, the high-priest of science, has said that in its beginning, its source, its centre, and its end, the universe is utterly and forever unknowable.

We are in full accord with the inductive method of science, and with the scientific spirit. Doubtless the phenomena of religion should be scientifically studied. But we have seen that science is as truly subjective as morals, art, or religion. Science is made by man, not man by science. Many thoughtful men, like the ancient Vedanists, have denied the existence of the external world. No people has actually denied the moral assumptions of the soul. It is easier for the writer to regard science as illusive than to deny that man has a religious nature. It is nothing but pure charlatanism that issues a bull against faith. We sometimes hear of a bull against the age, but this is a bull against the ages. We say nothing in this essay of the will. From the purely intellectual standpoint, if the philosophy of science, such as it is, can be relied on, forsooth that science has said or can say, we are, of course, free to believe that we are:

“Not merely cunning casts in clay,
Let science prove we are, and then
What matters science unto men?”

CLARENCE DE VERE GREELEY.

ARTICLE IV.—“WHAT IS THE BIBLE?”*

An Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of the Old and New Testament in the light of modern Biblical study. By GEORGE T. LADD, D.D., Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York: 1888. 12mo, pp. 497.

No thoughtful person in our time can fail to appreciate the importance of this question ; it has become an importunate one in the light of modern biblical investigation ; it is a question, too, that of all people Christians should desire to have answered intelligently and truthfully ; and such an answer can be looked for only in the direction of the best accredited results of scientific biblical study.

It is a serious fact that this scientific study of the Bible has been hitherto, and still is, so largely in the hands of men who either reject Christianity, or disclaim that faith and experience which we hold entitles one to the name of Christian.

Is it not to be deplored, also, that so many young men who have been reared in our more evangelical churches, and who are in preparation for the Christian ministry, *must* go to other sources for that view of the Bible which commends itself to them as the truest solution of the problem which the Bible presents ? Surely the Christian church has the greatest interest in knowing what its scriptures really are, and, least of all men, should the believer in the God of the Bible be unwilling to welcome the fullest light which investigation can shed upon the Bible itself. We believe, first of all, that God is a God of truth, and neither the Bible nor our Christian faith has anything to fear from the fullest truth concerning the origin and

* Old Testament questions, and especially those relating to the Pentateuch, are now attracting special attention. The following discussion—connected with the review of Dr. Ladd's new volume—touching as it does on the relation of modern theories to the Christian faith—may be of interest to the readers of this Review.—ED. NEW ENGLANDER AND YALE REVIEW.

nature of the Bible. It is one feature in this many-sided and perplexed age of ours, that it should be assumed that the claims and needs of religious faith are incompatible with a scientific attitude of mind, and in no direction is this need of adjusting the religious mind to the principles and methods of scientific study more apparent than in the treatment of the Bible. The proposition to investigate the Bible in accordance with those principles and methods that are followed in all questions pertaining to literature or history, meets everywhere with a vehement protest from some of the most devout and scientific minds. The objection is, that such a treatment of the Bible either involves a rejection of its special claims, or ignores its unique character, and so destroys or detracts seriously from its authority and regulative significance.

There is one element of truth in this objection which we are quite willing to admit. It is this: We are to approach any examination of the Bible as *Christians*, and we are to study the Bible with a constant recognition of the unique place and the supreme value which belong to these writings.

This Christian estimation of the Bible is as truly a fact to be recognized and accounted for as any of the phenomena which biblical history or literature presents; and no explanation of the Bible can be true or complete which does not include this relation it sustains to our Christian faith and experience. But a scientific study of the Bible is occupied chiefly with questions which can by no means be answered by simple appeal to the religious or theological apprehension of the Bible. These are questions of fact, essentially historical and literary problems, for whose solution only the principles and methods applicable to such investigations can legitimately be employed. The true endeavor should be to recognize and satisfy both interests—the interests and claims of Christian faith, and the rightful demands of scientific investigation.

Now, it is just this task that Dr. Ladd proposed for himself in the great work he put before the public some years since, and in the more popular discussion he presents in the present volume.

Dr. Ladd approaches the Bible from the standpoint of evangelical Christianity, and he brings to his investigation eminent

learning, a sound and discreet judgment, and a complete mastery of the methods and results of modern biblical criticisms. It is as a Christian, and in the interests of Christian knowledge and Christian life, that Dr. Ladd raises and seeks to answer the fundamental question "What is the Bible?"

An impelling conviction with Dr. Ladd is the need of bringing our conceptions and our use of the Bible into adjustment with those results of modern investigation which are certain to be recognized by the more intelligent and fair-minded students of the Bible. The main purpose of the book is, as its author affirms, "apologetic." "It is written in the interest of faith; and it "has reference to vindicating the Christian use of the Bible." "Indeed," says Dr. Ladd (preface, p. ix.), "I should be glad to show clearly and convincingly that modern critical study of the Bible has discovered nothing which need disturb, much less undermine and destroy, the intelligent employment of Holy Scripture as the believer's rule of faith and life."

The need of such an attempt as this is no imaginary one; it is real and serious. It cannot wisely be ignored that something like an exigency has arisen in relation to these sources of our Christian knowledge. The need, too, is that of some adjustment of our religious estimation and use of the Bible to a different critical judgment as to the origin and nature of the Scriptures. This need it is certainly not wise to deny or overlook; and it is no escape from such a recognition to content ourselves with the assurance, that as yet no generally accepted conclusions have been reached by the chief representatives of this modern biblical study, or, that such differences between these authorities still prevail as to make any such adjustment unnecessary. It is quite true that considerable differences still separate the most prominent authorities in Old Testament criticism, but it is not the less true that there is a consensus of judgment upon those questions that are of chief importance, and that these points of agreement become with every year more numerous, while the differences relate more and more to questions that are relatively subordinate. This steady direction of critical judgment is unmistakable. But, for our part, we quite agree with Dr. Ladd, that there is nothing in this movement to justify serious apprehension, *unless* our minds refuse

to accept this change in critical judgment. We have no reluctance to accept and welcome any verdict which an impartial and thorough examination of the Bible may render; we have no desire to keep from ourselves, or withhold from others, the fullest knowledge of all that modern critical scholarship is doing with these scriptures in which we have so profound an interest. Even were the consequences of accepting any well-grounded conclusions from such studies more serious in their bearing upon Christian faith than we believe them to be, we certainly could not be justified in refusing to entertain such conclusions and to adjust our religious views to them. Now it is this spirit of candor and courageous confidence in truth, this happy union of Christian faith with a scientific attitude of mind, that characterize Dr. Ladd's treatment of the great subject under discussion. This treatment of Dr. Ladd is marked throughout by a fine sense of honesty, a rare discretion and sobriety of judgment, and by a strongly positive and constructive aim. The treatment is lucid in its exposition, and comprehensive in its range. No presentation of such a subject within the limits of a modest volume could well be more adequate to what is undertaken.

We must leave it to the judgment of the best readers to justify this general estimate of the work, while we follow Dr. Ladd in his discussion of some of those subjects which are of special interest and importance. Dr. Ladd's principal question, "What is the Bible?" naturally divides into three more special questions. (1) What view have we to take of the authorship and formation of the separate writings which compose our Bible? (2) What is the revelation and inspiration to which our Bible bears witness? (3) What is the authority and regulative significance which we are to assign to the Bible?

Our approach to these vital questions must be from the standpoint at which Dr. Ladd places us in the fundamental question that forms the title of the book before us. That standpoint is the Christian faith and Christian experience. Our Christian faith and experience give to these writings an altogether unique place and a supreme value—that is the presupposition with which Dr. Ladd sets out. It is simply our Protestant confessions—the Scriptures are our only rule of

faith and practice. The main question now becomes: What conception of the Bible is it that is demanded by, or is essential to, the Christian estimation and use of these writings; and is the religious significance and value of the Bible essentially affected by the view we are compelled to accept upon the basis of assured results of biblical criticism? The special questions we have indicated are thus put in their true connection with that estimation and use of the Scriptures which give them significance for religious faith and life. Following out the inquiry relating to the authorship of the Bible,—the question of critical importance and interest is that relating to the authorship of the Pentateuch, or rather the Hexateuch—since the book of Joshua forms with the Pentateuch one literary whole.

In reference to the authorship of the Pentateuch there are three positions which are held. The first we may designate as the traditional view, which ascribes our Pentateuch essentially in its present form to Moses. There is, secondly, in extreme opposition to this view, the position of the so-called radical or destructive critics, under the leadership of Wellhausen and Kuenen, who deny the Mosaic authorship of any considerable portion of our Pentateuch, conceding to Moses but a slight germ of legislation, a very slight thread of narrative, if any at all. Standing between the extremes, are the larger number of biblical scholars, who do not support the traditional views, but who are, in their own judgment, far from rejecting a true and essential authorship by Moses. These scholars, prominent among whom are Dillmann and Delitzsch, maintain that a very considerable portion of the legislation of our Pentateuch, both moral and ceremonial, dates back—in its essential character at least—to the age of Moses, and may with truth be regarded as of Mosaic origin.

This, substantially, is the critical position which Dr. Ladd holds. It is succinctly stated in the appropriate chapter (ch. x. upon "Authorship of the Biblical Books," p. 1, 318.) "We conclude then, that both the ancient tradition which assigned the entire Pentateuch with its legal and historical contents to the great law-giver and prophet, Moses, and also the modern critical theory which regards this law and history, with its record, as in large measure the work of pious fraud accom-

plished at the time of exile, are unwarrantable." "The enactment and recording of these laws, as well as the incorporating of them in their historic setting, were by no means the work of Moses alone."

"Precisely how much of this work Moses did accomplish cannot be told with confidence." "There is doubtless a large body of the legislation, both civil and ceremonial, both that which arranges a cultus, and that which defines and protects rights, which is genuinely Mosaic." "But the law of the Lord was a progressive revelation; Moses, as the inspired servant of God, furnished its guiding ideas and great principles." "Through all the centuries after his work was ended, under the impress and leading of the thought that they were in covenant with Jehovah as their Redeemer, the people of Israel kept receiving the law in many concrete provisions and enactments; law books or collections of these enactments, with or without historical notices, began to be formed." "The Book of Deuteronomy gives us the great body of this as it existed upon its Mosaic basis, the reign of Josiah." "And finally the Hexateuch gives the law and the early history of the nation, as they were understood by the later workmen in Israel, and put into the final shape, at and soon after the age of Ezra."

Now it is important to bear in mind that this view of the origin of the Pentateuch differs very materially from the theory of Wellhausen and his associates. This difference is not merely one of degree, as might at first appear, but it is connected with a general view of the whole course of the religious history of Israel, and with a conception of religion which is fundamentally different from the assumptions of the more advanced schools of critics—those assumptions of naturalism which Dr. Ladd in common with Dillmann and Delitzsch strongly repudiate. This critical judgment respecting the authorship of the Pentateuch, we venture to assert, defines a position from which the judgment of the best accredited biblical scholarship will not recede in the direction of the traditional position. Even should the final resting-point in biblical criticism be found farther on in the direction of the critical positions of Wellhausen and Kuenen, we see no reason for apprehension for Christian faith. We maintain that the solution of this essen-

tially literary problem has no such vital connection either with the question relating to the character of the religion of Israel or the interests of Christian faith that we should take so serious an interest in one solution of it rather than the other.

We have not space even to specify the evidence upon which this conclusion which Dr. Ladd has reached rests. We think we can say without fear of disproof that the traditional position is no longer held by the great body of the most reputable scholars both in Europe and in America. It is not too strong a statement to affirm that the evidence against the direct and complete Mosaic authorship of our Pentateuch is of a sort that would be deemed conclusive in any other field of literary and historical investigation. We draw attention to two or three results of biblical criticism which hardly anyone who is acquainted with these subjects will call in question. Take first, the admitted composite structure of the Pentateuch. Critical analysis has placed beyond legitimate doubt the existence of at least three originally independent documents in our Pentateuch; these documentary sources originated at different times, and bear distinct evidence of composition by different authors, living at periods considerably remote from each other, and from religious standpoints that are not in all respects coincident. But these documentary sources, so distinctly traceable through our Pentateuch, do not terminate with it. The same threads of narration and prophetic representation are recognizable in the book of Joshua, which forms thus with our Pentateuch a single literary production. We must with propriety speak of the Hexateuch rather than the Pentateuch, if we wish to designate a single unitary division or group of the sacred writings. Now the bearing of this single fact in regard to the construction of the Pentateuch, and its organic connection with Joshua, is well nigh in itself decisive. We adduce but one more series of phenomena which the Hexateuch presents when taken in connection with the older historical books and the teachings of the earlier prophets. We mean the historical setting, in which the traditional view compels us to place the legislation and narratives of the Hexateuch. The supposition that the principal mass of the legislation and narrative matter which constitutes the Pentateuch originated in the age

of Moses, is beset by the gravest of difficulties. The legislation is for the most part unsuited to the age and the condition of the people for whom it was given, while it is both explicable and appropriate if assigned to a later period. Add to this fact the demonstrable incongruity between the ideals of religious life, the standards of judgment, which dominate this law and history of the Pentateuch, and the religious ideals and standards of judgment which the older historians and prophets employ in their representations and judgments of the Mosaic age and the times immediately succeeding. Now, let us make the supposition that the various documents comprising our Hexateuch were formed in the successive periods to which they bear witness, and into which they fit; in short, assume that our Hexateuch was a literary growth, extending through centuries; that the legislation it contains was of progressive formation, as well as its history. Let us make the Hexateuch, as a book, correspond with the progressive revelation it contains in its law and in its history, and this portion of our Bible becomes not only intelligible, not only can it be interpreted without artificial and violent methods, but it gains immensely in historic interest and value. Nay, we may add that it is adapted to reveal God in his ways of redemption as no other view of the authorship of these writings can claim to be. We are aware that many will regard such a deviation from the traditional view of the Pentateuch, as a fatal concession to the opponents of supernatural revelation, but we cannot share such a judgment. Indeed, if we view the Bible from the true standpoint, namely its claim to give us trustworthy knowledge of that self-revelation of God, which is complete in Jesus Christ, we cannot see how this essential claim and competency of the Bible is affected by any conclusion which results from a legitimate application of the principles and methods of literary and historic criticism. These conclusions may have interest and importance as problems of mere literary and historic investigation, but for the estimation and use of the scriptures essential to Christian faith, such conclusions have no vital importance. We venture even to maintain that should the theories of Kuenen and Wellhausen be accepted as the best solution of the literary problem of our Hexateuch, the right and competency

of the Bible to acquaint us with God in redemption would remain essentially unaffected.

The second question raised in our examination of Dr. Ladd's book is a question more vitally connected with the interest, we, as Christians, take in the Bible,—the question relating to revelation and inspiration. The reader will find Dr. Ladd's treatment of this topic able, and it will be hard to dissent intelligently from Dr. Ladd's general position. We confine our attention to a single aspect of this question. It is that of the relation which the Bible sustains to revelation and inspiration. Such a distinction as that between the Bible itself and the revelation with which it acquaints us, and between the writings that compose our Bible and the inspired men out of whose lives and deeds these scriptures have come—such a distinction is, as Dr. Ladd has pointed out, by no means trivial or untrue. To identify revelation with the Bible, or to make inspiration, the quality of parchments, a matter of words instead of an endowment of persons, would lead to an estimation and a use of the Bible which the Bible neither demands nor permits, if it is allowed to testify freely to its own character and purpose.

In seeking to define the true connection between the Bible and revelation, it is, we admit, not enough to say that the Bible is the record of revelation. Revelation is found in that entire spiritual movement—historic actions, moral struggles, religious aspirations, ideals—all that manifold and complete life we have before us in the Bible. Now the Bible as a collection of writings stands in very intimate and peculiar relations to that life and thought. We may come nearer to an accurate apprehension of this relation, if we say that the Bible is the medium, or the "vehicle" of revelation. Perhaps if we content ourselves with the perception that our scriptures have come out of this entire living movement of history and spiritual life, we shall preserve better the position at which the Bible, when rightly understood, places us, leaving it undetermined what is the more precise connection between our sacred writings and the divine Spirit, or between the actions and thoughts of the men of the Bible and the word and will of God, who, as we all confess, is adequately known only in Jesus Christ. The essential character which the scriptures in this connection have for our

Christian knowledge and life is that of authentic historic sources of information respecting the revelation which God has made of himself. We indicate this position and value of our scriptures when we recognize that their authors stand in a unique and not repeatable historic position in relation to this revelation of God. These men participate in this historic revelation of God in a way that later generations cannot participate in it. By virtue of this unique relation which these men sustain to the historical action of God in revelation, theirs is an inspiration in some sense specifically distinguished from the common inspiration of all who are the children of God. More than this, we do not think it to be necessary to maintain or possible to be maintained with rational confidence, respecting the nature and mode either of revelation or inspiration as distinguished therefrom. Any view of revelation and inspiration which the Bible sanctions, compels us to recognize degrees in both and forbids our extending to all portions of scriptures an equally close connection with the mind of God. This task of assigning to each portion of Holy Scripture the degree of divine truth or the divine Spirit that is to be recognized in it, would be a hopeless one for human powers, were it not for the fact that the revelation of the Bible is a progressive one and reaches a completion in a form that is itself intelligible, and supplies us with the necessary criterion for determining the degree in which the Spirit of revelation is present in all the earlier stages of it.

It is only in accordance with the scriptures, when we make them testify of Christ, and estimate them according as they do this. We are to make the Bible Christo-centric if we will interpret and use it according to its own declared purpose. Under such a treatment of the Bible, the various moral difficulties which portions of the Old Testament especially, present, are removed, without resort to a forced interpretation and doubtful apologetics. Under any other view of the revelation and inspiration of the Bible, such difficulties are insoluble. They are cleared away only when it is recognized that the revelation of the Bible is the mind of Christ, the morality of the Bible, its *final* morality *only*.

A third and final question, we have proposed, relates to the authority of the Bible. In any treatment of such a question

we may start with the Christian estimation of the Bible, which assigns to these writings an altogether unique position and authority, which we accord to no other writings. Dr. Ladd holds clearly and without reservation the Protestant's position—the Bible is our only rule of faith and practice. What then is the authority of the Bible, and how is this normative character of the Bible affected by the results of modern biblical study? "The authority of the Bible," says Dr. Ladd, "is its right to hold up before the soul the true picture of Christ and the true conception of Christianity." A better statement of what constitutes essentially the authority of the Bible could hardly be made, and it places us at the right point of view, and gives us the true canon in accordance with which we are to estimate the authority which belongs to particular scriptures. It enables us to distinguish between those scriptures whose teachings and requirements are entitled to supreme authority, and those scriptures whose authority is relative only, and those scriptures which, *by themselves*, can claim for Christians, no authority.

This treatment of the Bible is alone in harmony with its own character and claims, and with the true idea of the revelation made known in it. If the final revelation is the true revelation, so is the final revelation the only one that has supreme authority, and those scriptures which embody it must have a normative significance that cannot belong in equal degree to any other scriptures. Again, Dr. Ladd has ably shown that this competency of the Bible to "hold up before the soul the true picture of Christ" is not dependent upon an alleged infallibility, or absence of all error in the representations or teachings of the scriptures. Such an assumption is as unnecessary to the proper authority of the Bible, as it is unsupported by the testimony which the Bible presents to its own character. The function of the scriptures is, as has been stated, to give us the word of God. That alone is authority, and this function of the Bible is not best discharged by identifying in an unthinking way the Bible with the word of God, or by assuming a peculiar kind of inspiration *ad scribendum* for the purpose of giving us scriptures absolutely free from error. The only question really essential to this authoritative character of the Bible is: Does the Bible afford us authentic information of that general

course of history in which God has revealed his character and his will, and do the writers of these scriptures from their unique connection with this historical action of God in revelation, give us the requisite data for gaining a knowledge of that revelation in its essential character? Assuredly the scriptures do not take this position of supreme authority except through our understanding of them, and it is through this interpretative action that the authority of the Bible is reached; and it is upon the judgment of those to whom the scriptures are given that this assent to their authority must be based. But "what is this," it may be objected, "but to reinstate the principles of rationalism in the treatment of the Bible? Does not the authority of the scriptures on this view become a mere matter of human judgment, and is not this what Dr. Ladd logically teaches?" We think Dr. Ladd's position is as far from that of rationalism as his entire conception of the religion and history of the Bible is removed from naturalism. Whoever will follow our author through his admirable discussion of this two-fold relation which the Bible sustains to the word of God and to the church, can, with no degree of fairness, impute to him rationalistic principles. The Christian consciousness to which the ultimate decision must be referred is, as Dr. Ladd shows, a very different tribunal from that of the uninspired mind or the individual judgment: it is the mind of the church under the illumination and guidance of the Spirit, the same Spirit from which the Scriptures proceed. It is to bring to the interpretation and estimation of the scriptures that consciousness which has *itself* been formed under their influence. It is nothing more than the demand that the Bible shall interpret and vindicate itself; that its larger and unquestioned meaning shall be the criterion for interpreting its more special teachings; that what exhibits a less degree of the divine revelation shall be interpreted and judged by those scriptures which disclose the fuller revelation of God.

ARTICLE V.—DR. DELITZSCH ON THE PENTATEUCH.*

DR. FRANZ DELITZSCH, of Leipsic, has few equals in the field of Old Testament studies as a Christian scholar and conservative critic. What he has to say will be of special interest to those in this country whose minds are just being awakened to the great problems presented by the structure and contents of the Pentateuch. In the last edition of his commentary on Genesis (1887) he states at some length the solution which he is able to offer to these problems as a result of a long and studious career.

The object of the present article is to reproduce, without comment of any kind, the arguments and conclusions which he advances. If they seem fragmentary and oftentimes not sufficiently extended, the fault is not to be ascribed to the character of Dr. Delitzsch's statements but to the limitations under which a brief résumé necessarily labors. Those who wish to examine them more closely and to study the proofs with which they are supported must turn to the original.

Assuming without hesitation that there was an actual sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt, Dr. Delitzsch proceeds to establish certain antecedent probabilities with regard to the time when a Hebrew literature began to grow up. Egypt emerges from the shadows of the far distant past a civilized

* On the questions respecting the composition of the Pentateuch, no single scholar's opinions are of any binding weight. Their value depends on the strength of the reasons in their favor. But Delitzsch has a title to be listened to with respect, for several reasons; one of which is that he is a Christian believer. He has the right point of view; in this regard, standing in contrast with Rénan, whose brilliant but superficial (not to say, blasphemous) romance on the history of Israel—the counterpart of his "Life of Jesus"—has lately appeared. It is too much to expect even of Wellhausen and Kuenen that the rationalistic bias will be without its effect on their critical conclusions. To judge of the Bible in its parts, it is important to comprehend the Bible as a whole, and, above all, to comprehend the system of religion, the product of Revelation, the preparatory stages of which are exhibited in the documents constituting the Old Testament Scriptures.—ED. NEW ENGLANDER AND YALE REVIEW.

country, and during the 18th and 19th dynasties, the period of special interest in the present discussion, "material science and art displayed their greatest brilliancy. At that time the court poet, Pentaur, composed a poem, comparable to the Iliad, on the victory of Ramses II. over the Cheta. The passion for writing led to the most manifold productions. It was an age when polite literature flourished and the art of correspondence was cultivated." Even among the heathen inhabitants of Canaan it is probable that writing dates back to the Mosaic era, if not to the period immediately preceding. We may therefore readily accept the testimony of the Pentateuch that Israel learned the art of writing in Egypt. Thus, at the time of the Exodus, the people were in possession of the conditions necessary for the chronicling of those notable events which took place among them.

But previous to all the literatures of the ancient world, especially in the East, there are tales which are transmitted from mouth to mouth. Israel does not constitute an exception. The words of Isaac in Gen. xxvii. and those of Jacob in Gen. xl ix. appear to be a portion of this oral tradition. And since their contents do not seem *vaticinia post eventum*, and since the Oriental memory was capable of great things, these words may have been preserved even in their original form. Turning now to literature itself we may cite, without however anticipating subsequent discussions on the origin of the Pentateuch, the Book of the Wars of Jahve, Num. xxi. 14, as an example of what was produced at the time of the Exodus, and thus as one of the earliest specimens of the literary activity of the Hebrews.

There are, however, other important conditions, besides the possession of the art of writing, which are essential if a literature is to arise. Chief among these is a matured national life. The Patriarchal family must have developed into a people with a great past behind it and a great future before it. In the case of the Hebrews, Egypt was the place where this change took place. The surroundings were in one sense propitious. The Hebrews had before them a nation of culture and genius, a developed political and religious system. Dwelling for a long period of time in close contact with this highly

organized public and private life they would necessarily be schooled for the formation of their own religious and political institutions. "The sojourn in Egypt must serve to prepare Israel for its destiny as the people of the Law." Furthermore, we should expect to discover an inner relation between their long residence in the midst of a nation of matured institutions and the Sinaitic legislation. And such we find to be the case, for there are not a few references in the religious organization of the Israelites to the customs and regulations current in the land of the Pharaohs.

The residence in Egypt was, moreover, to serve still other purposes. The tyranny which the people suffered at the hands of the Pharaohs awakened in them a national and religious consciousness of their own. They remembered what their fathers had told them of the religious experiences of former days back to the time when their ancestors came from beyond Canaan, from Chaldea and Aramea. In the names which were current among the people at the period of the Exodus is to be found evidence of this re-awakened religious life. It may then be truly asserted that "the history of Israel does not begin with the condition of a rough, undisciplined horde, but with that of a family ripened into a nation under the richest means and models for the process of civilization." Such are the considerations which are forced upon the attention of all critics who do not, like Stade, sink the residence in Egypt into pre-historic mist. "That the time of Moses is to be looked upon as the real creative epoch for Israel which prefigures and determines the coming periods will, apart from some sceptical Ultras, be generally recognized."

There is yet another conclusion, more concrete and pertinent to the subject; and this is that a Mosaic Torah (Law) lies at the basis of the Pentateuch. "We are convinced that the history and the literature of the period after Moses demand the existence of a divine revelation communicated through Moses, which raised the people, now become independent, to the consciousness that it was the chosen of Jahve." Of course it is not to be denied that with the exception of some brighter intervals the life of the people seems to lack the guiding influence of such a Torah, but we are here concerned not with

a customary law. It is a revealed law, which is nevertheless one day to become customary. Again, "if the essence of the religion of Israel is ethical monotheism, as Kuenen conceives it to be, then the steady counter-current of naturalism in Israel shows that this ethical monotheism was no mere natural growth, but was the demand made by an original revelation, which set up an ideal whose realization was thwarted by the natural tendency of the people." Both the darker and the brighter side of Israel's history before the exile urges us to believe in the existence of a divine Torah dating back to the revelation through Moses. Not the least weighty argument is to be found in the fact that "the sacred authority of the prophets and the spiritual unity of the prophecy of both kingdoms, in spite of the totally distinct situation, are inconceivable without the fundamental unity of the divinely original basis." Furthermore certain references in the prophets, and in psalms generally thought to be by David, justify us in presupposing a Mosaic kernel in the Pentateuch.

Passing now over several subsidiary discussions, attention is called to the nature of the Pentateuch as it lies before us. It is not a carefully arranged book of laws, like the *Corpus juris civilis*, but it is a historical work which, following the course of national development, inserts the laws according to their time of emanation, and thus pictures the process through which Israel by and by received its matured institutions. This attempt to give laws in the order of their succession is quite striking, and naturally presupposes an acquaintance with the details of the history. In regard to a single place at least, that of the supplementary legislation on the Passover, Numbers ix. 1-14, "one finds himself confronted by a dilemma. It seems as though he must be either too suspicious or must assume a historical knowledge on the part of the author surpassing the measure of the probable." The Pentateuch as it stands is part of a great collective historical work which contains in addition Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings. Not until the period preceding the Maccabees, when the sacred literature of the nation was divided into the Law, the Prophets and the Hagiographa, did it receive the name Torah (Law). "Never, where in the canonical books of the Old Testament itself the Torah, or the

Book of the Torah, of the Torah of God or of Moses, is mentioned, does the book referred to mean the Pentateuch . . . ?” The name more often alludes to certain constituent elements of Deuteronomy. Further considerations in this connection will be presented a little later.

Omitting all reference to the Jewish and ecclesiastical tradition on the authorship of the Pentateuch, the following may be said in regard to the relation of Jesus and the disciples to this question. “The Lord and his Apostles think of the Torah (here Pentateuch) as would be expected of members of their nation. With them it passes for the work of Moses. They consider it the product of a divine revelation but not as God’s complete and final revelation” Consequently they emphasize designedly its human side. They did not, however, reflect more closely upon Moses’ exact relation to it. This “was beside their high and practical purpose and was moreover foreign to the character of their time. It is important for us to note that they were penetrated by the conviction that Moses was the mediator of the Law through whom Israel became the people of the Law.”

After examining exegetically those passages in the Pentateuch which testify to the actual share of Moses we find they “refer to single parts of the Torah, not to the whole Torah, and of course therefore not to the whole Pentateuch. With the verification of this testimony must Pentateuch criticism begin in order to proceed methodically.” As a preliminary remark it may be observed that the factors which make up the Pentateuch are well recognized, and “it is less the differing results of analysis which divide scholars than the different religious attitude toward the Holy Scripture, and the different valuation of the results in their bearings upon religion.” “Furthermore, the recent revolution in Pentateuch criticism has,” says Dr. Delitzsch and as his recent writings show, “influenced me to such an extent that I now perceive that the writer whose account of the creation begins the Pentateuch is not earlier than the one who relates the story of Paradise, but is later than he, and that the development of law and literature, out of which the Pentateuch has come, extended down into the period after the exile.” Nevertheless that this posi-

tion is not to be confounded with that occupied by the radical critics will shortly appear. The theory of the documents advocated must now be stated.

"With Gen. i. 1—ii. 4^a begins the work which was earlier called the Elohistic* *Grundschrift* (primitive document), and can now receive the same name in so far as in the present form of the Pentateuch it is the skeleton of the whole. Dillmann marks this work, which is especially given to the history of the cultus and of the law, A; we call it, following the customary and significant terminology of Wellhausen, Q (Book of the Four Covenants). That Gen. ii. 5—ch. iv. came from the same author is clearly impossible. The writer whose book began with these stories of primitive times is the Jahvist. Dillmann calls him C: we call him J. With ch. xx., if not earlier, a third narrator appears who like Q calls God *Elohim* up to the Mosaic epoch, but also makes himself known through a peculiar manner of delineation and a peculiar quality of language. He was named, as long as Q was regarded as the older Elohist, the second Elohist, but in reality the relation is just the other way. He receives from Dillmann the letter B: we call him E. The writings of J and E appear to have been welded into one whole before Deuteronomy received its final form. We name this whole JE, which Wellhausen terms the Jehovahist in distinction from the Jahvist. But Q also became by and by augmented, and the work which had thus grown, indeed within the priestly class which was called to the propagation of the law, is entitled the Priest's Codex (P. C.)." Certain integral parts of the Priest's Codex having been distinguished, attention is directed to the difference between the author of Deuteronomy, which in its original independent form is named D, and the Deuteronomist who edited the whole historical series ending with Kings in the style of the author of Deuteronomy.

To sum up the whole then, the documents are according to Dr. Delitzsch JE, (Jehovist) composed of two others J (Jah-

* The reader will bear in mind that the documents were at first divided broadly according to that name of God used in each. Thus in one set of passages God is called *Elohim* while in another he is called *Jahve* (Jehovah). At a later period in the history of Old Testament criticism further subdivisions were made.

vist) and E (Elohist) which have been welded into one; D, or Deuteronomy in its earlier form; PC (Priest's Codex) a development from Q (source) or *Grundsschrift* (Primitive document). This must be the general result of all thoroughgoing analysis. Details may be changed, but the broad lines above laid down will remain. Of course with the distinguishing of documents naturally comes an analogous arrangement in chronological order. But this must not prejudice against such evidence as tends to give an early origin for the constituent elements. "And if in the more accurate determination of the time at which they arose it should be necessary to go deep down into the period after Moses this does not exclude the possibility that what is related rests on tradition and that the codified laws stand upon Mosaic roots."

The next step is constructive. The attempt is made to define the limits of what may be considered Mosaic or produced in the spirit of Moses. In this search the Decalogue, being the "most fundamental part of the Sinaitic laws and the genuinest of the genuine" is to be the criterion by which we may decide what is the Mosaic style of thinking and speaking. Both in Exodus and in Deuteronomy where the Decalogue appears the style is the same. The copy in Exodus belongs to JE; and consequently we may believe that "if one of the two characteristically different styles goes back to the primitive Mosaic type" it is that common to D and JE and not that peculiar to the Elohist. Similar arguments from diction may be found to support Ex. xxiv. 4 in its statement that Moses wrote what is now contained in the Book of the Covenant (chap. xx. 22 seq.; xxi.-xxiii). "We have here in the Book of the Covenant, as in the Decalogue, the real Mosaic type before us, and indeed in relatively the oldest and purest form." These remarks will suffice to indicate Dr. Delitzsch's line of procedure. With regard to what in Deuteronomy are apparently the sayings of Moses he concludes: "We demand for these testamentary words a traditional substratum on which a reproduction, free it is true, but exceptionally spiritual and artistic, is built up. . . . The relation of the author of Deuteronomy to Moses may be compared with the relation of the writer who composed Isaiah xl.-lxvi. to the king among the prophets and with

the relation of the Fourth Evangelist to his Lord and Master." The author has really *lived into* Moses' manner of writing and speaking, and under the power of God's Spirit reproduces from a close spiritual union with Israel's leader.

The evidence found in Deut. xxxi. for the handiwork of Moses leads Dr. Delitzsch to say: "the Mosaic Torah of the fortieth year is contained in Deuteronomy but is not identical with it." And thus he proceeds, limiting the application of the word Torah by an acute exegesis and yet vindicating for Deuteronomy a Mosaic substratum. The Sinaitic legislation in the Book of the Covenant is repeated and amended in Deuteronomy. The most important case of this is the limitation of the cultus in ch. xii., whereby worship was centralized, one altar being substituted for the several allowed by Ex. xx. 24 seq. Such a change is to be accounted for on the ground that the first law was fragmentary and undeveloped, since in the Book of the Covenant itself the future establishment of this central holy place is presupposed. Furthermore, the fact that the prophets of the Northern Kingdom regarded worship on Ephraimitic ground as legitimate is not evidence against the early occurrence of this change. They could hardly be expected to hold a different view, since the division of the kingdom was in their eyes a providential event. Nor is the Tabernacle an anachronism, for a common place of worship was as necessary during those forty years of wandering as was a common leadership.

In regard to the historical character of the Priest's Codex, "we hold fast to this, (1) that the Israelitish history of primitive ages from the Elohistic account of the creation down to the story of Joseph was already composed in times long before the exile. For that traditions and reminiscences with such contents were present is to be presupposed and that they were in general what we find in Genesis can be gathered from literature which dates before the exile." (2) That the legislative and historical material in PC as in D and in JE is formed out of traditions which, however, did not always offer the same points of view and the same expressions. (3) "That at the time when Deuteronomy arose the foundation of the legislation codified by the Elohistic pen was already laid." These

statements are supported by passages in Deuteronomy and in the Book of the Covenant which require laws of the Priest's Codex as their presupposition and supplement. The difference between the two great types which form the Pentateuch is not to be explained by the difference in time, but by the fact that they each proceeded from a distinct school of thought. To the development of one Moses gave the chief impulse, while some great priest set forward the movement which, continuing down into the times after the exile, produced the Priest's Codex.

Scattered through the Pentateuch are a few examples of Mosaic poetry, notably Num. xxi. 17, 18; vi. 24-26; x. 35, 36; Deut. xxxii. Perhaps this last may have been one of the sources used by the author of Deuteronomy in his task of reproducing the work of Moses. To the same type of poetry belongs Deut. xxxiii. and Psalm xc., although they may have been composed by the author of Deuteronomy under an impulse identical with that which urged him to his more extended work.

The book of Joshua shows the same composite structure as the Pentateuch. When it arose "the priestly history of the period from the creation to the death of Moses, together with the excerpts incorporated from JE, was enlarged into the Pentateuch through the insertion of Deuteronomy, and to this Joshua was affixed as the sixth" element of a larger whole, the Hexateuch. "A writer under the influence of Deuteronomy, which, since Josiah was a spiritual power, worked over Judges, Samuel, and Kings into their present shape and bound them to the Hexateuch." At the time of the final redaction the hexateuchal relation was severed and the Pentateuch set apart henceforth to be given a place of preëminence as the Torah. This took place in all probability when the canon was constituted.

"Torah and Pentateuch are not identical terms. First in an age long after the exile are they identified. This is a fact of the greatest significance. Reflection upon it is adapted to remove conscientious scruples in regard to Pentateuch criticism and to free the mind from divers inveterate prejudices."

Some of Dr. Delitzsch's concluding remarks are of special interest. "The Christian as such accepts the Pentateuchal his-

tory and, generally speaking, the Holy Scripture, as a unity with one spirit, thought, and purpose. This unity consists also in all that pertains to our salvation and the history of its establishment. It is raised far above the results of critical analysis." However distasteful the work of criticism may be to the great mass of Christians and even to a certain class of Christian scholars, it is necessary for believing investigators to undertake the task and to show that these scientific studies can be pursued without treading under foot the respect due Holy Scripture. There is, it is true, a revolution going on in Old Testament territory which is bewildering, but "if only in this labyrinth the one truth *Christus vere resurrexit* stands sure, then we have Ariadne's thread and can find our way out. God is the God of truth. Love of truth, a submission to the demands of the truth, a surrender of traditional views which do not endure the test of truth, is a sacred duty, a part of the fear of God. 'Will ye be God's partisans?' Job cries out in condemnation of his friends who became the advocates of God against him, while they wrest the facts *in majorem Dei gloriam.*"

But with all this true courage there is to be a loyalty of faith, a loyalty which is the product of real experience and of a belief in the great facts of salvation. The Bible, notwithstanding its human, individual, and local characteristics, its relations to the times and to a temporary ritual, must remain a holy book since it is the "record of the works and words of God, the frame and the picture of the promised and manifested Redeemer."

ARTICLE VI.—SCHOPENHAUER'S METAPHYSICS OF MUSIC.

RICHARD WAGNER in his remarkable centennial essay on Beethoven acknowledges his great indebtedness to the pessimistic philosopher Schopenhauer for his fundamental ideas on music. Indeed, the philosopher's influence on the master is apparent all through the nine volumes of Wagner's literary works, and in the music dramas we find the philosophic relation of music to the other arts worked out into a new and immortal art. So not only to comprehend Wagner, the man, author, and composer, but also to understand the meaning of "the music of the future" and to gain a greater inspiration from the chamber music and symphonies of the older masters we should be familiar with these suggestive cullings from Schopenhauer's art chapters in "*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*."

We must recall the "truth which lies at the foundation of all that" Schopenhauer has "hitherto said about art," viz: "That the object of art, the representation of which is the aim of the artist, and the knowledge of which must therefore precede his work as its germ and source, is the Idea in Plato's sense, and never anything else; not the particular thing, the object of common apprehension, and not the concept, the object of rational thought and of science." Beginning his consideration of the fine arts with architecture, whose peculiar end was the objectification of the lower grades of the visibility of the will* in its conflict with gravity and rigidity, Schopenhauer now comes to the highest art of music for whose unique position there has hitherto been no fitting place in the systematic

* The key to Schopenhauer's philosophical system is in the title of the work from which we quote, "The world is my idea"—subjective idealism; yet he knows more of the thing-in-itself than Kant, for he calls this causal world stuff, this "kernel of every particular thing and also of the whole" by the name of that which is the most immediately and best known to us, viz: Will.

connection of his exposition. Music "stands alone, quite cut off from all the other arts." What can it be in this great and exceedingly noble art by which it affects the inmost nature of man so powerfully and is so entirely and deeply understood by him in his secretest consciousness? After giving himself up entirely to these impressions of all forms of music, which are usually left here as insolvable in their mystery, Schopenhauer then returned to reflection and an explanation of the nature of the imitative relation of music to the rest of the world. The independence of music and the secret of its influence he found in the explanation that in music we do not recognize the copy or repetition of any Idea of existence in the world. "Music is thus by no means like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the *copy of the will itself*, whose objectivity these Ideas are. This is why the effect of music is much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only of shadows, but it speaks of the thing itself." Thus is explained the phenomenalism and individualism of the lesser arts as contrasted with the universality of music. "Music does not express this or that particular and definite joy, this or that sorrow, or pain, or horror, or delight, or merriment, or peace of mind; but joy, sorrow, pain, horror, delight, merriment, peace of mind *themselves*, to a certain extent in the abstract, their essential nature, without accessories, and therefore without their motives. Yet we completely understand them in this extracted quintessence. Hence it arises that our imagination is so easily excited by music, and now seeks to give form to that invisible yet actively moved spirit world which speaks to us directly, and to clothe it with flesh and blood, i. e. to embody it in an analogous example. This is the origin of the song with words, and finally of the opera, the text of which should therefore never forsake that subordinate position in order to make itself the chief thing and the music the mere means of expressing it, which is a great misconception and a piece of utter perversity; for music always expresses only the quintessence of life and its events, and never these themselves, and therefore their differences do not always affect it. It is precisely this universality, which belongs exclusively to it, together with the greatest determinateness,

that gives music the high worth which it has as the panacea for all our woes. Thus if music is too closely united to words, and tries to form itself according to the events, it is striving to speak a language which is not its own."

"The words are and remain for music a foreign addition, of subordinate value, for the effect of the tones is incomparably more powerful, more infallible, and quicker than that of words. Therefore if words become incorporated in music, they must yet assume an entirely subordinate position, and adapt themselves completely to it. But," and here we trace the beginnings of Wagner's music dramas, "the relation appears reversed in the case of the given poetry, thus the song or the libretto of an opera to which music is adapted. For the art of music at once shows in these its power and higher fitness, disclosing the most profound, ultimate, and secret significance of the feelings expressed in the words or action of the opera, giving utterance to their peculiar and true nature and teaching us the inmost soul of the actions and events whose mere clothing and body is set before us on the stage. With regard to this superiority of the music, and also because it stands to the libretto and the action in the relation of the universal to the particular, of the rule to the example, it might perhaps appear more fitting that the libretto should be written for the music than that the music should be composed for the libretto. However, in the customary method, the words and the action of the libretto lead the composer to the affections of the will which lie at their foundation, and call up in him the feelings to be expressed; they act, therefore, as a means of exciting his musical imagination. Moreover, that the addition of poetry to music is so welcome to us, and a song with intelligible words gives us such deep satisfaction, depends upon the fact that our most direct and most indirect ways of knowing are called into play at once and in connection. The most direct is that for which music expresses the emotions of the will itself, and the most indirect that of the conceptions denoted by words. Where the language of the feelings is in question the reason does not willingly sit entirely idle. Music is certainly able with the means at its own disposal to express every movement of the will, every feeling; but by the addition of words we

receive besides this the objects of these feelings, the motives which occasion them. The music of an opera, as it is presented in the score, has a complete independence, separate, and, as it were, abstract existence for itself, to which the incidents and persons of the piece are foreign, and which follow its own unchanging rules; therefore it can produce its full effect without the libretto. But this music since it was composed with reference to the drama, is, as it were, the soul of the latter; for, in its connection with the incidents, persons, and words, it becomes the expression of the finer significance of all those incidents and of their ultimate and secret necessity which depends upon this significance. If now we cast a glance at purely instrumental music, a symphony of Beethoven presents to us the greatest confusion, which yet has the most perfect order at its foundation, the most vehement conflict, which is transformed the next moment into the most beautiful concord. It is *rerum concordia discors*, a true and perfect picture of the nature of the world which rolls on in the boundless maze of innumerable forms, and through constant destruction, supports itself. But in this symphony all human passions and emotions also find utterance; joy, sorrow, love, hatred, terror, hope, etc., in innumerable degrees, yet all, as it were, only *in abstracto*, and without any particularization; it is the mere form without the substance, like a spirit world without matter. Certainly we have a tendency to realize them while we listen, to clothe them in imagination with flesh and bones, and to see in them scenes of life and nature on every hand. Yet, taken generally, this is not required for their comprehension, or enjoyment, but rather imparts to them a foreign and arbitrary addition; therefore it is better to apprehend them in their immediacy and purity."

"According to all this we may regard the phenomenal world, or nature, and music as two different expressions of the same thing"—*will*, the fundamental world-stuff, expressing itself as nature indirectly and indistinctly as through Platonic Ideas, but immediately and subtilely in music as will-in-itself. "Music, therefore, if regarded as an expression of the world, is in the highest degree a universal language, which is related indeed to the universality of concepts, much as they are related

to the particular things. Its universality, however, is by no means that empty universality of abstraction, but quite of a different kind, and is united with thorough and distinct definiteness. In this respect it resembles geometrical figures and numbers, which are the universal forms of all possible objects of experience and applicable to them all *a priori*, and yet are not abstract but perceptible and thoroughly determined. All possible efforts, excitements, and manifestations of will, all that goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide negative concept of feeling, may be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies, but always in the universal, in the mere form, without the material, always according to the thing-in-itself, not the phenomenon ; the inmost soul, as it were, of the phenomenon, without the body. This deep relation which music has to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it. This is so truly the case, that whoever gives himself up entirely to the impressions of a symphony, seems to see all the possible events of the world take place in himself, yet if he neglects, he can find no likeness between the music and the things that passed before his mind. For as we have said, music is distinguished from the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more accurately, the adequate objectification of the will, but is the direct copy of the will itself, and therefore exhibits itself as the metaphysical to everything physical in the world, and as the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon. We might, therefore, just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will ; and this is the reason why music makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once appear with higher significance, certainly all the more as the melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon. It rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song, or a perceptible representation, as a pantomime, or both as an opera. Such particular pictures of human life, set to the universal language of music, are never bound to it or correspond to it with stringent necessity ; but they stand to it only in the rela-

tion of an example chosen at will to a general concept. In the determinateness of the real, they represent that which music expresses in the universality of mere form, for melodies are to a considerable extent, like general concepts, an abstraction from the actual. This actual world, then, the world of particular things, affords the object of perception, the special and individual, the particular case, both to the universality of the concepts and to the universality of the melodies. But these two universalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other; for the concepts contain particulars only as the first forms abstracted from perception, as it were, the separated shell of things. This relation may be very well expressed in the language of the schoolmen by saying that concepts are the *universalia post rem*, but music gives the *universalia ante rem*, and the real world the *universalia in re.*"

"The unutterable depth of all music by which it floats through our consciousness as the vision of a paradise firmly believed in yet ever distant from us, and by which also it is so fully understood and yet is so inexpressible, rests on the fact that it restores to us all the emotions of our inmost nature, but entirely without reality and far removed from their pain. So also the seriousness which is essential to it, which excludes the absurd from its direct and peculiar province, is to be explained by the fact that its object is not the Idea, with reference to which alone deception and absurdity are possible; but its object is directly the will, and this is essentially the most serious of all things, for it is that on which all depends."

The kinship of music and philosophy Schopenhauer shows strikingly after reminding us again that he has "been trying to bring out clearly that music expresses in a perfectly universal language, in a homogeneous material, mere tones, and with the greatest determinateness and truth, the inner nature, the in-itself of the world, which we think under the concept will, because will is its most direct manifestation. Further, according to my view and contention, philosophy is nothing but a complete and accurate repetition or expression of the nature of the world in very general concepts, for only in such is it possible to get a view of that whole nature which will everywhere be adequate and applicable. Thus whoever

has followed me and entered into my mode of thought will not think it so very paradoxical if I say, that supposing it were possible to give a perfectly accurate, complete explanation of music, extending even to particulars, that is to say, a detailed repetition in concepts of what it expresses, this would also be a sufficient repetition and explanation of the world in concepts, or at least entirely parallel to such an explanation, and thus it would be a true philosophy."

HARLOW GALE.

ARTICLE VII.--A NOTE ON A POINT OF MEDIEVAL HISTORY; by PROF. GEORGE B. ADAMS.**THE YEAR 1000.**

THE statement is often repeated that the people of the Middle Ages expected the end of the world to take place with the close of the first thousand years after Christ, and that as this date came near, this expectation occasioned great excitement and seriously affected conduct. Recent investigations make it certain that this supposition is unfounded and that there was no special fear of the end of the world connected with the year 1000.

The first careful study of the question was made by the Rev. Dom Plaine in the Catholic *Revue des Questions Historiques*, Jan., 1873. This was followed for France with an article by M. Raoul Rosières in the *Revue Politique* for March 30, 1878, and finally by a book, *L'An Mille*, by M. Jules Roy, Hachette, Paris, 1885, in the series of books called the *Bibliothèque des Merveilles*. Before the appearance of this book a careful study of the evidence had been made for Germany by H. v. Eicken and the results published in the *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte*, vol. xxiii. Finally an especially careful study for Italy has been made by Pietro Orsi who published his conclusions first in the *Rivista Storica Italiana*, iv. 1, and again in a little book, *L'Anno Mille*, Turin, 1887.

These investigators have reached, all of them, the same results. The erroneous opinion appears to have grown up from somewhat hasty conclusions drawn by historians in the eighteenth century from such phrases as, *hujus mundi superveniente termino*, which are of frequent occurrence in the formulae and charters of gift in the Middle Ages in stating the motives of the donors, and from a few references to the subject in the chronicles and other writings. Some of these will be found quoted in Gieseler's *Church History*, vol. ii. § 27, note 8. It is very certain that during some two or three centuries of the Middle Ages there was a more or less constant expectation that

the end of the world was approaching. Any unusual natural phenomenon, or public calamity, a war, a pestilence, sometimes an eclipse, or the falling of Annunciation on Good Friday was enough to create a momentary panic—antichrist was about to appear and the final judgment to begin. The evidence is entirely lacking that there was any extraordinary fear of this event in connection with the year 1000, or that conduct was affected in any unusual way as that date drew near. The approaching end of the world is referred to throughout the century following, in charters and elsewhere, in just the same way as before that year. Indeed the history of superstition in the United States and in our own century can furnish some facts to help us in understanding how likely such a belief was to keep constantly reappearing in much darker ages.

A passage from a charter of the year 1040, quoted from Flach, *Origines L'Ancienne France*, i. p. 140, will illustrate more than one point connected with the subject. "Mundi terminum propinquare prenunciata a Domino signa multiplici frequentia sui declarant. Surgit enim gens contra gentem et regnum adversus regnum et terre motus magni fiunt per loca. Unde ego Berta, dono Dei tocis Britannie comitissa et filius meus Conanus, hiis signis territi, etc."

GEORGE BURTON ADAMS.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB

March 23. No. 195 Old Chapel. Mr. Charles H. Ludington, Jr., read a paper on The Housing of the Industrial Classes in English Cities. A statement of the features of the problem as presented in London and a consideration of English legislation on the subject led to the conclusion that the programme of the State should be to forbid unhealthy dwellings, its mission being one of sanitation and police regulation; that state provision of artisan's dwellings is inexpedient; that English local government as now constituted, especially in London, blocks reform.

The conclusions from England's experience in the matter of private endeavor to better the conditions under which her industrial classes live has demonstrated:

(1) That the *very poor* taken as a class do not appreciate the benefit of wholesome homes and will make no sacrifice to acquire them. That they must be educated in the elementary laws of hygiene, in the value of pure air and sunlight, and in the use of fresh water and the broom, before they will be fit occupants for model dwellings. That the most effective power in thus educating them is personal interest in their welfare shown by their landlords.

(2) That this lowest element is the one it is most desirable to reach.

(3) That tenements in the worst districts may be so managed, and upon business principles, as to be training-grounds for their occupants in which they can be taught the principles of healthy living, and that such operations can be made to return a reasonable profit.

(4) That philanthropy and 5 per cent. can be coupled in the erection of model dwellings, so as to afford all necessary sanitary conveniences; that such dwellings can be made to house in a healthy manner as large a population per square foot, as the old rookeries, if not larger. That the *success* of such dwellings in London has been limited by two causes.

1. A class of working people, in general better off than those for whom the buildings were designed, have become the occupants, and have thus reaped the benefits in diminished rents.
2. Regulations, adopted and enforced by the owners of tenement-house property, concerning the occupancy of good dwellings, have given a sort of monopoly to the owners of bad ones.
(5) That the merely philanthropic side of the matter must not be given undue weight; that it is far safer to proceed in the main upon strict commercial principles and to bear in mind that to encourage *self help* lies at the root of all rational methods of relief.

April 13. Mr. Charles H. Ludington, Jr., read a paper on The Tenement House Problem in New York City. The conclusion was reached that the "double-decker," despite its defects and evil influences, must remain the prevailing type of tenement house. For the reformation of the system the following lines were suggested: (1) Agitation, not sensational in character, to keep alive and to develop public sentiment: (2) the gradual removal of all "rear tenements;" (3) the organization of societies and associations (*a*) to acquire and to renovate old tenements and (*b*) to erect wholesome and fit dwellings—the procedure to be invariably on commercial principles: (4) the creation of a permanent fund, by subscriptions and legacies and other means, to be administered by reliable trustees in furthering the objects of such societies: (5) the development of cheap rapid transit and ferry facilities: (6) charitable work in educating the poor to an appreciation of wholesome living: and (7) the organization and extension of cooperative loan and building associations.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

GOVERNOR CHAMBERLAIN'S ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA.*—We have received a copy of this work too late for an extended notice in this number of the REVIEW. It is our purpose to review the book hereafter and we will therefore at the present time merely announce its appearance. Having glanced over its pages we will add however that it gives every indication of containing a full, authentic, and thoroughly interesting account of one of the most important episodes in the history of Southern Reconstruction. The misgovernment that fell upon South Carolina during this period, arose primarily from the obstinate refusal of her leading and better classes to accept the situation, and to second the efforts of the Federal Government to enlist their interest and support in re-establishing the State on a new and better basis. This refusal necessarily left the management of its affairs largely to a less responsible and more ignorant class and the results are well known and clearly set forth in this volume. That a different course of action by the natural leaders of the people would have prevented all the evils for which maledictions are now heaped upon the "blacks and carpet-baggers" alone, is manifest from the fact that Gov. Chamberlain, at first without any assistance whatever from the leading white citizens of South Carolina, was able to accomplish so much in stemming the tide of corruption and folly which had set in previous to his election to the governorship. When his sincerity, courage, ability, and thorough integrity in the performance of his executive duties became so manifest as to extort their reluctant admiration and confidence, some faint encouragement on their part came to his aid, and had he been seconded by them, as they almost universally admitted he deserved to be, an era of security, prosperity, and repose might have been easily established on the basis of a genuine political freedom. Unfortunately such a basis was by no means in accordance with the popular desire or purpose. The old

* *Governor Chamberlain's Administration in South Carolina.*—A Chapter of Reconstruction in the Southern States, by WALTER ALLEN. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 8vo. pp. 544.

elements of race tyranny and local bigotry were too strong to be smothered, and after a brave but constantly losing contest, Gov. Chamberlain, abandoned by President Hayes to the mercy of an organized mob, was driven from South Carolina. From that time forth the cause of democratic liberty in the Cotton States was seen to be hopelessly lost, until that regeneration of their people which will ultimately come shall have been attained, or the Federal Government shall find both the will and the way to maintain the rights of its own citizens within their borders. The book is handsomely printed and bound, and is in every way worthy of the importance of its subject.

Even in so short notice as this, we cannot forbear a reference to the admirable manner in which the editor, Mr. Walter Allen, has accomplished his task. The great mass of documents which are here collected is so skillfully arranged, that, with the copious index which is furnished, the book can be readily consulted for information on any particular subject. In his preface, Mr. Allen says: "From the nature of the work that fell to his lot, the chief actor in this brief passage of history, not to say its hero, has been subjected in some quarters, to much dispraise, blame, and even obloquy. It cannot be doubted that he is a man of such quality as willingly to rest his claims to honorable remembrance on the truth of history,—the whole truth. It will not be disputed that for the period covered by this record he presents an interesting figure; nor will it be denied that he exhibited some high civic virtues and capacities, and did for South Carolina more than was hoped for at the time, and more than seemed within the power of one man. That he brought to his task great force of character, a strong purpose, admirable courage, high culture, and a powerful eloquence, is generally conceded. What he was, what he did, as well as the character of the events with which he was connected, will, however, best appear from a perusal of the record revealed in the following pages, in which no act or utterance that seemed to have importance regarding his aim and work has been willfully suppressed. By such completeness could best be fulfilled in respect of the subject in hand, what Tacitus conceived to be the main office of history: To prevent virtuous acts from being forgotten, and that evil words and deeds shall fear an infamous reputation with posterity.

"The whole is submitted with the confidence—such confidence as Carlyle must have had in publishing the Letters of Cromwell

—that the only condition indispensable to a just appreciation of one who bravely and honorably performed a hard duty is that what he did, why he did it, and how he did it, shall be fully and fairly set forth."

RENAN'S HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.*—The present volume is, as the author assures us in his preface, a part of a comprehensive work projected forty years ago, "The Origin of Christianity."

M. Renan's plan was to write the History of Israel as an introduction to the history of the first century and a half of Christianity. His reasons for deviating from his original design, and "plunging into the middle of the series," are the uncertainty of life, and chiefly the special attraction he felt toward the two chief persons in the history of Christianity—Jesus and Paul. The work which should have appeared first has been completed after six years of the author's undivided attention, and the first volume is now offered to the public; the two remaining volumes are promised within a limited time, and the entire work will bring the History of Israel down to the definite established Judaism in the time of Esdras. The present volume covers the time from the formation of the distinct people, as a branch of the nomad Semites, to the definite establishment of the kingdom of Israel under King David.

Those acquainted with the writings of Renan scarcely need be told that they will find in the present work the same brilliant and facile author, the same luminous and fascinating method of treating his subject that have always given M. Renan a strong if not dangerous attraction.

But what shall we say of Renan himself, and of the latest fruit of this gifted author's genius? It is by no means easy to do justice by M. Renan; he shocks our religious feelings by his levity of mind and his hard judgments; he tears away with a ruthless hand the veil of mystery where we are most impelled to recognize the presence of God, whose "ways are past finding out." He goes athwart our most cherished and deeply rooted convictions, he evinces a total incapacity for spiritual apprehension, he is Paul's "psychical man," attempting to give an account of things which the "psychical man" cannot know, because they are "spir-

* *History of the People of Israel till the Time of King David.* By ERNEST RENAN. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo, pp. 362.

itually discerned," and M. Renan does not appear to possess the organ or sense for the spiritual. We are prone to ask, Does Renan really understand the people of Israel, whose history he has written, he fails so signally to follow that people with sympathy in the profounder and more significant moments of their religious history. He has apparently no recognition of the great moral struggles, the profound religious experiences that constitute the greatness and unique significance of Israel. It is this lack of sympathetic appreciation, the first requisite to any true understanding, that makes us distrust Renan's qualification for such a task as he has proposed to himself.

Renan's general philosophy of the world and of man is one that finds neither occasion nor room for any god who is distinct from or superior to the material universe and the nature of man.

"No signs have been discovered in nature of any intelligent agent superior to man. Nature is inexorable, its laws are blind. Prayers never encounter any being that they can turn from its purpose. No prayer or aspiration has ever healed a disease or won a battle." Indeed, the two expressions which recur in the writings of Renan, "the genius of humanity" and the "Soul of the World," are quite synonymous with God. This philosophy of religion, we will only observe at present, allows no action of God as distinct from the mechanism of nature and the will of man. There is no room in such a philosophy of religion for a self-revelation of God as the source of man's religious life, much less a self-revelation of God in the form of historical action.

M. Renan belongs to a dominant school of historians which is distinguished by the critical principles it employs in the treatment of the biblical writings, and by the religious-philosophical assumptions under which it investigates the history of Israel. He starts with essentially the same presuppositions with Wellhausen, Reuss, and Kuenen, is guided by like critical principles, and we should expect him to reach very similar conclusions; but there are, however, two features in his treatment of the religion of Israel which distinguish his position somewhat sharply from the position of these historians. In marked deviation from his associates, Renan places the beginning of Israel's proper religion in a time far back of the beginning of Israel's history as a nation. It is not with the religion of Israel as a nation, the religion of Javeh, the God of Israel, that the development of the religion of Israel properly begins, nor is it to the period of the national existence of Israel

that we have to look, if we would find Israel's religion in its typical form. It is to the age of the Patriarchs, to the nomad-Semites—more precisely to a single branch of the Terachite-Semites, the Beni-Israel—that we must turn if we would know what that religion is which it was the unique vocation of Israel to make the possession of humanity. This religion of the Beni-Israel was, Mr. Renan teaches, a simple but spiritual monotheism. It consisted in the recognition of God as Elohim, the generic name for the Divine, the Almighty, the Ruler of all things. Elohim was worshiped by simple rites, free from idolatry and from human sacrifices. This religion of Elohim inculcated the plain virtues of truth, courage, hospitality, kindness, and unselfish regard for others. It is this unhistoric period that has special attraction for Renan. He finds in this religion of Elohim, the type of Israel's religion; it is the ideal to which the better minds—those who best preserved the genius of the people—always looked back and which they sought to restore. Indeed, according to Renan, the whole course of the religious history of Israel may be summed up in the endeavor to restore the religion of the Patriarchs. This estimate of the importance of the pre-Mosaic period for the religious development of Israel is in marked deviation from the significance which all the historians of the school to which Renan belongs, attach to it. With these historians, Israel's proper religion begins with the national life, and the development of Israel's religion goes hand in hand with the national history.

Quite otherwise with Renan; he sees in the nationalism of Israel the decadence from its religion, at the very outset. The adoption of Javeh to be the God of Israel was the sin and apostasy of Israel. Javeh was not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He was a tribal deity of obscure origin; originally cruel, fierce, destructive, not better than Chemesh or other tribal gods. Javeh was definitely adopted by the tribes in the wilderness, and he subsequently became the national God. As God of Israel, Javeh was no better than the nation. He was its "alter ego," its "genius or spirit personified." He did not make Israel better. Far from it, he brought to Israel those idolatries, those shocking and abominable rites, that were the great hinderances to the spiritual progress of Israel. "Javeh is not just, being monstrously partial toward Israel, and cruelly severe upon other peoples. He loved Israel and hated the rest of the world. He slew, lied, deceived, and robbed, all for the benefit of Israel."

Thus between Javeh and the Elohim of the Patriarchs there was really only antithesis. The Elohim of the Patriarchs was "just toward *all* and impartial. Javeh was partial and not just at all." Elohim was the God of all people and lands, Javeh was only Israel's God. Elohim was worshiped purely and with innocent rites, Javeh was worshiped with horrible rites and in an idolatrous way.

It was, then, a most untoward event for the religion of Israel, when Israel became a nation and Javeh became the God of Israel. "Each step in the formation of the national idea was accompanied by a degradation of the theology of Israel." The only hope for Israel lay then not in what Javeh could do to restore Israel, but in the ability of Israel to save itself from Javeh. The hope for the true religion of Israel, and the hope of humanity, lay in the genius of that people, that could expel Javeh and survive the destruction of its national existence.

"The prophets, and especially Jesus, the last of them, will expel Javeh—the exclusive God of Israel—and revert to the noble patriarchal formula of one good and just Father of the universe and the human race."

It is true that the prophets identified Javeh with Elohim, but they did so only as they first stripped Javeh of everything that constituted his distinctive character. It is an identification in *name*, not in fact.

The religious history of Israel then presents three stages or epochs. In its first stage, it enters in its pure, typical form, and that period forms the ideal towards which all subsequent ages in their best moments strive. The second period—the period of nationalism—has for the religious development of Israel no positive significance; it is a mere "episode" in the religious history of Israel. The last epoch in the religious development of Israel will be that characterized by the endeavor of the prophets to "recreate the first Elohimism," and to build upon the basis of the simple religion of the Patriarchs—to elevate and make universal the religious faith with which the Beni-Israel journeyed toward Egypt; and lastly, it will be the significance of the Law, that it is a distinct endeavor to reproduce and perpetuate the religious life that was long anterior to Moses.

J. E. RUSSELL.

YALE
AND HER
HONOR-ROLL
IN THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
1775-1783.

The undersigned, of the Class of 1862, has issued a monograph commemorative of those students and graduates of Yale College who rendered service to the country in the War of the Revolution.

An examination, at various intervals, of all accessible material, both in manuscript and print, has resulted in the collection of very nearly complete data for the work ; and, as the record reflects the highest credit upon the College and her sons of that period, it would seem to be well worth preserving in a permanent form. A large part of this record is entirely new ; many names and facts are recovered ; and the roll of soldiers and officers is unexpectedly full.

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45

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JUNE, 1888.

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NEW ENGLANDER

AND

YALE REVIEW.

No. CCXIX.

JUNE, 1888.

ARTICLE I.—MEN OF WEALTH AND INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING.

THE institutions here intended are those of higher education, colleges, universities, scientific and professional schools. The college offers liberal education. The scientific school gives a kindred, but narrower and more technical, training. The professional school fits for a special service. The university affords opportunity for extended courses of study, and for original research for the purpose of adding to the sum of human knowledge.

The term, men of wealth, is relative, but it may denote here those who have more property than the average of their own community, and are able to live in the better style there prevailing, and also to invest capital, either with or apart from their own efforts, for the acquisition of additional wealth.

The parts of a complicated machine can be understood in their function and importance, only as the structure and aim of the machine, as a whole, are intelligently apprehended. So a

view of our modern highly organized society in its entirety, and of certain co-working forces in its constitution and movement, is necessary, rightly to understand the functions and relations of two so important factors in it, as men of wealth and institutions of learning.

Civil society, that order of things in which men live together, and in which they, individually and collectively, may attain the true end of their being, embraces five institutions, viz: the family, the church, the school, the state, and the economic order.

The constituting principle of the family is in the domestic affections. Its function is the preservation of the species and the elementary training, or the unfolding of the man in his infantile period, according to his nature as a physical, intellectual, and spiritual being. In later life it affords sanctuary from every kind of care, and quiet opportunity for the enjoyment of every kind of satisfaction. Physically and chronologically the family is the basis of society, and as in itself a social unit, it touches human nature at more points than any other institution.

Man is a religious being. Hence society organizes the church for the promotion of his spiritual life. It affirms and fosters communion with God. Its aim is personal holiness. It thus teaches the ideal of manhood and the true use of life. So it gives the norm of procedure to every other institution.

Man is a political being. Hence society organizes itself into the state. The state is the institution of rights. Its function is to maintain equity among men in all their relations. Under the ægis of its protection, and by favor of its majesty and fostering sympathy, the church, the school, the economic agencies, the family and the individual, each and all, follow in safety and freedom their own inherent impulse and law. But the state finds its controlling principle in the teaching of the church upon the nature and destiny of man.

Man is an intellectual being, and therefore society organizes the school. This in all its grades, from the primary department to the university, receiving its ideal from the church, seeks a fully unfolded and perfected manhood, in intellect and character. By this, man is qualified for the conduct of life and of the several institutions of society.

For the supply of his physical wants man is dependent upon, and by virtue of his intelligence, he is supreme over, the material world. Hence society is organized economically. The economic order subjects nature to man for the purposes of subsistence, and that not merely physical, but such subsistence as is adapted and proportioned to all man's possibilities, in the various relations that he may sustain in social or institutional life.

Evidently, the harmony, dignity, and efficiency, in which the social order shall move forward, depend on each institution duly fulfilling its mission. If the church foster asceticism, tolerate dead formalism, or in any way inadequately promote holiness, the right standard of conduct, and the most effective incentives will be wanting in all relations ; the state, the school, the family, and the industrial order will lack both impulse and guidance, and society will languish at every point. When the state is corrupted or enfeebled, no men and no institutions are properly protected or sufficiently encouraged in their activities. If the family loses its purity and power, society is poisoned at its fountain ; men start in life dwarfed in physical, mental and moral equipment. Where the economic system is obstructed or perverted, poverty comes upon many, and lack of sustenance and vigor characterizes every department of the social order.

These general and obvious considerations may aid us in showing the relation of men of wealth, a leading factor in the economic order, to higher institutions of learning, a controlling factor in the educational order of society.

I. In the first place it is important to outline the scope and significance of this class of educational institutions. The college consists of a body of men, provided with certain requisite facilities, set apart for the promotion of all knowledge and the liberal training of men ; and also of a body of youth engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, and receiving large training of mind and character. Its mere existence therefore is a perpetual affirmation of the dignity of man, and of the inexpressible worth of perfected manhood. The common school is highly valued, but its service is far inferior. Its aim is to give such elementary knowledge as is indispensable in securing self-support, and in fulfilling the ordinary relations of citizenship.

But man is more than an instrument of production. He is an end in himself. Accordingly the college undertakes the full development of manhood, not merely equipping men for activities, but unfolding them, according to the possibilities of human nature as intellectual, moral, and immortal. The symbolizing of this conception in an institution, which, by the character of the men engaged in it, commands universal respect, is of supreme importance. Man is easily overborne by his passions, by his love of pleasure and of gain, of place and power, and the embodiment in a college, of the highest idea of his nature, is a steady restraint and a power unto salvation. Men readily see the value of knowledge which may be directly utilized in promoting subsistence or wealth, but the university declares the value of knowledge for its own sake, for the proper furnishing and feeding of man's soul, for the right development of his character, as a thinking, choosing being, responsible for what he is and becomes, as well as for his own livelihood. It is not the end of life to get a living; getting a living is only one of the means to life. Philosophy, or the rational explanation of God, man and the universe—science, or the rational exposition of the forces and laws by which the world goes on—art and literature, or the expression of the human mind and experience, in forms of language and beauty—religion, or the joining of man to God in personal allegiance and love—it is in these that man participates in the divine, and so rises to the freedom and dignity of his nature and heritage. To fashion men by these inspirations is the function of the college. Matthew Arnold criticizes American civilization as lacking that which is interesting, that which is elevated and beautiful. It is precisely these which the institutions of learning are established to foster and to contribute to our life. Sweep from this broad land the three hundred and fifty colleges scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific, whose existence is an object lesson upon the essential nobility of manhood, and the ideals of life would be destroyed, the aspirations of youth would be transmuted into greed for gain and position, and society would immediately start on a rapid decline from civilization to barbarism.

But for a just estimate, it is necessary to observe that the college is not only important but *indispensable* to the healthful

continuance and effective operation of all the other institutions which have been named, as working together in the maintenance and progress of the existing social order. It has ever been the right arm of the *church*. In Christian philosophy, man is a reasonable creature, accountable for conforming character and conduct to an intelligent conception of the supreme being and of his relations to that being. He is to be brought into communion with God through his intelligence. Naturally, therefore, in Scripture the ministry is regarded as a teaching office. Accordingly ever since the schools of the prophets were established under Samuel, the church has insisted on an educated ministry. The first disciples of Jesus Christ were of the ordinary education of their time, but when the gospel was to be preached to the great Gentile peoples, the best educated man of the Jewish race was called to the service. And even he was required to give nearly three years to special training. Then he went forth with unparalleled energy and influence among the great cities of the time. It was he that gave the best and most complete exposition of his Master's life and work in epistles, which have been the light of the church in all subsequent generations. The eminent example of this graduate of the school of Gamaliel has never been forgotten. In the first centuries, the schools of Antioch and Alexandria, the latter connected with a great university, sent out trained theologians and preachers to mold the thought and life of the church. In Alexandria lived and taught that great and liberal scholar, Origen. Here also taught Athanasius, the ablest man and the successful champion of orthodoxy in the greatest controversy in the early church. In connection with him, the three great Cappadocian bishops, Basil of Caesarea, and the two Gregories, educated together at Athens, exercised a ruling influence over the Greek church during subsequent centuries. It is a significant tribute to the power of the college, that when their fellow student, Julian, became apostate, and wielded imperial authority to suppress Christianity, he forbade Christians to hold schools of rhetoric, grammar, and the classics, in order to prevent the spread of the obnoxious religion among the educated. As sacerdotalism came in, and the notion that ordination imparted some divine quality prevailed, the education of the

clergy relaxed, but in the great eras of church progress, we find the names of great scholars, like Augustine, who was trained in the schools of Tagaste and Carthage.

Passing to later times, the reader of history finds that the great reformatory movements in the church have taken their rise in institutions of learning. The universities of Prague and Wittenberg, of Basle and Lausanne, of Oxford, Cambridge, and St. Andrews were the birthplaces of the Reformation. Methodism originated in Oxford, and the modern American movement for foreign missions in Williams College, Massachusetts. The indispensableness of colleges to the church is demonstrated by the fact that the predominant consideration, in founding most of them in this country, has been the felt need of an educated ministry. For nothing else would such sacrifices have been made amid the struggles of the early settlers. "Dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our ministers shall lie in the dust," such is the motive which the Harvard founders avowed. The preamble of the original charter of Yale reads, "for upholding and propagating the Christian Protestant religion by a succession of learned and orthodox men." With a few exceptions of modern date, this is substantially the origin of American colleges. How wise for the church men have thus been, appears in the fact that though with the advancement of society in wealth and culture, and the consequent multiplicity of other needs, a constantly increasing number of the liberally educated go into other pursuits, yet, between one-fifth and one-fourth of all graduates from American colleges are in the Christian ministry. Whatever may be the proportion of these to the entire body of the ministry in all denominations, no doubt they are the leading power in the pulpit of the United States. They set the standard of pulpit excellence, while many who miss of the college have the training of the theological school. Except among the colored people of the south, an illiterate clergy is no longer tolerated. The advancing intelligence of the people, the more intellectual advocacy of error, the competition of the press, make the need of an intellectually trained ministry more imperative than ever.

The college also greatly serves the church in leading young

men to choose the ministry as their vocation for life. Next to the Christian home, in determining men to this service, is the influence of the Christian college. During and near the end of his course of collegiate study, the young man, approaching manhood's responsibilities, takes a more sober view of life than ever before. What he shall do with himself, is a question to him of grave importance. The college, as a rule, holds up before him the ministry as the highest service in the world, and best for him, if, by virtue of talents and character, he is worthy of it. This influence turns scores of aspiring youth into the ministry every year.

The service of institutions of learning to the *State* is no less marked than that rendered to the church. In its large and divine office of maintaining equity and promoting the general welfare, the State has need of men of amply trained powers, and possessed of whatever wisdom human experience affords. Studies in history, philosophy, and science, fit men for the solution of the perplexing questions which arise in legislation. Colleges ground men in the elements of governmental science and political economy. Men, who through classical training have become familiar with the principles of government and their fitting application, have always been of inestimable worth in the conduct of States. It is the Anglo-Saxon peoples who in modern times excel in government. Any one who will read the great speeches of English statesmen made in crises of peril, will be surprised to observe how largely they draw upon the experience of classic nations. These statesmen attained to their leadership through university education. "Take the Cambridge calendar," says Macaulay, "take the Oxford calendar, for two hundred years; look at the church, look at Parliament, look at the bar, and it has always been the case that the men who were first in the competition of the schools, have been first in the competitions of life." In like manner, the reader of the *Federalist* finds an instructive illustration of the way in which men like Hamilton, Madison, and Jay—graduates of Columbia and Princeton—use the experience of ancient nations for the guidance of modern republics. The author of the Declaration of Independence was a member of Hampden Sydney College, Va., and the most eloquent advocate of the

measure on the floor of Congress was a graduate of Harvard. The former, that men might know for what he wished to be remembered, penned for his own tombstone the inscription, "Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, and founder of the University of Virginia." The liberty proclaimed in the declaration was to be perpetuated by the university. This is in happy accord with the historic position of institutions of learning in politics. On the Continent of Europe they have always been radical, the advocates of a larger liberty, but in this land, where liberty is established, they are staunch and conservative in maintaining it. Broad views of the experience and condition of mankind have this power.

Thanks to the democratic spirit of the American people, the United States has often availed herself of the services of self-taught men of exceptional abilities, but these men, like Henry Clay, have gone through life keenly regretting their lack of institutional discipline. More than once in the Senate, the great Kentuckian suffered the sharpest chagrin from the taunts of antagonists over the misuse of words. This class of men, in high station, have generally supplemented their own felt deficiency, by the selection of counselors of severer training and wider knowledge. Washington took into his cabinet Jefferson and Hamilton—the latter the statesman *par excellence* of the period—while Abraham Lincoln, though greater than any of them, leaned heavily on men of finer training, Secretaries Seward, Chase, and Stanton, and Senator Sumner. For carrying out measures, the energetic man of limited training serves well, but in the wise molding of the policy of States, university men have always been relied upon.

In this connection, the service of the college to the *Bar* should be emphasized. In the influential profession of the law there are many men without collegiate training, but the standard of respectability and honor in it, is established by graduates. Nothing requires more severely disciplined powers, and nothing furnishes a larger sphere for their exercise. In the determining of rights, in the conflict of interests, subtle and profound questions constantly arise, which need the keenest discernment, the fullest knowledge, the broadest view,

the closest logic, and the firmest grasp, of which the human mind is capable. Titles to large amounts of property, rights of persons, the just defense of society, are concluded in the courts, by the wrestlings and inquisitions of tremendous intellectual power. The stability of the social order depends on this being constantly done, according to law, truth, and justice. In fact, as a rule, the leading minds at the bar are university trained. Especially the Bench, which in its function of Interpreter of laws, gives legislation final and practical shape, elevating to its responsibilities from the foremost of the bar, presents a galaxy of powerful minds almost unapproached in any other sphere. About five hundred judges of Supreme Courts, State and National, have graduated at our colleges. The debt of the public to institutions of learning, for their influence in constructing the legal conditions under which we live, cannot be estimated.

The relation of the college to Medical Science and practice is of like importance. In the human body in itself, as affected by the infinitely varying conditions of the spirit that dwells in it, and by the endless variety of conditions about it, its liabilities to disease, the adaptation of multitudinous substances of nature to heal and invigorate, is an immeasurable fund of fact to be mastered, and of principles to discover and apply. This is something of vital interest to everybody. Life, vigor, and happiness, are largely dependent on medical science, and on wise and skillful medical practice. The high attainments reached here, are almost of necessity, the result of higher training both liberal and special. The fine discrimination, the care to observe all the facts involved, the ready discernment of laws, the judgment unfettered, while enlightened, by experience, quick as intuition, these are intellectual endowments, obtained best in severe classical training. The fulness of knowledge gained from the past is stored up in the professional school. The entire conquest of some of the more afflictive and destructive forms of disease, the higher measure of general health, the lengthened average of life, are all largely owing to the institutional training of men, and the promotion of this special learning. The facts are too familiar to require comment.

The relation of higher institutions to the *Common School* is vital. The genesis of our educational system has been from higher to lower. It is not the ignorant who ask for instruction, but the educated who labor to have it desired and received. It is a suggestive fact that while Harvard College was founded in 1636, it was not until 1647 that the first law establishing schools in towns of fifty or more inhabitants, for the teaching of reading and writing was enacted. The motive in each movement was substantially the same, to raise up, in the case of the college, religious teachers, and in case of the school, religious learners, or in other words, to qualify the common people with ability to read the Bible, and so to be successfully taught religion. That the higher institution might attain its true success, the lower was called into existence. So always the relation of the college to the common school is formative and causal. In the perpetual conflict between those who would make the school more comprehensive and efficient, and those who would confine it to the three R's, graduates are always leaders among the former. The college is constantly demanding that the high school shall send boys to its doors with a better preparation. The high school calls upon the grammar school to furnish pupils correspondingly advanced, and the latter in its turn hands the exhortation down to the primary. Thus the influence of the university is steadily to raise the quality of the common schools. The consequent demand for better public teaching gives rise to normal schools, and is continually introducing graduates into the higher and more responsible positions. Necessarily also large reliance is had upon college men for a good class of text books. No man can make a good English grammar who knows no other language. The text books on natural science are the work of men of science in institutions of science. Thus throughout the fountain head of educational life for the people is in the college. This is a plain matter of history and fact.

At the present time we are receiving large additions of population, utterly foreign to us in spirit and modes of thought. The most effective assimilating agency which we have, that which will most readily transmute these incongruous elements into our homogeneous American life, is the common school. This is vital

to political and social order. Because of its power in popular education, the college is a safeguard of our institutions of government.

The relation of the university to *Literature* in all its forms, the newspaper, the periodical, the book, the artistic representation of human experience in prose or poetry, the weightier treatise upon philosophy or science, is controlling and creative. It is impossible to indicate or to imagine the power and usefulness of the press, in its breadth of relation and production. The frequent comparison with the pulpit, and controversy over its relative value, is vain. It relieves the clergy of a great part of their duties in a former time, and leaves them free for a more effective and undivided attention to their own proper work. The press is in like manner co-operative with every activity. It is impossible to see how the institutions of society, the church, the state, the school, the family, and the economic order, could any of them exist as at present, much more how they could co-exist, and the established order of civilization continue without the Argus-eyed vigilance and the many-sided power of the press. It is by no means perfect or beyond criticism, but on the whole its beneficent force is magnificent. It is to be cheerfully admitted, that much which comes from it of excellent quality is by those who have not had the advantages of university life. A considerable portion of it is ephemeral, but it serves a useful end. But there can be no doubt that the standard of literary excellence of any given time is determined by those classically trained. It is a significant fact that according to Mr. Henry Holt in a recent issue of this periodical, while twenty-five years ago there was hardly a college-bred man in the publishing business, now there is hardly a publishing house that is not presided over by one. That means much as to the standard by which current literature is tried and molded. Minds familiar with the classic productions of the ages will keep the literature of the present from a low level. The effect of this is not to restrain but to promote originality. It furnishes material and exhilarating guidance to genius. To give a catalogue of the contributions to our permanent literature made by the instructors and graduates of our universities, would be to give the history of the various departments of human

thought, of philosophy, science, and poetry during the period under survey. In the nature of the case, an institution of any age becomes a literary center. The intellectual fame of the little spot within ten miles of Massachusetts state house, is owing mainly to the presence of Harvard University. This is too familiar to be written; but it shows the importance of the college in producing and molding the intellectual food of the nation.

The college also has essential relations to the economic order. A little more than a hundred years since Adam Smith published his "Wealth of Nations." Since then the science of business has become a university study. Political economy treats of the laws and forces of the business world. Like all science, it is a generalization. Its data are the facts of universal experience. In truth, most departments of business gladly acknowledge their indebtedness to this science. There are in practice many departures from sound teaching, but the more thoughtful and experienced men in the circles of industry, commerce, and finance, adopt the theories which political economy advances. Notwithstanding the fashion of newspapers which dissent from some of the teachings of the schools, to sneer at college men as unpractical theorists, in almost no department of human activity have the teachings of the higher institutions effected such extensive transformations as in the business world. The better practices prevalent in commerce and finance, in relation to land, and labor, and capital, are the outcome of the patient studies of men, who, not engaged and absorbed in some limited round of financial activity, take a wide survey of the facts and conditions under which business of all kinds is done, and so discover the general laws which must be observed for the harmonious working and true success of all. It is easy for the empiricist to sneer, but the thinker in the end prevails. "Let him laugh who wins."

It is not only by scientific teaching that the college affects business, but also by sending into its activities men scientifically taught and liberally trained. Formerly the three Professions absorbed nearly all of the graduates of the colleges, but the above statement regarding the number of college bred men in the publishing business, is indicative of what is going

on continually, in all the higher and more responsible lines of service. The administration of railroads, banks, insurance companies, large trusts and exchanges, financial editorships, and the like, are rapidly being taken by men endowed for them by collegiate discipline. As society grows in wealth and culture, and as the business life becomes more and more intricate, the demand for the highest trained talents is becoming more imperative, and institutions of learning are meeting it as fast as possible.

There is little need here to remark the contribution of science to the Arts. The application of scientific principles to production has revolutionized the conditions of modern life. Watt and Fulton were not graduates, but in their discovery and utilization of the force of steam, they were associated with men of larger science. The well-nigh simultaneous demonstration of the availability of electricity in communicating between distant places was by two professors, Joseph Henry and S. F. B. Morse. Similar has been the development of the telephone. From the expectant attitude in which men of science are now standing in the presence of the phenomena of electricity, as if they had not yet harnessed it to its most effective service, much more may be anticipated for the convenience of society, in respect to light, or heat, or power. This kind of investigation is incessant in the colleges and scientific schools throughout the land.

The bearing of the college on the *Family* is mainly, but not wholly, through its general influence on society. In its teaching of social science it diffuses a broad and sound view of family life in its purity and relations.

With its open door of opportunity for the young, it exerts a silent influence even upon homes whence no one enters it. It places before the family as high a standard of attainment as possible, and though the youth may, from misapprehension of its availability, fail to use its privileges, it helps him to decide for something high and noble, as his life work. The college is a perpetual assertion of the indefeasible dignity of man, and a warning against a low or unworthy sphere of action. It thus carries upward the course of many a young person that is unable to enjoy its full benefits.

But the chief importance of the college to the family is yet to come from educated women. The number of students in the women's colleges, as well as in co-educational institutions, is very large and rapidly increasing. The notion that an educated woman is to be a blue-stocking, a strong-minded devotee of woman's rights, so-called, or is to follow teaching, or one of the professions for life, is happily disappearing, and the education of women is gaining recognition for its own sake. Woman is being looked upon as human, capable of training and development into nobler womanhood, and the opinion more and more prevails that while various lines of activity may well be open to her, woman's highest function is always in the establishment and administration of the home. What may be done here in a very few generations by educated women, the world may hopefully anticipate. If, as students of the laws of heredity declare, it is the mother who transmits the nervous and brain organization to the son, we may look for a noble race of men from educated women. This is a matter of no little importance to the progress of society. Then, too, it is the mother who predominantly molds the dispositions and ambitions of her children. It is she who kindles and fosters the highest aspirations. An educated woman will desire her children to be as well trained as herself. President Elliot has shown from the records of Harvard, that educated men are more likely to transmit education, than rich men riches. But the influence of the educated woman is far more potent. The value of the higher institutions of learning to that fundamental institution, the family, cannot be estimated, nor is it yet fully demonstrated in experience. It will be, when colleges for women have had time to attain to their true measure of significance.

This line of thought need be pursued no farther. It is clear from this glance, that the institutions of higher learning hold a fundamental relation to, and are essential to the power of, the church, the state, the school, the family, and the economic order. Hence their claim to recognition and honor should command the sober and helpful consideration of every lover of his country and of mankind.

Space will not permit any considerable exhibit of American

colleges here, but a few statements may correct certain unfavorable impressions that prevail.

II. The work of colleges in this country is, and is to be, immense. According to the last report of the United States Commissioner there are in our land three hundred and forty-six colleges and universities, forty-nine schools of law, one hundred and fifty-nine of theology, and one hundred and seventy-five of medicine. Of these a minority are of the highest order, the majority respectable, while a considerable portion are, as the commissioner says, "Only the expression of a grand purpose." Secondary schools have taken the name of college with the intention to grow up to the name. Often the intention has been abandoned and the title retained. About three-fourths of the institutions reported are colleges, admitting only those who present certain generally required attainments, and sustaining a recognized four years' course of study.

These institutions have been established and developed by the voluntary efforts and sacrifices of those especially interested in religion and education. Every body of Christians going into a new territory finds a college desirable, and so there spring up more institutions than there is a constituency for. But the rapid development of the new States soon gives each college enough to do. Excess of denominational zeal has been moderated by the founding of State Universities and, in some measure, other institutions apart from religious control. But to-day the colleges, of highest standing and brightest promise, are those that are under pronounced religious influence, but are possessed of catholic spirit. This is owing to the popular belief in religion as essential to education, and to the fact of clerical leadership in the promotion of education, for, as the Commissioner of Education remarks, "The theological profession exerts the largest influence favorable to thorough scholarship."

This observation of the Commissioner, who is not a clergyman, derived from a survey of the entire country, should comfort those sons of Yale who so keenly regret that her charter requires ten out of eighteen members of her corporation to be ministers of Connecticut, and that if not the charter, the traditional interpretation of it, demands that the president be chosen

from the ranks of the clergy. The fact is that not only Yale, but nearly all colleges in this country exist, because of clerical devotion to higher education. This exceptional interest in education, and effectiveness in the founding of colleges, may evince exceptional qualifications for their administration. Institutions whose charters are without restrictive features follow substantially the course of Yale. Nineteen out of twenty colleges in want of an executive head—even many state universities that are organized to be conducted independently of ecclesiastical control or denominational influence—do not go to the professions of the law, medicine, or journalism, or even to the professorial chair for a president. Not merely for the sake of religion, but in the interests of liberal training, of philosophy, science, and literature, and for wise administration they naturally turn to that “profession which exerts the largest influence favorable to thorough scholarship.” Judging from the general practice through the land, it seems probable, that to remove the restrictive feature of Yale’s charter would not materially change the mode of procedure under it.

There is a general tendency to unite professional schools with colleges. A two-fold benefit results. Young men are withheld from the temptation to rush into professional life without the requisite disciplinary study, and those who go to college are restrained from business until they have received the needed measure of special training. The two classes of institutions are helpful to each other.

That some of these colleges are badly located, or that some should never have existed, is only saying what may be said of many railroads, blast furnaces, and woolen mills. The fact remains that the American people in entering upon their inheritance of lands, and in the founding of states, have made heroic efforts to establish an high order of society.

The opinion often expressed that there are too many colleges is a doubtful one. There is no room for jealousy between them, as the work is one, and all colleges help each other. The appeal of the Western college for money, educates that public sentiment on which the Eastern college must rely. That all the money should be given to institutions situated in one corner of the land, like New England, is absurd provincialism. New

states are so rapidly filling up, Dacotah gaining more population in twenty-five years than Massachusetts gained in her first two centuries, that colleges must be founded at the outset to secure their just ascendancy in the formation of society.

The notion that young men should come East for their education, while it may be just in relation to the special advanced studies afforded by the university, is thoughtless and puerile, as regards the liberal training given by the college. The first influence of the college is to suggest the importance of education, and it must be present to make the suggestion. The fair name of Harvard or Yale will do little to draw the youth from the mining excitements of Colorado. It will not rescue him from a materialistic conception of life. Moreover, if a young man in Nebraska should be awakened to the desirableness of higher education, the question of its attainableness remains. To come East costs too much. The practicability of such education for a poor young man needs to be constantly demonstrated by the proximity of the institution. It is in this way that Western institutions, instead of detaining men from the Eastern, constantly operate as feeders to the latter. There are hundreds of young men in Eastern colleges from the West, because the spirit of education has been fostered in their native regions by small colleges near at hand, that are demonstrating both the desirableness and attainableness of such training. A notable illustration of this is in the history of President Garfield. Williams glories in him as one of her most illustrious sons. Well may she do so. Yet it was not Williams, but Hiram—a college which few ever heard of until he threw the lustre of his name upon it—that, by its nearness to his boyhood's home, incited him to intellectual effort, and made it possible for him to gratify his awakened mind. When he had there accomplished half the curriculum he came East for better advantages. In a speech before the alumni of Williams, in the city of Cleveland, in the winter of 1880-81, he attributed the molding of his mind and character—outside of his home—principally to two persons, and strangely enough his intellectual expansion, he credited to a woman—a teacher in Hiram—and his moral education to the president of Williams. It was a distinguished honor to her, that the President-elect of the United States should thus write

the name of Almeda Booth beside that of Mark Hopkins, but the educators of Ohio agree that it was merited.

Ohio has been regarded as a conspicuous instance of a state with too many colleges, and from her error newer states have learned wisdom. She reports thirty-three colleges, but of these only twenty-one are really such, with the requisite standard of admission and four years course. Yet this mistake has its mitigations. Too many colleges for what? For the population? But New England has twenty colleges with one hundred thousand less people. Is there a too lavish expenditure of money? With nearly twice the population of Massachusetts, she has three millions of dollars less in college buildings, facilities, and funds. But does she reach an equal proportion of her youth? Massachusetts has twenty-one hundred and thirty-four students in college; Ohio has twenty-nine hundred and sixty, besides having in immediate connection with the colleges, and in part aided in instruction by the same funds, thirty-four hundred and twenty-four in preparatory departments.

Consequently Ohio sends a very large number of her sons east for training. In the catalogue of Yale University there are in all departments eighty-two names from Ohio, placing her next to New York in patronage of Yale, though Pennsylvania, which is next in the number of her colleges, follows close behind with seventy-two. When a state is early and amply provided with institutions of learning, her citizens soon demand the best the country affords, and return with usury what they have received from older communities.

It somewhat reconciles one to too many colleges, to observe what kind of a state such excess makes. What state holds a prouder place in the nation? Whence have come better Presidents? Harrison, Grant, Hayes, and Garfield—the last two trained in her small colleges. A gentleman, for many years a resident of Washington, remarks that no state sends to congress so influential a delegation as Ohio. Her public men are of high order and large significance.

It is desirable that the privileges, and the benefits of college life, should be evenly distributed throughout the country. It is a hopeful sign that the attendance upon college is in larger

proportion at the West than in the East. According to the report of the Commissioner of Education the attendance on college in the North Atlantic States is one person to 1286, in the South Atlantic one to 1600, in the South Central one to 1532, in the Northern Central one to 1273, in the Western one to 1031. Probably this relatively large attendance in the West is due to the fact that most colleges there are open to women, and that the higher education of women is more generally esteemed than in the East.

From this imperfect survey, it may be inferred that the voluntary mode of founding and conducting institutions—those doing the work who thoroughly believe in it—has been on the whole wise in procedure and efficient in operation. And it is fair to say that the small Western college, though its needs may not be so large, has just as valid a claim upon the public for support, as has the older and well established one of the East. Probably its needs are more pressing, because they relate to the essentials of liberal training, rather than to the higher pursuits of the few, who have already enjoyed such education. But the claim of both is solid, and both have hard work to keep pace with the demands made by the rapid expansion of the country, and the materialistic tendency of the time.

III. This leads to the consideration of the perennial need which colleges have of money. In this matter there are two questions, what expenses are to be met, and who should meet them.

1. The members of a college faculty, because of their absorption in the work of instruction and study, cannot engage in other activities to secure a livelihood. They must be supported, and that too in a way becoming their station and service. In fact, the salaries of college instructors are lower than they would command in almost any other pursuit. They are a body of first class men on less than second class pay. As reward for their renouncing gains, they have what money cannot command, the satisfactions of learning and beneficence, and of honor among men, yet they cannot live without money, and should be liberally supported in a service for which they are, in fact, no more responsible than the men who spend their lives in accumulation.

A college must have buildings, dormitories, halls, chapel, recitation and lecture rooms, libraries, and museums of art and history. These buildings decay and must be repaired or renewed. A large college is a small city, in which by-gone structures are continually to be taken down, and replaced with those adapted to present need. The college must have also costly apparatus for experimental and illustrative uses. This must in like manner be continually renewed. But a chief necessity for expenditure is growth. The desire of education is widening and deepening. Here is enlarged opportunity for the college to accomplish the end for which it exists. These tendencies should be encouraged. That colleges should continually need more and more of money, that what satisfies one year will be inadequate for the next, is not peculiar to them. It is a fact common to all great and prosperous enterprises. Business corporations want more capital as their business enlarges, and why should not colleges? A thriving railroad must invest more, and in new outreaching and coöperative lines. It is this which makes all good colleges always poor in relation to the work to be done. Small colleges need money because they are small, and large colleges need money because they are large. Both are trying to keep up with the growth of the demand for Light. The more work they do and do well, the more they create the desire for education, hence more students and need of larger and better faculties and facilities.

With the advancing intelligence in society, institutions must raise their standard for admission and of graduation, and some must provide for graduate courses of instruction, where the few but ever increasing number may pursue their specialties still further.

The reading of the catalogue of Yale discloses a rich opportunity for students, but a glance at the campus and the last report of the Treasurer, makes it a mystery how she can offer it. Exclusive of the old brick row, which disfigures the campus, and has already begun to be demolished, she has less than one-third enough rooms for her students. She is hard pressed to support the instructors in various departments. Every year enlarging demands are made—demands for more men, more rooms for recitations and lectures, and more books for libraries.

With all that she is doing, with all the excellent instruction she is imparting, hardly a single department of science, or philosophy, or literature is provided for according to the present state of the science in question. Important chairs vacated by death or removal, there is lacking income to fill. In the winter of 1886-87, before the Alumni Association of New York, President Dwight said that Yale needed two millions of dollars. To the unthinking it seemed to be only enthusiastic, post-prandial talk. Of course, anybody would like two million dollars! But among those, who on the ground are acquainted with the wants of the institution, or rather the demands which the public is making on Yale, and the facilities which the public seems to expect her to furnish, the remark appeared inadequate, and has been criticised, only as too low an estimate, by at least three millions. These statements can be definitely justified in figures, pointing out exactly where every dollar called for can be wisely and economically used in furnishing what is imperatively needed. In 1870, President, then Professor Dwight, in a series of articles on the future of Yale, expressed the opinion that in the then coming ten years, the college should obtain a million of dollars. He argued for it as if it were a large sum to his own mind, and one it might seem preposterous to propose to the public. But the event proved it to be a small figure. Within fifteen years two and a half millions came to the institution, without any of that special organized effort for which the professor pleaded. If he has made a similar mistake now, it is to be hoped that the wiser giving public will demonstrate his error in the same felicitous way. This is written not as a plea for Yale in particular or as a statement of her case, but as an illustration that all colleges and especially the prosperous, are poor in relation to the work that they have to do. One of the very best of Western colleges, furnishes just as good an instance. It has about one hundred and twenty thousand dollars in buildings, lands, etc., and one hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars in invested funds, including twenty-five thousand for library and eleven thousand for aid of students. The faculty consists of sixteen gentlemen. The chairs of astronomy, geology, zoology, chemistry, and political economy have not a penny of endowment, and the chair of English liter-

sture and rhetoric only \$10,000. Of course tuition amounts to something, but the only way in which the institution keeps out of debt is by raising a subscription of several thousand dollars to meet the annual deficiency. One hundred thousand dollars is necessary to bring the endowment up to the present outgo, and as much more for buildings needed every day. Not less than half a million dollars is needed within the next five years to put the college abreast of the public demands upon it. This case is typical. Three-fourths of the colleges of this land are compelled to make up an annual deficiency by subscription, after the miserable manner of inefficient, declining churches. A just, general statement of the pecuniary needs of institutions of learning is, that all colleges are always in a financial strait.

2. The next question is, on whom does the responsibility for the adequate provision for our colleges rest.

It is sometimes assumed that it rests upon those who patronize them, that the students should pay the entire expenses of their instruction. The notion is based on a defective view of public policy. The education of young men and women is not an individual interest, merely nor mainly; it is of public concern. Such higher education is essential to the civilization of the time. There is no reason why the State should provide common schools, that does not obtain as to the public support of the college. There is no reason, why the nation should train men at West Point and Annapolis for military and naval service, that does not hold good for the public provision, for the training of men for service in the relations of civil life. Of the two, the necessity of the latter is the more imperative. This is recognized by the establishment in the newer States of State universities. And the reason, why the State should not be called upon to support all the colleges, or enough for all the demands of the time, is merely one of expediency, viz: that the voluntary system works better, more efficiently, more freely, and more fully in sympathy with the higher tendencies and needs of society. Political control is low in its tone, embarrassing to the operations of an institution, and obstructive to growth. But the fact that the State does not do this great work, for the reason that somebody else is doing it better, does not relieve the public of the responsibility for its pecuniary

maintenance. State taxation is by no means co-extensive with men's pecuniary obligations to the public. A sound public policy must maintain institutions of higher education.

Further, the idea that students should pay all the expenses of their institutions, is impracticable. About one-third of those now in college are self-dependent, carrying themselves along by their own efforts, and incurring more or less of debt. Another third are supported in part or wholly, but with difficulty, by parents and friends. Not more than one-half of the remaining third, or one-sixth of the whole, could meet any considerable addition to the present expenses of college life. But if colleges had no invested funds, and there were added to present college charges, the interest on the plant, buildings, land, libraries, and facilities, the tuition fee, in most of our largely attended institutions, would rise from one hundred or one hundred and fifty to five or six hundred dollars per annum. This, with the unavoidable living expenses which are now the student's heaviest burden, would put higher education, out of the reach of the larger part of those who are now receiving it, and would diminish the number of educated men in society by two-thirds. The suggestion is utterly impracticable.

History is against it. In fact, all college students are beneficiaries to the extent of more than half of the cost of their opportunities. Indeed, in English universities, the word college was originally used to designate a company of students, housed in a certain building and supported from certain endowments. The necessity of higher education has, through the centuries, been so plainly not for individual but public ends, that the maintenance, not of students but of institutions, by benefactions has been well-nigh the uniform custom. The annual income of Oxford and Cambridge from endowments is three million and seventy thousand dollars, almost twenty times as much as Yale has from similar sources.

From the nature of the case and from experience, the inference is inevitable that the responsibility for the adequate support and vigorous advancement of institutions of learning is upon men of wealth. And notwithstanding that the prosperity of these institutions is largely due to them, it must be confessed that the severe struggles of many colleges, to carry

on their work, and their inability to do it adequately, show that men of wealth but imperfectly appreciate and discharge their duty.

IV. In this article there shall be no sympathy with the wide spread and undiscriminating disparagement of this class of men. As for the most part, the architects of their own fortunes, and efficient promoters of the general wealth, they are entitled to generous appreciation and admiration. Their record in this country is brilliant, beyond comparison with that of their class in any other land or time. The current relative exaltation of the laboring class in discussion and in politics, is unjust and injurious. While labor is the indispensable instrument of capital, capital is the leading force in production, furnishing with brain and energy, opportunity to labor and directing it in channels where society is benefited most by it. Granting that men of wealth invest, and risk under the impulse of self-interest, which is by no means the same thing as selfishness, still they constitute a beneficent force. In investment, men put their money where it affords not only a benefit to themselves, but to others, and often the latter is the larger benefit of the two. The consolidation of railroad lines into systems, was entered into by capitalists for their own advantage, but the resulting reduction of freights to the country, between the grain producing areas of the west, and the Atlantic seaboard, amounts, according to Mr. Edward Atkinson, to more than five hundred millions of dollars per annum. Who imagines that those immediately concerned realize anything like that?

True, wealth is sometimes guilty of usurpations. In large combinations men gain large profits at the expense of the public, perhaps aided by special legislation. But this may be offset by the enormous losses incurred, by which the public is permanently benefited. For instance, nobody knows how many millions have been invested in railroads in this country which proved a dead loss to investors, yet the roads have later lifted whole sections of the country, into new and vigorous life.

The truth is, that under the impulse to acquisition, men of wealth have developed the country, gridironed its broad domain with one hundred and twenty thousand miles of railroads, opened the lands to the people, worked the mines and scat-

tered their riches throughout the world, and made this "wilder-
ness to blossom as the rose."

Wealth, though like every good, it may be perverted, is a blessing. And the wealth in this country is enormous, being about \$60,000,000,000. It is increasing with amazing rapidity, having accumulated more since the war than in all our history before. According to Mr. Atkinson the annual addition is \$900,000,000. Every setting sun witnesses an increment of \$3,000,000 to our national wealth. While this increase is very widely distributed, this is an era of unprecedently rich men. More than one pair of money kings can be selected who could buy, without inconvenience, all our colleges at a fair valuation. Now, admitting fully that men of wealth in their office as promoters of wealth are a beneficent force, and more, that their presence in society makes possible and secures to us in all ways better institutions of religion, education, art, government, and philanthropy than we could otherwise enjoy, it is very clear that they are abundantly able to meet the necessities of our institutions of higher learning, even when largely stated, and that in view of this ability and their relations to society, it is their imperative duty to meet their wants immediately, adequately and continually. That they do not readily discharge this duty is not owing to meanness nor greed, but in sympathy with the time they have been too absorbed in acquisition, to think of distribution, and have given little thought to their responsibility for the right use of wealth.

The commanding consideration in this matter is that a man's wealth is not his own. It belongs with himself to God, to whom he, as a trustee, is accountable. Only as he meets the needs of society in a large and intelligent way does he respond to the claims of God. He is to remember that however he is accustomed to think of himself as the creator of his own wealth, he is indebted to society, both for the opportunity and the power. Society is the other party in all his transactions, and from that he makes his gains, and however much his honorable conduct of business may promote the riches of society, it is by no means an adequate return for all that he receives. It is an highly developed civilization to which he had contributed nothing, an order of society which he was born into, and which

had been slowly and at infinite cost developed, which gave him the idea and incentives to wealth, and afforded him the facilities for its attainment. The institutions of religion, government, and education have always worked with him and for him. It is therefore to them and to society that he owes a liberal share of his acquisitions. A man, who in the insurance business makes money on the premiums of the insured and by interest on investments, is indebted, not merely to those persons with whom he immediately deals, but to that entire society which is so instituted and ordered that such associations of effort and exchange can exist and prosper. Men who get wealth from those who ride on the railroads owe an inestimable amount to that stable and highly active order of society in which railroads are wanted and can be built with safety. So fundamental, as has been already shown, is the college to the existing exceedingly productive social and economic order, that it may be doubted whether there would have been ten thousand miles of railway to-day in the United States had not our institutions of learning been established from the beginning. The indebtedness of all these stupendous enterprises of continental scope in great variety of directions to learning, it is impossible to estimate, but it certainly is vastly more than all that the colleges ask for.

Men of wealth have not only thus an exceptional stake in highly civilized society, but an exceptional interest in the further development of such institutions. If institutions of learning have done so much, better sustained and more efficient ones would still more improve the economic order. It is for the interest of the capitalist that society should have many, imperative, and costly desires. But the necessities of barbarism are few. It wants no railroads, cares not for well wrought mines, or highly tilled fields, or products of manufacturing skill. Why is not Africa covered with a network of railroads? In our country, business waits for nothing so much as hordes of people, who being destitute of enlightenment and of aspiration, are content in barbarous conditions, and hence do not produce, and so demand from others. The way to get a market that shall be stable is to promote the higher civilization of the people. The economic order cannot advance by itself. Other

institutions are essential, not only to the institution, but to the increase, of property. "Man shall not live by bread alone." The church, the state, and the family, in that degree of efficiency which is secured only by the controlling influence of the college, are necessary to the continuous and extensive operations of wealth. How can business prosper under an unstable or feeble government? How can government be strong without intelligence and moral principle in the community? How can moral and intellectual character be promoted but by institutions of education and religion? Such is the stake of men of wealth in institutions of learning, as a factor in economic progress, that they should, as men of enlightened enterprise, render such institutions as vigorous and influential as possible.

The acquisition of wealth is beset by peculiar perils. One of the chief is mammonism, a low materialistic conception of life, a sordid spirit, an excessive estimate of the value of money for its own sake, and as a means for personal aggrandizement. To this, men of wealth are peculiarly exposed, and for its spread peculiarly responsible. "They that desire to be rich fall into a temptation and a snare, and many foolish and hurtful lusts; for the love of money is the root of all kinds of evil." So prevalent is mammonism, that it is hardly to be wondered at, that a Chinaman should write an article for the *North American Review*, declaring Heathenism to be better than Christianity. Of course he failed to see that Christianity is opposed to the vice he charged upon it; but his inference was not strange from the surface of things. The favorable conditions for acquisition afforded by Christianized society, together with unparalleled opportunity in our vast open resources, come upon men, after they have entered upon business with moderate aims, with almost resistless power of allurement. It is not only avarice that is awakened, but the desire of power stimulated by the success and, perhaps, the dominance of others, and also the love of distinction. In this land we have no titled nobility, but as money will command nearly every thing which the foreign lord inherits, we have an aristocracy of wealth, to attain to which many men sacrifice every worthy thing in manhood and in experience. Granting that many, with rigorous self-discipline, hold themselves in a noble and honor-

able equipoise, it must be admitted that this spirit of Mammon is terribly dominant in American life. It manifests itself in the business sphere, in unscrupulousness as to methods, in defalcations, in enormous frauds effected oftentimes under cover of legal chicanery, and wholesale robberies, which are condoned because of their enormity, and because society organized for a simpler condition, has as yet found no way to prevent or punish them. These things seriously impair and imperil the stability of the economic order. They break down the confidence which is the basis of commercial prosperity. When business morality declines, legitimate business ceases to be profitable.

The spirit of Mammon is fearfully corrupting politics. It has blinded men to political honor. As lately in Rhode Island, the decisive force in almost every important election is money, criminally used. The same power invades the legislative hall, to shape laws for the advantage of individual or local interests.

The same spirit lowers the life of the church. It degrades the home. The man sacrifices domestic happiness to gain, and the mind of the young is turned away from the really noble things to be aspired after, to the glitter of material eminence. All things are seen with distorted vision.

These things are not written here to denounce them, but to show the necessity that men of wealth—those that are not worshipers at the shrine of the golden god—carry forward our institutions of learning with a vigor that shall correspond to the intensity of business life, in order to counteract this peril that threatens every important factor of the social order. The college is less affected by this spirit of the time than any other institution, not excepting even the church. The least mercenary place in the world is a college. Here is a body of persons permanently concerned in things apart. The money worshiper never enters. It is uncongenial and unprofitable to him. Here is a life of silence, of study, of research, of the worship of the ideal, of aspiration for the noble things which money cannot command. The institution is itself a mighty protest against Mammon. It wants money, and a good deal of it, but not for Mammon. It wants money to convert it into intelligence, into intellectual and moral dignity and worth.

There is no way conceivable in which men of wealth who would save their own class, and the order of things in which they are actively concerned from ruin, can do so much as in promoting higher education. To abate the passions of the market-place, let the colleges and universities be exalted.

Another evil of the time fostered by great fortunes is excessive, luxurious self-indulgence. A man is to provide for himself and family a livelihood, and that, too, in a large sense, taking into account the whole range of human desires and possibilities. But it is a serious question, how far expenditure may go in this direction. Luxuriousness, or lavish outlay for things which minister to the lower nature, is a vice. But when a man spends for everything which may gratify the appetite, for all the rich surroundings that may please the sense, keeps a numerous stud of blooded horses, a tally-ho coach and a yacht for the ostentatious delectation of himself and his comrades in idleness, he reveals a guilty ignorance of the real dignity of the human soul, and an equally culpable oblivion to the needs of his fellow men. A life of personal pleasure is childish and weak, and the larger the scale of it the more conspicuous it is, but not the less contemptible. Luxuriousness is a vice. A man has a right to expend on himself and on his own, so much for sense, for comfort, for art and literature, as he and they can appropriate unto personal enlargement, and for development in intellectual and moral worth, and *no more*. To indulge further is to become debauched. Luxuriousness is a debasing vice. It enervates the man and his family. It dazzles, corrupts, and misleads the young. It is not a use, but a vicious destruction, of wealth. A man had better burn an hundred thousand dollars a year, than consume it in the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eye, and the pride of life. To burn destroys it; but the luxurious use of it degrades the man himself and society. At the present time, next to Mammonism this is the vice of the rich. In former days, to acquire a fortune required time, and certain virtues, which were more and more developed in the activity. Now wealth is often so easily secured, that there is no education in the process, and many gain it who have neither the intellectual or moral discernment to direct it to any but low personal ends. Their tastes are vulgar,

and without originality. They blindly follow what they see, and they have an eye only for the coarser displays about them. In large segments of society, there is no just standard of living, and men sport away what would have been great fortunes to their nobler ancestors.

In this state of things there is another reason why men of wealth should further the college. The college is inherently antagonistic to luxuriousness. Here is high thinking with necessary plain living. In universities, faculty and students, except here and there one of the latter, who is really out of place, live in exceeding simplicity, giving emphasis to higher things than personal gratification. An institution of learning is an incorporated protest against all kinds of grossness. It is a proclamation of the supreme worth of man, because of his intelligence and spiritual nature. It sends forth men impressed with the dignity of life, and the larger use of wealth, as tributary to manhood. It is by fostering such institutions that men of wealth can best resist the debauchery to which their class is most grievously tempted.

It is a slightly different way of putting this, to say that men of wealth need colleges to afford them the true and large enjoyment of riches. It is colleges which give to society those better elements which make life desirable. Wealth can command most things. But what, if the things desired do not exist? Money becomes tributary to weal, when it gathers that which builds up character and cultivates refinement. But money can attain these only in a highly refined state of society. Intellectual society is the only society worth living in. Wealth becomes useless when it cannot command the communion of intelligent and moral men and women.

But the weightiest reason for giving to colleges is in the benefit to mankind. Apart from any reactionary advantage, what a man does for his fellows in education reaches men most effectively to bless them. In this disinterested bestowment, a man rises to a divineness of character and activity. The incentive to industry presented by Paul, is that a man may have to give to them that have not. This is Christianity. In fact, most of our colleges have been started from this motive. Those who found, and those who conduct them, are consciously

working for mankind. One seems to have been wasting time, in thinking of any other aspect of the matter. The demand upon rich men to engage in college work is an invitation to participate in something far above the realm of personal advantage. Money used for such noble ends has nothing sordid in it, no vicious tendency to mammon or luxury. It is rarely excessive and is without peril to the subject. All acquisition for such purposes is sanctified. It is clean in method. It will bless the toiler. Like mercy, "it blesses him that gives and him that takes." This is a kind of good which the many can engage in, but the wealthy class, by reason of exceptional power, can best do, and are chiefly responsible for, those larger deeds which colleges need.

Giving to colleges has its peculiar attractiveness and affords its peculiar satisfactions. One who had given \$50,000 to a college said, "I cannot tell what I have enjoyed. It is like being born into the kingdom again." It is indeed being born into a kingdom; it is accession to empire over men and over the future.

Those immediately benefited are *young men*—young men of high aspirations, of superior talents, brilliant promise and immeasurable opportunity. The services of the best men trained in the best manner are thus furnished the public. The ultimate good is better institutions of religion, government, and education, better homes, better business conditions, and in every way a more elevated society.

Giving to the college reaches men in their *highest* needs, and so meets all needs. Men are easily drawn to give their money to cases of physical distress, to eleemosynary institutions near at hand. It is well. Hospitals and asylums, for every class of afflicted and helpless ones, should be provided. But this is only temporarily meeting want. It alleviates, but does not prevent. These ills are the outgrowth of an imperfect order of society. Economical expenditure will aim to prevent them. To give to the promotion of education is to elevate the life of society so as to prevent those sins, crimes, and misfortunes, which occasion most of the sorrows of the poor and wretched. He who gives a hundred thousand dollars to establish a hospital alleviates. The man who gives the same to a college pre-

vents, for the next and every generation. Which is the higher service, that of alleviation or prevention? The latter not only saves suffering, but adds to the power of society for all time. It is higher work.

The *permanence* of such work is satisfactory. The higher the service, the more enduring. An educational force works deeply and surely. It alters the whole structure of that with which it has to do. For instance, how much more effective money expended in promoting sanitary science than in the affording of comfort to the sick—the latter of course must be done. This science has reduced the death rate in the cities of England and America, where applied, thirty-three per cent. Who can measure the diminution of painful disease indicated in such a fact? What an emptying of hospitals and a saving of expense? But whence sanitary science? Who is active in promoting its application to society? Educated men in every community where it is known. It alters the entire body of conditions under which men live, and comes in as a permanent force. To foster colleges is thus to elevate life perpetually.

This work for colleges has an attractiveness in its *breadth*. Men of quick sympathies and generous impulses are easily led to aid good things in their own community. It is well. But the benefit is limited in its range. It has only a local significance. But he who gives to a college steps up upon the broad plain of national and world life. The empire he enters is bounded only by human possibilities of development. He reaches the nation and the race of mankind. This opportunity to influence men does not quickly touch the sympathies; it does not move the feelings like a case of suffering at the door, or like a little need of one's own community. But it appeals to intelligence, to a large vision of the world, of society and its advancement. It would be a liberal education to many, crowded and driven in the business whirl, localized in their sympathies, to come to a thorough intelligent apprehension of the scope of college influence. Such breadth of view would open to them an alluring breadth of opportunity.

The *associations* of this order of benevolent service are a great honor. The world respects no class more than those to whom the public entrusts its youth, and who are elevating

human life in the education of men and women. He becomes allied with these, who furnishes money for their work. He is equally deserving of public appreciation. His name becomes identified with the best things, linked in the public mind with the best names forever. To a man necessarily absorbed in the duties of accumulation, it must be a pleasure to invest some of his acquisitions, where they will perpetuate his name and power for good in high relations after he is gone. He gains a noble kind of earthly immortality. Doubtless this hope influences men in founding colleges, and happy is he who is able to establish a college that is, and is to be, needed. Yet as things are, it is a very grave matter. So many institutions now exist, that the need of more is not clear, except in the opening territories. He who founds a college takes upon himself the grave responsibility of demanding from others, and from coming times, coöperation. He should therefore be sure that there is such a necessity for the work, as will readily be apparent to them. However useful money may seem in a new institution, it has to struggle on with beginnings and uncertainties, and is in a problematical condition for a long time; whereas, money, invested in an already well established institution, goes immediately at work with all the momentum and scope which the college has gained in its years of existence.

Springing from this same honorable impulse, men in giving to colleges show a strange preference for the erection of buildings, rather than direct aid in instruction. Of three hundred thousand dollars given to Yale last year, about two hundred and fifty thousand was for buildings. These were much needed, but not more than Chairs of instruction. A building seems to be more of a reality, it bodies forth to the eye the significance of the gift, but it is less enduring than an endowment for a chair. Buildings decay, endowments remain. Men pass away but endowments are immortal. The name of the donor to the funds of instruction appears on the records and in the catalogue, with an ever-lengthening roll of honor through the centuries. And what an honorable roll it is. If any man will take the catalogues of fifty colleges in the United States, he will find a galaxy of noble names, not easily paralleled in honor in any other sphere of benevolent service, and will feel

like Bunyan, as he caught a glimpse within the golden gates, "which, when I had seen, I wished myself among them."

V. Notwithstanding these considerations, and many more like them, which may not be stated here, the colleges are struggling with inadequate support. Men are widely apathetic. Why do not the men who are truly benevolent in spirit, relieve the want? Simply because the case is not fully understood. In the nature of the case the work of the colleges is quiet and secluded. There easily grows up a sense of distance between them and the world at large. Then, too, they are such a mighty force for good, that there is a subtle consensus of all evil influences against them, as against the Christian church. These influences are numerous and various in their operation. President Elliot is reported recently as accounting for the difficulties of Harvard, by the adverse attitude of the press towards all colleges, and towards Harvard in particular. Whether reported correctly or not, there is truth in the assertion. With the exception of the religious press and a small portion of the secular, the tone of the newspaper and its mode of holding the college life before the public are such as to convey a very erroneous impression of it. The carping spirit towards the theories of education practiced, instead of intelligent discussion, the exaggerated accounts of boys' pranks, the enormously disproportionate attention given to boys' games, all make up an essentially false summary of the significance of the college, fostering an unintelligent apathy towards their work.

Now it would be delightful, if men would of themselves rise above these daily influences, and properly investigate the facts, gain a just appreciation of these institutions, and come forward with the requisite funds. Indeed, it may be said that it is their duty to do so. But as a rule men do what they are educated to do. And here, as in all the things in which they give their aid, they must be enlightened and persuaded. And here comes the duty of the colleges themselves. *If they will do what every other kind of benevolent agency does, viz.: adequately present their case, their needs will be correspondingly met.* This is the one remedy for apathy whether it arise from ignorance or prejudice. Most men of wealth are amenable to reason. Multitudes are benevolent. They are timid lest they

make mistakes in benefactions. They are waiting for light. The public mind is in darkness and confusion on the subject in hand, for the reason that every good case is more systematically presented to it, than that of the universities. Every other great movement has an organized mode of enlightening and enlisting the coöperation of the public. As the college gets along with as little money as possible, and when some specific necessity becomes intolerable, a desperate effort is made to supply it. But appeals for exigencies do not commend the work as a whole, nor widely, to men. Colleges should have, like other great organizations for public benefit, religious or philanthropic, a broad system of procedure, and a sustained effort to hold their work before the public, and to keep everybody informed of it.

Here we come upon a duty which the colleges owe to the public, but which is generally neglected, especially at the east, viz: that of the *public and aggressive advocacy* of higher education. Such education is accounted an individual matter. Those who come to college do so, because of some unusual home influence, or exceptional personal aspiration. There is lacking a sufficient awakening of the general public, to the necessity of more youth entering the higher educational life. In the West, this thing is better done. There, the need is more pressing, in the midst of the more materialistic and exciting enticements of business opportunities. The western college president stands everywhere for the supreme importance of higher education. He makes it his theme wherever he goes. He makes public addresses upon the subject. He persuades parents and children to engage in it. He seeks opportunities to present his case, not primarily for money for his own institution, but to raise up a just opinion, and to enlist the young in it. The necessity exists here as well as there, only it is less clearly felt. There are hundreds of families whose young people are asking what to do with themselves, to whom the opportunity for education would be a boon, if they could only be aroused to see it. The eastern college opens its doors, sends out to its own alumni and former patrons a suggestive catalogue, but makes no effort to show the public the wider need of higher education. As a result of this lack of

policy, there are men all over the land, some of them life-long residents of college towns, who complain that, while they might easily have gone through college, they did not do so, because no one suggested it as desirable. They simply took it for granted that such training was not for them. But the college work is a benevolent work, and must proceed like one. Youth not only need education, but to be persuaded to secure it. Education is like religion ; those who most need it, do not desire it. It is a benevolence to awaken in them a just conception of it. There are thousands of youth whom society needs to have educated, who will not be, because the value of education is never effectively presented to their consideration. As the colleges have taken up the work of higher education, it is upon them to prosecute it openly, broadly, and continually. Like the church they must *create a demand* for the blessings they offer. To-day, society has hardly a need more pressing, than that the inestimable importance of higher education be energetically set forth to people at large, reaching all communities and homes.

Another thing that needs to be presented is the attainability of such education. There are thousands of young men in this region of first-class institutions, who look upon education as eminently desirable, but as inaccessible to them. Their parents, with more or less of reluctance, accept the deprivation, because they know no better. Education, the young man sees, costs money ; one, two, or three thousand dollars ; he has not that amount, neither have his parents, and so he concludes that he is providentially excluded from the privilege. But so long as fully one-third of the youth in these institutions are dependent on their own efforts, poverty is evidently no barrier to the acquisition of the best education New England affords. An aspiring, energetic young man can find enough to do for himself, and will find a helping hand at every point. No one need despair of education for want of money. It is not money but effort that is needed. Many youths in the rural regions, that are obliged to go beyond their native hills for a living, and who, unqualified for life, hurry westward or to the city, would, if *they knew the facts*, find their way to the colleges.

Here now is a distinctive missionary work in behalf of

higher education to be done. If the representatives of institutions of learning will go before the public, in communities, in churches, in educational gatherings, in teachers' conventions, in schools and academies, if they will get among the common people, where the youth with easily kindled aspirations are in great multitudes, they will soon double the measure of their usefulness and significance. Such efforts will break down the barriers that naturally arise between institutions of quiet and seclusion, and the public. The feeling that the college is a kind of exclusive aristocracy will disappear. Let it be made clear that the college holds out a helping hand to every youth to carry him forward into life with a noble significance, let people generally see its relation to all the institutions of society, and men will be compelled to accord it, not merely distant respect, but hearty practical interest and coöperation. The question who shall publicly advocate higher education can easily be settled. It would be a great advantage if college presidents should make themselves felt in this matter. Here and there can be found some other college officer who can effectively do it, and can be spared for the purpose, but be that as it may, since the college sets itself to the benevolent work, the responsibility rests upon it for securing the largest results possible.

How effective such effort is, is best known to those, particularly in the west, who have engaged in it. A very large part of the constituency of western colleges is that raised up by active effort. A young man pursuing theological studies, a few years since, in connection with his preaching here and there, prepared a discourse on higher training, which he delivered Sunday evenings for three or four months, as occasion offered, and in the next opening of the college year, nineteen appeared at the doors of the college nearest to those communities, where the address had been given. The theme is a good one, and the people are easily, especially the young, interested in it.

To the readily suggested fear, that such a movement might lead to unseemly pulling and hauling between institutions for students, it must be said that this business is one, and not that of rival companies competing for patronage. The different missionary societies seldom fail to recognize that the success of

each is involved in the prosperity of all. The cause is too high to admit of its being handled by men without taste or self-restraint. Public opinion would compel it to be done with dignity.

This may seem to be, but it is not, a digression from the financial problem under consideration. The course here advocated would increase the patronage of the colleges, would bring in tuition and above all, would enlighten with the general public, men of wealth, and strongly prepossess them in favor of institutions of education. The opened and enlarged public relations of the colleges, would tend to bring to their support the men that are needed.

Specific financial effort, however, will still be necessary, and for this an organized department of finance, that is, an established, permanent arrangement for the gathering of funds. The raising of money needs to be recognized, and definitely and efficiently provided for in the organization of the college. The great bodies which, like the American Board, use money largely, have well-defined arrangements to get it. The appeal of the college must for the most part be personal and private, but, no less, somebody is needed to make it. This matter of detail, as to who is to undertake it, will settle itself according to the circumstances of each institution. Only it is not to be looked upon as unimportant and to be fitfully and occasionally done. A man, or men, must have it in charge who shall through a series of years become fitted to it, by experience, by widened acquaintance with men, with their ability and disposition, and other responsibilities. Such a man, whether associated with the faculty of instruction, or only with the treasury, makes a place for his college in many minds, that sooner or later will either by gift, or bequest, abundantly support it. He makes men see the stake they have in education. Through any considerable lapse of time, he forms many personal relationships between college and the business world, through which money will naturally flow. It is not easy to get men to give liberal sums to specific needs and on short notice. It is not difficult to form such relations with them, and to bring them to the general work of education, provided time is taken. And time can be taken only as the work is

largely provided for, and the college is relieved from the haphazard way of support thus far so prevalent. Incidentally, no man can do so much in this regard as the president, and in smaller institutions it devolves upon him; but in the larger, it is clearly impracticable for him, in connection with all his duties, to organize and carry on a sustained movement such as is here pleaded for. His active propagation of higher education would be his most effective financial influence.

The most important coöperation to be invoked in this kind of effort is in the alumni of our colleges. They are in the pulpits, at the head of the bar, they are on the bench and in all important stations in social and public life. They are in an important sense permanent members of the universities. As a rule they are heartily loyal to their alma mater. They should be made to feel that they are regarded by their own institutions as allies as well as sons—that they are expected everywhere to favor the interests of higher education. The public does expect this of them. Whoever asks for money for a college is met with the inquiry, "What are the *alumni* doing about it?" Their attitude of interest and self-denying helpfulness, or their indifference, are alike influential for good or evil. It is the first duty in getting money to induce the alumni to engage in the undertaking according to their ability. Not that they are as a class rich, but they have been in the best sense enriched by the colleges. They have received what money cannot buy. They have received large benefits, the cost of which, though they have paid their tuition bills, they have only in small part defrayed. The demand upon them, made by the public mind, rests in justice. Surely if in any direction they should be generous it is here. Their responsibility is like that of children to their parents.

This is written, neither to appeal to alumni, nor to find in their indifference any excuse for others who can help the universities, but to say that, notwithstanding the definiteness of this responsibility, and the reasonableness that educated men should see that responsibility, there rests the duty on *the college*, the duty, through some adequate arrangement, to reach the alumni and present to them open and easy ways, in which to do what they may. This field will yield fruit, *if worked*, and

not otherwise. Men generally, even if interested, will refrain from doing, because all that they can do will seem so small. Some years since, Yale undertook to raise five hundred thousand dollars, as the Woolsey Fund. The result was a little more than half of that sum, so that the effort is often accounted a failure. But considering the mode of procedure, the result was surprisingly large and much to the credit of the alumni. The eminent scholar and divine whose name it was sought to honor may have the satisfaction of knowing that what was done was a spontaneous offering of esteem and affection from a multitude of admiring pupils. For there was no effective system adopted to secure the money. Circulars were sent out by class secretaries. But a circular is an impotent thing. Suppose at a great meeting of the American Board a similar measure should be enthusiastically proposed, and then a circular issued? The board never does that thing. It excites an interest and follows up the matter on the field by personal efforts in its own way.

Imagine another mode of procedure. Let a man or men be set at work with the understanding that there is to be a *concerted* movement for five years to establish an Alumni Fund for the general purposes of the institution, in which all possible of the five thousand living graduates of Yale should participate. Let the alumni be visited in person and invited, upon a full statement of the case, and of others concerned in the effort, each to do what he can. The assurance that all are concerned in the undertaking will insure the importance of small sums, many of them making a splendid re-enforcement of the hands of the university. Let men classify themselves. How many could give twenty-five thousand dollars a year for five years? how many ten thousand? how many one thousand? how many five hundred? how many one hundred? how many fifty? how many five? how many one? Perhaps one thousand alumni could not or would not be reached, but it seems probable that the remaining four thousand, fully enlightened and sensible of a general rally, such as would insure a magnificent success, would cordially respond and do something worthy of their alma mater. If five hundred men would each give one hundred dollars annually for five years, they would roll up a

quarter of million of dollars for the treasury. And does anybody doubt that as many as five hundred could be persuaded to do so? Probably two hundred and fifty would give a thousand apiece, and there is another quarter of million of dollars. A considerable number would go a good way beyond that. It is not absurd to predict that if this movement were properly worked the Alumni Fund could be carried to one million of dollars in five years. That is only two hundred dollars in each alumnus—less than fifty dollars annually. Is it preposterous to imagine that for such a short period one hundred dollars each from the five thousand might be realized? That would result in \$2,500,000. But this can be done only by definite system and effort. *Somebody must work at it.*

But the money thus gained is not all. It is the conscious alliance of the alumni as a body. They would find themselves committed to their university in all places and at all times. They would more unitedly send their sons here. The fund so established would constitute a basis for further action. Bye and bye, when the younger alumni of to-day shall have come to years of influence and fortune, a similar thing might be attempted again and the same fund more than doubled. So it might grow from time to time. More than this, the alumni being enlisted, wealthy patrons, fathers of the younger men just out of college or still in it, might readily be engaged in an effort to meet present necessities, while the current of public feeling, so far as duty to other institutions would allow, would draw into the college treasury money from those who have no such personal interests as have the patrons. Thus the alumni become a powerful influence when consolidated by effort. Not only gifts are secured by such movements in which so large an element is concerned, but bequests from unexpected quarters.

Yale is thus spoken of because near at hand and having a large constituency, which it is impossible to believe, if properly appealed to, would allow the momentum of her career to be retarded for want of funds. Other institutions, larger or smaller, will find similar concentrated and sustained efforts correspondingly remunerative. The one thing to be emphasized, details aside, is the necessity of *organized and sustained effort* to obtain funds. It is not wise to mourn over the indifference

of rich men, if there is not efficiency to ask them for money, adequately and continually.

The sum of the case is that it is the duty of men of wealth to furnish funds for universities. It is also the duty of the colleges to make that duty very clear to them.

It is not easy to picture to ourselves the noble spectacle of wealth in hearty alliance with learning. Wealth would receive unprecedented exaltation among men. It would be lifted out of the mire of materialism; no longer the slave of mammon, but rid of its animalism; no longer the ally of iniquity but of righteousness, it would seem sanctified and transfigured. When men shall use wealth more largely for the benefit of their fellows, its acquisition will no longer be looked upon as sordid, but an exercise of noble self-sacrifice for high ends. It used to be said that a man could not die respectably in Boston without leaving a bequest to Harvard. Unfortunately there was a sneer in the remark, and more unfortunately it was not true. But the time will come, and apparently soon, when for a man to amass a fortune through the agencies of civilized society, and give no part of it for the public good, will be accounted disgraceful. Then doubtless more of Boston's wealth will flow towards Harvard, and her citizens will begin to pay in part for the benefits, for the distinction their city has attained throughout the nation, because of the proximity and cultured influence of the noble university, which was founded contemporaneously with the commonwealth.

The testimony of wealth liberally sacrificed to learning will impress the public with the supreme worth of education. The institutions will be thronged, as they are not yet. Every higher force in society will be invigorated. The boundaries of knowledge will be extended, and human life will move on in a purer and brighter atmosphere.

S. H. LEE.

ARTICLE II.—STRONG'S PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

Philosophy and Religion, a series of Addresses, Essays, and Sermons designed to set forth great truths in popular form. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., President and Professor of Biblical Theology in the Rochester Theological Seminary. A. C. Armstrong & Son, New York. pp. 632.

THIS book is designed to be a companion-volume to the author's Systematic Theology which appeared less than two years ago. It is in some sense the popular counterpart of the more technical and scientific "System." As the title imports the contents of this volume had been in the main presented as public addresses, either as sermons or as discourses or lectures for special occasions. The title "Philosophy and Religion" is used as a general caption which is large enough to embrace the varied contents. The author has gathered together from the Reviews and from his *repertoire* of sermons and addresses a mass of materials produced during the past twenty years. A larger part of the book is given to Religion than is accorded to Philosophy. The latter term would, however, embrace some of the most interesting and elaborate chapters, as, for example, those entitled: "Philosophy and Religion," "Science and Religion," "Modern Idealism," and "Scientific Theism."

The author announces in the preface that "the book is printed by way of testimony." He disclaims any "expectation that the book will be widely read," and adds that he is not "aware that any friends desire to read what he has written." "If any choose to read, well, etc. But if none choose to read, it is also well,—the author, at least, has delivered his soul." This might seem to some an ungracious introduction, suggesting the idea that the dominant motive of the book was rather the putting of the author on record than convincing and helping the reader. However this may be, the attentive and pre-

pared reader will find that the book will serve to put him into relation with a wide range of vigorous and helpful thought upon many of the most difficult problems and highest interests of life.

The book is so diversified in its contents that our brief notice must limit itself to a small part of the work. We select the sermon on the "Holiness of God" which well represents Dr. Strong's theological standpoint and mode of argument, as it is also representative in its bearings upon the relations of Philosophy and Religion.

The purpose of the sermon is to define the relation of holiness to the divine essence and to the other attributes of God. "The attributes are qualities without which God would not be God." Holiness is one of these attributes; love is another. The author then distinguishes between the active and the passive sides of the attributes, and states that "the consideration of the passive side must come first,—the thought of the attribute as *quality* must come before the thought of the attribute as *power*." Dr. Strong defines holiness as purity, not "passive purity," but "purity unsleeping—the most tremendous energy in the universe eternally and unchangeably exerting itself"—"purity in conscious and determined movement." Holiness is therefore "the self-preserved quality of God." "Holiness in God is purity willing, affirming, asserting, maintaining itself; it is the self-affirming purity of the divine nature."

The next inquiry is: What is the relation of holiness to the other attributes of God's being? Its relation to justice is first discussed. "Justice is simply transitive holiness, or holiness exercised toward creatures." In principle, therefore, holiness and justice are identical, the latter being a term for the holiness of God as exercised toward His creatures. Justice is "legislative" and "executive" holiness, and becomes "retributive" upon occasion of sin in the creature.

The next point is the relation of holiness to love. Dr. Strong uses the term love as synonymous with benevolence. Love is the self-communicating impulse which exists eternally in God. "From eternity God was love, because from eternity there was the communication of all his fulness to the Son." The relation of holiness to love is important, but very different

from the relation of holiness to justice. Holiness and justice are essentially one; not so holiness and love. "Love cannot be resolved into holiness." "Nor, on the other hand, can we resolve holiness into love. Holiness is the fundamental and determining attribute of God, and it must utter itself in self-preserving purity and in retribution against sin. Justice, therefore, must be exercised; benevolence or love—the self-imparting impulse of God—may be exercised or not." "Justice is something invariable; it comes equally to all, love varies with the sovereign pleasure of the bestower." "That which is highest in us is highest also in God. As we may be kind, but must be righteous, so God, in whose image we are made, may be merciful, but must be holy. Mercy is optional with him." "Love is an attribute which, like omnipotence, God may exercise or not exercise, as he will. But with holiness it is not so. Holiness must be exercised everywhere."

After the elaboration of this view of the relation of holiness to love, the problem naturally arises: Are not holiness and love in conflict? Is there not a duality of principles in the nature of God? "Ah! there would be," says the author, "but for one fact—the fact of the cross. The first and worst tendency of sin is its tendency to bring discord into the being of God, by setting holiness at war with love, and love at war with holiness. And since both these attributes are exercised toward sinners of the human race, the otherwise inevitable antagonism between them is removed only by the death of the God-man."

The author here explains that this conflict of opposing principles in God never actually takes place, because the atonement already exists in the counsels of God from eternity and thus God reconciles Himself to Himself and the "opposing claims" of these two fundamentally antagonistic principles are prevented from impairing the divine blessedness.

Having now denied the existence of any essential relation between holiness and love, and even made them inherently antagonistic principles which would have made "war" in the being of God but for the atonement, the author attempts to rescue love from its banishment to make it serve the purposes of his final appeal. "Let us not imagine," he says, "that love

fails to have proper recognition when we make holiness supreme. * * * When we think of what holiness is, it would indeed at first sight seem to exclude love. And yet, wonder of wonders—He loves the sinner and *cannot see him* perish. The *complex* nature of God is strangely capable at once of these two mighty emotions—hatred of the sin and love for the sinner; or to put it more accurately, love for the sinner, as he is a creature with infinite capacities of joy or sorrow, of purity or wickedness, but simultaneous hatred for that same sinner, as he is an enemy to holiness and to God."

We have given a fragmentary, but, we think, not an incorrect account of the course of argument presented in this sermon. When the author, in urging the importance of a right conception of the divine holiness, assures his hearers that "our conception of God must settle our eternal destiny," we hope he does not intend to pronounce an unfavorable settlement of that destiny for those who cannot accept his "conception of God," or his analysis of the divine attributes. There is certainly much with which most Christian thinkers will heartily agree. The description of the self-respecting and self-imparting impulses in God is among the statements which would win general consent. Concerning the *relations* of the attributes to the divine essence and to each other, there would be most difference of view. We present a few difficulties which, in our judgment, attend the view taken.

The attributes are "qualities without which God would not be God." Love is an attribute. Without love, therefore, God would not be God. Love is essential and constituent in his nature. So much Dr. Strong admits. Now, if God is love, must he not *act as love?* Can a quality or attribute, without which God would not be the perfect Being He is, remain perfectly passive and quiescent? As matter of fact, love has been eternally operative within the internal relations of the Deity. In these relations love is not only constituent but, it would seem, operative from a necessity springing from within the nature of God. Our next query is, whether God would be God if he did not love the created spirits that have never sinned. Upon Dr. Strong's own principles, it was his love that moved him to create them; it is his love that sustains them; we suppose that

our author would be constrained to admit that God must love them—it being understood that the “must” denotes a moral necessity springing from what God is. Up to this point, then, we have upon Dr. Strong’s own definitions a self-imparting impulse in God, without which He would not be God—eternally operative within the Godhead. The admission of the self-imparting principle as essential and as eternally operative in God, sweeps away the author’s argument that this principle may be merely potential, and that its exercise is dependent solely upon the divine will. Love cannot be (1) essential, constituent, and eternally operative in God, and (2) subordinate, passive, and optional in respect to its exercise. Love is either not what Dr. Strong *admits* it to be, or it is not what he *maintains* it to be. God must act as He is. How can a part of his essential, eternal nature remain in abeyance? We accept Dr. Strong’s admissions, and therefore reject his argument.

A comparison is made in the course of the discussion between love and omnipotence. It is said that as omnipotence may be inoperative, so love may be, at God’s option. The comparison is deceptive. Love is a distinctively moral concept and concerns personal relations. Power is a concept which belongs to the idea of will. It has its meaning in relation to the will alone. Power is simply the energizing of will. To say that God is at liberty to exercise his power or not, is only to say that it depends upon God’s will whether he will exert his will or not. The statement is a mere truism. But to say that love, benevolence, mercy, are dependent merely upon God’s will and thus to predicate an essentially ethical conception upon will, is a wholly different procedure. It is utterly fallacious to treat love and omnipotence in the same category in discussing their relations to the divine will. The fallacy is in assuming that love has the same relation to the will as the will’s own energizing has to it. The concept of love is fundamentally different from that of power, and has fundamentally different relations to the will.

This possible or supposable quiescent love of which Dr. Strong speaks is simply inconceivable, provided it be allowed that love is an essential moral attribute of God, an element in his moral perfection “without which he would not be God.”

We now reach the more difficult question as to the relation of God's love to sinners. It is certainly a fact that God *does love* sinners, and it is a reasonable supposition that what he does it is according to his nature to do. If now, as Dr. Strong maintains, God must be strictly just towards all, and justice is the fundamental and determining attribute which is "independent of love," and to which love is wholly subordinate, how is it that this weaker attribute has triumphed? According to Dr. Strong's argument there is every reason for justice taking its course universally with men. It is the fundamental attribute which God cannot abate. Love is merely optional. Why does not justice have its way? We know the answer which the theory gives: "It does have its way in the penal inflictions which were visited upon the God-man." But we ask: "Is not Christ God, and what led him to bear these penalties?" The only answer possible is: Love. Then love is really supreme and triumphant. God averts justice from sinful men only by means of his love for them which triumphs over justice, or at least prevails in the divine counsels respecting the treatment of sinful men. If it be said (and this is what the theory comes to) that God avenges Himself upon Himself in person of the eternal Son, it is still love for man which, supreme and eternal in the divine Being, devises and executes this plan of sovereign mercy.

According to our author's view, there arises, upon occasion of human sin, in the nature of God a conflict between justice which would destroy the sinner, and love which would pardon and save him. It is the tendency of sin to introduce discord into the divine Being. This discord would actually exist but for the plan of the atonement which meets the ends of justice and vindicates God's violated holiness. All this takes place in eternity. The relations involved are not, therefore, relations of temporal sequence, but of logical or metaphysical order. Now, we ask, how there can be any *discord* in the nature of God between justice and love when love is subordinate and optional. The author first puts love wholly beneath justice to show the supremacy of the latter and then, in view of the fact of redemption, elevates it again to such dignity and power that it is made to stand up and contend, and that successfully, with

justice, or to put the point in a different form: How on Dr. Strong's theory that there is "a principle (holiness) of God's nature, not only *independent of love*, but *superior to love*," can a plan of grace for sinners ever arise? Holiness is fundamental and determining and is "independent of love;" sin has (in the divine foresight) violated holiness and this attribute must exert itself in penalty. If it lies deeper than love in God and is independent of it, and has its infinite energy of wrath excited against sin, how is it logically conceivable that an inferior, optional, and (in its relation to holiness) independent and non-determining attribute (love) should succeed in checking this punitive energy? It is no answer, but an evasion to say that God punishes Himself, since he cannot spend his wrath upon Himself or upon His eternally holy Son. This would not only be inconsistent with the divine blessedness and self-contradictory, but would be contradictory of universal principles of justice which require that penalty for sin shall be visited upon those who commit it. If love is a subordinate attribute in God, we affirm that it is logically inconceivable that a plan of grace for sinners should ever arise. Dr. Strong does not show how it is possible or conceivable and on his principles he cannot. When he approaches the point he passes it over with an exclamation and an evasive allusion to the *strange* fact that notwithstanding the subordination of love, etc., God still contrives to love the sinner. "Wonder of wonders!" he says, "he loves the sinner and *cannot* see him perish. The *complex* nature of God is *strangely* capable of these two mighty emotions," etc. He may well say: "Wonder of wonders!" if his principles are correct. After having degraded love to an inferior position in the divine nature, declared its total subordination to inflexible justice, and made it, like omnipotence, dependent upon the supreme pleasure of the divine will, it is a "wonder of wonders" to make conceivable an eternal plan springing from the divine love by which the operation of mere naked justice against sinful men is averted and overtures of universal benevolence and grace made to them. The being of God is indeed *strangely complex* if that which is inferior and wholly dependent can conquer what is superior and independent and if God can pacify the hostile

forces within his own Being which have been set at variance by human sin, by punishing Himself.

If love is not, at least, coördinate with justice in the divine nature, no logical ground can be found in the divine Being for the work of redemption. We believe that the perfection and glory of the divine Being consist in the eternally perfect harmony in unity of all the qualities of His life. To us this stratification of attributes is unsatisfactory in itself and doubly so in the results to which it leads. But we are not here concerned with the advocacy of any opposing view. We regard it as fatal to Dr. Strong's analysis that it gives no logical ground in the being of God for the work of atoning love, imperils the divine essence in a war with itself, and gives no better reason why the feebler principle prevails over the stronger than that God within the realm of his own being expends his wrath upon Himself, a proceeding to which, if it were not inherently absurd, He could have been animated only by *love*.

Our author states that "as we *may* be kind, but *must* be righteous, so God *may* be merciful but *must* be holy." Does Dr. Strong mean to say that men are not under *moral obligation* to be kind or that the moral obligation to be righteous is higher or different from the obligation to be kind? Does he mean to say that God would be God, that He would be as excellent a Being as we know Him to be if He were not kind, or if He were non-kind or unkind? Is not kindness, mercy, grace a part of moral perfection and must not God be morally perfect? If God acted in mere naked justice would He be as excellent a Being as He is? If He would not, then it is an inherent and necessary part of His perfectness to be kind and merciful. If He would, then His love and grace are activities of mere caprice not required by His ethical nature and have no moral excellence. We believe that this proposition is exactly what Dr. Strong's argument leads to; that it lays no basis for love in the being of God and in trying to do so robs that love of all moral worth. The theory hinges love upon caprice and we reject it. The obligation on the part of God to be kind and merciful is precisely the same as the obligation to be just or holy. Both are ethical conceptions essentially

inhering in the idea of moral perfection. Whatever is the obligation of God to be the perfect Being, such is his obligation to be love and to act in the exercise of love, as truly as to be just and to act justly. To deny this is either to deny that love is a part of moral perfection or to deny that God is bound to be morally perfect. Dr. Strong charges pernicious consequences upon the view which blends holiness with love. We unhesitatingly charge upon his opinions tendencies ten-fold more pernicious, the tendency to found God's eternal love upon mere will or caprice and to mar the very conception of God's moral excellence.

The truth is that Dr. Strong has confounded two widely different conceptions: the conception of God's obligations *to sinners* as such, and the conception of His obligations to Himself as the perfect Being. It is true that there is nothing in the sinner, considered as such, which can make a claim upon God's mercy or form a basis of obligation, but there is an obligation grounded in the divine Being Himself as morally perfect, and as the one who unites in Himself all possible moral excellences. Dr. Strong has been so anxious to deny the former ground of obligation, that he has actually denied *any and all* obligation on the part of God to exercise an obvious moral attribute. This confusion is pervading in his whole discussion and throws his argument into the clearest contradiction with his own admissions in the early part of the sermon.

It is but necessary to take the proposition that "a man *may* be kind but *must* be righteous" into human relations to expose its speciousness. Suppose a man is not kind, is he the sort of a man he *ought* to be? Is he as excellent as he would be if he were kind? Certainly not, for kindness is a moral excellence of a high order. A man even is under *moral obligation* to be kind. So also is God whose obligation is synonymous with the demands of His eternally perfect ethical nature.

Another weakness of Dr. Strong's argument is, that he treats love as a mere *capacity* without content. This idea is involved in the notion that it might have been passive, quiescent, potential only. Not that this is the conception of love which is exclusively presented in the sermon. In many places it is spoken of in ways inconsistent with this idea, but this is the idea of it

which pervades the argument concerning its relation to holiness and justice. It is fundamentally erroneous. Love is, in its very nature, an active power, an energizing affection. It is the central activity of all moral perfection. To conceive of it as possibly quiescent in the perfect Being, is to misconceive its nature. Such a conception cannot be carried out in human relations, to say nothing of applying it to God. What would be said of a man who maintained that he was at liberty, at will, to love his fellowmen or not? The character of the *strictly* and *merely just* Shylock who felt that it was optional with him whether he should be kind or merciful, and who chose *not* to be so, has not been generally admired. It is amazing that a reverent mind could ever attribute such an attitude as even conceivable to the God of all grace.

The author says that we do not thank God for His justice for he *must be* just; but we thank Him for his love since that is optional. We answer that we do praise and adore Him for His justice as a part of His moral excellence, precisely as we praise and adore Him for His love. If we do not *thank* Him for His justice and *do thank* Him for His love, it is simply because love is the *giving* side of His being—that side of His nature which is related to us as blameworthy and undeserving and not because the one is necessary and the other optional. We thank God, of course, for what we do *not* deserve; we cannot thank Him for what we *do* deserve, but the difference is not grounded upon the necessary character of the latter and the optional character of the former, but upon the *relation* which we sustain to Him, in the one case as *undeserving* and in the other as *deserving*. When a person gives us a gift we naturally thank him for the gift and for the giving impulse and we do not thank him specifically for his honesty in business, because the former only is that side of his being which is related to us in the act of giving. Our adoration of God for His justice which accompanies our thanks for His grace, places the thought of the two in the same relations to His moral excellence and to His holy and perfect will.

We will add that on the scheme which this sermon seeks to carry out in making love subordinate to justice in the nature of God, no rational doctrine of substitution is possible. In

mere naked justice, wrath seeks out the guilty and can be satisfied with expending itself upon no other. Substitution is an ethical conception and can spring only from love. Mere justice cannot give rise to a substitution, nor can it be satisfied with one. It will "have its pound" and nothing else. At this point this theory of justice as related to love breaks down in its application to the atonement. Vicariousness is a quality of *love*, and love may accomplish a substitution which shall be in harmony with justice, but justice in itself considered "independent of love," not only can not do it, but can not even *permit* it.

We have followed Dr. Strong far enough. In the preface he expresses the prayerful desire that "his errors, if he has erred, may be uprooted and exposed." The writer of the foregoing comments would not, for a moment, suppose himself able to "uproot" errors so fundamental as he thinks he discovers in some of Dr. Strong's arguments, but contents himself with the hope that he may have contributed something in the way of "exposing" some of the difficulties which attend the author's opinions. These strictures, however, do not neutralize the commendation given to the volume as a whole. There are many chapters with which we could as cordially agree as we earnestly dissent from the one which we have reviewed. And, whether agreeing or differing, we accord to the volume a high character for vigorous and felicitous style, great industry, and varied and ample learning.

GEORGE B. STEVENS.

ARTICLE III.—PRACTICAL PESSIMISM.

PESSIMISM, which may fairly be called the science of despair, has of late come into prominent notice again through the fashionable utterances of Mr. Edgar Saltus, the author of the *Anatomy of Negation*, the *Philosophy of Disenchantment*, and a novel or two of doubtful tendency. It is no new thing of course. Solomon was touched with it. The flower of the best philosophic Roman thought evolved its last analysis, when suicide was recommended as the only escape from a world of evil. Mr. Saltus is a devout disciple—although he would probably wearily deny the adjective as involving too much exertion—of Schopenhauer and Hartmann who are the modern exponents of scientific pessimism, and his book, the *Philosophy of Disenchantment*, is a sort of digest of their respective philosophies—clarified of much of the original mystic verbiage, and strained into a moderate sized volume for the American market. Mr. Saltus has many readers. His theories have become a fashionable cult. At first sight one is tempted to not take him seriously. Pessimism seems too childish to discuss, a literary child which should be sent supperless to bed. But it *is* taken seriously by a great many, therefore it is worth examination. Fortunately for an intelligent discussion, Mr. Saltus has defined his science in unmistakable terms. We are not left to draw inferences, as to what he means by his hobby. He is bolder than his disciples, and braves discussion in this definition. “Broadly stated,” he says, “scientific pessimism in its most advanced form, rests on a denial that happiness in any form ever has been or ever will be obtained, either by the individual as a unit or by the world as a whole.” And this as the author goes on to state because life is not a ‘pleasant gift,’ but a “duty which must be performed by sheer force of labor.”

Such a broad statement involves its upholder in a web of inconsistencies of course. But these are gaily discounted by Mr. Saltus either by passing them over entirely, or by giving up the whole question in an admission which never for a mo-

ment shakes his belief or stays his dogmatic conclusions. The essential Atheism of the pessimistic philosophy is contained in these words, which, according to Mr. Saltus, is the ground work of Schopenhauer's argument. "The question as to what the world is has been considered, and the answer conveyed, that Will, the essence of all things, is a blind, unconscious, force, which after erupting in inorganic life, and passing therefrom through the vegetable and animal kingdoms, reaches its culmination in man, and that the only relief from its oppressive yoke, is found in art and in impersonal contemplation."

In view of this Mr. Saltus concludes—always as the channel of Schopenhauer's thought—that "The best use life can be put to is to pass it in a sort of dilettante quietism." He has the grace to make a sort of apology to the human race, that only a very few possess the "refinement of sense and burnish of intellect" necessary to this enviable state.

Happiness being denied, on the ground that it involves duty and labor, the pessimist finds himself in a difficulty as to how he is to endure this wretched planetary existence for any length of time. "Where, then, it may be asked," he continues, "for this malady of the refined, are the borderlands of happiness to be found? From the standpoint of this teacher (Schopenhauer) the answer is that they are discoverable simply and solely, in an unobtrusive culture of self; in a withdrawal from every aggressive influence and above all in a supreme indifference, which culpable though alluring, permits the neophyte to declaim with Bandelaire,

'Résigne-toi, mon cœur, dors ton sommeil de brute.'"

But at this brutal conclusion even Mr. Saltus pauses, and although not in the context hedges upon its spirit. "It may be remembered," says he of his Master, "that beyond the surface of things here examined, he pointed in another essay to the influence of morality on general happiness, and recommended the practice of charity, forbearance, and good will to all men, as one of the first conditions of mental content."

Here of course, visible to all eyes save those of a blind disciple, is a glaring and palpable contradiction of the substance of pessimistic teaching as quoted by Mr. Saltus himself. For

"the practice of charity, forbearance, and good will to all men," is not indulged in without effort, struggle, and sacrifice, which will keep even the burnished intellect of a scientific pessimist from the enjoyment of "dillettante quietism."

Before dealing with what seems to me to be the two or three fundamental fallacies of pessimism as a practical philosophy of life, it may not be out of place to note something of the every day life of these philosophers who are put forth as the teachers of humanity.

Mr. Saltus has been more than indiscreet in his biographical revelations. Possibly he believes that his gods are beyond criticism, but surely he should be careful how he photographs them in the act of smashing their own system to atoms.

For example, Schopenhauer is quoted as uttering this noble sounding remark, "It is for this reason that the approbation of one's contemporaries, however numerous their voices may be, has so slight a value for the thinker, for at best he can hearken to the voices of the few." And the pupil says loftily of his teacher, "To such a man as Schopenhauer—one who considered five-sixths of the population to be blockheads, and who had thought out a system for the remaining fraction—to such a man as he, the question of esteem or the lack thereof, was of small consequence."

These be lofty and swelling words applied to one who used such language of himself as this: "My extreme unction will be my baptism, my death a canonization," and of whom it is recorded by his worshiping biographer that he was constantly on pins and needles to know regularly how many copies of his works were sold. But this is not all. He accepted with the benign seriousness of self-acknowledged worth, the sonnets and flowers that where showered upon him on his birth days, and in his letters, alluded to the ascending glory of his fame with innocent and amusing satisfaction, being enchanted by the success of his philosophy of disenchantment. He records, with the presuming vanity of the most disgraceful optimism, that people come from far to look at him, that a stranger kisses him. Some one is to exalt his portrait in a little niche by itself, as worthy of reverence, and this prophet to whom five-sixths of the population are blockheads, cries out "that will be

the first chapel erected in my honor," and in awe struck egotism, "what *will* be said of me, I wonder, in the year 2100!" His pessimism might have received a deeper tinge indeed to know that two hundred years this side his own time limit, his friends can not find disciples enough to erect a monument in his honor. It is certain that his estimate of the blockheads in the population of his native land would have been considerably increased.

But again we turn to this man's real life, to whom in his system of philosophy, the esteem of others was as *nihil*. He notes that the women read him with passionate delight. In a letter he says, "My works are read with such admiration, that the members are crazy to get a picture of me, of any kind, nature, or description." Again he confides to a friend, "My fame is spreading like a conflagration, and not in arithmetical ratio either, but in geometric or even cubic." He refers to the fact that an admirer "sent his son and nephew here, only that these young people may in their old age be able to boast that they had seen and spoken to me."

All this is not the utterance of a pessimist with calm contempt for the opinions of the world, but of a very sanguine and worldly-minded man, whose breath was the applause of the world he professed to despise. One has a secret feeling that Mr. Saltus is laughing both at Schopenhauer and his readers when he presents such incidents from the letters and diary of a practical pessimist.

One final example of the practical hold his opinions and published beliefs had upon himself. "He was honesty itself," says Mr. Saltus, in childlike admiration of the great man, "and yet thought every one wished to cheat him. To mislead a possible thief, he labelled his valuables *arcana medica*, put his bank notes in dictionaries, and his gold pieces in ink bottles. He slept on the ground floor that he might escape easily in case of fire." Now this was commendable caution on the part of a miser who found happiness in earthly baubles, or of a miserable man to whom life was a desirable thing—but in deference to Mr. Saltus, I submit it was hardly a fitting or consistent mode of life for a profound philosopher whose solvent for the present was "dilettante quietism," and who was ever looking forward to the great quietus.

The pessimistic philosophy of Hartmann is, according to Mr. Saltus, a shade brighter than that of Schopenhauer, but based upon a denial of the possibility of happiness, eschewing duty, labor, and sacrifice, it dwindles to trivialities, which seem beneath the contempt of a healthy mind. Art and science offer the only real pleasures of life, although health is grudgingly admitted by Hartmann, as a factor—not, however, to temper the evil winds of existence to the shorn lambs of humanity, but because, by it, we are enabled to “exile ourselves from inconveniences which would otherwise disturb that zero of the sensibility which the pessimist holds to be the nearest approach to reality in happiness.”

But Hartmann looks askance even on sensuous pleasures. “In the case of the amateur,” says Mr. Saltus, “the pleasure of listening to good music, of seeing a fine actor, or of looking at works of art, is undoubtedly the one that causes the least amount of inconvenience, and yet Hartmann is not to be blamed for noting that even this pleasure is seldom unalloyed. In the first place there is the bother of going to the picture gallery; then there is the bad air and hubbub in the theater; after this comes the danger of catching cold, of being run into or annoyed in a dozen different ways, and especially the fatigue of watching and listening.” Is such pitiful and trivial reasoning philosophic discussion? It is rather the pining of a whining child. It gives us a warrant to claim that pessimism is self-deceived whether consciously or not. The basis of such practical pessimism as this is surely—not, that there is no happiness but that the pessimist resolves not to see happiness. Not that human happiness is an illusion, but that the pessimist has put out his own eyes.

So far I have endeavored to give some insight into the profession of scientific pessimism, being fortunate in so clear and frank an expounder as Mr. Saltus, and also to touch lightly upon the surface practice and precept of the two great philosophers whose name and works are the modern authority of the theory. I wish now to treat briefly of the fallacies that underlie the pessimistic philosophy, stated, or inferred in the definition given by Mr. Saltus, and further illustrated, I trust, by what I have already written.

I quote again the frank avowal of the American disciple, "Broadly stated, scientific pessimism in its most advanced form, rests on a denial that happiness in any form, ever has been or ever will be obtained, either by the individual as a unit, or by the world as a whole."

This conclusion is reached because life is not a "pleasant gift," but a "duty which must be performed by sheer force of labor."

It seems to me that the pessimist who despairs of happiness because life involves duty and labor has an utterly fallacious conception of happiness itself. He practically declares that the object of life is pleasure-getting for the senses, and that because pleasure is tempered by effort, therefore there can be no happiness. But healthy men and women take issue at once with such a theory of life. Duty and labor are not curses to human nature. Duty offers the noblest incentive to living. Labor affords the means by which life is tolerable. There are often disagreeable duties and ill-rewarded labor, but even ordinary men and women who are not philosophers, perceive that duty for duty's sake, and labor for labor's sake are a joy and happiness in themselves—are rewards in themselves, apart from any material result that may accrue from them. Is life a failure because it holds sorrow, ill health, poverty, misery, for some or all? Is life an evil thing because nothing worth while is gained in it save at the cost of effort or sacrifice? Leave out this "sheer force of labor" at which the pessimist complains so bitterly. Let it be possible for men to have just these necessities—even the pessimist would need them—food, clothing, and shelter, without labor. What would result? Civilization would die out. Its afterglow would illumine the world for long, but in the end barbarism. It may be a very humiliating fact for the culture of these days to face, but it is undeniably true, that the spur of modern civilization is primarily, the demand of the stomach to be filled, and the skin to be sheltered. Lay aside the necessity of toil, and we would shortly be in need of missionaries from Macaulay's New Zealander, who had stopped en route, perhaps, to make his prophetic sketch. Work, effort, struggle, material and mental, form the very cement of society.

The South Sea Islanders, in a state of nature, untouched by

the influences of missionary or trader, were exponents of this ideal civilization of pessimism, as *they* were not living lives of duty, performed by sheer force of labor. Would Mr. Saltus accept the South Sea Islander as a type of true happiness?

The pessimist makes thus a very serious mistake, from a material point of view, in putting out of court the present conditions of human life. But it goes without saying to the uninformed five-sixths of humanity, that he makes also a very grievous moral mistake. Granted that life is not a pleasant gift, but is a duty involving labor and sacrifice. Even from the lowest earthly point of view, is sense-pleasure the highest pinnacle of human effort? Does he the best for *himself* even—self being the pessimistic divinity—who grovels in the valley inhaling its miasmatic mist—or he who by sheer labor climbs the mountain side, and bathes in the sunlight and warmth. Granted that you and I may never be happy, as the pessimist counts happiness—happy in the pleasant gift of a life that has no badly ventilated theatres, and revelling in galleries of the old masters brought to our doors, without the bother of going forth to visit them. Is there not something better for the possessor of a moral nature, even on earth, and involving no future possibilities at all, than a life of titillating the senses? In other words, is not that life which is on a higher plane than can be measured by sensual pleasures, selfish gratification, or reduction to the zero of indifference, is not that the better choice of manhood or womanhood, not to use the adjective of Christian at all. Is life, which is merely a pleasant gift, worth living at all? Blot out the result of lives of duty and effort and sacrifice. Would even the pessimist find it a happy world? If we concede that the world was intended as a play house, that the human race was created to lead a butterfly existence—then it is the worst of all possible worlds—a failure, a mockery, and a sham. But if the world is a workshop, and men workers—if an infinite purpose is being accomplished through men and the world, by the Architect of both, then life is not only worth living indeed, but worth living *because* it is a duty performed by sheer force of labor.

So much for the pessimist's conception of life and happiness. The one is a mistake, and the other an illusion! He reaches

his sorrowful conclusion by following another *ignis fatuus*. When he condescends to deal with the facts of life about him, he does so not as a truth seeker, but as a fault finder. We saw a moment ago, in what pitiful twaddle he indulges concerning the minor annoyances of even material pleasure. It is not too much to say that the professional pessimist, in pursuit of his theory, uses a microscope for the blemishes of to-day, and a telescope for evils so far beyond a practical connection with this present life, that he is forced to summon artificial aid for their discovery. In violence of all philosophic calmness, and unprejudiced observations, the pessimist spends all his exertions upon the confessed evils of mankind, and blemishes of the world. Nobody disputes that both exist. No one claims perfection. Very high authority uttered the sentence, "in the world ye shall have tribulation." We grant it. But while admitting, we protest, not as a theory, but as an experience, that life is a good, virtue is a practice, happiness is a fact. But the scientific pessimist turns his eyes away from the light, and roams through the dark recesses. He uncovers the festering sores, and points out the diseased spots. He dwells upon dishonor and weakness, failure and falsehood. A beam of sunlight falling across his path is not a messenger of life, it is a thing in which he discoveres specks floating, and dust arising. And why? Not to alleviate misery, but to glory in it—to teach men to loath themselves and to despise their neighbors. To analyze horrors, to elevate the self-disgust of an hour, or a generation, into a science, and to prove that despair and hopelessness are the true solution of the problem of life. And this he persists in for some inscrutable reason, in spite of the protest of facts, which he will not consider. What he has written, he has written. In spite even of the intuition that he is building a house of cards, for as Mr. Saltus says, with sublime infallibility, "*in spite of vagaries* [an admission which seems to me significant of conscious defeat], pessimism as expounded by Schopenhauer and Hartmann possesses a real and enduring value, which is difficult to take away."

Surely, if Mr. Saltus is a true prophet, God the Father made a mistake in creating the world, God the Son failed in redeeming it, and God the Holy Ghost is a will-o'-the wisp, instead of

a spirit guiding into all truth. This is pessimism in its last analysis. Not a pretty sentiment for the pleasure of those who find joy in nursing a secret grief, but the negation of God, and a denial that this is God's world.

Pessimism is finally convicted, however, out of its own mouth, especially by the ingenuous articulations of Mr. Saltus. When it reaches by fallacious conceptions, and partisan pleading, the conclusion of the whole matter that happiness never was, is not now, and never will be reached—and presents that as the corner-stone of its scientific philosophy, it gives into man's hand a test to show forth its amazing falsity.

For men have been happy, are now happy, and arguing from experience, always will be happy. Not every man, every where, at all times,—but happiness has, does, and will exist. When confronted, however, by the amazed testimony of this generation for instance—the pessimist is by no means confused. He settles the matter *ex cathedra*, by declaring that our happiness is not real, that it is an illusion.

Very good, the pessimistic philosopher, distinctly disapproving of this world on general grounds, and all that is in it, save the one-sixth remnant, admits grudgingly that we may have the *semblance* of happiness, even in this miserable planet. I believe that when I am happy, I am really happy. I have all the symptoms and bear all the fruits. I am not, to my mind, the victim of an unphilosophic imagination, which ought to know better. But if the pessimist persists that it is only an illusion my answer is still a perfectly simple and fair one. An illusion or semblance that answers every purpose of the reality, is to me the same as the reality. If my daily food has all the qualities necessary to sustain and nourish life,—it is little to me what it may be called real, or illusory. It does the work of bread for me ; to me, therefore, it is bread. So with happiness, although the illustration is not, perhaps, a perfectly symmetrical one. Let the happiness we experience, and which we enjoy be called illusion if the pessimist will. It answers every purpose of that by which name we call it. It must be wiser to think we are happy, and to enjoy our illusion, to see some good in all the evil by which we are surrounded, than to search like a vulture for the carrion evil everywhere.

Merely as a philosophy of life—as a means of attaining the mental content which pessimism decides to be a good—the faith of a Christian man is infinitely more helpful than the wail of the pessimist. From the standpoint of the philosopher, who could say as Hartmann, that “the universe is nothing but will, rending itself in eternal self-partition and unending torment”—from such an atheistic and despairing point of view as that even, the belief or even hope that the finger of Omnipotence is on the pulse of the universe, regulating its fevered and eccentric throbs—that a Designer is weaving a pattern out of what seems an intricate and tangled snarl—this, as a practical, every-day philosophy to live by, is better than the hopeless outlook of self-partition and unending torment.

We can but admit, I say again, that there are evils in this life of ours. Schopenhauer and Hartmann are not original in dressing up that fact. We grant that there is cause for grave apprehension many times in the crises of individual, and national history. There is much of hollowness and pretense. Dead Sea fruit glitters and turns to ashes in our grasp. Not once in a lifetime, but many times we are face to face with intricate puzzles, and are ready to sink under wearisome burdens. If this were all there would be superficial facts enough for a gospel of despair. But it is not all, even in this life it is not all. The believer in God cannot be a pessimist. He believes that in spite of the imperfection grafted upon the original stock which was the image of God, yet as God looking once upon His handiwork in the morning of creation saw that it was good, so shall He pronounce again, when in the end the Son giveth all things up, His divine work of redemption completed, into the Father's hands—that God may be all in all. He believes that all things evil and false are in their very nature temporary; that the germ of possible good is implanted as firmly in men as the roots of the everlasting hills are embedded in the earth—nay, even more, for when these are rolled up as a scroll and melt with fervent heat, the life of good is nowhere hurt, but lives and will live forever. The fair Hope angel which sprang to full power and beauty from the opened sepulchre of the Risen Christ broods yet in fertile quiet over the hearts of those whose stay is made on Him. The prophet

of that Christ looks forward to that unrevealed yet pregnant future, with untroubled eyes, in the midst of trouble. Failure and defeat and sorrow—these have been and will be. In hardened blindness the gospel of despair exclaims—

The golden age was ended long ago,
The songs are sung and greatness is no more.
What themes are left to set our hearts aglow?
And make anew the fiery tongues of yore.
Far from its source the stream of life runs low,
In weedy shallows on a barren shore—

In a high and noble antiphon, the prophet of the Christ replies :

A broader world, a higher life we know,
Our great ideals higher yet arise
And over all our quickened fancies throw
A shining halo of transcendent dyes,
Old suns have set, another sunrise glows
In golden promise over clearer skies.

BEVERLEY E. WARNER.

UNIVERSITY TOPICS.

POLITICAL SCIENCE CLUB.

MAY 11th. A paper was read by Mr. A. F. Gates on "Manufactures in the U. S. in 1789." The material for an account of the condition of manufactures at that time is very meagre and is furnished mainly by the papers and magazines of that date.

During the Revolutionary war manufactures had been developed in certain lines of industry, and on the other hand many enterprises had been entirely ruined. Immediately after the war, what was termed at that time "the importation frenzy" set in. Foreign goods became the fashion in American markets. Our importations far exceeded our exports. The manufacturing industries of the United States for three or four years after the war were in a chaotic state.

The condition of our manufactures in 1789 presents a striking contrast to that of a few years before. In every direction the industry of the people had been stimulated towards manufactures. Societies had been formed in most of the States to organize capital to engage in manufactures, to collect and disseminate useful information in regard to them, and to confer premiums and offer bounties as encouragement to skilled labor. The rapid growth of manufacturing was the subject of remark and of surprise to all who traveled through the United States at this time. Skilled laborers, mechanics, and tradesmen were emigrating in large numbers to America and introducing the machinery then in use in the Old World. In many of the important industries like iron, glass, paper, boots and shoes, and many branches of the woolen and cotton manufactures we were competing successfully with England and the continent. Mill-privileges were being rapidly utilized and factories built. Pennsylvania and Massachusetts were the foremost manufacturing States. There was also a large and increasing amount of household manufacturing. This was not confined to New England but was extensively engaged in by rich and poor throughout the Union.

"THE FENCE."

The Corporation of Yale have decided that the new building for recitation rooms, which a generous friend of the University has authorized them to put up this summer, shall be located at the junction of College and Chapel Streets, so as to form the southeast corner of the quadrangle which is already so near completion. Highly gratifying as the announcement had been to all the friends of the University that this building, so much needed, was to be at once built, the fears of the students were awakened lest its erection might shut them out from the "fence" that for some years past has been their popular gathering place in the hours not devoted to study. Their alarm was shared by many of the younger graduates, whose memories of their college days were associated with life-long friendships formed there under the elms. The conflict which in consequence arose between "sentiment" and "business" is so happily explained by a writer in one of the New Haven daily papers—the *Morning News*—that we take the liberty of transferring the paragraph to these pages, that the alumni in their wide dispersion may have an opportunity of reading it. It needs scarcely be added that there can be no question that with the changes that have become necessary, some other gathering place will be speedily found which will serve all the social wants of the students even better than the old "fence."

"SENTIMENT vs. BUSINESS."

"The attachment which the Yale students feel for the old fence is a natural one. To the students as well as to the younger and even some of the older alumni, the fence does not mean simply a common-place barrier to separate the college grounds from the street. It is a kind of a club; it is a general meeting place where friendships are formed in college, and old associations renewed by the graduates who return to their class meetings. It is only natural, therefore, that the proposition to erect a building on the corner of Chapel and College Streets,—even though the building may be thirty feet from the sidewalk, and therefore not interfering with the fence proper in the least,—should arouse at once a feeling of regret on the part of the students.

"The question which the Corporation has to decide is, however, a business question and not a sentimental one. The plan of re-building the college in the shape of a quadrangle was conceived over twenty years ago, and the very site on which it is now pro-

posed to place the new building was at one time set apart for the use of the Peabody Museum. The objection of the students applies, of course, to any building erected upon that corner. To comply with their wishes, therefore, would involve a sudden change in a plan which has been consistently adhered to for more than twenty years, and would result in disfiguring the campus by rendering ragged and incomplete its most prominent corner. It may be that the original plan was badly conceived, but inasmuch as eight expensive buildings have already been put up in accordance with it, it is evident that the question is no longer an open one. The plan cannot be changed now. It must be either completed as originally intended or left incomplete.

"There is, however, another consideration which the Corporation cannot afford to disregard, and which is even more important. The space upon the campus is limited. The ground is valuable. To leave the corner free from encumbrance in accordance with the wishes expressed by the students and some of the alumni would involve sacrificing a frontage of at least 100 feet on Chapel Street and 200 feet on College Street. This plot of ground alone is probably worth from \$50,000 to \$75,000. The question that the Corporation therefore has to face is, can Yale College, in the present condition of its finances, afford to use a \$75,000 lot for a \$10 fence? Or, to put the matter in the most favorable light, can it afford to sacrifice such a lot for the benefit of whatever sentiment may attach to the fence? Some enthusiasts have proposed to raise \$125,000 in order, as it were, to buy off the generous donor, and to have the building erected on a different site. They do not seem to see that even were this as easily done as is assumed, \$125,000 would not be enough. They would be obliged to provide not only the building, but also the site; and in order to make it possible for the Corporation, without financial loss, to accept such a change, it would be necessary to raise at least \$200,000. Granting all that has been claimed in favor of the social advantages of the fence, the Corporation, who are in charge of the business interests of the college, are obliged to meet this question fairly and to ask themselves whether the college is rich enough to pay such a large sum for sentiment.

"The students and the alumni may therefore as well face the inevitable at once. The college grounds being limited and the university being committed to the quadrangle plan, the ultimate occupation of the Chapel Street corner is inevitable. The fence may not under these circumstances be as popular a rendezvous as

it has been hitherto, but that the "manly democracy" of Yale is dependent upon any such material support we do not for an instant believe. In fact, we venture to predict that, when the quadrangle is once completed, the old buildings in the center torn down, and their places occupied by a beautiful lawn and shady trees, the students of future generations who sit in that academic enclosure and sing their songs and smoke their cigars and form their friendships under the sweet influences of old Yale, will wonder that their predecessors of ten or twenty years back could ever have thought it such a privilege to sit on a dusty street, with horse cars passing every few minutes, and bootblacks and newsboys hovering about in search of business.

"The transition from one period to another is, of course, always hard. It would not be to the credit of Yale men if they accepted it without a thrill of regret. But the transition is sure to come, and it is the part of sensible men to accept the inevitable in a manly way, and to hasten rather than to retard the movement. The more quickly the change is effected, the shorter will be the pain of making the change."

"It is therefore the part of wisdom, to say nothing of gratitude, to offer every encouragement possible to benefactors who are as generous as the unknown donor of the new building, in order that the transition period may be made as short as possible, and that our regret at the loss of the fence may be speedily compensated by the beauties of the completed quadrangle."

The writer in the *Morning News* refers to the peculiar "sentiment" with which the "fence" is regarded by Yale students. Probably, in all colleges, there are numberless places and customs and things which are the object of a somewhat similar "sentiment." In the eyes of the undergraduates, and graduates also, these all have an importance that can hardly be understood by anyone who has not himself been one of their number. But there is a reason why this feeling at Yale is specially strong. The college community is unique. In other colleges, even in the oldest, the students to a large extent come from the immediate vicinity, so that the majority of them have their homes within a few miles of their college rooms. But it is very different at Yale. A large proportion even of the students who are put down on the University catalogue as having their homes in New Haven, have really come from other and often distant parts of the country. Their parents have come with them, and have made a home for them in

the town while they are pursuing their studies in the college. But whether these students are counted as from Connecticut or not is a small matter and makes no appreciable difference; for it has always been true that a very large majority of the whole body have come from outside of the limits of the State. To such an extent has Yale always drawn its students from all parts of the United States, that it has been known for a hundred years as more distinctively a national college than any other. There has been no time when any considerable section of the whole country has long been unrepresented on the college "Green." Even when the college was founded, nearly two hundred years ago, one of the special objects proposed was to furnish the higher education for the youth of the colonies to the west and south, that they might be "fitted for the State and the Church."

We refer to this fact with regard to the students at New Haven because it has been the cause of some marked and important peculiarities. The students not being able to go home every few weeks, and not expecting to go, have been compelled to depend upon themselves for society more completely than the students in any other college. This is the reason that the "fence" and other places of resort have been so highly valued. When the writer of these lines was in college, there were always students who never expected to go home during their whole academic course. A large number went home only two or three times. Classmates thus living together for years, with so few interruptions, and meeting in so many places of common resort, form friendships which give rise to an *esprit de corps* among the whole body of students which is probably not paralleled among so large a body of men outside of the army and navy. This is the explanation of what is so often said of Yale students, that they "always pull together."

Another result of the fact that the Yale students come from every part of the country, and are so intimately associated in college, has been that the spirit among them is thoroughly American and democratic. There is probably no one thing that Yale students are more proud of than the fact that on the college "Green" a student is estimated for what he is as a man. In the whole college community, manhood, ability, character, are considered as the great things. Mr. Henry Holt, in an Article in this Review for last March, speaking of the college, gives expression to what probably every Yale graduate will at once recognize as true. He says: "The traditions of the college are of respect for

learning, but they are of respect for manhood first." He adds, Yale is "the one place of all I ever knew where a man's accidents, however brilliant, are subordinated to his essentials, however sober—the one place where the democratic phrases of Burns and Jefferson are facts." The writer has been often told by rich students, and poor students too, that it is considered by all as the glory of Yale that a poor student has as good a chance of obtaining any and every honor within the gift of the student community as a rich one.

That Yale has a reputation for being thoroughly American and democratic in spirit was amusingly illustrated in the hearing of the writer within the present week. In a neighboring city, a student was heard depreciating Yale as a place where "any one can get on." When questioned as to his meaning, he said that "a student at Yale who has no money is just as much thought of as one who is rich." He added, the college that I belong to is "just like the world." "It is a world in itself, and a man to be anybody has got to be rich." The suggestion was timidly made that "character and ability ought to count as of some importance." The reply was : "That may be so at Yale—which is only a large boarding school, where men have to go to recitations and study like grinds—but in the world it is money that makes the man, and our college is just like the world." When asked what a "grind" was, the answer was "a 'grind' is a 'jay'"—with which lucid definition the conversation was closed.

It is indeed true that at Yale, students do have to study, and do have numberless daily duties to attend to, and at regularly recurring hours, as most other people have to do in the "world." According to the Yale theory, this is considered the best preparation for the "world." But as long as the students come in such numbers from north, east, south, and west—as long as the students of no one city or no one State predominate—as long as money makes no privileged class—as long as the "manly democracy" of Yale meet face to face in their numerous places of public resort, in which a man is considered to be "a man for all that,"—whatever deficiencies there may be among those who remain long enough "under the elms" to drink in the spirit of the place, it will certainly continue to be true that there is no provincialism and no snobbery. Yale will ever be thoroughly American and democratic.

The fence must go, but Yale students will have no difficulty in finding even a better place for all those social gatherings which, after all, play no unimportant part in the general make up of a man's education.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

EARLY LIFE OF SAMUEL ROGERS.* — The poet, whose early years are here described, is perhaps the most conspicuous example in modern times of what may be done in literature by one whose genius has never been stimulated by the need of providing for the necessities of life. At the age of thirty, his father died and left him an ample fortune. At forty, he established himself in a house in St. James's Place, London, which he enriched with the choicest treasures of art; and in which, for fifty years, he entertained his friends with princely hospitality. Rogers's "breakfasts" were famous among literary men the world over. This volume carries the life of the poet only to his removal in 1803 to his "new house" in St. James's Place. Another volume is to follow.

Samuel Rogers was of distinguished Puritan ancestry, and the reader is supplied with ample material for studying the kind of life which was common in England in the eighteenth century among the descendants of the men who were in sympathy with our New England ancestors before they left their native land in the seventeenth century. The English historian Green says, that "home, as we conceive it now, was the creation of the Puritan." In this book we have an illustration of what he means. As the progress of civilization is studied broadly, it is now seen that one result which followed the taking of the Bible as a daily rule of life by our Puritan ancestors was "to give a new tenderness and refinement to the common family affections." Green says that the result was that "a higher conception of duty colored men's daily actions." The Anglo-Saxon character, as seen in history for the centuries before, was a coarse one. It is so now. It is to the influence of the Bible that the superior "gentleness" of the American character to-day is to be ascribed, to which scores of English travelers have directed attention. A similar "gentleness" is to be found among the descendants of the Puritans who

* *The Early Life of Samuel Rogers.* By P. W. CLAYDEN. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 12mo, pp. 405.

remained in England. The charming letters of the mother of Rogers to his father, with their self-revelations of character, and their descriptions of family life, when Mr. Rogers was absent from home, are almost the duplicates of letters which were written in this country at the same period, and which are still preserved in so many families, giving glimpses of life in our American homes. Samuel Rogers says: "I was taught by my mother to be tenderly kind towards the meanest thing, and however people may laugh I sometimes very carefully put a stray wasp out of my window."

One of the noticeable chapters describes the celebrated Dr. Price, the clergyman whose church the family attended. This is the Dr. Price who became so famous in England for his defence of the American colonies on the breaking out of our Revolution. In a few months, nearly sixty thousand copies of his book were sold, and the Corporation of London presented him with the freedom of the city in a gold box in "testimony of their approbation of his principles, and of the high sense they entertained of his observations on the justice and policy of the war with America." Dr. Price was a great favorite of the children in the Rogers family. He played games with them. He delighted them with his telescope, his microscope, and his electrical machine. He often spent the evening in the family, and the children never forgot the impression his conversation made upon them. In after years, Rogers said, "He would talk and read the Bible to us, till he sent us to bed in a frame of mind as heavenly as his own." His conscientiousness and benevolence are exemplified by many anecdotes, one of which we will transfer to these pages. "In a field near his house, he once saw some larks struggling in the nets in which they had just been caught. He cut the net and set them free, but reflecting on the loss he had thereby caused to some unknown person, returned and deposited some money on the spot." On another occasion, as he was taking a walk, he "remembered that he had seen a beetle on its back, and he returned through several fields, found it, and set it on its legs." Dr. Price's generous defence of America occasioned him much annoyance and he received so many anonymous letters threatening his life that he felt obliged to give up his correspondence with Dr. Franklin, on the ground that "prudence required him to be extremely cautious."

It is interesting to find among the "early recollections" of

Samuel Rogers one relating to the first tidings of the outbreak of hostilities in our Revolution. The father, one evening, "after reading from the Bible at family prayers, explained to the children the cause of the rebellion in America, and told them that England was in the wrong, and it was not right to wish that the Americans should be conquered." When the news of the battle of Lexington reached England, his father put on mourning; on being asked if he had lost a friend he answered that he "had lost several friends—in New England." We are also informed that the Recorder of London put on mourning for the same event; and Granville Sharp gave up his place in the Ordinance office, because he did not think it right to ship stores and munitions of war which might be used to put down self-government in the American colonies.

Educated with such views Rogers naturally felt great sympathy for the French on the breaking out of the Revolution of 1789. The people of England rejoiced in the destruction of the Bastile almost as much as the people of France. It was regarded by English Liberals as the formal entry of France on the career of constitutional government; as the proclamation of a new era in which the old Whig toast of "Civil and religious liberty all the world over" should have its complete realization. Rogers went over to Paris himself to see the dawn of the new era, and his letters and journals which are given at length will always have a special value for the light they throw on this era of French history. He went over again in 1802, after the Peace of Amiens, and we have another series of letters from Paris of real historical value.

The volume contains also a large number of letters describing excursions that he made in distant parts of England, Scotland, and Wales. In 1789, he made an extensive tour of the "Lake Country," and ascended Skiddaw with the celebrated botanist, Dr. Coyte of Ipswich.

All who read this charming book will be eager for the appearance of the additional volume which is promised.

WILLIAM L. KINGSLEY.

SANFORD'S HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT.*—The people of each of the States of the Union owe it as a duty to the men who were its founders that the story of what they did should be taught to every child who grows up in the enjoyment of the privileges

* *A History of Connecticut.* By ELIAS B. SANFORD. 12mo, pp. 381. S. S. Scranton & Co., Hartford.

which were obtained by their self-sacrificing labors. Especially is this true in the case of all the older States, among which no one has a more honorable and more interesting history than Connecticut. This history has never been properly appreciated. The early settlers, as Professor Dexter has shown, made a point of avoiding notoriety and of saying as little as possible about the political privileges which they enjoyed. They carefully abstained from making statements as to the wealth, the prosperity, the resources, or even the number of the inhabitants of the colony. The policy which they steadily followed was to attract as little of the attention of the English government as possible.

Connecticut was really the birthplace of American democracy. Its constitution of 1688 was the first really democratic written constitution which went into operation on the continent. Under it a race of public men was bred up who thoroughly understood the working of constitutional government, and it is now generally conceded that under the lead of Johnson, Sherman, and Ellsworth, the constitution of the United States itself was "merely the grafting of the Connecticut system on the stock of the old Confederation." No one of the old colonies showed more public spirit. There is no one whose military record is more honorable. During the first century and a half, it may be said that its people were almost brought up on gunpowder, so constantly were Connecticut men out of the colony in actual service. No State has done more for education.

The book that Mr. Sanford has prepared for use in the public schools is admirably fitted to be a text-book. It is provided with a large number of illustrations, admirably selected. There is a good index. In fact, the book is so attractive that it is to be hoped it may find a place in every family in the State.

DR. SMITH'S DONELLAN LECTURES.*—This book comprises the Donellan Lectures by Dr. Smith, for 1884-5, at the Dublin University. The aim of the lecturer is to show the analogy that exists between our knowledge of man and our knowledge of God. We know God by the same processes of thought, as those by which we know ourselves. The argument is somewhat like that of Drummond in "Natural Law in the Spiritual World." He shows the force of the analogy between the principles which

* *Man's Knowledge of Man and of God.* By RICHARD TRAVERS SMITH, D.D. (MacMillan & Co. London and New York.)

control human nature, and those which we judge must exist in God, who made human nature what it is. When we assert our belief in the personality of man, we show ourselves capable of holding the idea of the personality of God, since there is a necessary analogy between the two ideas. There are no greater difficulties involved in the latter notion than in the former; indeed we cannot escape the perplexities into which the former drives us, unless we "follow that knowledge out into that divine sphere to which its analogies lead us."

Our idea of personality does not arise from a perception of man's physical organization, nor even from knowledge of his intelligence, but in our self-consciousness, which attribute we then ascribe to all other men. Self-knowledge includes the perception of ourselves as objectively filling a place in the world, having a history, and foreseeing a future, and also the consciousness of self-identity in the midst of all possible changes of environment. Dr. Smith maintains that self cannot be directly known as a subject, though our "Understanding is quite equal to seeing that the 'I' is something different from the act of thinking and that this appears from the very words, 'I think.'" In other words; we know that the subject exists. Another content of self-consciousness is the will; "the working power of the Self," and which like the Self transcends thought.

We cannot have a consciousness of the personality of other men. Our knowledge of their personality comes from other sources. It is the result of a mysterious instinct, a super-sensible element of which it can furnish no account to itself. The personality of man, is given to the mind as a datum which it must accept. Having premised thus as to man's personality, the latter half of the volume aims to show how we know God through self knowledge. The mystery of personal life points to further mystery. Belief in the supernatural is a necessity. According to Mr. Spencer, the worship of human spirits is the germ from which religion has developed; and this idea, Dr. Smith suggests, confirms his thought that we reach the notion of God through the idea of the personality of man. Our personality could not have originated in something Impersonal; consciousness is not the product of Unconsciousness. Conscience suggests responsibility, and implies a superior power behind it. "Our moral nature demands a moral God." The power of the human will to modify the operation of the laws of nature, intimates the ex-

istence of an Omnipotent Will, the Author of Nature. The longing after personal communion, not finding full satisfaction in anything human, leads to faith in a Personality who is Love. "The same want of the human soul which leads it through nature to man, leads it through man to God."

We cannot understand the mystery of the Divine Personality; we cannot understand the mystery even of human personality; nevertheless we may have communion with God as a person, and this is the essence of all religion. Human personality always implies the relations of father, brother, friend; and we are thereby compelled to think of the Divine Personality as manifest in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; a mystery indeed, but sufficiently known so that in communion with the Trinity every moral and spiritual need of the soul of man is fully satisfied.

These lectures of Dr. Smith have special merit, as a fresh, lucid, and popular presentation of this question which is undoubtedly of great importance in the study of philosophy and theology.

M. G. BULLOCK.

COME YE APART.*—This book is a calendar for devotional reading. At the top of each page is a verse of Scripture, and the texts chosen are made to cover the earthly life of our Lord. The readings which follow each text are intended to be neither exegetical nor expository, but practical and promotive of a devotional spirit. They are exceedingly full of suggestions to duty, and encouragements to a holy life. It is a good book to take into one's "inner chamber" as a help to devout meditation upon the words of our Saviour.

LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF HUMAN LIFE.†—This is also a book of devotion. Mr. Philip (who is a minister in the Free Church of Scotland) is known to readers of devotional works, as the author of "Earth's Care and Heaven's Cure," also "Earth's Work and Heaven's Rest." This new volume is his best. Its style is robust and manly, and at the same time spiritual and devout. Many of the sentences flash with the beauty of a crystal. It abounds with striking metaphors drawn from nature and art. An enumeration

* *Come Ye Apart. Daily Morning Readings in the Life of Christ.* By Rev. J. R. MILLER, D.D. (Robert Carter & Brothers.)

† *Lights and Shadows of Human Life.* By Rev. JOHN PHILIP, M.A. (Robert Carter & Brothers.)

of the topics embraced in the book will suggest how practically devout it is. There are chapters severally on the Source, the Sweetness, the Problems, the Burdens, the Compensations, the School, the Value, the End, the Sequel, and the Crown of Life. The author declares that his chief design has been to show what a magnificent gift life is, and to what noble account it may be turned. He has done his work well.

STEDMAN'S "VICTORIAN POETS" is so well and favorably known that any praise of it will be but repetition. With its companion volume, "Poets of America," it is an example of a very high, if not the highest kind of criticism. While giving the best studies of individuals and schools, it yet goes beyond the individual and school and treats the art of poetry in the most comprehensive way. It suggests to us that as modern historians have made a vast improvement in the writing of State history, in a somewhat similar way Mr. Stedman has improved on former methods of criticism. As luck will have it, thirteen years after its first appearance, it is the thirteenth edition which now in an enlarged form is brought out in Victoria's year of jubilee. It is an encouraging sign of the times when the reading public takes one edition each year of so noble a study of a subject so elevated. It plainly indicates what so many question, but what Mr. Stedman never questions, that good and true poetry is sure of appreciation always.

MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM: VARIANT EDITION.†—The reader at first may expect that this Variant Edition is similar to one of Mr. Furness's Variorum Editions, but the former contains but few notes of general criticism, to which about two-thirds of the Variorum Edition are devoted. The Variant aims only to give a "Facsimile reprint of the text of the first folio, 1623, with footnotes giving every variant in spelling and punctuation occurring in the two quartos of 1600, according to the perfect copies in the Barton Collection, Boston Public Library," and "every variation

* *Victorian Poets.* Revised and extended by a supplementary chapter, to the Fiftieth Year of the Period under Revision; by EDMUND CLARENCE STEDMAN. Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1888. Price \$2.25.

† *A Midsummer Night's Dream: Variant Edition;* with introduction and notes by HENRY JOHNSON. Boston and New York. Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Price \$1.00.

from the texts of Fisher, Roberts, and the Folio which the Cambridge, Globe, Clarendon Press, Delius, Rolfe, Hudson, and White editions agree in adopting." Of the work in the Variorum edition which may be compared with this Dr. Furness says: "It may well be conceived that no part of my labor is more onerous than this of collation; for which there is so little to show, and at which I do not suppose that one reader in a hundred, or in five hundred, ever even as much as glances. But the work has to be done." The Variorum is intended for the highest classes of Shaksperian students. The Variant, though it will be highly prized by advanced students, would be most useful for the very beginners in the serious study of Shakspere, in leading them to a critical discussion of what Shakspere really wrote. For such use it is perhaps as good as anything could well be, and its judicious freedom from notes which would partly defeat this purpose is a good feature.

THE UNITED STATES OF YESTERDAY AND OF To-MORROW.*— In this volume Dr. Barrows has collected fourteen essays of considerable interest. Several of them are very instructive studies in our geography, among which may be mentioned with particular commendation the one entitled "The Great American Desert." It traces the history of that mythical region from its original appearance in geographies, when its dimensions embraced a large part of the country between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, down to its almost complete disappearance from descriptions of the Western country. "Ancient Chicago" is an interesting picture of the early life of that great city. The essays on "Lynch Law," "The Railway System of the West," "Wild Life on the Border," give abundant testimony of Dr. Barrows' wide familiarity with the geography, history, and social life of the West. His introductory chapter on "How Large is the West," applies the arithmetical method made so familiar in "Our Country," by which one tells how big Texas is by showing how many times it will contain Portugal or Greece. The chief objection to this process is that most Americans have a much better idea of the true size of the Western States than of the size of those European countries which are compared with them. Hence the net result is to lead the reader not to estimate correctly the size of the American State

* *The United States of Yesterday and of To-morrow.* By WILLIAM BARROWS, D.D. Boston: Roberts Brothers. Price, \$1.25.

but to underestimate the size of the European country. The writer of this notice has proved this experimentally several times in the case of unusually intelligent men. Let the doubter try to pick out the American State nearest the size of Portugal or ask his friends to and see what the result is.

ENGLISH HISTORY FROM CONTEMPORARY WRITERS.*—The great activity of the scholars the present century in promoting the study of the original sources of national history has already resulted in a remarkable increase of facilities for such work. In Germany the most interesting works of the *Monumenta Germaniae* have been reprinted in a cheap form and also translated into German by specialists, while in France under the editorship of Messrs. Zeller, Darsy, and Luchaire, a series of little books made up of extracts from the best contemporary historical narratives and variously illustrated has put within reach of reading people matter hitherto accessible only to the rich or the learned. Prof. F. York Powell, of Christ Church, Oxford, encouraged by the success of the French series, has undertaken to edit a similar one in English. The publication of the *Rolls* series has made this attempt practicable and this enterprise in turn will do much toward spreading and popularizing the immense stores of knowledge edited and sifted in the *Rolls* series. These two early issues of Prof. Powell's series are to be highly commended. The first one deals with the Conquest of Ireland in the years 1166–1186, and the extracts are largely derived from *Giraldus Cambrensis*. Many other contemporary writers, however, are represented. Mr. Hutton's work continues his earlier volume on the “Misrule of Henry III.,” and Matthew Paris is the leading authority. The series is illustrated from antiques. It is to be hoped that it will meet with the success it deserves. We regret, however, that a series which is published in England at a shilling or one and three pence a volume, according to the binding, should be put on the market here at seventy-five cents. It is true that the American edition has a wider margin and more substantial binding, but to raise the price three-fold on a popular series that may contain fifty volumes is an unfortunate step. It practically puts the

* *English History from Contemporary Writers.* Strongbow's Conquest of Ireland. Edited by FRANCIS PIERREPONT BARNARD, M.A. Simon de Montfort and his Cause, 1251–66. Edited by Rev. W. H. HUTTON, M.A. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Price, 75 cents.

series out of the reach of a good many. Mr. Putnam has assured the public that international copyright would not raise the price of English books, excepting the novels. We believe that is true on the whole, but it is hardly the way to convince the public of it, to reprint cheap English books at nearly three times the original price.

WILLIAMS' "RATIONAL THEOLOGY"** is a volume of essays three of which are reprinted from this *Review*, upon some of the most important and difficult problems of Ethics and Theology such as "Divine Sovereignty," "The Atonement" and the Person of Christ. They are written from the standpoint of liberal, evangelical theology and handle their themes with clearness and vigor. In the Introduction the author maintains the fallacy and confusion of those who still seem determined to array Reason and Scripture against each other and insist that the one or the other must be chosen as the exclusive norm of theological thought. He says: "It will be asked: 'Do you put reason above the Bible?' This question indicates some confusion of thought,—at least, a definition of reason unlike the scientific, or, more probably no definition at all; otherwise, the question would not be possible." The author properly assumes that that which is truly rational cannot be arrayed against what is truly scriptural. The assumption of a contradiction between the two means, either the surrender of reason and consent to un-reason, or the admission that the Bible is unreasonable. "He who says he would accept the Bible as a revelation from God, whether reasonable or not, pays a very doubtful compliment to either the Bible or to himself." (pp. 6, 7.)

The essay upon Virtue lays chief stress upon the right choice of the will as the moral law's chief requirement; that upon Divine Sovereignty vehemently repudiates the Calvinism of Calvin; that upon Atonement favors the governmental theory and that upon Christ's person defends the Kenotic theory of His Incarnation.

* *Rational Theology: Ethical and Theological Essays*; by JOHN M. WILLIAMS, A.M. Chicago, Chas. H. Kerr & Co. 1888. pp. 310.



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
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